Author: Caracal

Why Is Saudi Arabia Concerned About the Houthis Attack on Israel?

Pro-Islamic and pro-Palestinian social media accounts across various platforms and countries are celebrating the Houthi militants claim of breaching Israel’s missile defense system and reaching central Israel, near Tel Aviv, with a modern ballistic missile. The reported strike on September 15th caused no casualties but captured headlines due to its strategic significance. A militant group from Yemen launched the missile over Saudi Arabia, breaching Israel’s renowned defense system and reaching the vicinity of Tel Aviv. For the Houthis, this was a notable achievement in their “Holy War”, one Israel likely did not anticipate. However, this development has heightened tensions in Saudi Arabia, the leading nation in the Islamic world and home to its most sacred sites. Saudi Arabia, already engaged in conflict with the Houthis, now faces an increasing security risk. The Houthis striking capabilities and resilience represent a significant threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, a Sunni-majority Islamic nation that supports Yemen’s official government in its battle against the Shia-majority Houthis, believes that Iran, a Shia power, has been supplying arms to the group and is convinced that the recent strikes were carried out with Iran’s assistance, despite the Houthis claiming they used homemade weapons. The Sunni-Shia conflict has deep historical roots, spanning centuries of violence and mutual hostility, much like the long-standing conflict between Muslims and Jews. Now, Saudi Arabia views the recent Houthi attacks as a growing threat to its own security. The Houthis advanced capabilities, including their weapons and technology, have surprised many observers. Additionally, the group’s involvement in attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea has significantly reduced traffic on this crucial route, leading to increased maritime transport costs and disruptions to the global economy by affecting the Suez Canal. Given these impacts, Saudi Arabia presented Houthis as not just a regional threat, but a global one.

In Sana’a, the capital of Yemen and a Houthi stronghold where the rebel group coordinates its attacks on shipping, the leadership celebrated Sunday’s missile strike on Israel, which landed in an open area near Ben Gurion International Airport. They hailed the strike as a breakthrough, attributing it to the efforts of Yemeni technicians, and vowed that more attacks would follow. Prior to the strike, the Houthis had issued warnings of an impending assault on Israel. Previous missile attacks by the group had failed to penetrate deep into Israeli airspace, with one missile in March landing in an open area near the Red Sea port of Eilat. In July, an Iranian-made drone attack on Tel Aviv killed one person and wounded ten others. During Sunday’s strike, Israel activated its Arrow and Iron Dome defense systems, though it remains unclear whether any of the interception attempts were successful.

Saudi Arabia now faces an urgent need to take stronger action against the Houthis, as the threat they pose could be as significant to the kingdom as it is to Israel, if not greater. A potential attack on Saudi territory is a growing concern, especially given previous incidents. The kingdom also wants to prevent the Houthis from gaining further support and enhancing their reputation for bravery in the name of Islam. If the Houthis gain more support in Yemen, the Saudi-backed official government could be in jeopardy. However, before launching any strikes, Saudi Arabia is likely to seek U.S. approval, and more military operations are anticipated. Saudi leaders are calling for a more robust approach than mere pinprick bombings to effectively sever the Houthis supply lines.

Saudi Arabia has also pointed to Iran’s interference in Arab nations such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Palestine, expressing disappointment that Tehran has failed to uphold the diplomatic agreement it reached with Saudi Arabia in China two years ago. The kingdom had hoped Iran would take a more proactive role in fostering regional stability and resolving disputes, not just with Saudi Arabia but across the broader region. However, the escalating tensions are likely to exacerbate the Middle East crisis, potentially drawing in additional parties, including the U.S. and the U.K. The Houthis are likely to receive more support, and Saudi Arabia may bear higher costs than Israel in this situation.

September 17, 2024
Is China Working to Resolve Tensions with India?

China and India, two ancient civilizations, have maintained contact for centuries, once enjoying a historically strong relationship. However, the modern-day People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India now face one of the most strained diplomatic situations in the world. The source of tension can be traced to Tibet, which once served as a buffer zone between the two nations. Following China’s annexation of Tibet and its improved accessibility in the Himalayan region, territorial disputes have escalated, leading to military standoffs, a full-scale war, and deadly clashes, including the infamous Galwan Valley incident. China’s territorial claims over India’s states of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, and Ladakh- areas it views as part of Tibet-have been met with strong resistance from India, which insists on the McMahon Line, a boundary drawn between British India and Tibet, as the legitimate border. China’s refusal to recognize this line has fueled enmity, leading to volatile borders and a rising power struggle.

China’s efforts to entrap India’s neighbors through debt diplomacy, combined with India’s strengthening of strategic partnerships with China’s adversaries, have deepened the animosity. But what if these two heavyweights could once again set aside their differences? Both nations, with immense potential, stand to benefit greatly from cooperation, as they did in the past. There’s no doubt that competing against each other is taking a toll on both, as reflected in their economic realities. So, is it time for these two countries to finally put an end to their conflict?

The tensions between China and India peaked during the Galwan Valley incident in Ladakh in 2020. Chinese interference disrupted Indian roadwork, sparking a violent clash. Without the use of firearms, as mandated by prior agreements, the confrontation resulted in casualties. While officials managed to de-escalate the situation eventually, the incident – coinciding with the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic – further eroded India’s trust in China. India responded by imposing restrictions on Chinese businesses and banning popular apps like TikTok, which had generated significant revenue from India. This sudden ban severely impacted China’s economic interests and led to backlash. In India, campaigns to boycott Chinese products gained momentum, pushing the country toward alignment with the U.S. and Europe – an alliance it had traditionally avoided.

India, however, also faced challenges due to the absence of Chinese-made goods, which had previously ensured lower prices in the market. Ultimately, the relationship between the two nations deteriorated, and animosity increased. However, as years have passed since the incident, it appears both countries have moved forward. China, having experienced slowed growth due to the pandemic, corruption, and market restrictions, is now facing economic challenges. In search of a large market to regain its momentum, China views India as its best option, especially as Western nations and Japan continue to exert pressure. China has only a territorial dispute with India, and if that issue is resolved, there are no other major conflicts between the two. With a population of 1.5 billion, India presents an opportunity for China to regain its pace and work toward its goal of surpassing the U.S. economy. For India, which is not fully ready to embrace the West, resolving the issue with China would allow it to focus on internal problems, particularly as many of its neighbors are embroiled in political turmoil that poses challenges for India.

Reports are now emerging that both countries are warming up to diplomatic talks to resolve their issues. On Friday, September 13th, China’s Foreign Ministry announced that it had withdrawn from four areas, including Galwan Valley, in accordance with India’s demands. The Ministry also stated that India and China held several meetings in Russia, their mutual ally, and agreed to create favorable conditions for further discussions and to build trust. The latest meeting occurred as part of the BRICS high-ranking officials’ gathering, with India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi leading the talks. India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, confirmed on Thursday that 75% of the disengagement issue has been resolved. Mr. Wang, a member of China’s Politburo, had previously stated that China is facing a turbulent global environment and views India as one of its best partners for cooperation, with the two ancient civilizations standing together. Both sides have conducted over 20 corps commander-level talks, and China appears to have high expectations from India. However, for India, the situation is challenging, as it is a democracy and the opposition frequently accuses Prime Minister Modi of not doing enough to address border issues, alleging that he is allowing China to take advantage.

It is expected that if India joins forces with China and Russia, they could form a powerful bloc capable of dominating Asia. Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and smaller Asian countries would likely be pressured to align with this bloc, while Islamic countries in the West, frustrated with the United States’ approach in Gaza, might also join as allies. Such a powerful bloc could emerge. However, many believe that resolving the territorial disputes and establishing a definitive border will be challenging. The territorial claims, extending back centuries and even thousands of years, complicate efforts at resolution. Nonetheless, economic interests can sometimes outweigh other concerns.

September 16, 2024
How Will the U.S. Election Impact the Israel-Gaza Conflict, and Vice Versa?

Israel’s war on Gaza shows no signs of ending soon, and countries around the world seem unwilling to intervene. The only country outside of Israel with the capacity to meaningfully intervene is the United States. Despite being the world’s most powerful country, capable of diplomatic and military operations anywhere, the U.S. appears constrained in acting against Israel’s will, a nation it holds dear. With a sizable Jewish and Muslim population – both of whom are divided over the Israel-Gaza conflict – the U.S. presidential election is also expected to be influenced by the situation. In response to growing negative sentiment and campus protests in solidarity with Palestine, the U.S., along with its Arab allies, has attempted to broker a ceasefire and develop a solution, but these efforts have not succeeded. With Biden stepping away from the presidential race, the U.S. now awaits the upcoming contest between hard-right Republican Trump and left-leaning Democrat Kamala Harris to see how future intervention in the Israel-Gaza conflict will unfold.

While both candidates follow core U.S. policies in the Middle East, their approaches to resolving the conflict differ. Kamala Harris has not outlined detailed plans but remains firmly committed to Israel, continuing the U.S.’s long standing support for the nation. She reaffirmed her backing of Israel, emphasizing the need to secure the release of hostages, while advocating for a two-state solution to provide both Palestinian sovereignty and security, which conventionally the US does not endorse.

Harris advocates for a ceasefire, conditioned on Hamas releasing the hostages taken during the October 7 attack and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. She was among the first Western leaders to call for a ceasefire in early March and has been more outspoken than President Biden regarding the humanitarian crisis caused by Israel’s military actions in Gaza. However, she has yet to make progress in advancing negotiations on this issue. Despite her reported disagreements with Prime Minister Netanyahu over his handling of the war, she has not proposed any actions that would directly affect his government. Notably, she skipped Netanyahu’s speech to Congress in July but met with him privately during his visit to Washington. Harris’s positions can appear inconsistent or impractical, raising questions about the feasibility of her approach.

Donald Trump, the former president, has clearly stated his position on the Israel-Gaza conflict and claims to have a resolution plan. He has pledged to resolve the issue quickly if re-elected. However, he has not provided specifics on how he would negotiate with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas to achieve a ceasefire and secure the release of Israeli hostages held in Gaza.

Trump has consistently supported Israel’s war on Gaza, urging the country to conclude the conflict swiftly due to diminishing international support. Although he was initially critical of Netanyahu and Israeli intelligence for being unprepared for the Oct. 7 attack, he quickly retracted those comments and reaffirmed his strong alliance with Netanyahu, with whom he had a close relationship during his presidency. During his time in office, Trump released a peace proposal he called a blueprint for a two-state solution. However, this plan did not propose a fully autonomous Palestinian state and was perceived as heavily favoring Israel. Trump’s administration strongly backed Netanyahu’s government and endorsed hard-liner Israeli policies previously rejected by the U.S. His presidency also saw a significant warming of relations between Israel and several Arab countries, highlighting his skills as a negotiator and businessman.

Criticism of the current U.S. government’s actions is likely to target Kamala Harris, as American activists have reported on the ongoing casualties from the war. Traditionally, Muslim and Arab voters lean toward the Democratic Party, but dissatisfaction with the current administration’s handling of the situation and its stance on Israel has caused frustration. Additionally, many liberals and anti-war advocates within the Democratic base are unhappy with the government’s response. While Trump is unlikely to gain favor from these groups due to his pro-Israel stance, many believe he might be able to end the conflict with his negotiation and problem-solving skills, which previously helped improve relations between Arabs and Israelis during his tenure. A ceasefire before the election seems unlikely, as the outgoing president, who is not running for re-election, would not gain any political advantage from such a deal.

September 15, 2024
Why Is Putin Seeking Mediation from China and India in the War?

The Russia-Ukraine war is now in a stalemate, with neither side able to advance. Russia, once seen as the Goliath aiming to capture Ukraine, is now humiliated, unable to move forward, while Ukraine has even crossed into Russian territory. What many expected to be an easy victory for Russia, with the war ending in a few months, has turned into a protracted conflict, and no one expects a quick resolution – unless Putin resorts to nuclear weapons, launching the endgame. This unexpected prolongation is a challenge for all involved, but it affects Russia more than Ukraine.

Ukraine has already endured massive losses, with many of its men killed, its women fleeing to the West, and its buildings reduced to rubble. However, they remain resilient, bolstered by Western money and munitions. Russia, on the other hand, is under heavy Western sanctions and losing its strength. While not fully economically collapsed, its economy is suffering and becoming increasingly reliant on China and other allies. Meanwhile, countries that once followed the Kremlin are now recognizing its weakness and beginning to distance themselves. All of this highlights that Russia is the biggest loser in this war, and though they need to end it, their pride remains an obstacle.

Extensive discussions were held between Putin and Western leaders to avoid war. However, a confident Putin seemed intent on humiliating them, and we all remember how Macron was belittled during his meeting with Putin in Moscow. Putin initiated the war, but no one anticipated this outcome. Ukraine is fighting fiercely, and Western nations remain steadfast in their support.

Initially, Putin disregarded peace talks and negotiations, but now he appears ready to end the war. Interestingly, he is not engaging with Western leaders, but instead reaching out to countries like Brazil, China, and India – key BRICS nations, except for South Africa – who are attempting to establish an alternative power bloc. Putin mentioned a preliminary agreement reached between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators in the early weeks of the war during talks in Istanbul, which was never implemented, as a potential basis for new negotiations. However, it seems neither side is proposing a realistic plan they can agree on, raising doubts about Putin’s true intentions.

Zelenski is now more confident and is reportedly planning larger operations following the incursion near Kursk. It is expected that the current U.S. Vice President, Kamala Harris, will become the next president, so there will likely be no significant policy change regarding support for Ukraine. Putin’s recent moves may be aimed at shifting the narrative, portraying Ukraine as the aggressor and Russia as willing to settle.

China’s involvement will not be effective with Ukraine, as China remains firmly aligned with Russia and the Kremlin won’t find much common ground with Brazil despite its leftist president. India, which maintains strong relationships with both Russia and the West, is another potential mediator suggested by Russia. India has shown its neutrality through visits by Prime Minister Modi and other officials to both Russia and Ukraine. Modi’s criticism of the war during his visit to Moscow was well-received in the West. However, the chances of India intervening are slim, as India is one of the few countries benefiting from the war, securing cheaper oil and gas from Russia. India’s foreign minister has stated that this is a bilateral issue, and India would only help with peace talks if requested, otherwise it will not interfere.

So, It is clear that neither China, India, nor Brazil are likely to intervene. Putin is likely aware of this, making his actions a strategic move to convince both the Russian public and the world that Russia is not responsible for prolonging the war and is willing to negotiate.

As the war stretches into its third year, the Russia-Ukraine conflict increasingly resembles a personal battle between Putin and Zelensky. Both leaders, unwilling to compromise and driven by their egos, seem inclined to prolong the war, despite the suffering and losses on both sides. Peace talks could tarnish their images, and Putin cannot imagine conceding to Zelensky. However, as Russia begins to suffer more, they may deflect blame and place it on Ukraine. The invitations to India and China can be seen as part of this strategy to shift the narrative.

September 13, 2024
Jordan Embraces Islamic Politics

Jordan, a constitutional monarchy known for suppressing political voices and its peculiar parliamentary voting system, held elections on Tuesday under a new electoral law to elect members of the lower house. These elections took place amid heightened political tensions due to Israel’s war on Gaza and a challenging economic environment marked by high unemployment – issues that were not fully addressed by the kingdom. As the results emerge, it appears that the country, which has long suppressed Islamic politics, is witnessing a resurgence of such influence. Jordan’s Islamist opposition party has topped the parliamentary elections, although it fell short of securing a majority, according to official results.

The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, secured 31 out of 138 seats in the Parliament, tripling its representation in the House of Representatives, according to the country’s election commission on Wednesday. This result is historic for the Islamists, marking their largest representation since 1989, when they won 22 of the 80 parliamentary seats. In the previous Parliament, elected in 2020, the IAF held 10 seats, and in the 2016 legislature, they had 16. The election results are seen as reflecting a broad desire for change among voters, many of whom were not necessarily Islamists but were frustrated with the old political order and wanted a shift. The Muslim Brotherhood, which combines Islamic values with democratic principles, gained influence during the Arab Spring and operates as a transnational Sunni Islamic organization. However, it is labeled a terrorist group in countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Russia. Its growing role in Jordan’s political scene could lead to friction with the Kingdom, which is wary of closer ties with Israel.

During the ongoing war, Jordan has sought to navigate a delicate political balance by maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel and intervening in Iran’s retaliatory attack in April, when it shot down missiles that flew over its territory. This position has sparked considerable anger among many Jordanians, particularly those who are descendants of Palestinians displaced during the Nakba and the 1967 war. Official results released on Wednesday reflect this frustration, showing a boost in support for political factions critical of Israel’s actions in Gaza.

In Jordan, the King exerts substantial influence over the country’s governance. He has the power to sign, execute, or veto laws, as well as to suspend or dissolve Parliament and alter the length of its sessions. Despite attempts to improve the democratic process following the Arab Spring and waves of protests, Jordan’s political system remains highly centralized. The 2022 electoral law was designed to bolster the role of political parties, but the Parliament is expected to continue being dominated by tribal and pro-government factions. This new law introduces a significant change by allocating 41 seats to over 30 licensed, predominantly pro-government parties. Jordan’s voting system still favors sparsely populated tribal and provincial regions over densely populated urban areas, where Jordanians of Palestinian descent – often supporters of Islamist groups – are concentrated. Although more than two-thirds of Jordanians reside in cities, these areas are allocated less than a third of the parliamentary seats.

Recent electoral reforms have lowered the candidacy age from 30 to 25 and implemented a mixed proportional representation system for the 138-seat Parliament. Voters now cast two ballots: one for lists in 18 local districts competing for 97 seats, and another for political parties in the national district, which has 41 seats. The system also includes 12 reserved seats for Christian, Circassian, and Chechen minorities, as well as 18 seats for women. Future elections are anticipated to increase the proportion of seats in the national district, potentially facilitating the formation of parliamentary coalitions.

Many Jordanians believe that a passive Parliament filled with pro-government deputies is ineffective in driving change. However, this election is significant as it represents a modest step in the democratization process initiated after long protests. Turnout among Jordan’s 5.1 million eligible voters in Tuesday’s election was low, at 32.25%, a slight increase from 29% in the 2020 election. Despite this, the election is pivotal in Jordan’s history, as it will shape the country’s future democratization efforts, its stance on Palestine, and potentially revive the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world. Thus, Jordan’s election holds considerable significance for the region.

September 12, 2024
Is Iran Unhappy with the Blooming Russia-Azerbaijan Romance?

Iran has stood firm with Russia and continued its support during the war in Ukraine, despite sharp criticism. While this may partly be due to the limited options under heavy Western sanctions, the relationship between the two countries has been mutually beneficial, helping them navigate their economic struggles. However, every nation ultimately pursues its own interests. Russia, for instance, has shifted its allegiance, seemingly abandoning its long-time partner Armenia to build a closer relationship with Azerbaijan. This new partnership has caused significant disruptions in the region, particularly for Iran, which is in dispute with Azerbaijan and maintains friendly ties with Armenia.

As a result, Iran has begun publicly criticizing the growing Russia-Azerbaijan relationship. Although Iran and Russia are partners in major projects like the North-South Corridor and rely on common markets such as China and India, these emerging tensions could jeopardize their shared objectives. If these disputes continue to escalate, they might undermine both countries’ ambitions and lead to further instability in the region.

Iran’s reformist government has issued a warning to Russia over its support for Azerbaijan in a border dispute, as tensions between Tehran and Moscow continue to simmer. Iranian Foreign Minister Sayeed Abbas Araghchi took the rare step of rebuking Russia after it backed Azerbaijan’s demand for a land corridor along the Armenia-Iran border, which Tehran fears could restrict its access to Europe and beyond. Araghchi emphasized that regional peace, security, and stability are not just priorities but essential to Iran’s national security. He added that any threat to the territorial integrity of neighboring countries or redrawing of boundaries – whether from the north, south, east, or west – is entirely unacceptable and considered a red line for Iran.

Araghchi’s remarks clearly referred to Moscow’s decision to support Azerbaijan’s call for an east-west corridor through Armenia to the Nakhchivan exclave in western Armenia. The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the so-called Zangezur corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan directly to Nakhchivan by passing through Armenia’s southern province. Iran fears that such a corridor could cut off its access to Armenia and, consequently, to Europe. Azerbaijan has threatened to establish the corridor by force if necessary, which could potentially trigger another conflict with Armenia. Baku demonstrated its military superiority in September 2023 by swiftly recapturing occupied territories in Nagorno-Karabakh. Earlier this week, Iran also summoned Russian Ambassador Alexey Dedov to express its dissatisfaction with Moscow’s stance, indicating that it did not want conflict on its borders to be encouraged by Russia.

Photo Credit: Eurasia Review

In Tehran, a debate is unfolding over the wisdom of maintaining close ties with Moscow. The tone of Araghchi’s tweet indicates his intention to emphasize the substance of his call for a more balanced east-west policy, which was a central theme of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s successful election campaign. Araghchi’s rebuke has been echoed by others in Iran. Mohsen Rezaei, former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and secretary of the Expediency Council, criticized the Russian behavior as unacceptable and contradictory to their professed friendship with Iran, calling for clarification of these ambiguities. Ahmad Naderi, a hardliner in parliament, argued that the lack of a strong response to past Russian actions has emboldened Moscow, stressing that strategic cooperation should not come at the expense of Iran’s national interests. Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, former head of Iran’s national security and foreign policy commission, suggested that Moscow’s stance on the Zangezur corridor might be a pre-emptive move by Putin to obstruct the formation of new communication channels between the Iranian government and the U.S.

The current dispute has significant geopolitical ramifications, especially if it signals that the newly elected Iranian government is prepared to adopt a firmer stance towards Moscow as part of its strategy to rebalance its foreign policy. While Russia and Iran are set to sign a new strategic cooperation agreement, the specifics are still under negotiation.

With Europe imposing sanctions on Russia and seeking alternatives for oil and gas, Iran is emerging as a key player. An EU spokesperson emphasized that relations between the EU and Iran are unlikely to improve if Iran continues supplying drones and other weaponry to Russia for use in Ukraine. In response, Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Amir Saeed Iravani, sent an unusual letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, dismissing claims of such trade as baseless. EU foreign affairs head Josep Borrell has engaged with the new Iranian government to address Iran’s support for Russia in Ukraine and to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. This indicates ongoing negotiations and tensions between European and Iranian interests.

September 11, 2024
Why Can’t the Indian Government Fix Manipur?

India’s northeast, a hilly region inhabited by various tribal communities, has long been plagued by ethnic clashes. The territory has experienced ongoing tensions between different tribes but has been held together primarily through strong intervention from New Delhi. With foreign powers, including China and the United States, showing interest in the region, the Indian government has often sought peaceful solutions to resolve these conflicts. As part of these efforts, the Union government has accommodated numerous demands, granting various rights, authorities, and even statehood to different tribes.

However, there have been several instances where demands for separate rights, administrative systems, and statehood have led to significant unrest, and the central government has at times struggled to intervene, as these conflicts are deeply rooted in generational tribal animosities. This hostility often extends to the central government itself when it attempts to intervene. National political parties used these disputes to gain influence in the region, escalating ethnic clashes to the political level. Many states in the region are now ruled by national parties in alliance with tribal parties, forcing the government to weigh political interests when trying to neutralize ethnic tensions.

While such scenarios are common in the northeast, Manipur has now become the focal point, with a deadly clash between two ethnic groups escalating into what resembles a civil war. Despite efforts, the situation remains unresolved. As horrifying news continues to emerge from Manipur, the issue has become a national concern, with international media criticizing the Indian government, which now appears ineffective. Why is this happening?

Two ethnic groups, the Meitei and the Kuki-Zo, are fighting each other with weapons, each attempting to control their territories, attacking, and ousting the other. Women are increasingly targeted in these clashes. The conflict between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo has a long history, dating back centuries, with frequent clashes. The situation has worsened now, and the Hindu nationalist BJP government, in power at both the national and state levels, has failed to quell the violence The national government is protecting the state government and its Chief Minister, Biren Singh, who is from the Meitei community. The government is now accused of supporting the Meitei, the original and majority Hindu community, against the Kuki-Zo, who are predominantly Christian. Earlier media reports outside India highlighted the Hindu-Christian nature of the conflict, though both ethnic groups include people from various religions, including Islam. The latest wave of attacks, which made headlines in May 2023, followed a High Court verdict that granted reservations to the Meitei community, which was expected to affect the Kuki-Zo people. Experts believe this was only one factor contributing to the escalation. Since then, the violence has resulted in at least 221 deaths, over 1,000 injuries, 60,000 people displaced, and numerous homes and buildings burned.

These ethnic clashes have become a serious political debate in Indian Parliament, with opposition parties and even BJP-affiliated organizations criticizing the central government’s inaction. The state government has undoubtedly failed, but the central government has not taken steps to address the situation, such as removing Chief Minister Biren Singh, who is accused of exacerbating the conflict. The opposition is pointing fingers at Narendra Modi, alleging that he is indifferent to the state’s plight.

In the political arena, there is growing concern about why the central government is allowing the situation to escalate. Despite the Indian Army being one of the most powerful in the world, its deployment in the region has been minimal. The central government has permitted the state government to manage the situation, although experts believe that a military intervention might draw international attention, as the Kuki-Zo are ethnically linked to Myanmar and could attract foreign influence, potentially worsening the conflict.

The Kuki-Zo are now demanding a separate state, which could further inflame tensions from Meiteis if statehood is granted. Such developments would likely lead to increased demands for more states from the region, creating more tribal nature. Additionally, removing Biren Singh could cause discontent among the Meitei population. Therefore, the central government is currently focusing on conducting negotiations between the conflicting parties.

While addressing the crisis at the central level appears to be the most viable option, the central government faces an uphill battle as both ethnic groups remain entrenched in their positions. Resolving this issue cannot be achieved simply by attempting to appease all parties involved. Instead, the central government might develop temporary measures to address the immediate concerns, though a permanent solution will undoubtedly be a protracted process.

It is noteworthy that the Indian judiciary is increasingly assuming a more proactive role than the government itself. On July 31, the Supreme Court demanded a comprehensive breakdown of around 6,000 FIRs related to the violence in Manipur. The court was deeply shocked to learn that it took 14 days for the police to register even a zero FIR concerning the brutal assault and public humiliation of two women. During the hearing on August 1, the Supreme Court criticized the police investigations as slow and described the situation as an absolute breakdown of the constitutional machinery. The court’s intervention is hoped to accelerate peace negotiations and bring about a resolution.

September 10, 2024
Is Azerbaijan following Russia’s lead in conducting sham elections?

A superhero, a hyper-patriotic party, ineffective opposition, and an election controlled entirely by the ruling party. No, this isn’t about Russia – this time, it’s Azerbaijan. And the similarities are not superficial; they are very real. It appears that Azerbaijan, the oil-rich Caucasian country and a close ally of Russia, is replicating Putin’s tactics for maintaining power. Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s president and current ‘superhero,’ along with his New Azerbaijan Party, a nationalist conservative force and close friend of Putin’s party, secured victory in Azerbaijan’s snap parliamentary elections. These elections, opposed by the weakened opposition and criticized by election watchdogs, were widely labeled a sham.

Parliamentary elections were held in Azerbaijan on 1 September 2024, two months earlier than the originally scheduled date of November 2024. Since the Republic of Azerbaijan’s first parliamentary election in 1995-96, the New Azerbaijan Party has never lost an election and has consistently maintained power. And this time, the New Azerbaijan Party won a majority of 68 out of 125 seats. This outcome was expected, as there were limited alternatives for voters. The voter turnout, below 40%, reflects a lack of public interest in the election process. Campaigning was minimal and largely ceremonial, with the leading opposition, the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, opting not to participate.

Although the election followed the model of Russia’s sham elections and its predictable outcome offered little hope for change, it still made headlines, particularly as it marked the first elections since Azerbaijan regained control of the Armenian separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh following the war in September 2023. Constituencies in the reclaimed region also participated in the vote. Aliyev, credited with overseeing the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh, and his party were expected to secure support. However, the opposition appeared to distrust the electoral process. Echoing Russia, reports of irregularities surfaced, further reinforcing the impression of imitation. The leading opposition party, the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, boycotted the election for the seventh consecutive time. Musavat, the oldest existing political party in Azerbaijan, rejected the legitimacy of the new parliament, demanding another vote and accusing the election of widespread violations, including multiple voting, ballot stuffing, and undue pressure on observers. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also condemned the election, stating that it fell short of democratic standards well short of democratic standards. OSCE monitors reported that the campaign was barely visible and described the election as a contest devoid of competition.

The 125 members of Azerbaijan’s National Assembly are elected from single-member constituencies using the first-past-the-post system. Although the election results faced accusations of manipulation, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party of President Aliyev secured a narrow majority, winning 68 out of 125 seats. With the main opposition party boycotting the election, the second-largest bloc consisted of independents, who won in total 44 seats. The remaining seats were claimed by smaller parties. The official voter turnout was reported at 37.3%.

Influence from superpower neighbors is not uncommon, but it is striking how many former Soviet states have adopted similar administrative practices. Azerbaijan’s approach, in particular, exemplifies a model that closely mirrors Russia’s. This pattern often coincides with a troubling array of malpractices and mutual support among these nations. Such connections among these deceitful politicians are creating a power conglomerate that extends across borders and ultimately humiliates and mocks democracy.

September 9, 2024
How Taiwan Uses History to Resist Reunification

Taiwan and China both lay claim to an ancient Chinese heritage that stretches back through the centuries. Despite diverging historical narratives, each asserts itself as the real China. Officially, they are both still called China – Mainland China as the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan as the Republic of China. Mainland China, guided by the legacy of the Qing Dynasty, claims dominion over regions like Tibet and stakes territorial claims in India and other neighboring countries. This reflects the Communist Party’s sweeping vision of a Greater China – a concept of reunification that aspires to blend both historical and contemporary claims into a unified Chinese identity.

The vision of a “Greater China” introduces a particular strain for Taiwan, often reduced to the moniker “Chinese Taipei,” a term that subtly undermines its sovereignty. In response, Taiwan has deftly turned the narrative, casting doubt on the very premise of China’s ambitions. How, Taiwan asks, can Beijing champion the idea of reunification while ignoring the territories historically ceded to Russia? If reclaiming lost lands is truly China’s goal, then shouldn’t those lands – seized under humiliating treaties – be part of the equation? Yet, with Beijing and Moscow bound in their modern-day geopolitical dance, this seems unlikely. Taiwan’s position is both sharp and simple: can the dream of Greater China hold weight when it conveniently omits Russia’s territorial gains?

Taiwan has skillfully reframed the territorial question in a way that could subtly disturb the carefully cultivated alliance between China and Russia. In a recent interview, President Lai Ching-te posed a provocative challenge: if the Chinese Communist Party were truly committed to the principle of territorial integrity, why has it not sought the return of land lost to Russia? Lai, who assumed office in January, pointed to the Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 convention that saw China cede vast swaths of territory – including present-day Vladivostok – to its northern neighbor. And yet, Beijing remains conspicuously silent on the matter.

Despite the historical loss of territory, Chinese officials have continued to attend Russian economic forums in Vladivostok, a city once part of China’s vast imperial expanse. President Lai implied that this silence on the Russian front casts doubt on Beijing’s proclaimed commitment to territorial integrity. The fixation on Taiwan, he argued, is less about reunification and more about geopolitical ambition. Taiwan’s position within the first island chain of the Pacific would provide the Chinese Communist Party with unparalleled strategic leverage, offering control over critical maritime routes and a commanding presence in the Taiwan Strait.

Under Xi Jinping’s rule, the Chinese Communist Party has steadfastly maintained that Taiwan is a renegade province, governed by what it calls illegal separatists. Xi’s vision for reunification involves the eventual annexation of Taiwan, a goal rooted in Beijing’s claim that the island has always been part of China, only to be lost to Japan during the country’s so-called century of humiliation. For the CCP, Taiwan stands as the final frontier in its mission to restore China’s territorial integrity.

In a sharp critique, Taiwan accuses the CCP of prioritizing its ideological kinship with Moscow over its historical roots. This counter-narrative positions the Republic of China – Taiwan – as the rightful steward of Chinese heritage, while casting Communist China as a Soviet creation that continues to cultivate its ties with Russia. The implication is clear: the CCP’s ambitions are geopolitical, not historical, and its fidelity to China’s ancient legacy is, at best, an afterthought.

Lai’s comment can be viewed through multiple lenses, as it strikes at the heart of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) claims to territorial integrity, the historic narrative of a Greater China, and the sentiment among those who long for reunification. But perhaps more strategically, Lai is targeting the delicate relationship between China and Russia – a bond that, for now, appears unshakable. Economically, politically, and strategically, these two nations act in concert, with China helping to soften the blow of Western sanctions on Russia, and Russia lending support to China’s geopolitical maneuvers. Both countries, their modern borders shaped by 19th-century wars and treaties, seem to present a unified front.

Yet, by invoking these historical accords, Taiwan is making a shrewd move. Lai’s remarks could plant the seeds of discord between China and Russia, forcing them to confront uncomfortable questions about their past and potentially weakening their current alliance. The subtle reminder of past territorial losses to Russia – territories that Beijing has quietly overlooked – could stir old wounds and reveal fractures in their partnership that both governments have long worked to conceal.

September 8, 2024
Geopolitics of the Deepening Singapore-India Partnership

While Singapore maintains defense ties with the United States, its foreign policy has long been guided by pragmatism, fostering relationships with nations across the spectrum, including pariah states like North Korea. Despite its broad diplomatic outreach, Singapore places particular emphasis on its ties with the U.S. and its allies, serving as a major hub for American and European businesses in Asia. At the same time, with a large Chinese-origin population, Singapore – like Hong Kong – has also functioned as a key gateway for Chinese businesses to the global market.

However, as the South China Sea emerges as a hotspot for geopolitical tensions, Singapore may soon be pressured to choose sides. Given its defense partnership with the U.S., it is likely to align with Washington over Beijing. Interestingly, Singapore also seems to be forging closer ties with India, a nation wary of China but less inclined to align closely with the United States. Both countries are working to deepen their relationship, with political experts speculating about the potential involvement of the U.S. in this evolving dynamic, as Washington seeks to bolster alliances in the region.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who views Singapore as a model of development is looking positive to these efforts, engaging with key Singaporean leaders to deepen their partnership. Singapore’s increasing affinity for India prompts the question: is a broader geopolitical realignment occurring in the region?

On the pivotal recently concluded two-day visit, Prime Minister Modi and Singapore’s leaders elevated their bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, signing four Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), including a key agreement on semiconductor cooperation. As India seeks to bolster its semiconductor industry, Singapore’s expertise and resources could prove more valuable than munitions in the coming years. The agreements aim to nurture talent in chip design and manufacturing, while encouraging Singaporean tech investments in India. They also explored potential collaboration in areas such as technology, sustainability, and innovation.

Modi also held discussions with Singaporean President Tharman Shanmugaratnam and Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, as well as former Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, where they focused on cooperation in green energy and FinTech.. In a significant gesture, both leaders visited AEM Holdings’ semiconductor facility, engaging with officials and marking a crucial step toward expanding trade opportunities between the two nations. Modi also met with 81-year-old Emeritus Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong, Singapore’s second prime minister.

During his visit, the Indian leader engaged with top business leaders and CEOs, highlighting India’s recent economic reforms and policy initiatives aimed at enhancing its business environment. The discussions centered on fostering innovation across a range of industries, while exploring new pathways for collaboration and growth.

India appears ready to open its extensive markets to Singaporean technologies, aiming to strengthen its relationship with Singapore while curbing Chinese influence, especially in the tech sector. Modi sees India’s large market as a valuable asset, using it to forge partnerships and counter China’s expanding role in the Indian Ocean. For Singapore, tapping into the Indian market presents substantial business prospects and is thought to align with a broader U.S. geopolitical strategy. Some believe the U.S. sees Singapore as a crucial intermediary capable of deepening ties with India more effectively than Washington could on its own. This potential alignment mirrors past U.S. efforts, such as investments in Malaysia, where American interests were successfully promoted. Although recent collaborations between Singapore and India might seem focused on business and technology, they also carry significant political weight.

September 7, 2024