Author: Caracal

  • Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 with a brutality few could have foreseen, has, in a technical sense, reached its conclusion. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, worn down by years of conflict and international sanctions, now belongs to history. In its place, Damascus is now under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist faction left to govern a fractured nation, torn apart by sectarian divisions and shaped by decades of authoritarian rule.

    To much of the world, HTS remains an organization shrouded in infamy, its name still marked by the stigma of terrorism. Yet, in the alleys of the capital and the corridors of power, its leaders—chief among them Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—project an image of determined ambition. Their rhetoric emphasizes a break from the grim patterns of extremist rule, rejecting comparisons to the Taliban and pledging an approach guided by pragmatism and, perhaps, restraint. However, words, however carefully crafted to reassure a skeptical world, cannot erase the unease of minorities—Shia, Kurds, and countless others—whose fragile existence on the nation’s periphery remains haunted by the specter of displacement, discrimination, or worse.

    HTS’s tenure in Idlib, long a laboratory for its ambitions, hardly inspires confidence. Reports from the years of its administration there paint a picture of a governing apparatus that struggled to transcend its militant origins, marred by accusations of repression and ineptitude. Now, thrust into the complexities of running a modern state—an endeavor demanding more than rhetoric and religious zeal—the group must wrestle with a task that has humbled leaders far better prepared.

    The biggest challenge for Syria’s new administration is shedding the “Terrorist” label attached to its leadership—a designation that complicates its path to recognition, international aid, and the maneuvering room needed in Syria’s fragmented political landscape. For Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), securing legitimacy could unlock vital support from foreign powers, bolstering its position in a potential tug-of-war with rival factions and even a looming conflict with Kurdish forces.

    Diplomacy, often defined as the art of achieving the improbable, has become the tool of choice for Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Blacklisted as a terrorist by the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and United Nations, al-Sharaa has managed to carve out surprising diplomatic inroads. Shedding his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and the trappings of militant rebellion, he has recast himself as a statesman intent on steering Syria out of five decades of Assad rule. His overtures to Western officials have already borne fruit, with the United States recently lifting a $10 million bounty on his head following what he described as “Productive” talks.

    Winning Western support could prove transformative. Access to international aid would accelerate Syria’s reconstruction after more than a decade of ruinous war. Al-Sharaa’s government, if granted a modicum of trust by the West, could also leverage Sunni solidarity to attract funds from Gulf powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. An alignment with Sunni-majority nations might ease tensions with Israel, paving the way for regional stability—or at least détente.

    The Kurdish question, however, remains a stumbling block. Turkey, HTS’s largest benefactor, vehemently opposes Kurdish autonomy in Syria, while the United States may pressure Damascus to seek a fragile coexistence with Kurdish factions as part of any broader reconciliation. Al-Sharaa’s ability—or inability—to navigate this minefield could define his administration’s relationship with the West.

    Iran poses an equally complex challenge. Maintaining the fragile allegiance of Syria’s Shia minority will require delicate handling, particularly if Tehran views the new Sunni-led administration as a threat to its regional ambitions. Any missteps here risk turning Shia groups, with Iranian support, into a destabilizing force within Syria.

    Russia, meanwhile, cannot be ignored. Marginalized on the global stage but entrenched in Syria, Moscow remains a power broker capable of influencing Damascus’s fortunes. Al-Sharaa must walk a tightrope, balancing old alliances while pursuing new ones—a test of his diplomatic finesse as much as his political will.

    The harsh realities cannot be ignored: over 90 percent of Syrians live in poverty, more than six million have fled the country, and another seven million remain displaced within its borders. A decade of war has crippled the economy, leaving the nation in ruins. For HTS, the road ahead demands more than lofty promises—it requires pragmatic leadership and skilled diplomacy to secure the support essential for Syria’s reconstruction and renewal.

    A stable Syria offers more than just domestic benefits. Refugee returns could ease migration pressures on Turkey and Europe, but the UN has cautioned that hasty repatriation without international support risks reigniting the country’s deep-seated conflicts. Damascus must aim higher than mere stability; it must pursue sustainable peace within a unified state. That vision demands foreign powers, such as Israel, which continues to occupy Syrian territory illegally, step back to allow the country to heal.

    Sharaa’s calls for revisiting Syria’s political transition, particularly the relevance of the 2015 UN Security Council resolution that shaped it, carry merit. Yet his next steps will be decisive. If he insists on entrusting the drafting of a new constitution to a handpicked committee of loyalists, he risks repeating the mistakes of his predecessors. A meaningful constitution must emerge from an assembly elected by Syrians or representatives of the country’s vast diversity—not from a closed circle of ideological allies.

    Failure to adopt an inclusive approach could erode the legitimacy of a new charter, reducing it to a document as disregarded as the Assad regime’s defunct constitution. Sharaa’s rhetoric suggests he understands the stakes, but his actions will determine whether Syria’s long-awaited renewal can take hold—or whether its divisions will only deepen.

  • India’s Khalistan Paradox: Divisions That Endure

    India’s Khalistan Paradox: Divisions That Endure

    Sikhs, one of the many religious communities in India, have long pursued political ambitions and established their own territories in the northern part of the Indian subcontinent over the centuries. The religion, a blend of Hinduism and Islam, was once the state religion of the Khalsa Raj, which existed on the map from 1799 to 1849 and stretched over a large area during its period. Sikhs fought against the rulers of India, the Mughals and the British, but ultimately, their kingdom fell under British rule and became part of British India. After the British split the kingdom’s territory between India and Pakistan, Punjab, the heart of the Sikh kingdom, was divided into Western Punjab, which went to Pakistan, and Eastern Punjab, which remained part of India. While most of the Sikh population moved to Eastern Punjab after facing persecution from Islamist forces in Pakistan, India warmly welcomed them and appointed Sikhs to key positions in the government. The initial harmony between Sikhs and Hindus was strong, as Sikhs did not share the same rivalry with Hindus as they did with Muslims. However, the demand for an independent Sikh state, under the name of Khalistan, soon began to trouble the relationship.

    Besides India and Pakistan, a large Sikh diaspora existed in English-speaking countries due to prolonged British rule. As Sikhs gained wealth and influence, they amplified the demand for a separate state by carving it out of India. Khalistan, the proposed land for the Sikh state, was supported by overseas Sikhs and Western governments, who feared India’s growing alignment with the Soviet Union. The demand for Sikh statehood received heavy funding from the West and Pakistan, which, after losing East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) due to India’s intervention, saw this as an opportunity to support Sikh youth. This eventually led to the Sikh insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the region of Punjab experienced a wave of terrorist acts, prompting the Indian government to respond with a strong stance. This led to the assassination of India’s then-Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, by her Sikh bodyguards. The assassination caused widespread anger and riots against Sikhs, with propaganda spreading in India that equated Sikhs with Muslims—suggesting both prioritize religion over their motherland. Anti-Sikh campaigns were carried out across India. Once a beloved community, Sikhs became increasingly viewed with suspicion. Overseas Sikhs exploited these tensions to rally youth, recruit them, and spread their propaganda both abroad and in India. They used both peaceful and violent means to keep the issue alive among the Sikh diaspora and in India.

    As India’s domestic politics shifted toward Hindu nationalism, with the BJP holding a strong majority and Narendra Modi emerging as a powerful figure, overseas Sikhs feared that India would assimilate the Sikh population through nationalism. Sikh leaders, who are highly influential in Canadian politics, and community leaders in the UK, USA, and other countries, began attacking Modi and the BJP, pressuring their respective governments to take a tougher stance against him. In response, Modi targeted Khalistan supporters fiercely. The clashes became more frequent, and Sikhs supporting Khalistan attempted a coup under the guise of the farmers’ protests. As Modi tightened his grip on India, the Khalistan movement shifted its focus to foreign countries, particularly Canada, the USA, the UK, and Australia, where Khalistan supporting Sikhs launched large campaigns against India, attacking Hindus, delivering hate speeches, and desecrating the Indian flag.

    By the 2020s, Sikh leaders, long recognized for their provocative rhetoric against India and Hindus, began to face an alarming wave of anonymous attacks. On June 18, 2023, one of the most prominent voices in this movement, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, was fatally shot in the parking lot of a Sikh temple in Surrey, British Columbia This triggered a huge outcry in the Sikh diaspora against India, with some accusing Indian diplomats and the Indian spy agency RAW of orchestrating the attack. A few weeks later, Khalistani supporters set fire to the Indian consulate in San Francisco, and Indian diplomats were subsequently targeted by Khalistanis. Canada used this attack to criticize India. Justin Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister and a staunch supporter of Sikhs, directly entered the conflict, turning it into an India-Canada dispute. In 2023, the United States also came out against India by alleging a plot by the Indian government to assassinate New York–based Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a spokesperson for the pro-Khalistan group Sikhs for Justice, who openly threatened to bomb Indian planes, among other actions.

    India will not allow any further secession, as it now has a Hindu nationalist government working toward an Akhand Bharat, a union of all Indian subcontinent countries. However, Sikhs are receiving significant support from Canada, which has a large Sikh voter base and influential leaders like Jagmeet Singh. As a result, the demand for Khalistan will likely continue to grow. If India does not make serious efforts to improve the living conditions of Sikhs within the country, the diaspora can easily utilize them. Moreover, regardless of whether China is involved, the West does not want a superpower to emerge in Asia and may sponsor attempts at secessionism in India to destabilize it. As a result, Khalistan will likely receive continued support from the West. This will push India closer to Russia and China, creating turbulence in its relations with the West. Therefore, Khalistan will continue to act as a barrier between India and the West.

  • Does Israel Want To Expand?

    Does Israel Want To Expand?

    Israel is often seen as having no expansion plans beyond the territories of the former British Mandate. Its actions following the Six-Day War support this perception, as it briefly held Gaza and returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, both gained during the conflict. Similarly, Israel reclaimed areas under the British Mandate from Jordan, specifically the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which were previously under Jordanian control. After regaining these territories, Israel negotiated agreements with neighboring countries, promoting mutual respect for borders and significantly reducing regional tensions.

    The territories reclaimed from Egypt and Jordan are now recognized by international authorities as part of the Palestinian state. However, Israel expanded its Jewish population in these areas through planned settlement growth, transforming arid deserts into fertile land, and relocating more people to these regions. Numerous reports, even before the renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas on October 7, 2022, point to Israel’s de facto annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In contrast, Israel has made fewer efforts to establish settlements in Gaza, and the situation has largely remained stable since the withdrawal of settlements in 2005. However, following the October 7 attacks, it is now clear that Israel will likely follow the strategies it used in the West Bank, leading to further encroachment on what some view as the future state of an independent Palestine.

    Israel’s recent actions have raised further doubts, as its expansion plans now appear to extend beyond the former British Mandate. In addition to these territories, Israel continues to control the Golan Heights, which was not part of the British Mandate and which the international community still recognizes as part of Syria, and which it has not returned through peace negotiations. As Israel shifts its military operations toward its borders with Lebanon and Syria, and with Gaza no longer posing an immediate threat from the south, the country seems to be intensifying its focus on the Golan Heights. Israel is following the same strategies used in the West Bank. The Israeli government has approved a plan to invest over $11 million in the occupied Golan Heights, aiming to double the region’s population. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the initiative an important response to the evolving “New Front” with Syria, emphasizing that strengthening the Golan Heights is essential for strengthening Israel at this time. Netanyahu reiterated the government’s intent to retain the area, promote its development, and expand settlements there. 

    Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Israel established a buffer zone by stationing troops on the Syrian side of the border, arguing that previous ceasefire agreements had collapsed due to changes in Damascus. Reports suggest that Israeli troops have extended their presence beyond this buffer zone in several areas. The Golan Heights is home to over 50,000 people, including Jewish Israelis and members of the Druze and Alawite religious minorities. As the Jewish population grows and Syria maintains stable governance, the Muslim population may move towards Syria, which will likely lead to undisputed Israeli control of the Golan Heights. There are now more than 30 Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights, housing around 20,000 people. Netanyahu stated that Israel would continue to hold onto the territory, make it flourish, and expand settlements there. This announcement followed a day after Syria’s new de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, criticized Israel for its ongoing strikes on military targets in Syria, reportedly targeting military facilities.

    As Netanyahu maintains a cruise mode, he is likely to adopt a more aggressive approach. The Golan Heights, surrounding areas, Lebanon, and even Yemen hold historical significance for the Jewish people, with a once-thriving Jewish population that was displaced by Arabs. Given this, Netanyahu may plan to re-establish settlements in these regions to serve Jewish interests. It may seem like an exaggeration, but by observing these trends, it is clear that Israel seeks expansion, citing security as the justification. This pattern is evident in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, Lebanon, and potentially Aden. The Jewish people have a deep connection to their history.

  • Will Singapore Ever Recognize Palestine?

    Will Singapore Ever Recognize Palestine?

    As the Israel-Hamas conflict slipped into yet another charged chapter, Singapore retained its measured commitment to a two-state solution, its calls for Palestinian sovereignty growing steadily louder. Yet, despite these increasingly public declarations of support, the city-state continues to withhold formal recognition of Palestine. By contrast, its Muslim-majority neighbors have embraced a more unequivocal stance, championing Palestinian statehood while categorically refusing to recognize Israel. Their position is tethered to the broader contours of the “From the River to the Sea” ideology, a vision that entertains the erasure of the Jewish state altogether.

    If not to dismantle Israel, the question might reasonably arise: why not recognize both? Intriguingly, Singapore sets itself apart not just from its regional peers but also from nations that recognize both Israel and Palestine. Instead, it aligns with countries like Japan and South Korea, which extend official recognition solely to Israel. But unlike these countries, who remain muted on the question of Palestine, Singapore strikes a markedly different tone. Through consistent, though noncommittal, expressions of support, it fosters a posture that is at once active and ambiguous—a calculated ambiguity that renders its stance an exercise in balancing rhetoric and restraint.

    There were fleeting moments when Singapore seemed poised to join the growing list of nations recognizing Palestine, as Spain and Armenia had done in recent years, spurred by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Each time, however, Singapore stepped back. In May, a proposed resolution to recognize Palestine sparked cautious optimism across the Islamic world, which saw the potential shift as a significant gesture from a prominent Asian nation. The optimism, though, proved premature. By July, in a parliamentary address, Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan announced that Singapore would recognize Palestine—only for the resolution to be quietly shelved.

    Come September, Singapore once again appeared to take a bold step, supporting a United Nations General Assembly resolution demanding that Israel end its unlawful presence in the occupied Palestinian territories within a year. Whispers swirled of Singapore leaning favorably toward Palestine, yet the momentum faltered once more.

    Singapore’s delicate balancing act took center stage in a recent podcast episode featuring Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. Reflecting on the Gaza war and its global repercussions, Wong affirmed Singapore’s commitment to collaborating with international partners to help secure a homeland for the Palestinian people while aiding their preparation for eventual statehood. He stressed the necessity of a deliberate and nuanced approach, positioning Singapore as neither beholden to the views of its neighbors nor inclined to alienate the United States. Technical assistance, Wong argued, represents a meaningful and uniquely Singaporean contribution to global affairs—a strategy deeply rooted in the city-state’s diplomatic ethos. Drawing comparisons to Singapore’s well-established support initiatives across Southeast Asia, he suggested that similar efforts could play a critical role in equipping Palestine for the responsibilities of statehood. Over the course of the 46-minute podcast, Wong’s remarks revealed a careful and calibrated strategy—one that seeks to balance principle with pragmatism, charting a course that maintains Singapore’s reputation as a constructive, if cautious, participant in the global dialogue on Palestine.

    In the interview organized by Plan B, Prime Minister Wong reiterated Singapore’s steadfast support for a two-state solution, while emphasizing the nation’s recent initiatives to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Since the war erupted in October 2023, Singapore has dispatched five consignments of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Both government-led and citizen-driven contributions have amassed over US$13 million in donations to support relief efforts. Earlier this month, Dr. Maliki Osman, Singapore’s Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, met with Dr. Mohammad Mustafa, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Palestine, during a conference in Cairo. There, Dr. Maliki reaffirmed Singapore’s commitment to assisting Palestine in its capacity-building endeavors. Moreover, Singapore has expanded the number of scholarships offered under its Enhanced Technical Assistance Package for Palestinians, increasing the annual intake from three to ten. 

    While Singapore’s public stance appears to align with Gaza, its domestic policies exhibit a more restrictive approach, particularly when it comes to managing any form of public protest that could tarnish its image. In October of the previous year, authorities prohibited public events tied to the Gaza conflict, even in the country’s sole designated free speech zone, citing concerns about public safety and security. They also issued a warning against displaying symbols associated with the war. Three women were charged for attempting to organize a group of 70 individuals to deliver pro-Palestinian letters to the president’s office and official residence without a permit. Despite such efforts being stifled, there has been ongoing pressure from Palestinian supporters in the city-state for Singapore to sever its defense ties with Israel and officially recognize Palestinian statehood. This has been accompanied by a surge in public mobilization. A petition demanding the government recognize Palestine as a state has collected over 10,000 signatures since its launch in October.

    The Singaporean government’s sympathy for Palestine is evident, yet its actions reveal the deep constraints of what it is willing—or able—to offer. While there is a notable push for practical support, the more contentious issue of formal recognition remains elusive. This tension speaks to the complex diplomatic landscape that Singapore must traverse. The city-state, often characterized as conservative in practice but progressive in appearance, exemplifies this paradox. On closer inspection, it is apparent in nearly every facet of its policies.

    With 15 percent of its population Muslim and deep business ties to neighboring Muslim-majority countries, Singapore can no longer ignore the Palestinian cause. However, any move to formally recognize Palestine seems untenable without risking its strategic relationships elsewhere. Chief among these is its long-standing military alliance with Israel, which dates back to Singapore’s split from Malaysia in 1965. At that time, Israel played a key role in helping build Singapore’s military—an offer other regional powers, like India, had refused. Caught in this diplomatic web, the city-state finds itself in a precarious position, unable to fully align with either side without facing significant consequences. Though Singapore will likely delay its recognition of Palestine “Until the Right Time.”

  • How the BJP’s ‘One Nation, One Election’ Is Redefining Indian Democracy

    How the BJP’s ‘One Nation, One Election’ Is Redefining Indian Democracy

    From the United States to Japan, democracies everywhere contend with a common predicament: the staggering financial burden of elections. Governments allocate vast budgets to organize them, while political parties and candidates pour in even greater sums to secure victory. This flood of money—both aboveboard and concealed—not only fuels corruption but often forges troubling alliances between business tycoons and politicians, bound by the relentless demand for funds. Fair elections remain the cornerstone of democracy, but their escalating costs can feel like a silent affliction, gradually undermining the very principles they are designed to protect.

    In India, the world’s largest democracy, elections scale up into grand spectacles of participation and spending. With over a billion people involved, the process transcends politics, transforming into a sprawling festival of flags, rallies, sweets, and freebies. Spanning months, election seasons unfold in staggered phases, covering parliamentary, state, and local polls across 28 states and multiple union territories. The financial strain on the nation is immense, fueled not only by government and political party expenditures but also by the pervasive corruption and money laundering that frequently accompany the process.

    The relentless cycle of political campaigns, rife with financial and ethical challenges, undeniably hampers India’s economic momentum. Yet democracy, by its very nature, cannot exist without elections. To address this dilemma, the Indian government has put forth the contentious “One Nation, One Election” proposal—a bold attempt to streamline the electoral process and curb costs and corruption. But the question persists: will this sweeping reform resolve India’s electoral quandary, or will it usher in a host of new complications?

    An India Today report predicts that the cost of the 2024 elections could soar to a staggering 1.35 trillion rupees. While official figures remain unverified, experts believe the final cost will likely surpass this estimate. The Centre for Media Studies, a Delhi-based non-profit, revealed that India spent over 600 billion rupees on the 2019 general elections, making it the world’s most expensive at the time. Added to this are the billions spent on various state elections. Confronted with these enormous costs, the government has proposed a solution aimed at reducing financial strain: the merger of national and state elections, to be held once every five years. This forms the backbone of the “One Nation, One Election” initiative. The Indian government is considering the synchronization of all elections, whether within a single month or a set time frame, to ease the financial burden of repeated electoral cycles.

    Beyond financial savings, the government argues that the proposal would bring other benefits: by avoiding the disruptions caused by ongoing election seasons, governance could become more efficient, and politicians could focus on national issues rather than just campaigning. Additionally, the government believes it would also boost voter participation and encourage greater political engagement.

    For years, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been a staunch advocate for the concept of “One Nation, One Election.” The party has long supported a vision of a strong central government over a decentralized federal system. But this idea has sparked fierce opposition, particularly from India’s regional parties and the Congress Party, the country’s historic political powerhouse.

    The Congress Party now opposes the “One Nation, One Election” proposal, despite having conducted unified elections from 1951 to 1967. In stark contrast to Modi’s vision of a centralized system, Congress seems fragmented and hesitant to endorse the initiative. Party leaders fear the proposal could bolster Modi’s position, using his national popularity to secure synchronized state and parliamentary elections, potentially weakening Congress’s foothold in state politics. Many regional parties share this concern, believing the plan would further undermine India’s federal structure. They worry that national issues would dominate in a unified election cycle, sidelining state-specific concerns and diminishing the influence of regional governments in the national conversation.

    With a five-year parliamentary term and the possibility of no elections in between, critics argue that such a system would free the ruling party from the democratic “Test” of frequent elections. This, they warn, could empower the government to push through unpopular policies—like fuel price hikes—without fear of electoral consequence.

    Though the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) still enjoys a commanding position, even with a two-thirds majority necessary to amend the constitution, its path to implementing “One Nation, One Election” faces obstacles. On Tuesday, India’s law minister, Arjun Ram Meghwal, introduced a bill in Parliament to establish the system, only for it to fail in a vote. In a notable twist, even BJP members—including a prominent union minister—abstained from voting. However, the government remains undeterred, planning to move the issue to a parliamentary committee for further deliberation. The committee will review a report from former President Ram Nath Kovind, who chaired a nine-member panel recommending simultaneous elections. Kovind described the proposal as a “Game Changer,” citing economists who believe the change could bolster India’s GDP by up to 1.5%.

    India, the world’s largest democracy, is perpetually in election season. With 28 states, eight union territories, and nearly a billion eligible voters, elections are an ever-present feature of the nation’s political landscape. Unifying all elections into one season may reduce the spectacle and vibrancy of the process, but it could ultimately strengthen India’s democracy by streamlining elections and curbing excessive spending. However, this shift risks eroding the federal nature of India’s constitution, potentially creating tension at the local level. The impact of the “One Nation, One Election” proposal could fundamentally alter Indian democracy, diminishing the role of federalism and state-level politics, leaving national parties and their agendas with dominant influence.

  • As Sanctions Suffocate Russia, Kazakhstan Struggles to Breathe

    As Sanctions Suffocate Russia, Kazakhstan Struggles to Breathe

    Landlocked and deeply intertwined with Russian politics and economics, Kazakhstan has long felt the gravitational pull of its northern neighbor. For decades, the nation has relied on Russia as its gateway to the globe. But as Russia faces its toughest period in recent years and endures a deluge of sanctions over its war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s dependence has become costly.

    When the war began and Western sanctions were imposed on Russia, many speculated that Kazakhstan might benefit from Russia’s economic isolation, with businesses redirecting trade through its borders. However, the reality has been far harsher. Kazakhstan now finds itself burdened by unavoidable sanctions. The surging U.S. dollar, a weakening ruble, and a flood of Russian migrants, goods, and businesses have further strained the country’s economy. This mounting pressure has battered the tenge, stretched public finances, and made daily life increasingly difficult for its citizens.

    Over the past two weeks, the Kazakh tenge has steadily weakened, unsettling citizens just ahead of the holiday season. On December 4, the currency dropped to 522 against the U.S. dollar. Although it briefly regained ground, it slid again, trading at 521 by December 11. This sharp decline—nearly 10 percent in just ten days—has ignited a firestorm on social media across Kazakhstan. The tenge’s rapid depreciation is fueling inflation, especially for food and consumer goods, much of which is imported from Russia. In Almaty and other cities, prices continue to rise, compounding the stress on an already uneasy population.

    Kazakhstan’s National Bank, in a statement on November 28, attributed the tenge’s sharp decline to a number of external fundamental factors. The bank identified Russia’s faltering economy, grappling with a steep ruble devaluation, as a key driver of the currency’s struggles. The tenge’s drop closely followed reports of the ruble hitting its lowest level in over two years after the announcement of a fresh round of U.S. sanctions.

    The National Bank highlighted the strengthening U.S. dollar as a significant factor driving the tenge’s decline, noting that a strong dollar is traditionally a negative factor for raw materials. It also cited the worsening geopolitics and energy market price volatility as additional pressures on foreign exchange markets.

    Kazakhstan’s reliance on raw materials like oil and gas as its primary exports has heightened speculative pressure, increasing the likelihood of further currency volatility.  Energy companies, a major source of government revenue in Kazakhstan, pay their taxes in dollars. As a result, the tenge’s recent decline is not expected to significantly impact the state budget in the short term. Despite this, economic analysts remain concerned about the near future.

    In late November, the National Bank sold more than $1 billion in assets from the National Fund, the country’s strategic reserves, and plans to allocate another $900 million in December to stabilize the tenge. To curb inflation, the bank also increased the base rate by one percentage point, raising it to 15.25 percent.

    Analysts worry that Kazakhstan’s heavy dependence on the National Fund to prop up the tenge may undermine the country’s economic resilience in the medium term. In October, the International Monetary Fund called on Astana to establish clearer fiscal policy guidelines to safeguard the National Fund’s ability to finance social and economic infrastructure projects and shield the economy from future shocks.

    By the end of November, the National Bank revised its inflation forecast for 2025, raising the projected range to 6.5-8.5 percent from the earlier estimate of 5.5-7.5 percent. However, actual price increases significantly outpace the official inflation figures, as highlighted by price comparisons in stores and markets frequently shared by bloggers.

    Many investors have started to withdraw their money from the country. Despite higher interest rates and rising credit costs, people continue to take out loans, which inevitably pushes prices higher and places additional pressure on the tenge. The weakening ruble against both the U.S. dollar and the tenge could also lead to an influx of Russian food and goods into the Kazakh market. This influx, experts warn, could erode the competitiveness of local producers and further destabilize Kazakhstan’s economy. Tough times lie ahead for the country. Although the government and National Bank claim they are addressing the issue and try to spread optimism, the public remains unconvinced.

    In reality, Kazakhstan has little control over the situation, as it remains deeply tied to Russia, an influence it cannot escape. While China recently surpassed Russia as Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner in overall turnover, Russia still held the top spot as Kazakhstan’s primary source of imports during the first eight months of 2024, accounting for nearly 30 percent of the total, according to official government statistics. 

    Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia is largely a result of the country’s corrupt political elites. For over 30 years, these leaders have prioritized political maneuvering, self-promotion, and resource distribution, rather than working to strengthen the nation’s statehood. They have neglected vital areas such as economic development, infrastructure diversification (including alternative oil export routes), the creation of a secure information environment, improving public welfare, and fostering a stable middle class. By mirroring Russia’s political system, they constructed a false democracy that silences opposition and preserves their own grip on power. Closing the door to the West, they guaranteed continued alignment with Russia. As long as the current administration remains in power, Kazakhstan’s ties to Russia will endure, despite Western attempts to intervene. Meanwhile, the burden of this relationship continues to fall on the people.

  • The Impeachment That Saved South Korea from Shame

    The Impeachment That Saved South Korea from Shame

    For decades, South Korea has held itself up as a beacon of democracy, emerging from the shadows of authoritarianism to embody the principles of freedom and justice on a divided peninsula. But under President Yoon Suk Yeol, that proud narrative began to unravel. By declaring martial law, dissolving parliament, and clinging to power with an iron-fisted resolve, Yoon thrust the nation into a crisis that sent shockwaves through both allies and adversaries alike.

    The backlash was swift and relentless, sweeping through the streets and digital platforms. Protesters took to the streets, while online voices drew troubling comparisons between Yoon’s South Korea and its northern neighbor, eroding the country’s hard-won status as a democratic model. What had taken years to build was on the verge of collapse.

    As public outrage grew, a fractured parliament made its first attempt at impeachment. Yoon stood firm, refusing to resign. Only after a second, decisive vote did his impeachment succeed. In that moment, South Korea glimpsed hope at the end of a prolonged political crisis and further humiliation. 

    On Saturday, South Korea’s National Assembly made the historic move, passing an impeachment motion against President Yoon Suk Yeol just days after his controversial declaration of martial law—an act overturned within hours. Yet, Yoon’s fate now lies not in the hands of legislators, but with the Constitutional Court, which must determine whether the impeachment is valid. The stakes are high: the court has up to 180 days to deliberate, and its decision could reinstate Yoon, cement his removal, or leave the nation in further uncertainty.

    Precedents loom large in the minds of the South Korean public. In 2004, the court rejected the impeachment of Roh Moo-hyun, allowing him to resume his presidency. Conversely, in 2017, it upheld the impeachment of Park Geun-hye, permanently removing her from office in a landmark ruling. 

    If the impeachment is upheld, a general election must follow within two months, setting the stage for further drama. While the case against Yoon appears compelling, the outcome is far from assured. The Constitutional Court holds the authority to decide Yoon’s fate, but even a single dissenting vote among the judges could nullify the motion. With Yoon having appointed three of the court’s members, the possibility of a reversal looms over the process, casting doubt on its impartiality.

    In the aftermath of Yoon’s suspension, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo has assumed the role of acting president, steering a government mired in political chaos. The ruling People Power Party (PPP) teeters on the brink of collapse, with its leader, Han Dong-hoon, stepping down after a failed bid to unite the party against the impeachment vote. His resignation, citing the disintegration of the party’s Supreme Council, has left the PPP leaderless and vulnerable.

    Meanwhile, the opposition Democratic Party senses an opportunity in the disorder. Armed with public outrage over Yoon’s actions, they are seizing the moment to press for an early general election. Such a move, they argue, would help restore South Korea’s dignity, renew public faith in its democracy, and offer the nation a chance at fresh leadership capable of undoing the damage to its global reputation.

    The National Assembly’s members rose to meet a pivotal moment, understanding the weight of damage the nation was burdened with and the urgency of decisive action. On December 14th, they cast their votes in an impeachment process that South Koreans overwhelmingly supported, with over 70 percent of the public demanding Yoon’s removal. For the opposition Democratic Party, led by Lee Jae-myung, this political turmoil has paved a clear path to power. Yet Lee himself carries legal baggage, complicating his ascent. 

    For now, the opposition’s focus remains squarely on the presidency. The Democratic Party has vowed not to pursue impeachment proceedings against Prime Minister Han Duck-soo or other Cabinet members, citing the need to maintain a functioning government amid the political upheaval. Yet, analysts warn this restraint may be fleeting. Should Acting President Han fail to align with the Democratic Party’s agenda, Democratic leader Lee Jae-myung could reverse course, plunging the government into paralysis as political gridlock prevents key decisions from being made or implemented.

    Yoon’s impeachment does not signify the end of South Korea’s political turbulence, nor the dawn of its resolution. Rather, it serves to close a shameful chapter in the nation’s democratic story. The true reckoning, however, will come with the election of a new president, one that promises further drama in a country already scarred by a crisis that has tarnished its reputation and weakened its hard-won soft power. For years, South Korea has worked to project its democratic ideals and cultural influence, but now it confronts the stark fragility of both. This moment of reckoning threatens not only its national identity but its standing on the global stage.

  • The Sixties, Revisited: How Bangladesh Found Its Echoes

    The Sixties, Revisited: How Bangladesh Found Its Echoes

    Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, stands as an undeniable military and diplomatic victory for India. The small yet densely populated country emerged amidst escalating tensions between India and Pakistan, culminating in the 1971 war, which claimed countless lives on both sides. Despite securing victory, India faced significant geopolitical challenges. The United States and China aligned with Pakistan, isolating India on the international stage. Furthermore, the war drained India of substantial resources and finances, contributing to the eventual decline of its then-leader, Indira Gandhi. However, India gained a strategic ally in the East, easing threats on its eastern flank and allowing a concentrated focus on its borders with Pakistan and China.

    Now, 50 years after Bangladesh’s independence, the tides seem to be turning. In Bangladesh, Bangla nationalism has been sidelined, anti-India sentiment is on the rise, minorities face increasing persecution, and Islamism is regaining ground. It feels like a scene from Back to the Future, where someone travels back in time and creates an alternate history—perhaps one where Pakistan won over India in the 1971 war. 

    Pakistan was carved out of British India in 1947, encompassing Muslim-majority regions under the demand of Islamists, with religion as the sole basis for division. Present-day Bangladesh, then East Bengal, joined the state of Pakistan. However, the people of West Pakistan and East Pakistan were vastly different in ethnicity, language, customs, food, and culture. There was no leadership capable of uniting these two distinct regions. Eventually, West Pakistan reduced East Pakistan to the status of a colony. The West treated the East’s people as second-class citizens, humiliating them for their color, height, language, and food. This discrimination sparked a political revolution in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League, which championed Bangla nationalism. Tensions escalated into violent conflicts with Islamists and the Pakistani army during the 1960s, culminating in bloody years.

    As refugees poured into India due to the humanitarian crisis, India decided to intervene, leading to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. India’s victory gave rise to Bangladesh, a new nation in South Asia.

    Yet, peace remained out of reach. The lingering influence of Islamism fueled unrest, while competing ideologies, such as communism, began to take root. Foreign powers, from the United States to China, advanced their own agendas in the region, leaving Bangladesh weighed down by overpopulation and entrenched poverty. Despite signs of progress under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership in the 21st century, rising accusations of authoritarianism cast a shadow over her rule. Like many other Islamic nations grappling with internal strife, the political landscape unraveled, ultimately driving her into exile.

    Bangladesh appears to be drifting into anarchy, a state that seems woven into its history. The current interim government looks confused and uncertain about the direction it should take. Everything the country achieved after the 1970s, including its vision and progress, has been effectively dismantled. The people now harbor resentment towards their founding figure, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who led Bangladesh to independence by fighting against Pakistan and Islamists. They despise the Awami League, the party that once brought prosperity to the country. Anti-India sentiment is pervasive; they reject being overshadowed by India, even though they lack the capacity to thrive independently. Social media fuels this hostility, spreading hatred toward India and Hindus, with extreme acts like placing Indian flags on the floor as doormats. Bangladesh seems to be revisiting the chaos of the 1960s, an era marked by Islamist dominance, student-driven anarchy, and rampant anti-Indian propaganda

    They have seemingly traveled through time, reaching a point where their path diverged into an independent Bangladesh. But where are they headed now? Islamism is the only unifying factor left in the country. Will they return to Pakistan? No chance—Pakistan has collapsed, and joining it would only make matters worse. Could they become a pro-Western country, as some, like Yunus, hope? That too seems impossible, as Islamism currently drives the nation. Nor can they become Chinese satellites.

    Bangladesh is unable to direct its own path independently. Its economy is in tatters, and it remains highly vulnerable to even minor climate shifts. The country can rely only on India, given the shared border and India’s relative strength in the region. But relying on India, while fostering intense anti-India sentiment, could plunge the country back into anarchy.

    The nation appears stuck, confused, and without direction. The only hope for Bangladesh’s future is the rise of a strong leader, like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the 1960s, who can guide the country toward a clear vision

  • Georgia Accelerates Toward Russia with Pro-Kremlin President

    Georgia Accelerates Toward Russia with Pro-Kremlin President

    Democracy and free speech remain intolerable for many governments, who see them as direct threats to their control over the populace and their profitable monopolies on state resources. In their quest to forestall any transfer of power to the people, ruling elites will stop at nothing. These dynamics inevitably breed tension, especially when domestic factions align with opposing global powers. And it is the scenario in Georgia, a small but strategically crucial nation at the juncture of Europe and Asia, where a political crisis is unfolding. Here, a West-leaning, democracy and free speech supporting populace finds itself in an increasingly fraught standoff with a government tethered to Moscow’s influence.

    Georgia’s political landscape is dominated by an entrenched elite, closely intertwined with powerful business magnates—a structure long shaped by Russian dominance and, more recently, tempered by Europe’s growing influence. This dual allegiance has ignited a fierce power struggle, with each side staking a claim to public support. Pro-Russian conservatives find their champion in the ruling Georgian Dream Party, while those resisting the oligarchic nexus are tied to the promise of a European future. After witnessing Ukraine’s struggle, a significant portion of Georgia’s public began favoring closer ties with Europe. However, the Kremlin-linked government, seeking to consolidate power and move closer to Russia, started pushing back. They have rewritten the constitution, held unfair elections, and enacted measures reminiscent of Russian authoritarian practices to silence dissent and retain authority.

    Following constitutional changes and a new framework set by the ruling party’s interests, Georgian lawmakers have chosen Mikheil Kavelashvili as the country’s president. A former professional football player and outspoken critic of the West, Kavelashvili is staunchly pro-Russia. Over the past year, he has repeatedly accused Western intelligence agencies of attempting to drag Georgia into a war with Russia. Under the revised system, Georgia’s president is now selected by a college of electors, comprising members of parliament and local government representatives. Of the 225 electors present, 224 voted for Kavelashvili, who was the sole nominee. His election starkly contrasts with the country’s previous practice of direct presidential elections, further fueling public discontent over Georgia’s democratic backsliding.

    The opposition has declared Saturday’s election invalid and recognizes only Salome Zourabichvili, the sitting president, as Georgia’s legitimate leader. Zourabichvili, a pro-Western figure deeply at odds with the ruling Georgian Dream Party, has refused to step down. She is demanding fresh parliamentary elections, paving the way for a looming constitutional crisis. The October parliamentary elections were widely viewed as heavily rigged, further eroding public trust in the pro-Kremlin government.

    Protests have swept across Tbilisi, with demonstrations planned at over a dozen locations. For the 16th consecutive day, thousands of pro-EU demonstrators have filled the streets, now turning their anger toward the newly nominated president as well. The protests culminated in a massive rally outside parliament, where the crowd rallied behind Salome Zourabichvili. Intensifying her criticism of the government, Zourabichvili denounced its latest actions during a press conference, stating, “What will happen in parliament tomorrow is a parody—an event entirely devoid of legitimacy, unconstitutional, and illegitimate.”

    Georgia is plunging into a significant political crisis as the country finds itself with two presidents after December. Salome Zourabishvili’s refusal to leave office, the opposition’s parliamentary boycott, and ongoing protests have already overshadowed the presidency of her successor, Gia Kavelashvili, likely weakening his position from the outset. The government’s response to Zourabishvili’s defiance following Kavelashvili’s inauguration on December 29 remains uncertain, constrained by widespread public anger.

    Adding to the turmoil, European leaders have thrown their support behind the Georgian opposition, openly rejecting the legitimacy of the recent parliamentary elections and the current parliament. Meanwhile, Washington has intensified its pressure by imposing sanctions on Georgian officials, including visa bans for around 20 individuals accused of undermining democracy, among them key ministers and parliamentarians.

    These developments raise the alarming prospect of Georgia drifting closer to Moscow. The fear is that the country could fall further into Russia’s orbit, effectively becoming another satellite state. As this political standoff deepens, those advocating for democracy face increasing risks of suppression and retaliation.

  • Why North Korea Isn’t Weighing In on the South’s Turmoil?

    Why North Korea Isn’t Weighing In on the South’s Turmoil?

    They thrive on mocking and humiliating each other, with their rivalry defining their existence. North Korea and South Korea—one people divided by contrasting ideologies and governments have long competed to showcase which system best serves its people. The two Koreas—South and North—function like estranged brothers, each leveraging hatred for the other to bolster faith in their respective administrations. Without the enmity and stark administrative differences, they are fundamentally the same people—potentially capable of uniting. To prevent this, politicians on both sides benefit from perpetuating hostility.

    Yet, when South Korea plunges into political turmoil, dividing both politicians and citizens, North Korea remains unusually silent and calm—a stark contrast to the typical animosity between the two countries. President Yoon, the central figure in South Korea’s political drama, harbors deep animosity toward the North, skillfully leveraging this hatred to his advantage. He even links opposition forces to North Korea to justify his controversial martial law declaration, a move that has further inflamed an already charged political climate and put him under threat—a perfect situation for North Korea to act.

    Strangely, despite numerous opportunities to exploit South Korea’s vulnerability or launch a powerful propaganda attack, North Korea has chosen restraint. It remains inactive, refraining from using the chaos to fuel domestic narratives. Why has this traditionally aggressive neighbor, so known for its hostility, suddenly embraced such uncharacteristic restraint and maturity?

    North Korean state media typically exploit any signs of public dissent in the South, using them to depict South Korea’s democratic system and its leaders as corrupt and inept. Yet, for over a week, North Korea chose not to capitalize on the opportunity, refraining from mocking its ideological adversary and missing a chance to showcase the supposed superiority of its socialist communist model.

    North Korea has used the situation to argue that the South unfairly blames it for all its domestic troubles, sowing doubt even within South Korea itself. President Yoon’s martial law declaration, for instance, claimed that “anti-state” and “North Korean communist forces” had infiltrated his domestic political opposition—a claim that holds little substantive merit. There has also been a gradual reduction in the coverage the North provides its people about the South in state media, because they no longer want to emphasize the South. Instead, they aim to position it as “Just another” country.

    Some analysts suggest that Pyongyang refrained from broadcasting images of mass protests in South Korea to avoid inspiring similar uprisings among its own citizens. Others believe the North fears that turmoil in the South might compel its government, under pressure, to divert public attention by provoking a security incident with Pyongyang. Another theory points to Pyongyang’s decision in late 2023 to amend its constitution, officially designating South Korea as a “Belligerent state” and reframing their relationship as one between “Two hostile states”. This shift marks a departure from the North’s previous rhetoric of the two Koreas as a single, homogenous people destined for reunification.

    Some believe North Korea withheld reports on South Korea’s unrest, fearing it might inspire its own citizens to resist their leadership. However, for others, Pyongyang’s approach seems more strategic, as it aims to navigate this period of South Korean vulnerability with its long-term objectives in mind.

    The North did not stay silent. On Wednesday, KCNA covered the events in South Korea with its trademark inflammatory tone, describing the declaration of martial law by President Yoon Suk Yeol as a shocking move. The report condemned his actions as those of a fascist regime, claiming that the South Korean military was a “Gangster organization” and describing Yoon’s declaration as “A disaster.” It also claimed that the South Korean public was demanding his immediate impeachment and punishment. The report included about 20 photos, but none showed South Korean civilians resisting the military outside the parliament. The tone of the coverage suggests that the North sees the South’s political struggles as an opportunity to further distance itself, reinforcing its identity as fundamentally separate. It seems intent on severing ties with its “Brother” to pursue its own path.