Author: Caracal

  • China to Deepen Ties with Hungary: A Strong Ally for China in Europe?

    China to Deepen Ties with Hungary: A Strong Ally for China in Europe?

    In a strategic maneuver, Beijing has made a notable move by extending an offer to enhance security cooperation with Budapest, a development unfolding against the backdrop of Hungary’s strained relationship with its EU and NATO allies. The burgeoning warmth in ties between Budapest and Beijing is becoming increasingly apparent.

    Hungary is portrayed by the Western media as a possible Trojan horse . The outspoken populist prime minister Viktor Orbán publicly declares his undying devotion to NATO and the European Union, but he also regularly questions important choices made by these institutions. Meanwhile, China, displaying its position as the second-biggest economy in the world and serving as a check on the US, is well-liked by Orbán and the Hungarian government. 

    The emerging Eastern axis, steered by China, actively seeks alliances in Europe. Europe grapples with the intricate challenge of navigating political and economic dynamics and is looking more aligned with the United States. Notable participants of China’s ambitious projects like Italy contemplating withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The combined pressure from the United States and European bodies creates an environment where additional participants may also contemplate withdrawal. In this time Hungary, becoming different, Viktor Orbán emerges as a formidable leader, adept at challenging the very institutions that China aims to influence. 

    Prime Minister Viktor Orbán entered into discussions with China’s Minister of Public Security, Wang Xiaohong, last Friday. In statements published by China’s official Xinhua news agency over the weekend, Wang expressed the intention to “deepen cooperation in areas including counter-terrorism, combating transnational crimes, security, and law enforcement capacity building under the Belt and Road Initiative.” The Chinese minister envisions making “law enforcement and security cooperation a new highlight of bilateral relations.”

    Hungary’s acceptance of China’s offer is a notable anomaly, considering its membership in the EU and NATO. This deviation from the norm is accentuated by Budapest’s distinctive position of maintaining closer ties to Moscow than any other EU member, while concurrently fostering a relationship with Beijing. Noteworthy is Prime Minister Orbán’s distinction last year as the sole EU leader attending a forum of the Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing. Adding substance to this diplomatic shift, China’s electric vehicle manufacturer BYD has revealed plans to establish its inaugural European production factory in Hungary.

    Following the meeting with Wang Xiaohong on Friday, Orbán’s spokesperson emphasized the Prime Minister’s declaration that “respect is increasingly missing from international diplomacy, but it has always remained between Hungary and China.” The discussions centered on crucial aspects of security and stability. This unfolding narrative of heightened cooperation between Budapest and Beijing in the realm of security occurs against the backdrop of Hungary’s strained relations with its EU and NATO partners. As Hungary’s standing in Western states continues to deteriorate, recent actions, such as reneging on a commitment not to be the last to ratify Sweden’s NATO application, contribute to a further erosion of trust.

    Budapest’s evident isolation was underscored during the Munich Security Conference over the weekend, where notable Hungarian officials were conspicuously absent. Despite this, in a speech delivered in Hungary on Saturday, Prime Minister Orbán hinted at a change, announcing, “we are on course to ratify Sweden’s accession to NATO at the beginning of parliament’s spring session.” The ongoing tension was palpable as Hungarian officials declined meetings with visitors from Washington, a move that drew criticism from the US ambassador in Budapest, David Pressman, who expressed regret over the lack of engagement with the most senior US bipartisan congressional delegation to visit Hungary in years.

    Orban’s second term in office; in 2017, the two countries formally recognized their collaboration as an all-encompassing strategic alliance. Following the public outcry and protests in 2021 over Fudan University’s plans to open a campus in Budapest, the Hungarian government decided to put the project on hold and hold a vote on the issue. But the planned referendum was ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on May 22, 2022, citing its global ramifications. Officials in Hungary promised that the project will be revived once the ruling Fidesz party won the 2022 parliamentary elections. 

    Hungary has used its veto power in 2020 and 2021 to intentionally obstruct the European Union’s attempts to formally renounce China’s activities in Hong Kong. On February 20, 2023, Wang Yi, a well-known diplomat and member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo, visited Budapest to meet with Prime Minister Orbán, underscoring the importance of the diplomatic ties between Hungary and China. Péter Szijjártó, the foreign minister of Hungary, emphasized during the conference how important it is for the two countries to work together when navigating crises, saying, “When we have faced crises in recent years, Hungary has always come out of them stronger than it went into them.” On February 27, 2023, Orbán approved Wang Yi’s peace proposal, which sought to stop Russia from invading Ukraine. 

    Hungary has consistently diverged from EU positions critical of China, particularly on human rights issues, and has welcomed Chinese investments despite the EU’s call for member states to align their relations with China according to the bloc’s stance. Notably, Hungary hosts Huawei Technologies’ largest logistics and manufacturing base outside China, a move that has raised concerns as the European Commission warns of potential security risks posed by the telecom giant.

    Since 2016, Huawei has collaborated with Shanghai-based artificial intelligence firm Yitu Technology to develop solutions for smart cities, focusing on enhancing public safety and policing through the use of AI and surveillance. This intricate web of diplomatic and economic ties underscores Hungary’s complex position within the geopolitical landscape.

    If Orban continues to hold power in Hungary, it is likely that more issues will arise, potentially deepening existing problems with Europe. As a result, Hungary may find itself increasingly isolated in the region, lacking the support of both Europe and the US. However, aligning with China could open up new possibilities for Hungary. Simultaneously, for China, this alignment serves as a counter to Europe’s realignment with Vietnam and India. By establishing ties with Hungary, China aims to strengthen its foothold in Eastern Europe and capitalize on economic opportunities.

  • The Downfall of the Indian Opposition Alliance

    The Downfall of the Indian Opposition Alliance

    Narendra Modi and the BJP is in a cruise mode.  With the impending Lok Sabha (House of Commons) elections on the horizon, a multitude of factors fortify their confidence in an enduring dominance. Modi’s magnetic leadership, forward-looking developmental initiatives, resonance with Hindu sentiment, and substantial financial backing collectively underpin what appears to be an unimpeded march toward electoral success.

    Yet, at the heart of Modi’s seemingly seamless trajectory lies a conspicuous vacuum— the absence of a formidable opposition in the Lok Sabha. The official recognition of an opposition, necessitating at least 10% representation, is notably vacant in India’s current political landscape. This void amplifies the BJP’s influence, leaving the opposition space remarkably unfilled.

    The primary opposition force, the venerable Congress party, grapples with substantial weaknesses that have diminished its efficacy. Despite these challenges, the Congress seeks to mount a credible challenge to the BJP by forging alliances with various state parties under the umbrella of the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance. 

    In its initial phases, the alliance displayed commendable performance. The Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance, commonly known as I.N.D.I.A., has emerged as a united front announced by leaders representing 28 political parties, gearing up for the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. The acronym I.N.D.I.A. was proposed during a pivotal meeting in Bengaluru, where leaders from all 28 participating parties unanimously embraced this symbolic title.

    The inaugural meeting of opposition parties, a momentous gathering in Patna, Bihar, was chaired by Chief Minister Nitish Kumar on June 23, 2023. Attended by 16 opposition parties, this assembly marked the introduction of the proposal for a new alliance. Following this milestone, the second meeting unfolded in Bengaluru, Karnataka, on July 17 and 18, 2023, under the chairmanship of UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi. During this session, the formal acceptance of the alliance’s formation took place, with an additional ten parties joining the coalition. The Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance was officially christened, and plans were set for the third meeting, scheduled to occur in Mumbai.

    The third assembly took place in Mumbai between August 31, 2023, and September 1, 2023. Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi, and chief ministers from five different states were among the notable attendees. After two days of intense discussion, the coalition reviewed key electoral issues related to the approaching general elections in great detail. During these talks, the details of the coordination committee were carefully outlined, and a complete three-point resolution was eventually adopted. This resolution is a significant step forward for the cooperative projects carried out by various political organizations uniting under the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance. It unequivocally declares the alliance’s commitment to working together to address the many issues that the general elections in India in 2024 are expected to present. 

    The fourth assembly, convened in New Delhi on December 19, 2023, honed in on pivotal elements encompassing seat-sharing, joint rallies, and the selection of a prime ministerial face and/or convenor for the alliance. A noteworthy resolution was embraced, underscoring the imperative to maximize the use of VVPATs in the imminent elections. The emphasis lay on self-verification by voters and the separate storage of VVPAT slips. Setting deadlines for seat-sharing arrangements, the alliance declared nationwide protests against the suspensions of opposition MPs in the Indian Parliament on December 22. While plans for a grand joint rally in Patna on January 30, the death anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, were alluded to, they remained unconfirmed.

    However, the trajectory took an unexpected turn with the advent of the fifth meeting, conducted virtually, with some leaders unable to participate. Post-meeting, Mallikarjun Kharge, the president of the Indian National Congress, assumed the mantle of alliance chairperson. Seat-sharing discussions took center stage, with the Chief Minister of Bihar, Nitish Kumar, declining the role of national convenor.

    As the electoral momentum initially surged, the later days unveiled the burgeoning vulnerabilities of the alliance. The dearth of robust leadership, the failure to establish a cohesive minimum program, and internal avarice within participating parties are now precipitating the coalition’s collapse. At the national level, the Indian National Congress stands as the sole representative within the alliance. However, the party grapples with internal weaknesses, marked by the absence of a prominent leader and the dominance of the Gandhi family, reluctant to relinquish control to outsiders. Regrettably, this familial stronghold has yet to recognize the urgency of the situation, failing to formulate effective policies to counter the formidable presence of Modi, despite being a national-level party. The intricate dynamics of this political landscape underscore the critical need for a resilient and strategic opposition to navigate the challenges presented by the current political climate.

    While on paper, other collaborators such as the Aam Aadmi Party, Communist Party of India (Marxist), and former national parties like the All India Trinamool Congress and Nationalist Congress Party carry or carried a nationalist label, their influence remains largely confined to their regional strongholds. Exploiting the weakened state of the Congress, these parties seek to contest and expand their influence beyond their traditional territories, a move restricted by the Congress itself.

    The complications intensify as regional parties with conflicting national interests undermine the broader image and objectives of the Congress. The alliance with the DMK, with its anti-Hindu stance and leaders making divisive statements, casts a negative shadow on the national-level standing of the Congress. Personal agendas, exemplified by JD(U)’s Nitish Kumar, further contribute to leaders withdrawing from the alliance. Modi’s strategic overtures, including awards for local parties and their leaders, have enticed collaboration with the BJP-led NDA alliance, leading parties like RLD and the National Conference to consider exiting and join NDA. A growing number of parties are preparing to contest the elections independently rather than aligning with the BJP.

    Genuine democracy necessitates the presence of an opposition. India, proudly hailed as the world’s largest democracy with a populace exceeding 100 billion, fails to meet the criteria of a commendable democratic model in the eyes of Western think tanks. The absence of a robust opposition in India poses the risk of transforming the nation into a de facto single-party state, as the BJP champions the notion of Ramarajya, departing from the modern state concept embraced by Western counterparts.

    The ideological architects behind the BJP seem to dismiss the strength of a diverse and vibrant opposition, opting instead to emphasize a narrative that weakens the West and underscores perceived conflicts with Islam. To safeguard the essence of Indian democracy, it is imperative for the opposition to awaken to the current scenario. However, the very parties constituting the opposition, driven by personal interests and avarice, appear poised to precipitate the collapse of the INDIA alliance. This potential disintegration could inadvertently pave the way for a third term for Narendra Modi, if not counteracted promptly. The intricate interplay among political forces in India emphasizes the vital significance of a robust opposition to safeguard the democratic values that characterize the nation’s democracy.

  • Prabowo’s Indonesia Will be a Key Ally for China: A Strategic Outlook

    Prabowo’s Indonesia Will be a Key Ally for China: A Strategic Outlook

    In the current trend of prematurely asserted election victories, Indonesia follows the trend, as Prabowo Subianto, endearingly dubbed the “cute grandpa” by Indonesian youth, and a seasoned statesman with a nuanced military background, boldly proclaims his victory in the recent presidential election. At 72 years old, Prabowo Subianto will be the heir to the immensely popular incumbent, President Joko Widodo, harboring aspirations to become the eighth president of the world’s third-largest democracy. Noteworthy is the inclusion of President Widodo’s son as Subianto’s running mate for the vice president position.

    Amid the absence of official declarations from election authorities and the conspicuous lack of agreements from the two other former provincial governors in the race, Subianto, leaning on unofficial results, confidently announces his victory to a gathered crowd in Jakarta. His proclamation characterizes the win as “the victory of all Indonesians,” illustrating a strategic move to unite the populace under his leadership.

    Subianto is a  figure marked by a tumultuous past, faced a ban on entry into the United States for a lengthy two-decade period, a consequence of allegations related to human rights violations. His military trajectory unfolded against the backdrop of the Suharto dictatorship, a chapter that concluded just over 25 years ago in the Indonesian archipelago. Holding a prominent position in the military hierarchy, Subianto served as an army general, notably assuming the role of a special forces commander in a unit implicated in allegations of torture and disappearances—an assertion vehemently disputed by Subianto.

    Current unofficial tallies from Indonesian polling agencies indicate Subianto securing 57% to 59% of the votes, drawing on data from over 80% of the sampled polling locations. Although the official tally may extend over a month, historical precedent suggests the reliability of quick counts based on a sampling of polling stations across Indonesia. This method has consistently provided accurate reflections of results in the nation’s previous four presidential elections since the inception of direct voting in 2004.

    Despite his hasty declaration of triumph, Subianto struck a calm tone in a broadcast speech from a sports stadium. He issued a warning against conceit, stressing the need of humility in the face of uncertainty. Declaring that this victory should go beyond individual successes, he recognized the difficult journey that Indonesia travels as a country caught between a difficult historical story with democracy. 

    Indonesia is on the trajectory to become the world’s fourth-largest economy in the next decade, and in a need to strategically shape its foreign policies, with a particular emphasis on asserting uphand in south east Asia. However, inherent disparities, including ideological opposition to the West, a foundation rooted in communism and Islam, perceived imperfections in democracy, leadership marked by corruption or crime allegations, and the sensitive issue of Western Papua, have the potential to strain relations between Indonesia and Western nations. Paradoxically, these very differences also position Indonesia as a natural ally for China, further fortified by the nation’s possession of the world’s largest nickel reserves. Probably the duo will be best friends with benefits.

    In a decisive move in 2020, Indonesia imposed a prohibition on the export of nickel ore, aiming to establish a competitive electric vehicle and battery supply chain. Recognizing the strategic importance of this decision, China has made substantial investments, injecting a notable US$3.6 billion into Indonesia’s nickel sector in the first half of 2022. This financial commitment aligns seamlessly with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and complements Indonesia’s ongoing infrastructure initiatives, led by Incumbent President Widodo. These initiatives include notable projects such as the inception of Southeast Asia’s first high-speed rail.

    The apparent stagnation in Indonesia’s ambitious new capital project needs a significant increase in investment, a void that seems poised to be filled by China. President Widodo’s stance with foreign investment underscores the nation’s need, and China stands ready to fulfill it, fostering deeper connections with both Chinese companies and the government.

    It is certain that Prabowo, poised to assume office after Widodo, is unlikely to disrupt the established economic cooperation with China, a trend notably evident in his past actions. Similar to its Southeast Asian counterparts, Indonesia contends with China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. Despite facing challenges, including the tragic explosion at a Chinese-financed nickel processing plant last year, which sparked concerns about the perceived reliability of the Chinese relationship, China maintains its position as Indonesia’s primary trade and investment partner.

    Previously, apprehensions arose regarding the prospect of Indonesia adopting an assertive stance in response to China’s escalating tensions in the South China Sea. There was speculation that Indonesia might have explored solidarity with other ASEAN countries facing similar sovereignty disputes against China, potentially forming a united front against Beijing’s actions. However, in the present scenario, Indonesia’s inclination toward China seems increasingly probable. This alignment holds the potential to cultivate a coalition involving Russia, China, Indonesia, and possibly India, shaping a resilient trade bloc with a substantial market encompassing 300 billion people. Such an alliance could exert considerable political influence, countering regional interests pursued by the United States.

  • India and UAE Agree for a Trans-Continental Trade Corridor to Counter the BRI

    India and UAE Agree for a Trans-Continental Trade Corridor to Counter the BRI

    In a momentous diplomatic development, India and the United Arab Emirates have formalized a groundbreaking agreement, establishing a trade corridor strategically linking Europe and India through the Middle East via sea and rail routes. This calculated bypass aims to navigate away from Chinese funding, mitigate pirate threats, and avoid the Suez Canal rush. Unveiled during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Gulf states, this ambitious initiative carries the endorsement of both the United States and the European Union.

    The Indian foreign ministry issued a statement detailing the framework agreement, although specific terms remained notably scarce. Emphasizing that this endeavor not only builds upon existing understandings and collaboration but also seeks to deepen cooperation between India and the UAE for the enhancement of regional connectivity. Initially introduced in September, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in New Delhi, the corridor’s expansive scope stretches from India, crossing the Arabian Sea to the UAE, and further extending through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel before ultimately reaching Europe.

    The narrative of the India-Middle East Economic Corridor unfolds against the backdrop of a persistent four-month conflict in Gaza, introducing disruptions to U.S.-backed initiatives that seek to deepen integration between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In response to the ongoing regional unrest, Saudi Arabia, a pivotal player, has opted to suspend normalization plans. Notably, inquiries seeking clarification on the specifics of the agreement from the UAE foreign ministry have remained unanswered.

    During their meeting, characterized by Indian Prime Minister Modi as a fraternal relationship, both he and UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan expressed optimism despite the formidable challenges in the region.

    India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (Source: SCMP) 

    In heralding the establishment of a contemporary trade route, this initiative elegantly resurrects historical pathways once traversed by ancient civilizations – the Romans, Greeks, Venetians, Arabs, and Indians. These routes, integral for centuries, regrettably fell into neglect following the opening of the Cape route and the Suez Canal. According to reports, the modern project unfolds with the development of cutting-edge ports, railways, and special economic zones. The unveiling of this initiative took place on the grand stage of the G20 summit in India, where President Biden’s plan not only secured the support of the United States but also garnered backing from the European Union, France, Italy, and Germany.

    The proposed plan outlines two distinctive routes – an east corridor linking India to the Gulf Arab states and a northern corridor connecting the Gulf states to Europe. Beyond showcasing the United States’ adeptness in rallying its Middle East allies against China’s ascendancy, this ambitious project also underscores the Gulf states’ intricate balancing act between long standing allies like the U.S. and emerging partners like China, all within the framework of an evolving global order. Analysts discern this strategic move as a direct challenge to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a monumental infrastructure project launched by Beijing a decade ago to forge global connectivity. Intriguingly, three of the nations involved in the new corridor are already members of the BRI, potentially placing them in a delicate position. Italy, a G7 member, is also part of the BRI, but reports suggest that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is exploring ways to strengthen ties with China while contemplating a “soft” exit from the BRI—a move deemed unconventional by some analysts.

    The recently formalized framework agreement between India and the UAE appears to signify a joint commitment by both nations to advance their ambitious plan for establishing a corridor.  Beyond the corridor agreement, the UAE and India have solidified their collaboration through the signing of a bilateral investment treaty. This comprehensive partnership extends to cooperation agreements covering diverse areas such as electrical interconnection, trade, and digital infrastructure. Prime Minister Modi, making his seventh visit to the Gulf state in nearly a decade, is poised to address the Indian diaspora at an Abu Dhabi stadium and participate in a summit in Dubai. Additionally, he is scheduled to inaugurate the first-ever stone-built Hindu temple in the Middle East in Abu Dhabi, underscoring the deepening ties between India and one of its major trading partners.

    The envisioned trade corridor is anticipated to streamline movements significantly, serving as a linchpin for various interests. This ambitious project acts as a tool for the United States, seamlessly connecting all relevant stakeholders in the region. For the Middle East, the corridor transcends mere business; it is inherently intertwined with politics. The financial aspect is pivotal in the collaboration between Israel and the Gulf states. This agreement ensures their alignment with the United States, as financial influxes consolidate their cooperative stance.

    Amidst the Biden era and the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Gulf states’ relationship with the U.S. has experienced a slight diminishment. However, there’s a subtle yet discernible shift in their stance, displaying a newfound interest in engaging with Russia and China. The hope lingers that this project will foster common interests with Israel.

    From a European perspective, this route promises an uninterrupted supply chain, mitigating concerns about pirate attacks, Suez Canal blockages, and political obstacles. Furthermore, the project attracts infrastructure investments from the region, providing Europe access to India’s expansive market.

    For India, the corridor is more than an economic conduit; it symbolizes a strategic move to bolster power in countering China, perceived as a potential adversary in their future trajectory. This economic trade corridor, therefore, serves as a catalyst for extensive political cooperation, poised to have a profound impact on the unfolding dynamics of the 21st century.

  • The Global Ripple Effect: How Singapore’s Economy Responds to Recession

    The Global Ripple Effect: How Singapore’s Economy Responds to Recession

    In light of prevailing economic realities, Singapore has recalibrated its 2023 growth projections downward, as unveiled in official data released on Thursday. The revised growth rate now stands at 1.1%, slightly below the earlier estimate of 1.2%. The fourth-quarter performance, exhibiting a year-on-year growth of 2.2%, fell shy of the government’s initial projection of 2.8%, primarily attributed to a downturn in manufacturing activity. The Ministry of Trade and Industry has issued a cautionary note regarding “significant” downside risks looming in the global economy, citing concerns such as the potential escalation of the Israel-Hamas conflict or the War in Ukraine.

    The deceleration of Singapore’s economy is perceived as an integral facet of the global economic slowdown, which is casting a shadow over numerous major world economies. Although authorities characterize it as potentially shallow or technical, their confidence does not translate into clear solutions. Given Singapore’s economy’s high susceptibility to global trends, a slowdown is deemed expected. Despite some positive indicators, such as a decrease in unemployment, experts are forecasting a recession in the United States by mid-2024. The United Kingdom, grappling with a contraction of 0.3% in the final three months of 2023, is officially in recession, marking the conclusion of a dismal year with overall growth at just 0.1%—its weakest performance outside the Covid pandemic year of 2020 since 2009.

    Japan, once a competitor for the US economy in terms of growth, has surrendered its third position to Germany and finds itself in a recession, disclosed in data released on Thursday. This comes as Japan confronts challenges like a weak yen and a declining, aging population. While Japan’s economy grew 1.9% in nominal terms in 2023, making it the fourth-largest globally, its GDP in dollar terms stands at $4.2tn compared to Germany’s $4.5tn. Both countries share similarities such as being resource-poor, having aging populations, and heavy reliance on exports. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, is grappling with rising energy prices from Russia’s conflict in Ukraine, increasing interest rates in the eurozone, and a persistent shortage of skilled labor.

    Even China, with a faster-growing economy than the United States, is experiencing substantial pressure. Its stock markets have recently been among the world’s worst performers due to concerns about a sluggish economic recovery and challenges in the property sector. The global economic landscape appears increasingly complex and interlinked, with various nations navigating unique challenges amid the broader slowdown.

    In 2023, the main catalyst for Singapore’s economic growth emerged from the “other services industries,” showcasing a robust 3.9% year-on-year expansion. The Ministry of Trade and Industry highlighted positive contributions from the information and communications, as well as the transportation and storage sectors. Noteworthy is that all sectors, barring manufacturing, exhibited full-year expansions. Despite a contraction of 4.3% in the manufacturing sector, the construction industry in Singapore thrived, experiencing a notable growth of 5.2% throughout 2023. The information and communications sector demonstrated a year-on-year growth of 4.7%, slightly slower than the preceding quarter, while the finance and insurance sector witnessed a substantial increase of 5.4%, surpassing the 2.5% growth observed in the previous quarter.

    Peering into the horizon of 2024, Singapore upholds a growth projection ranging from 1% to 3%, foreseeing a gradual resurgence in manufacturing and trade-related sectors harmonizing with the global surge in electronics demand. The anticipated recovery in air travel and tourism is poised to lend additional support to sectors tied to tourism and aviation. Despite a steady external demand outlook for 2024, the Ministry of Trade and Industry underscores prevailing global economic headwinds. Ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, coupled with the delayed impacts of monetary tightening, present potential challenges. 

    In response to the Q4 2023 performance, Barclays has marginally adjusted its 2024 GDP growth forecast, revising it down to 2.7% from the initial estimate of 3.0%. Following the release of the data, the Singapore dollar was observed trading at 1.347 against the U.S. dollar. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) anticipates a deceleration in core inflation, a pivotal gauge for the central bank, to an average range of 2.5 to 3.5 per cent for 2024, down from the 4.2 per cent recorded in 2023. Reflecting on the uncertainties persisting in both the growth and inflation spheres, MAS Deputy Managing Director Edward Robinson remarked, “There are continuing uncertainties on both the growth and inflation fronts… so the MAS will be monitoring these trends and implications on both inflation and growth. We will review that comprehensively in the next scheduled review in April. Despite the economic landscape, the central bank has maintained its exchange rate-based monetary policy, holding steady for the third consecutive meeting, with inflation lingering as a concern.

    Singaporean politicians perceive the current scenario as opportune for policy enhancements. The slowdown in Western economies and Japan serves as a cautionary tale for Singapore, where the lowest birth rate and a dearth of skilled workers are seen as the root of the problem in deceleration. The Singaporean government recognizes the need to address these issues, and as the spotlight turns toward foreign nations, India emerges as a rising star while others express apprehension. Projections indicate that India is poised to secure the third position within the next two or three years. Currently experiencing a robust growth rate exceeding 7%, India’s fifth-largest economy expanded by 7.6% in the July-September quarter, propelled by government spending and manufacturing. Singapore needs to formulate policies that align with the trajectories of India and other emerging economies.

  • Imran Khan’s Setback: Coalition of Political Dynasties to Take Power in Pakistan

    Imran Khan’s Setback: Coalition of Political Dynasties to Take Power in Pakistan

    In the end, it’s all about power. Two arch-rivals, both hailing from prominent political dynasties and tainted by allegations of corruption, have forged an alliance to grasp the reins of authority. Following the dramatic aftermath of the recent general election in Pakistan, a coalition comprising the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has orchestrated a strategic accord, effectively sidelining the party led by the populist former prime minister, Imran Khan, despite its securing the highest number of votes.

    The coalition, composed of former collaborators who worked together to dismantle Imran Khan’s PTI government, was revealed in a press conference held in Islamabad on Tuesday night. With a shared goal of addressing the nation’s numerous challenges, these opposing factions, supported by two smaller coalition partners, publicly announced their plan to form a united government. Shehbaz Sharif, the brother of Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister and current president of PML-N, emerged as their nominee for the position of prime minister.

    In response to this intricate political maneuver, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party vehemently denounced the coalition as “mandate thieves,” criticizing the collaborative endeavor to wrest control from the party that secured the highest number of votes. Despite PTI holding the largest vote percentage and the highest number of members, their inability to contest with a uniform election symbol, due to a ban, led to PML-N emerging as the largest party according to the election commission. With PPP and smaller parties lending their support, this coalition is poised to secure the majority of 133 seats out of 265. The military, a crucial determinant of power dynamics in the nation, has already given its endorsement to this formidable coalition.

    As the final tally comes out by election commission, The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has successfully garnered support by endorsing independent candidates, securing a significant tally of 92 seats. In a tightly contested political arena, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) has strategically allied with independent candidates, consolidating a formidable bloc with 81 seats. The Pakistan People’s Party follows with 54 seats, while the Muttahida Qaumi Movement – Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F), and the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) hold 17, 6, and 3 seats, respectively. Contributing to the intricate mosaic of political representation, smaller parties like the Balochistan National Party (Mengal), Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party, Awami National Party, Balochistan Awami Party, Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen, Pakistan Muslim League (Z), and Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party each hold one or two seats. This diverse distribution highlights the multiparty dynamics in play, laying the groundwork for a coalition government that necessitates strategic alliances for effective governance.

    Initially anticipated as a straightforward victory for PML-N and its leader, the three-time former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, the election took an unexpected turn. PTI’s overwhelming support translated into the highest number of parliamentary seats, dealing a perceived blow to Nawaz Sharif, who had received tacit support from Pakistan’s influential military—an institution historically known for shaping election outcomes. PTI contends that widespread rigging tainted the electoral landscape, leading to an alleged injustice that deprived them of numerous parliamentary seats. From his prison confines on Tuesday, Khan cautioned against other political entities “venturing into the misadventure of forming a government with stolen votes.”

    The subsequent press briefing illuminated the coalition’s selection of Shehbaz Sharif, the younger sibling of Nawaz Sharif and a former prime minister from 2022 to 2023, as their nominee for the role of prime minister. With no opposition within the coalition, he stands poised to assume the position uncontested. Asif Ali Zardari, co-chair of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), elucidated the reasoning behind their alignment with PML-N, stating, “Looking at everything, we have thought and decided to sit together. We have contested elections against each other, but despite that, it is not necessary forever. Opposition happens in elections. It was electioneering opposition, not ideological opposition.”

    While Zardari is slated for the presidency nomination, the PPP affirmed their intention to abstain from holding ministries within the coalition government. These roles will be occupied by figures from PML-N and smaller coalition partners. Bilawal Bhutto, Zardari’s son and PPP co-chair, exhibited reluctance to forge a close association between the party and the coalition government, rooted in the considerable support for PTI among the masses and the perceived unpopularity of PML-N.

    Shehbaz Sharif expressed gratitude to Zardari and Bilawal, acknowledging their party’s decision to vote for PML-N. He emphasized the coalition’s unified stance, declaring, “Today we have united to tell the nation that we all accept the split mandate.” Despite this, public skepticism and legitimacy questions persist, prompting Shehbaz Sharif to pledge “revolutionary steps” to address the economic crisis. However, the new government inherits power amid a cloud of public distrust, particularly from fervent supporters of Khan and PTI, who view PML-N and PPP as enablers of military interference in politics.

    The coalition’s proclamation also underscores the sustained dominance of Pakistan’s two powerful political dynasties – the Bhuttos and the Sharifs. Maryam Nawaz, Nawaz Sharif’s daughter, assumes the role of chief minister of Punjab province, wielding significant political influence.

    In anticipation of a potential opposition role, PTI’s leadership categorically rejected coalition offers from PML-N or PPP, bolstered by the incarceration of numerous senior PTI figures who allege politically motivated legal proceedings against them. Responding to the evolving political landscape, Zardari extended an olive branch to PTI for reconciliation, stating, “It should, and every other political force should, come and talk with us. Our economic and defense agenda should be common.”

    Despite legal challenges raised by PTI, the impending government is destined to be a coalition of PML-N and PPP. Despite skepticism from international media, the military’s decisive role solidifies this alliance. The future trajectory of this government may be foreseeable, as any internal issues within this coalition are unlikely to lead to another election, given the fragile state of Pakistan’s economy. The notorious alliance of parties notorious for corruption and dynastic politics, appears poised to steer Pakistan, raising concerns about the country’s future stability.

  • Thaksin out of Prison: How Former Prime Minister’s Parole Will Affect Thailand’s Politics

    Thaksin out of Prison: How Former Prime Minister’s Parole Will Affect Thailand’s Politics

    In a surprising turn of events, Thailand’s justice minister has announced the impending release of Thaksin Shinawatra, the nation’s former prime minister currently serving time in prison. This development unfolds six months after Thaksin’s return from a self-imposed exile. Thaksin was originally given an eight-year sentence in August of the previous year due to charges of corruption and abuse of power, but King Maha Vajiralongkorn  reduced it to just one year. 

    Srettha, a member of the Pheu Thai Party led by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the youngest daughter of Thaksin, broke the news. Following the May elections, in which the progressive Move Forward Party won the majority of votes but was prevented from taking office by powerful groups allied with the military and traditional elite, the Pheu Thai Party emerged winner. This political environment in Thailand has become even more complicated as a result of this most recent event. The link between the military and the ruling Pheu Thai party is now solidified. Additionally, the military can take more serious action against Pita, the current populist leader, and his Move forward Party.

    In the current Thai political landscape, a complex dynamic unfolds as both populist leaders and the authorities find themselves in opposing positions. A populist figure, advocating for systemic change, is navigating a relentless stream of legal challenges, employing the typical lese majeste tool. Concurrently, after years of detainment and exile, a former prime minister pivotal in reshaping the nation’s authority is on the brink of release. This marks a momentous development as Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime minister, seeks liberation from imprisonment, having been a target of the country’s perilous lese majeste laws and accusations of dictatorship.

    The intrigue deepens as the military authority takes substantial actions against Pita, the current focal point of their attention, facing the looming threat of a party ban. Pita’s party holds the majority in the Thailand legislative assembly. The recent release of Thaksin, who once found himself in a similar predicament, sparks curiosity, considering his party’s prior banishment and his enduring political exile. The prevailing perception suggests that the authority’s heightened measures against Pita and the Move Forward Party are strategically aimed at garnering support from the populace, predominantly in favor of Pita.

    On Tuesday, Justice Minister Tawee Sodsong disclosed that the 74-year-old, renowned for his past ownership of Manchester City, would be among 930 prisoners granted early release. Thaksin qualifies for release after a six-month period due to his critical health condition and age exceeding 70, as outlined by Sodsong. While the specifics of his release remain unclear, there are expectations that monitoring measures, possibly including an ankle tag, and travel restrictions may be imposed. Thaksin’s return to Thailand aligns with his Pheu Thai party’s resurgence to power, in collaboration with pro-military factions, prompting speculation about a potential behind-the-scenes agreement influencing the reduction of his prison term.

    Thaksin Shinawatra was the inaugural prime minister of Thailand to serve a full term, leaving an indelible mark on the nation’s modern history. The former prime minister held the position from 2001 to 2006, and after being absent from the political arena since his 2006 ousting, he is making a comeback to Thailand after a hiatus of over 15 years. His leadership, widely considered distinctive, was characterized by a plethora of noteworthy policies that set him apart from his predecessors. These policies encompassed various domains such as the economy, public health, education, energy, social order, drug suppression, and international relations, marking a departure from the norm. Notably, Thaksin secured re-election once during his tenure. Among his most impactful initiatives were the reduction of rural poverty and the introduction of universal healthcare. These measures garnered previously overlooked support from the rural poor, particularly in the populous northeast region of the country.

    Thaksin’s cabinet comprised a diverse coalition, including academics, former student leaders, and past leaders of the Palang Dharma Party. Figures like Prommin Lertsuridej, Chaturon Chaisang, Prapat Panyachatraksa, Surapong Suebwonglee, Somkid Jatusripitak, Surakiart Sathirathai, and Sudarat Keyuraphan were instrumental in his government. Traditional regional power brokers also aligned themselves with his administration.

    Despite these achievements, Thaksin’s government faced mounting accusations of dictatorship, demagogy, corruption, conflicts of interest, human rights offenses, undiplomatic behavior, exploitation of legal loopholes, and a confrontational stance towards a free press. As a highly controversial leader, he became the subject of numerous allegations, including lese majeste, treason, usurpation of religious and royal authority, asset sales to international investors, and religious desecration.

    Rumors are circulating that Thaksin Shinawatra’s imprisonment, which commenced on August 22 last year, might conclude as early as this weekend, sparking discussions in local media. Thaksin continues to wield significant influence, stirring controversy in the nation. Since 2008, living in exile to evade legal charges, he has maintained impact by sharing viewpoints on social media and engaging in discussions on platforms. Despite his physical absence, political parties aligned with him dominated recent elections, with Move Forward, a pro-democracy party, emerging as the leading vote-getter.

    Upon his return to Bangkok, Thaksin received a hero’s welcome from supporters, making a poignant public gesture by prostrating himself before a portrait of the king at the airport. Recently, the former telecoms tycoon faced lese-majesty charges related to comments made almost a decade ago in South Korea. The outcome of the case remains uncertain, but Thaksin vehemently denies the charges and has written to the attorney general, seeking fair treatment.

    In the current landscape, Thaksin’s potential release signifies the authorities’ intent to bolster the Pheu Thai party, establishing a connection between the royal and government spheres to secure widespread support. The clear implication is that further measures will be taken against Pita and the Move Forward Party. The authorities have unequivocally identified Pita and the New Forward Party as their primary targets, signaling a strategic alignment with Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party.

  • In the Hands of Tomorrow: The Significance of Young Voters in Indonesia

    In the Hands of Tomorrow: The Significance of Young Voters in Indonesia

    Indonesia emerges as a pivotal testing ground, given the prevalent presence of millennials and Generation Z within its population. The growing influence of the internet-savvy generation within the voting booths plays a pivotal role in determining the election’s outcome.

    The Indonesian General Elections Commission highlights a significant demographic shift, revealing that out of the anticipated 205 million voters, a notable 106 million fall below the age of 40, constituting 52% of the expected electorate. This shift underscores the captivating nature of Indonesia’s elections, emphasizing the escalating impact of the younger generations on shaping the political landscape.

    With presidential elections occurring every five years, the 2024 polls on February 14th signify a noteworthy departure. This marks the first instance in a decade for the selection of a new leader due to the term constraints of the incumbent president, Joko Widodo. The 2019 election, with an 82% voter turnout, showcased the lowest abstention rate since the initiation of the presidential electoral process in 2004. Ongoing election campaigns vividly spotlight the candidates’ focused outreach to a specific audience.

    Campaign strategies encompass a diverse range, from TikTok initiatives and the rebranding of established political figures to resonate with the preferences of the new generation, to mobile phone-centric campaigns and musical festivals. Banners line roads, pavements, and homes, transforming social media feeds into a bustling battleground of election fervor, adorned with campaign videos, fan art celebrating candidates, and a torrent of opinions.

    Parties and candidates employ various strategies, such as distributing tickets to K-pop concerts and crafting social media feeds filled with cats and viral dancing, in a deliberate effort to capture attention. Even candidates with Islamic backing strategically tailor their efforts to address the concerns and inclinations of the youth demographic. This diverse array of campaign methodologies reflects a deliberate endeavor to connect with and appeal to various segments of the electorate, underscoring the evolving landscape of political outreach in Indonesia.

    Against the backdrop of a significant youth demographic, a discernible pattern emerges as all three contenders for political office in Indonesia surpass the age of 50. Notably, the leading aspirant, 72-year-old Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, strategically selects a vice-presidential candidate under 40, specifically Gibran Rakabuming Raka, aged 36 and incidentally, the offspring of the incumbent president. Subianto’s campaign tactics entail a deliberate effort to reshape public perception, steering away from the image of a military general accused of instigating unrest in the nation. Presently, he cultivates a contrasting persona – that of a genial grandparent, engaging in TikTok dances and even crafting a personalized avatar tailored to resonate with the TikTok generation. This calculated rebranding strategy, reminiscent of Jokowi’s past initiatives, underscores the candidates’ recognition of the influential role of social media and the effectiveness of well-funded campaigns in shaping public sentiment.

    Prabowo Subianto, a former special forces commander, carries a controversial legacy marred by allegations of past human rights abuses. These encompass claims of involvement in the abduction and enforced disappearance of student activists in 1997 and 1998. Despite being discharged from the army over these accusations, he has not faced criminal prosecution and vehemently denies any wrongdoing.

    Accusations of rights abuses in Papua and East Timor further stain Prabowo’s record, with allegations including targeted killings of East Timorese civilians, such as the notorious 1983 Kraras massacre where hundreds lost their lives. Despite labeling these claims as “unproven allegations, innuendoes, and third-hand reports,” Prabowo, renowned for his fiery temper, undergoes a substantial rebranding effort to secure voter favor. His campaign depicts him as a grandfatherly figure, adopting a softer tone in speeches and even showcasing jovial dance performances on stage.

    The primary concerns resonating among young Indonesians encompass the quality of life, corruption, institutional integrity, and environmental issues, particularly air pollution. Economic challenges, notably in social welfare and unemployment, add to the critical concerns, with 14% of Indonesians aged 15 to 24 grappling with joblessness in 2022. The youth, increasingly alarmed by climate change, particularly in Jakarta, the world’s most polluted city, assertively call for a government possessing both “good character” and a “certain level of competency” to address these pressing issues.

    Despite these urgent concerns, the youth engagement in social media appears more motivated by entertainment than the substantive problems they face. Some experts argue that the election’s social media space is often utilized to divert attention from real issues, providing entertainment through platforms like TikTok that create a screen-blanketing effect. Social media takes on a pivotal role in connecting with young voters, considering that nearly 60% of the nation’s workforce operates in informal sectors. TikTok and Instagram have transformed into crucial battlegrounds for political campaigns, featuring tactics such as TikTok live streams and targeted engagement to resonate with the younger demographic.

    As the election results approach on Wednesday, they not only hold the key to determining the nation’s new leader but also offer insights into the efficacy of social media campaigns in addressing the concerns of young voters. However, a growing concern arises, questioning whether political campaigns might excessively rely on superficial strategies, potentially trapping young voters in gimmicks rather than addressing substantive issues. The outcome not only shapes the nation’s future but also sets a global precedent on the role of screens in political campaigns and the behavior of the internet generation during elections.

  • People Choose Democracy in Pakistan; “Military Nominee” Fails to Impress

    People Choose Democracy in Pakistan; “Military Nominee” Fails to Impress

    In the recent Pakistan general election, both the military and Nawaz Sharif fell short in their endeavors to secure victory. Instead, the electorate opted for the alternative led by the Islamic populist figure Imran Khan, who is presently incarcerated on serious charges, including an alleged non-Islamic manner of marrying his wife – a crime in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Despite Imran Khan’s imprisonment, his party had to navigate the electoral landscape with independent candidates, lacking a uniform election symbol. Surprisingly, the voters rejected candidates endorsed by the military, opting instead for those aligned with Imran Khan.

    People Choose Democracy in Pakistan; “Military Nominee” Fails to Impress

    To summarize the distribution of seats for various parties in the Pakistan general election according to Al Jazeera’s report:

    • Pakistan People’s Party (PPP): 54 Seats
    • Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN): 76 Seats
    • Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Affiliates: 97 Seats
    • Others: 37 Seats (Including the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM -17)

    The total number of seats mentioned in the report is 264.

    According to reports from Pakistan, no single party secured a majority in the 265-seat assembly. Imran Khan’s affiliates emerged with a leading position, securing 97 seats, although they currently lack an official party structure. The party with the majority, officially backed by the military and representing former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), is set to shape the political landscape. The election outcome underscores a significant divergence from the expectations set by the military and Nawaz Sharif, highlighting the enduring support for Imran Khan and his political vision even in the face of challenges and legal controversies.

    This election outcome not only stands as a testament to Imran Khan’s political standing but, perhaps more significantly, reflects the public’s aversion to military intervention in governance. The lingering uncertainty revolves around whether Imran Khan can establish a government, fostering the potential for a coalition government or, conversely, grappling with a military junta in the upcoming term. Despite enduring challenges such as living costs, security, energy, employment, and environmental concerns, the noteworthy aspect extends beyond the yet undetermined final seat tally for each party. The remarkable voter turnout signals a resolute commitment to exercising democratic rights and resisting military interference in the electoral process.

    Despite allegations of vote-rigging and a suspicious internet blackout during the election, General Asim Munir, the current army chief, remains optimistic about the outcome. The military’s endeavors to manipulate the election were seemingly thwarted, partly due to the innovative use of social media by the PTI, including AI-generated campaign videos featuring Khan addressing voters from jail.

    Although Nawaz Sharif secured the second position, he assertively claims his right to form the next government. To achieve this, he may seek support from the PPP, his historical rivals, and potentially court independents aligned with Khan. Both parties, emblematic of powerful political dynasties—the Sharif family and the Bhutto family—may engage in political negotiations in the days ahead before the largest party or coalition is decided and subsequently invited by the president to form the government.

    Before the polling on February 8th, the prevailing perspective suggested that Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister and leader of the PML-N, was on the verge of assuming the role of the next prime minister. This perception gained traction as he appeared to have tacit support from Pakistan’s influential military establishment, a historical powerhouse recognized as the nation’s political arbiter, renowned for influencing elections and directly shaping governance through coups.

    As the election approached, it became clear that the military leadership was resolute in preventing Imran Khan’s party from regaining power. Khan, who had initially secured victory in 2018 with military backing, experienced the dissolution of their alliance, ultimately leading to the orchestrated downfall facilitated by the generals.

    In a spokesman role for Imran Khan, Ali Khan emphasized the crucial part that the military, frequently referred to as the “establishment,” plays in shaping the political environment. Ali Khan was shocked by the public’s overwhelming support and encouraged the “prime institution”, which is the military, to respect the people’s will and avoid getting directly involved in politics, even in the face of the military’s best efforts to retain control. 

    Despite these appeals, the imprint of the military’s influence remained unmistakable in the election outcomes. Nawaz Sharif’s apparent return from political exile, facilitated by a clandestine agreement with the army, echoed a history fraught with turbulence, marked by the conclusion of previous terms following challenges to military authority.

    Within Sharif’s party, apprehensions surfaced concerning the election results and the anticipated formation of a feeble coalition government. Some speculated that this coalition might align with the military’s agenda, strategically sidestepping challenges to their political and business interests. There were murmurs of the potential ascension of Sharif’s younger brother, Shehbaz Sharif, to the role of prime minister should such a coalition come to fruition.

    A senior PML-N leader intimated that the military harbored concerns about Nawaz Sharif’s pursuit of a parliamentary majority, apprehending the resurgence of a defiant leader. The military seemingly derived satisfaction from the election results, capitalizing on a society divided and polarized. A hung parliament, according to observers, conforms to the military’s proclivity for control through repression, ensuring their unopposed dominance in the political arena.

    The Chief of Pakistan’s military is urging political leaders to demonstrate “maturity and unity” in the aftermath of an inconclusive recent election. The failure to produce a clear winner has prompted the military’s favored party to forge a coalition for governance. The military’s historical influence over Pakistan’s political landscape, with generals overseeing nearly half of the country’s post-1947 history since partition from India, is significant. General Syed Asim Munir stressed that elections are not a zero-sum competition but a mechanism to determine the people’s mandate. He called on political parties to respond with maturity and unity, emphasizing the importance of stability and a healing approach to transcend the prevailing politics of anarchy and polarization.

    In the aftermath of an unforeseen election triumph, Imran Khan’s political party asserts its determination to lead the next government, despite opposition efforts to wrest power through a discreet coalition deal. However, challenges loom large as Khan remains incarcerated and effectively in exile, posing potential ramifications for the governance of any forthcoming administration. The political landscape, shaped by Imran Khan’s brand of Islamist populism, prompts reflections on Pakistan’s future, especially in the context of perceived shortcomings.

    The election results suggest potential geopolitical repercussions as well. A fragile government backed by the military may resort to conflict with India to garner public support, a move that could exacerbate the country’s existing challenges. The unfolding political developments will likely have a profound impact on the entire region. In such a scenario, Sharif emerges as a favorable candidate for the military. The impending struggle to secure a government position may witness independent affiliates aligning with Nawaz Sharif’s coalition, enticed by financial and power incentives. Should these efforts prove unsuccessful, the imminent specter of military rule—a familiar occurrence in Pakistan—continues to loom on the horizon.

  • Why is Free Kurdistan Not Happening?

    Why is Free Kurdistan Not Happening?

    Kurdistan, the homeland of the Kurds, remains unrecognized by the world and is confronted with an unprecedented threat to its survival. The autonomous region in Iraq, having established separate administrations, military structures, and a distinct identity, is actively advocating for complete statehood but finds itself in a state of limbo.

    As the United States’ closest ally in the region, with a majority Kurdish population, Kurdistan faces existential threats from neighboring countries that harbor a considerable Kurdish population antagonistic to their cause. Despite contemplating the immediate availability of statehood, the Kurds are indeed grappling with significant existential challenges. Various reasons contribute to the threats to the Kurds’ long standing aspiration for statehood, ranging from internal issues to concerns about the weakening of the American government.

    The original Kurdistan, also referred to as Greater Kurdistan, is a loosely defined geo-cultural region in West Asia where Kurds constitute a significant majority population, and the foundation of Kurdish culture, languages, and national identity is deeply rooted. Geographically, Kurdistan spans the northwestern Zagros and the eastern Taurus mountain ranges.

    Why is Free Kurdistan Not Happening?
    Map of Kurdistan (Image Courtesy: Fondation-Institut kurde de Paris)

    Kurdistan is commonly divided into four regions: Northern Kurdistan (southeastern Turkey), Southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq), Eastern Kurdistan (northwestern Iran), and Western Kurdistan (northern Syria). Some interpretations extend its boundaries into parts of southern Transcaucasia. Different Kurdish nationalist groups advocate for either an independent nation-state covering these regions with a Kurdish majority or increased autonomy within existing national boundaries. The precise demarcation of the region remains a contentious issue, with certain maps exaggerating its scope.

    As of a 2016 estimate from the Kurdish Institute of Paris, Kurdistan’s total population is around 34.5 million, with Kurds constituting 86% of the population in Northern Kurdistan. The region also includes Arab, Turkish, Assyrian (Syriac), Armenian, and Azerbaijani minorities. Southern Kurdistan hosts Christian (Assyrian and Armenian) and Turkish (Turkmen) minorities. Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran have significant Caucasian populations that underwent Kurdification, adopting Kurdish as their primary language. Kurdish, part of the Indo-European language family except for the Semitic and Turkic languages around them, is a crucial component of Kurdish identity.

    Geographically, Kurdistan covers approximately 190,000 km² in Turkey, 125,000 km² in Iran, 65,000 km² in Iraq, and 12,000 km² in Syria, totaling around 392,000 km². Turkish Kurdistan encompasses a substantial area in the Eastern Anatolia Region and southeastern Anatolia of Turkey, with an estimated 6 to 8 million Kurds residing in the region.

    The term “Kurdistan” has historical origins, first documented in 11th-century Seljuk chronicles. From the 8th to the 19th centuries, a multitude of Kurdish dynasties, emirates, principalities, and chiefdoms emerged. In the 20th century, there were short-lived attempts to establish Kurdish entities, including the Kurdish state (1918–1919), Kingdom of Kurdistan (1921–1924), Red Kurdistan (1923–1929), Republic of Ararat (1927–1930), and Republic of Mahabad (1946).

    Why is Free Kurdistan Not Happening?
    Map of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Image Courtesy: University of Kurdistan Hewlêr)

    Iraqi Kurdistan, which has the most chance for getting statehood and recognition from the international bodies, obtained autonomous status through a 1970 agreement with the Iraqi government, solidified as the autonomous Kurdistan Region within the federal Iraqi republic in 2005. In Iran, there is a Kurdistan Province, though it lacks self-rule. Kurds involved in the Syrian Civil War successfully seized control of significant portions of northern Syria, establishing self-governing regions under the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (commonly known as Rojava), where they aspire to achieve autonomy within a federal Syria post-war.

    A 2010 report from the United States, predating the instability in Syria and Iraq as of 2014, predicted the potential existence of Kurdistan by the year 2030. The vulnerability of the Iraqi state, exacerbated by the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, created an opening for Iraqi Kurdistan to pursue independence. Turkey, while historically opposing Kurdish autonomy in Turkey and Syria, shifted its stance toward acknowledging the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq.

    Turkey’s long standing fear has been that a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would fuel and support Kurdish separatists in Turkish provinces, leading to strong opposition to Kurdish independence in Iraq. However, amidst the chaos following the US invasion of Iraq, Turkey began collaborating more closely with the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government. Despite this, the mere mention or expression of ‘Kurdistan’ in Turkey still carries the risk of detention and prosecution.

    The successful 2014 Northern Iraq offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant further weakened the Iraqi state’s ability to exert power, providing the Kurds with a “golden opportunity” to enhance their independence and potentially declare an independent Kurdish state. The Islamic State’s hostility towards Turkey made Kurdistan strategically valuable to Turkey as a buffer state. In June 2014, a spokesman for Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party expressed Turkey’s readiness to accept an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq.

    Kurdistan, endowed with abundant oil resources, has been actively engaging in economic cooperation and securing oil deals primarily with its volatile neighbor, Syria. Despite the complexities surrounding the Kurdish issue in Syria, significant oil contracts have been forged between Kurdistan and Syria. Additionally, Iran, which has recently taken a stronger stance against Kurds in the region, particularly following the Mahsini issue, has also established increased economic cooperation with Kurdistan.

    According to the Iranian Free Zones News Agency (Freena), Hojatollah Abdolmaleki disclosed the collaboration during a press conference at Iran’s exclusive exhibition in Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan region. Abdolmaleki emphasized the pivotal role of the newly established free zone in fostering cooperation between Iran and Kurdistan. The opening ceremony of the exhibition saw the participation of senior officials from both sides, including Abdolmaleki, the secretary general of the Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce, the Iranian envoy in Sulaymaniyah, and the head of the Union of Exporters and Importers of the Kurdistan Region.

    Despite several promises for statehood from the United States, Iraq, the United Nations, and occasionally from Turkey, the Kurds have faced numerous obstacles, particularly prolonged referendums driven by various reasons. Although they came close to achieving statehood in 2017, even their allies rejected the prospect. The Iraqi government has reclaimed territories once occupied by the Kurds, including areas with significant oil reserves. The collapse of oil revenues has left the Kurds grappling with serious financial challenges.

    In addition to Turkey, Iran has also intensified actions against the Kurds, further contributing to the Kurds’ predicament. A significant division exists within the Kurdish population, with the ruling KDP party leaning towards Iran’s support rather than aligning with the Iraqi federal government. The United States has a vested interest in the region, providing military aid and financial assistance, with a notable presence of administrators and officials in Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan. However, the inactive governance and increased Iranian intervention have posed challenges.

    Despite the current difficulties, a people with a long history of fighting for their identity and a homeland are likely to find a solution to their current problems. However, the extended decision-making process by the United States could jeopardize a key and reliable ally in the region, potentially leading to strategic consequences.