Category: Asia

  • Is Sri Lanka quietly drifting back into India’s orbit?

    Is Sri Lanka quietly drifting back into India’s orbit?

    Long wary of being seen as a satellite of India, Sri Lanka has spent decades navigating its foreign alignments—at times courting the West, and more recently, leaning heavily toward China. That pivot, especially during the Rajapaksa era, brought a surge of Chinese investment but also coincided with one of the most severe economic crises in the island’s post-independence history. Now, under the weight of that collapse, Sri Lanka appears to be rebalancing. The island nation is quietly edging back toward New Delhi—not through grand gestures, but via a deliberate flow of strategic agreements and behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

    For Colombo, this shift marks a pragmatic recalibration. What was once seen as a one-sided relationship with India is increasingly viewed as a possible path out of economic despair. For New Delhi, the moment offers both a strategic opening and a pressing imperative. By providing critical aid, essential supplies, and infrastructure investment, India is not only helping to stabilize its southern neighbor but also reinforcing its presence in a region where Beijing’s influence has grown markedly.

    Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka

    Narendra Modi, the Indian Prime Minister who has skillfully crafted diplomatic relationships across the region, recently made a significant visit to Colombo. The trip—his first to Sri Lanka since President Anura Kumara Dissanayake took office in September last year—served as a symbol of the changing dynamics in South Asian geopolitics.

    During the visit, India and Sri Lanka signed seven key agreements spanning defense, energy, digital infrastructure, health, and trade. The move signaled a recalibration in regional alliances, as both nations work to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean.

    Initially, concerns in New Delhi centered around Dissanayake’s leftist background and potential leanings toward Beijing. However, those apprehensions have since softened. Instead of drifting closer to China, Colombo appears to be re-engaging with New Delhi in a more pragmatic and strategic manner.

    Dissanayake reassured Modi that Sri Lanka would not permit its territory to be used in any way that might threaten India’s security. Modi, in turn, welcomed the gesture, emphasizing the deeply interconnected nature of security interests between the two nations.

    India Backs Sri Lanka’s Core Needs

    Amid an economic collapse and mounting debt to China, India provided vital supplies and assistance when Sri Lankans needed them most. While China invested heavily in large-scale infrastructure projects—many of which offered limited benefits to ordinary citizens—India’s approach focused on immediate relief and practical support. This made a lasting impact on the public and nudged the Sri Lankan government toward rebuilding trust and strengthening ties with New Delhi.

    That relationship is now evolving. Expanding beyond emergency aid, India is investing across multiple sectors. As a symbol of this growing partnership, the two leaders recently inaugurated—virtually—the construction of a 120-megawatt solar power plant, a joint venture funded by India and aimed at advancing Sri Lanka’s energy future.

    Sri Lanka needs to balance

    While Sri Lanka is working to repair its relationship with India, cutting ties with China is far from simple. China remains Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral creditor, accounting for over half of the island’s $14 billion in bilateral debt at the time of its sovereign default in 2022. The economic collapse, however, forced Colombo to rethink its heavy dependence on China—a reliance that had contributed to the crisis—and created space for India to step in with substantial financial and material assistance.

    Nonetheless, China’s role in restructuring Sri Lanka’s infrastructure loans remains vital. President Dissanayake’s first official overseas visit to New Delhi in December signaled a renewed diplomatic warmth, but his subsequent trip to Beijing in January underscored the balancing act Colombo must maintain. That same month, Sri Lanka signed a $3.7 billion investment deal with a Chinese state-owned company to build an oil refinery in the country’s south, reaffirming Beijing’s enduring economic footprint.

    It’s evident that Sri Lanka still looks to China for large-scale funding—support that India, thus far, has been cautious to extend. As such, it would be premature to declare a pro-India tilt in Colombo’s foreign policy. Instead, Sri Lanka appears to be navigating a delicate path, seeking to balance both powers in pursuit of its own national interests.

    What happens next?

    It’s clear that Trump’s trade policies have shaken the global order. China is no longer the China the world once knew; it is now seeking broader relationships rather than maintaining a confrontational posture. This shift will inevitably influence dynamics in South Asia as well. The region, with its massive population, represents a significant market that China cannot afford to ignore. Yet among South Asian nations, India stands out with the strongest purchasing power—making a stable relationship with New Delhi increasingly important for Beijing.

    India, for its part, remains deeply concerned about China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka, which it considers part of its traditional sphere of interest. As China recalibrates its global strategy, it may seek to ease regional tensions with India, potentially stepping back from past hostilities. In this evolving landscape, the groundwork is being laid for improved relations between India and Sri Lanka—an alignment that could help India reclaim its influence in the region. At the same time, it offers Sri Lanka a valuable escape from the strategic and economic trap it has been struggling to navigate.

  • The Impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol: A Chapter Closes, But the Story Goes On

    The Impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol: A Chapter Closes, But the Story Goes On

    The president who declared martial law and attempted to shutter parliament has finally been decisively ousted. The political drama that has gripped South Korea since December is now approaching its climactic turn. In the peak moment of this saga, for 22 breathless minutes, millions across the nation listened as Chief Justice Moon Hyung-bae of the Constitutional Court delivered the verdict in the impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol—an outcome shaped by the president’s chaotic and authoritarian bid to consolidate power. The wait was excruciating, the atmosphere almost theatrical.

    The court’s ruling on Friday may have offered a fleeting sense of institutional redemption. Yet domestically, the country remains deeply fractured. The verdict that ousted the president is far from the final act. The saga will continue—perhaps as another season in a long-running national reckoning. The decision has now triggered a 60-day countdown to elect a new president, with the date to be announced within ten days by Acting President Han Duck-soo.

    A landmark verdict

    The Constitutional Court’s decision marks a pivotal juncture in South Korea’s democratic history. With each damning sentence, Chief Justice Moon Hyung-bae gave voice to a public long demanding the permanent removal of the suspended president. Crowds gathered outside the court hung on every word, their anticipation mounting as Moon methodically laid out the case against Yoon Suk Yeol.

    Moon declared that Yoon’s actions posed a direct threat to democracy. He asserted that the 64-year-old conservative populist had gravely betrayed the public’s trust, plunging the nation into its most destabilizing political crisis since its democratic transition in the late 1980s. When the Chief Justice finally pronounced that President Yoon was officially removed from office, the crowd outside erupted in cheers.

    According to Moon, Yoon’s declaration of martial law had sown widespread chaos, damaging both the economy and foreign relations. He emphasized that Yoon not only imposed martial law without legitimate cause but also violated the constitution by using military and police forces to obstruct the legislature. This, Moon concluded, constituted a flagrant abuse of emergency powers and a collapse of constitutional order.

    The Chief Justice stressed that the severity of Yoon’s violations—both in terms of constitutional principles and their broader political consequences—made his removal necessary. The decision, though deeply disruptive, was framed as essential to preserving democratic integrity.

    Yoon, who did not appear in court for the ruling, has no right to appeal. He now faces a separate criminal trial on charges of insurrection—a dramatic final chapter to a presidency undone by its own authoritarian excesses.

    The election is coming.

    South Korea’s turbulent political climate now shifts toward a high-stakes presidential election, set in motion by the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol. Acting President Han Duck-soo is expected to announce the election date in the coming days. Although the legal process has advanced, the political atmosphere remains deeply fraught, with the public starkly divided.

    Political parties are racing to field competitive candidates, with the Democratic Party’s Lee Jae-myung currently leading in the polls. In contrast, Yoon’s conservative People Power Party faces a formidable task: finding a nominee who is either free from association with the disgraced administration or capable of channeling the strongman persona that once galvanized Yoon’s base.

    During his presidency, Yoon often leaned on Cold War-era rhetoric, branding opponents as pro–North Korean or anti-state—language that analysts believe only deepened national polarization. As the party charts its path forward, any potential candidate will need to navigate this fractured landscape by studying Yoon’s core supporters and tailoring a message that resonates with them.

    Unsettled division

    The ongoing clashes between South Korea’s rival political factions present a profound challenge to the country’s democratic foundations. While friction between a president and a parliament controlled by opposing parties is not unusual, the current level of animosity has taken a deeply unsettling turn. The National Assembly has become a battleground, a reflection of the broader dysfunction consuming the nation’s political discourse.

    When the Assembly held its initial impeachment vote in December, it offered the People Power Party a chance to distance itself from President Yoon Suk Yeol. Instead, its lawmakers boycotted the vote and reaffirmed their loyalty to the embattled leader. In doing so, they lent credence to Yoon’s widely discredited claims that recent elections—including a parliamentary vote earlier in the year—had been tainted by fraud.

    Such rhetoric found a receptive audience among Yoon’s supporters, who echoed Donald Trump’s “Stop the Steal” slogans as they poured into the streets. Conspiracy theories, once confined to the margins, quickly moved to the heart of political protest.

    Whoever takes office in the upcoming presidential election will inherit the unenviable task of bridging a deeply polarized society and restoring trust in democratic institutions—institutions that many believe Yoon systematically undermined.

    Conservatives in Trouble

    The Constitutional Court’s ruling brings a dramatic close to the turbulent three-year presidency of Yoon Suk Yeol, a conservative populist whose rise and downfall are now framed by impeachment. After narrowly defeating liberal candidate Lee Jae-myung in the 2022 election, Yoon was initially seen as a bold, no-nonsense leader poised to cut through political deadlock and restore order to a weary electorate. But what once seemed like strength soon hardened into inflexibility. His presidency became defined by relentless confrontation—battling an opposition-led National Assembly, targeting critical journalists, clashing with striking medical workers, and obstructing probes into corruption allegations involving his wife, Kim Keon Hee. His rhetoric grew increasingly incendiary, casting political opponents as criminals and accusing them of colluding with North Korea, echoing the paranoia of South Korea’s Cold War past.

    In the wake of the ruling, the People Power Party issued a restrained statement, calling the verdict regrettable while affirming its respect for the Constitutional Court’s decision. The party also extended a formal apology to the public. Meanwhile, Yoon’s legal team denounced the decision as unconstitutional and demanded his immediate reinstatement. But public sentiment had already turned decisively against him. A Gallup Korea poll released just days before the verdict found that 60 percent of South Koreans supported his permanent removal from office.

    With the political winds shifting sharply against the conservatives, Yoon’s party now faces an uphill battle as it braces for the upcoming presidential election.

    The saga continues

    The political saga is far from over. Few believe that either the candidates or the electorate in the upcoming presidential election will be able to move beyond the bitterness of the past four months. Yoon’s future also looms as a troubling uncertainty in South Korean politics. He now faces a separate criminal trial on charges of insurrection—a grave offense that carries the possibility of life imprisonment or even the death penalty, although no executions have been carried out in South Korea since the late 1990s. Despite his removal from office, Yoon continues to command a fiercely loyal base, and how his supporters respond in the coming weeks will be closely watched. As the country approaches the polls, the political landscape remains deeply fractured. A liberal victory appears increasingly likely, while the conservative camp is gripped by internal doubts and public distrust. And The climate of hostility shows little sign of dissipating.

  • Bangladesh beckons China, offering a strategic foothold

    Bangladesh beckons China, offering a strategic foothold

    Bangladesh’s interim government has harbored resentment toward India from the outset, frequently expressing its hostility through political actions and rhetoric on social media. From symbolic gestures—such as placing Indian flags beneath their feet—to inflammatory online discourse, nationalist factions in Bangladesh regularly voice their disdain for India, despite its crucial role in the country’s independence.

    With relations with India strained and facing economic, demographic, and cultural challenges, Bangladesh has consistently sought external support. A decade ago, Pakistan might have been a viable ally, but its internal crises have rendered it ineffective. The West, which once backed efforts to unseat the Hasina government, now maintains its distance, wary of provoking Bangladesh’s growing Islamist factions. Russia, reluctant to jeopardize its strong ties with India, has similarly refrained from direct involvement—leaving China as the most viable alternative for Dhaka’s new leadership.

    As the geopolitical landscape of South Asia shifts, Beijing is steadily entrenching itself in Bangladesh, weaving a web of economic and strategic entanglements that grant it a firmer grip on the Bay of Bengal. This maneuvering is more than a matter of regional diplomacy—it is a calibrated challenge to India’s long-standing influence, a quiet but deliberate push to reshape power dynamics in the subcontinent. For New Delhi, the implications are clear. The alignment between Dhaka and Beijing is not just a passing phase but a structural shift, one that threatens to redefine the balance of power. 

    Evolving Bilateral Cooperation with China

    After meeting with Muhammad Yunus, the leader of Bangladesh’s interim government, Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to deepening bilateral ties, emphasizing China’s readiness to elevate cooperation with Bangladesh. According to Yunus office, the trip secured $2.1 billion in Chinese investments, loans, and grants.

    A substantial portion of this funding is earmarked for establishing a Chinese Industrial Economic Zone (CIEZ) in Bangladesh, with nearly 30 Chinese companies pledging $1 billion to the project. This aligns with Yunus push for increased private Chinese investment in Bangladesh’s manufacturing sector.

    Additionally, China plans to provide a $400 million loan to modernize Mongla, Bangladesh’s second-largest port. Further cooperation on projects like Mongla’s modernization and the potential Teesta River initiative is drawing Bangladesh deeper into China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Discussions also covered water resource management, and Beijing reaffirmed its support for Bangladesh’s efforts to repatriate over a million Rohingya refugees still living in overcrowded camps after fleeing persecution in Myanmar.

    For Bangladesh’s interim government, Yunus meeting with Xi was a significant diplomatic breakthrough. While many countries remain hesitant to engage in large-scale agreements with an interim administration, China has shown no such reservations, actively reviving ties that had remained stagnant since the previous government’s fall.

    However, a pressing concern is the widening trade imbalance. Bangladesh’s exports to China, primarily textiles, account for only a fraction of the $23 billion bilateral trade volume. In response, China has granted zero-tariff market access to Bangladeshi products, creating new opportunities for industries such as leather goods. Agricultural exports, including mangoes and jackfruits, are already in the pipeline, with the potential for further expansion into China’s vast agricultural market.

    Yet, concerns persist over the nature of Chinese investments. Unlike Western economic partnerships, Chinese funding often comes with minimal social or environmental safeguards, raising questions about how much Bangladesh’s labor force and broader population will truly benefit from these deals.

    Worsening Bilateral Cooperation with India

    India maintained a strong relationship with Sheikh Hasina’s government, but her departure has disrupted cross-border ties. This shift became evident when Muhammad Yunus chose China for his first state visit, despite reports suggesting that he initially sought to visit New Delhi first.

    According to Yunus press secretary, Shafiqul Alam, the interim government had formally requested a bilateral visit to India as early as December last year—weeks before finalizing the trip to China. However, India did not respond favorably. Meanwhile, speculation remains that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, known for his Hindu nationalist stance, may explore engagement with the Yunus administration, despite growing allegations of violence against Hindu minorities.

    Analysts suggest that Bangladesh’s interim government is aware of the strategic imperative to maintain stable relations with India. Bangladesh is equally important for India, both as a regional partner and a key player in maintaining stability in South Asia. Modi’s recent meeting with Yunus during a major regional summit underscored ongoing cooperation, and his Independence Day message to Bangladesh’s leadership reaffirmed the significance of strong bilateral ties.

    However, tensions persist, exacerbated by Hasina’s continued presence in India. The growing closeness between Yunus and China is likely to further strain relations, deepening the rift between Dhaka and New Delhi.

    Future of India-Bangladesh Relations

    Given the profound historical and cultural ties between the two nations, the restoration of diplomatic relations remains essential. Yet, the trajectory appears to be diverging. China’s chief interest in Bangladesh lies in its strategic position, a development that poses a considerable risk for India. The Bay of Bengal, a critical extension of the Indian Ocean, serves as India’s most secure maritime domain, anchoring key naval installations along its eastern seaboard.

    India’s vulnerability is further compounded by the narrow corridor that connects its mainland to the landlocked northeastern states, a passage running along the Bangladesh border. Any shift in Bangladesh’s geopolitical stance could disrupt India’s regional security strategy. Yunus recent remarks on the issue have heightened concerns in India, fueling growing hostility toward the Bangladeshi government. Meanwhile, similar apprehensions are reportedly rising in Dhaka, further deepening the divide.

    India may choose to hold off on any decisive diplomatic moves until after Bangladesh’s elections, with Modi likely to steer clear of direct engagement until a new government is formally in place in Dhaka.

  • Can East Asia Set Aside Old Rivalries to Forge a New Economic Order?

    Can East Asia Set Aside Old Rivalries to Forge a New Economic Order?

    While East Asia remains divided into two camps—one aligned with the U.S. and the other with China—recent developments have sparked speculation about a striking possibility: that the region’s economic giants—China, Japan, and South Korea—could set aside their long-standing rivalries to forge a new economic order. Such an alliance could emerge as a formidable force in Asia, challenging the U.S.-led global system and reshaping the balance of power.

    This idea gained traction after reports from China, initially shared by a social media account affiliated with Chinese state media and later picked up by major outlets like DW, captured widespread interest. As the world focuses on Trump’s escalating tariff threats, East Asian nations—long dependent on trade with the U.S. and deeply embedded in global production and innovation networks—find themselves particularly exposed.

    Despite historical tensions and political differences, Trump’s tariff war is increasingly seen as a common economic challenge. His policies, which make no distinction between allies and adversaries, aim to restore manufacturing to the U.S. or at least rebalance trade—a strategy that threatens to further slow growth in these East Asian economies.

    Amid this uncertainty, diplomatic engagements among these nations have taken on greater significance. Meetings that might have once drawn routine attention are now closely scrutinized, with Chinese reports of closer cooperation between these states gaining widespread recognition.

    The meeting in Seoul

    While the world was waiting for Trump’s Liberation Day announcements on new tariff rates, a pivotal meeting took place in Seoul. China, Japan, and South Korea came together to strengthen trade cooperation, bringing together South Korean Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun, Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Yoji Muto, and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao.

    In a joint statement released after the meeting, the three trade ministers committed to advancing comprehensive and high-level negotiations on a South Korea-Japan-China free trade agreement, aiming to bolster both regional and global trade, as reported by DW.

    South Korean Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun emphasized the need to reinforce the implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), in which all three nations participate. He also highlighted the importance of creating a framework to expand trade cooperation through Korea-China-Japan FTA negotiations.

    The countries further pledged to foster a stable and predictable trade and investment environment. Ahn pointed to the increasing fragmentation of the global economic landscape, stressing the necessity of collective efforts to tackle shared challenges.

    As part of their ongoing collaboration, the ministers agreed to hold their next meeting in Japan.

    Trump’s tariffs

    As Donald Trump announced new tariffs on Wednesday, East Asia is set to bear the brunt of the economic repercussions. A base tariff of 10% has been introduced, and in a bid to rebalance trade, China, Japan, and South Korea will face even steeper taxes, with no exceptions made for U.S. allies.

    Chinese imports will now be subject to a total tariff of 54%, combining a newly imposed 34% tariff with the existing 20%. Key U.S. partners have not been spared—South Korea will be hit with a 26% tariff, while Japan will face a 24% rate. The base tariffs will take effect on April 5, with the higher reciprocal rates coming into force on April 9.

    Adding to the economic strain, new tariffs on automobiles and auto parts have been introduced, delivering a heavy blow to the manufacturing sectors of China, Japan, and South Korea. As home to some of the world’s largest automakers, these nations rely heavily on their automotive industries, making the new trade barriers a serious threat to their economic stability.

    Obstacles outweigh potential?

    While the economic benefits of closer cooperation are real, the challenges outweigh the advantages. Generational animosity between these nations remains strong, and domestic politics in each country often thrives on such rivalries. Closer collaboration could destabilize the already fragile political landscapes of Japan and South Korea, both of which face significant internal challenges. Additionally, the ideological divide between China’s communist government and Japan and South Korea’s democracies raises further concerns about compatibility.

    Another major obstacle is the deep-rooted geopolitical ties—Japan and South Korea’s strong alliances with the U.S. contrast sharply with North Korea’s alignment with China. Both Tokyo and Seoul receive substantial economic and security support from Washington, and any shift toward deeper cooperation with China could put them in a difficult position. Trump, known for his retaliatory economic policies, could respond unfavorably to such a move.

    Amid these complexities, a report from a social media account affiliated with Chinese state media on Monday claimed that China, Japan, and South Korea had agreed on a joint response to U.S. tariffs. However, Seoul dismissed the claim as exaggerated, and Tokyo outright denied that such discussions took place. A spokesperson for South Korea’s trade ministry stated that the assertion was overstated and pointed to the official text of the countries’ joint statement.

    At a press conference on Tuesday, Japan’s Trade Minister Yoji Muto acknowledged that the trade ministers had met over the weekend but clarified that no such discussions had occurred. He described the meeting as a general exchange of views rather than a coordinated economic response. Yes, the fear is real.

    What if major economies join forces?

    According to the IMF, China is the world’s second-largest economy at $20 trillion, followed by Japan at $4 trillion and South Korea at $2 trillion. Together, they form a $26 trillion economy—larger than the European Union’s nominal GDP and nearing the $30 trillion U.S. economy. However, uniting these economic powerhouses remains a daunting challenge, despite their strong trade ties.

    Japan and South Korea depend on China for semiconductor raw materials, while China imports advanced chip products from both nations. Acknowledging this interdependence, all three countries have pledged to strengthen supply chain cooperation and expand discussions on export controls.

    At the Seoul meeting, trade ministers from China, Japan, and South Korea committed to expediting negotiations for a trilateral free trade agreement aimed at strengthening regional and global trade. A spokesperson for South Korea’s trade ministry stated that all three nations acknowledged evolving global trade dynamics and reaffirmed their dedication to ongoing economic cooperation.

    Some analysts speculate about the potential formation of an Asian economic bloc that includes ASEAN and India, creating a formidable economic force. However, deep-seated rivalries, competing strategic interests, and the ambitions of some leaders to establish an “Asian NATO” pose significant challenges, making full economic integration uncertain.

  • As Democracy Falters, a Nostalgic Call for Monarchy Rises in Nepal

    As Democracy Falters, a Nostalgic Call for Monarchy Rises in Nepal

    Nepal, one of the world’s youngest republics, abolished its centuries-old monarchy in 2008 with the promise of stability and renewal. Nearly two decades later, that promise has unraveled. Instead of progress, democracy has brought political paralysis, economic stagnation, and a deepening public disillusionment. The republic is in crisis, and many are beginning to question whether the revolution was a mistake.

    The call for the monarchy’s return is no longer a fringe sentiment. Protesters fill the streets—not out of nostalgia, but out of frustration with the leaders who replaced the king. The government, unnerved by the growing unrest, has responded with crackdowns—at times, with deadly force. The same streets where crowds once gathered to demand democracy are now filled with demonstrators calling for its reversal.

    Is Nepal on the verge of reversing its own revolution?

    Increasing Protests

    Thousands of protesters gathered in Nepal’s capital on Friday, demanding the restoration of the Hindu monarchy and the country’s return to a Hindu state. The demonstrations erupted into violent clashes with police, leaving two people dead and dozens injured. Chaos unfolded as protesters broke through barricades and hurled stones at officers. In response, police fired tear gas, rubber bullets, and live rounds into the air. The unrest quickly spread, with rioters vandalizing homes, shops, and political party offices, even setting fire to buildings, including the headquarters of a newspaper and a TV news channel.

    Police spokesperson Shekhar Khanal confirmed that 17 protesters had been arrested, explaining that security forces were left with no option but to intervene when demonstrators attempted to breach restricted areas. He stated that officers used tear gas to disperse the crowd after protesters tried to force their way through, but the situation escalated as they resorted to vandalism and arson. One protester was killed in the clashes, while a journalist lost his life when a building was set on fire. However, royalist protesters claim that the police were the first to resort to violence.

    Government Tightens Control

    The government recognizes the gravity of the escalating unrest and has decided to take stronger measures. Support for the pro-monarchy movement has surged amid Nepal’s deepening political and economic instability, fueling widespread dissatisfaction. However, the government’s primary concern remains suppressing the protests, fearing they could spiral into a crisis capable of toppling the administration—an outcome not uncommon in South Asia.

    In response, authorities have imposed a curfew in parts of the capital and deployed security forces to maintain control. Prime Minister KP Oli has convened an emergency cabinet meeting to assess the escalating security crisis.

    The protests, the largest since 2023, highlight the growing momentum behind the push for the monarchy’s restoration. Earlier this month, over 10,000 supporters gathered at Kathmandu airport to welcome former King Gyanendra, chanting calls for his reinstatement. Ahead of the demonstrations, the Committee for the Restoration of Monarchy clarified that their demand was for a constitutional monarchy—one that would coexist with a democratic government and serve as a stabilizing force above politics. However, the government remains staunchly opposed, and Gyanendra himself has a history that suggests a deep affinity for power.

    A monarch once much hated

    As royalist support gains momentum, apprehension over the monarchy’s return persists. While nostalgia for the past is growing, the monarchy was once widely despised—a sentiment that fueled Nepal’s deep political strife, akin to civil war, the rise of the Maoist insurgency, and prolonged instability. The country continues to grapple with the lasting effects of that turmoil.

    Gyanendra, the king championed by royalists, remains a polarizing figure. He ascended the throne in 2001 after a mass shooting at the royal palace claimed the lives of most of his family. Initially, he held only ceremonial authority, but in 2005, he seized absolute power, dissolving the government, imprisoning political leaders, declaring a state of emergency, and deploying the army to govern the country. Widespread protests ultimately forced him to cede control to a democratically elected government in 2006. Two years later, in 2008, parliament formally abolished the monarchy.

    A failed democracy

    People once fought fiercely for democracy, but many now question whether it was worth it. Since the republic’s establishment, Nepal has been mired in political instability, with fragile coalition governments collapsing within months and senior leaders entangled in corruption scandals. Public frustration has steadily grown, fueling the resurgence of the pro-monarchy movement. Many supporters do not believe the king will miraculously fix the country, but they see no alternative as corruption deepens and social decay forces their children to seek opportunities abroad. Their disillusionment has driven them back to the streets.

    Meanwhile, pro-government voices claim the movement is fueled by nostalgia, with protesters longing for an imagined era of stability—particularly the so-called “glorious days” of the 1980s, a period Nepal never truly experienced as other nations did. Some, especially the communist leaders now in power, accuse India of interference, arguing that New Delhi would prefer a monarchy over a pro-China republic in Nepal.

    Regardless of the competing narratives, one reality is clear: Nepal’s democracy has failed its people, and they are exhausted.

  • South Korea Reinstates Han Duck-soo After Impeachment Rejected

    South Korea Reinstates Han Duck-soo After Impeachment Rejected

    Another day, another twist. South Korea’s political drama is becoming more gripping—and increasingly unpredictable. The Constitutional Court has overturned the impeachment of Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, reinstating him as acting president in yet another dramatic turn amid months of upheaval.

    Han initially stepped into the role after President Yoon Suk Yeol was impeached for briefly declaring martial law late last year. However, his tenure as acting president was short-lived—lasting less than two weeks—before he was impeached and suspended by the opposition-controlled parliament on December 27 for refusing to appoint three additional justices to the Constitutional Court.

    The decision, which could shape Yoon’s future, put Han at odds with the opposition.

    An Important Verdict

    On Monday, the court’s justices voted seven to one to overturn Han Duck-soo’s impeachment. Of the eight justices, five acknowledged the validity of the impeachment motion but ruled that there were insufficient grounds to remove him, as he had not violated the constitution or South Korean law regarding the martial law declaration or potential insurrection, according to a court statement. Two justices found the impeachment motion invalid from the outset, arguing that it had not secured the required two-thirds majority in parliament. Only one justice voted in favor of impeachment.

    Political Deadlock in South Korea

    South Korea remains mired in political deadlock, with the president and parliament locked in a standoff, each representing rival parties unwilling to display even a modicum of political maturity. The country lacks both strong and imaginative governance. While the Constitutional Court’s ruling restores a form of leadership, whether it can resolve the impasse remains uncertain.

    Although the political deadlock stems from the last parliamentary election, the crisis escalated dramatically when President Yoon Suk Yeol abruptly imposed martial law on December 3. Despite his attempts to retain power, he was ultimately impeached following sustained efforts by parliament. Prime Minister Han Duck-soo briefly assumed the role of acting president, only to face impeachment himself soon after. In the aftermath, Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok took over as acting president while the Constitutional Court deliberated on the cases of both Yoon and Han, deepening the country’s governance turmoil.

    Reinstated as acting president on Monday, Han welcomed the court’s decision and described it as a wise ruling. He emphasized the urgency of national unity, noting that citizens were clearly voicing their discontent with the country’s deeply polarized political landscape. He added that there was no room for further division and that the nation’s priority should be to move forward.

    At 75, Han is a seasoned statesman with more than three decades of leadership experience, having served under five presidents from both conservative and liberal parties. In a nation deeply polarized by partisan politics, he has been regarded as a rare figure whose career transcends ideological divides. Parliament impeached him over his alleged involvement in the martial law declaration, his refusal to appoint additional justices to the Constitutional Court, and his opposition to special counsel bills targeting Yoon and First Lady Kim Keon-hee. 

    What Comes Next?

    The country is grappling with one of its worst ecological crises, marked by rampant wildfires, severe drought, and escalating economic challenges—emergencies that call for strong and stable leadership. Yet, political leaders remain entrenched in their rivalries, unwilling to set aside their differences.

    Despite his reinstatement, Acting President Han continues to face resistance from the opposition. The opposition-led parliament has accused him of failing to prevent Yoon’s declaration of martial law, a charge he has consistently denied. At his sole hearing on February 19, Han rejected any involvement in the decision and urged the court to dismiss the impeachment.

    Yoon’s office welcomed Han’s reinstatement, stating that the ruling exposed the reckless and politically motivated nature of excessive impeachments by the national assembly. The officers expressed hope for greater stability in governance, though the next episode remains volatile.

  • Indonesia Expands Military’s Role, Raising Fears of Democratic Erosion

    Indonesia Expands Military’s Role, Raising Fears of Democratic Erosion

    In a nation that has endured military brutality and struggled to reclaim democracy, fears of a return to military-dominated governance are once again resurfacing. Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy, stands at a critical juncture. President Prabowo Subianto—an ex-special forces general and former son-in-law of Suharto, the country’s longtime autocrat—has ratified contentious amendments to military law, expanding the role of armed forces personnel in civilian governance. This shift raises concerns that Indonesia could be inching back toward military dominance, reminiscent of the New Order era, when the armed forces wielded sweeping political power under Suharto’s rule.

    The controversial revision

    Indonesia’s parliament has passed sweeping revisions to the country’s military law, expanding the presence of active-duty military personnel in civilian government roles. The new legislation increases the number of agencies where military members can serve from 10 to 14, adding institutions such as disaster mitigation and the attorney general’s office. Previously, officers seeking civilian posts outside a select group—including the defense ministry and state intelligence agency—were required to resign or retire from military service.

    The revisions further extend these privileges to key government bodies, including the state secretariat, the counterterrorism agency, and the narcotics agency. Additionally, the law raises the retirement age for officers, a change critics argue deepens military influence in governance.

    The amendments were approved on Thursday in a plenary session led by a parliament dominated by President Prabowo Subianto’s ruling coalition. Speaker Puan Maharani presided over the unanimous vote, asserting that the revisions uphold democratic principles and human rights—claims that activists and political analysts have met with deep skepticism.

    What the government says

    Indonesia’s law minister, Supratman Andi Agtas, has rejected concerns that the revised law signals a return to the military dominance of the Suharto era, insisting that the changes are necessary to address domestic and geopolitical challenges. Defending the amendments, Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin told parliament that shifting geopolitical dynamics and advancements in global military technology require the armed forces to adapt to both conventional and unconventional threats.

    Despite initially opposing the revisions, the main opposition party ultimately endorsed them—a decision critics argue undermines democracy and reflects the growing political alignment in favor of Prabowo since his election last year.

    What Critics Say

    Critics contend that President Prabowo is intent on reinstating the military’s influence in civilian affairs, arguing that the swift passage of these amendments undermines the government’s stated commitment to human rights and accountability. The bill was approved in under two months after the president formally requested the amendment, raising concerns over the hasty legislative process and lack of transparency.

    The creeping militarization of government has been apparent for some time, reinforcing fears within civil society. However, some argue that warnings of a full-scale return to the New Order era may be overstated.

    Student organizations have vowed to protest outside parliament in Jakarta, with one group condemning the law as a threat to democracy. By Thursday evening, nearly a thousand protesters had gathered, holding banners as police officers and military personnel maintained a heavy presence around them.

    Undermining Democracy

    Despite 25 years of efforts to curb military influence in politics and governance, local human rights watchdog Imparsial found that nearly 2,600 active-duty officers were already serving in civilian roles even before the latest legal revisions. The recent changes further entrench military presence in government under Prabowo.

    During Suharto’s rule, the armed forces exercised a dual function, controlling both security and administrative affairs—a structure many see mirrored in Prabowo’s legislative amendments. Critics warn that his presidency could erode Indonesia’s hard-won but fragile democracy. Since taking office last October, he has already expanded the military’s role in public affairs. His flagship $4 billion free-meal program for children and pregnant women, for instance, relies on logistical support from the armed forces. Given these developments, concerns over growing military influence appear well-founded.

  • Myanmar’s Junta Moves Toward Elections, but Fears of a Farce Persist

    Myanmar’s Junta Moves Toward Elections, but Fears of a Farce Persist

    Despite Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, the junta is pressing ahead with plans for an election. Rather than seeking peace or addressing the country’s deepening crisis, it is focused on tightening its grip on key cities through political maneuvering and the familiar tactics of sham elections used by other authoritarian regimes.

    On the surface, this move appears to be an attempt to pacify critics and draw advancing rebel groups into the political process. Yet, with the junta widely despised across the country, its promise of elections in December 2025 or January 2026 is seen as little more than political theater. A genuinely fair vote would almost certainly result in the military’s defeat—an outcome it is unlikely to accept. So, instead of bringing stability, the election is expected to escalate violence, fuel repression, and serve as yet another means for the junta to cling to power.

    The Call for an Election

    Myanmar’s military junta announced on Saturday, through state media, that it would hold a long-promised election—its first time specifying a timeline since seizing power in a 2021 coup. The announcement follows junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s recent visit to Moscow, where Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly endorsed the plan.

    China, a key military ally with significant economic interests in Myanmar, has also expressed support for the elections. Meanwhile, Belarus, another close partner of the junta, has signaled its willingness to assist in the process. However, most Western governments and election watchdogs are expected to dismiss the vote as a sham, lacking both credibility and legitimacy.

    A challenging election

    An election—if conducted under genuine democratic principles—would be fraught with challenges, as opposition parties are either banned or have chosen to boycott the process. Nearly 22,000 political prisoners remain behind bars, according to a local monitoring group, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, whose government was overthrown in 2021. Her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), was dissolved after failing to re-register under an electoral law imposed by the junta following the coup.

    Beyond political repression, the feasibility of holding nationwide elections remains highly questionable. The military has lost control of vast swathes of the country to a patchwork of opposition groups actively resisting its rule. The junta’s territorial losses have been so severe that it managed to conduct a full census—intended to prepare voter lists—in fewer than half (145) of the country’s 330 townships. A BBC-commissioned study estimates that the military now controls only 21% of Myanmar’s territory, though it still dominates key, densely populated cities.

    So, the prospect of holding nationwide elections that genuinely represent the entire country and all its people is not only a formidable challenge but an almost impossible task.

    Path to more bloodshed

    Rather than bringing peace or stability, the election is expected to escalate violence. For ordinary people in Myanmar, it represents a source of fear and uncertainty. When the military conducted its census last year, many were too afraid to respond, while those tasked with carrying it out feared being targeted by opposition forces. A similar scenario could unfold during the election.

    Analysts warn that the junta, which has brutally suppressed dissent since the coup, will likely resort to even greater force to ensure polling takes place in the areas it still controls, leading to intensified confrontations. It is almost certain that opposition groups, currently in an aggressive stance, will resist, increasing the risk of prolonged conflict.

    How will it unfold?

    Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has long pledged to hold elections but has repeatedly extended the state of emergency, delaying the process. During a visit to Belarus, he stated that the election would be held in December 2025 or by January 2026. He also claimed that 53 political parties had registered to participate.

    Min Aung Hlaing further announced that the military would invite Belarusian teams to observe the election. His statement came during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who has held power for more than three decades and recently secured a seventh five-year term in an election widely dismissed as a sham.

    The junta’s decision to align itself with regimes well-versed in orchestrating controlled elections raises serious concerns. Given past patterns across the region, the vote is likely to be carefully engineered to guarantee victory for junta-backed parties, ensuring the military’s continued grip on power.

  • A Peace Deal in the Caucasus, Sealed Under Baku’s Shadow

    A Peace Deal in the Caucasus, Sealed Under Baku’s Shadow

    One of history’s most entrenched rivalries has reached a critical moment. Azerbaijan and Armenia have finalized a peace agreement after a conflict that ended in Armenia’s crushing defeat. The foreign ministries of both Caucasus neighbors have confirmed the treaty, marking what could be a historic breakthrough—though deep-seated animosities remain.

    The hostility between these two ethnic groups stretches back centuries, shaped by a long history of massacres and territorial disputes that have left thousands dead. Their struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region deeply intertwined with Armenian identity, has been a focal point of bloodshed for generations. Wars erupted with the Soviet Union’s collapse and again in 2020, before Azerbaijan launched a swift and overwhelming offensive in September 2023, reclaiming Nagorno-Karabakh and fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitics.

    Today, relations between the two nations are at their lowest point. While international pressure—particularly from Europe and Russia—has long sought to push both sides toward reconciliation, negotiations have repeatedly collapsed under the weight of unresolved disputes.

    Finally, a Peace Deal

    Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister, Jeyhun Bayramov, declared that negotiations on the peace agreement with Armenia had concluded, stating that Armenia had accepted Azerbaijan’s proposals on the two previously unresolved articles. Armenia’s foreign ministry later confirmed that the draft agreement had been finalized and was ready for signing. However, highlighting lingering tensions, Armenia criticized Azerbaijan for announcing the deal unilaterally instead of issuing a joint statement. Despite this, it expressed willingness to discuss the timing and location for the formal signing.

    The peace deal ultimately took shape with Armenia conceding to Azerbaijan’s demands. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan formally recognized Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively ending three decades of Armenian separatist rule—a move widely viewed as a pivotal step toward normalization. Additionally, Armenia had already ceded four border villages to Azerbaijan the previous year, relinquishing territory held for decades. In the end, Azerbaijan secured an unquestionable victory, while Armenia endured a resounding and humiliating defeat.

    Who Made the Deal Happen?

    A peace deal had long been a priority for key regional players, particularly Russia and the European Union, both seeking to maintain their foothold in the region. Traditionally, Russia acted as the primary mediator between these deeply divided ethnic rivals, maintaining a peacekeeping presence. However, Armenia’s defeat in the war—and its sense of betrayal by Moscow—fundamentally shifted this dynamic.

    Tensions over the conflict further strained Armenia-Russia relations, with Yerevan openly accusing Moscow of failing to provide support. In response to what it saw as Russian inaction, Armenia suspended its participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) last year. While Russia, the United States, and the EU each attempted to mediate at different stages, Moscow’s waning influence became increasingly evident—not just in its inability to shape the outcome but also in the tone of official statements.

    The Minsk Group—formed in 1992 under the leadership of the United States, Russia, and France—was originally tasked with overseeing the peace process. However, its relevance diminished over the years, particularly as Azerbaijan accused it of favoring Armenia. As a result, the draft peace treaty was largely negotiated outside the Minsk Group framework, with the final agreement reached directly between the two countries.

    The credit for the peace deal goes to both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Despite the political fallout from Armenia’s defeat, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan chose to push forward with negotiations, ensuring that discussions remained on track. With international actors facilitating the process, Azerbaijan reaffirmed its commitment to ongoing dialogue, expressing its readiness to engage in bilateral talks on normalization and other unresolved issues.

    What Does It Mean for the Region?

    Deep-seated ethnic animosities endure, passed down through generations, ensuring that distrust remains deeply ingrained. True reconciliation remains elusive, as neither side fully trusts the other, and the scars of war—along with the terms of the peace deal—are unlikely to fade from their collective memory. Azerbaijan, having secured a decisive victory, still harbors ambitions for further territorial gains at Armenia’s expense, a demand shaped by historical grievances and nationalist aspirations.

    The region’s geopolitical complexities further heighten the uncertainty, deterring direct intervention from external powers. Russia has positioned itself firmly behind Azerbaijan while maintaining strategic ties with Turkey and, notably, Israel. Armenia, meanwhile, counts on support from Europe, the United States, and, unexpectedly, Iran—creating a tangle of alliances that makes the situation even more precarious.

    With Azerbaijan holding the upper hand, the potential for renewed conflict remains high. Should Europe strengthen its backing for Armenia, Russia may encourage further Azerbaijani assertiveness, exacerbating tensions. At the same time, any instability involving Iran could ripple across the region, adding another layer of volatility. While the peace deal may provide a temporary reprieve, its long-term viability remains uncertain, leaving the specter of future conflict looming over the region.

    More Issues to Be Settled

    Disputes also continued over proposals for both nations to withdraw legal cases from international courts. Armenia and Azerbaijan remain embroiled in litigation before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human Rights, each accusing the other of rights violations committed before, during, and after their armed conflicts.

    Pashinyan emphasized the need for clarity, stating that withdrawal from international courts must come with a complete renunciation of the cases. He warned that without such assurances, there could be a scenario where both sides formally drop their legal claims, only for Azerbaijan to later revive these issues bilaterally, potentially escalating tensions.

    Azerbaijan has also made additional demands. Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that Baku expects Armenia to amend its constitution by removing references to its declaration of independence, which asserts territorial claims over Nagorno-Karabakh. Such amendments would require a national referendum. Meanwhile, nearly all of Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population—more than 100,000 people—fled the region after Azerbaijan reclaimed it in a swift, 24-hour offensive.

    In the months leading up to the announcement that the peace treaty text had been finalized, bilateral relations deteriorated sharply, raising doubts about a near-term settlement. Azerbaijan hardened its stance on securing a land corridor to Nakhchivan, while Baku’s rhetoric grew increasingly aggressive. This hardline approach now appears to have pressured Armenia—still reeling from its disastrous defeat in the Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan’s reconquest of the region in late 2023—into making key concessions on the treaty’s most contentious issues.

    With their differences on two critical negotiating points now settled, Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to be advancing toward the formal signing of a peace agreement. However, this does not guarantee lasting peace for both of them.

  • Kurdish Accord: Al Sharra’s Big Break

    Kurdish Accord: Al Sharra’s Big Break

    In a surprising development, the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government—a Sunni Islamist administration led by former militant leader Al-Sharra—has reached an agreement with the Kurdish forces in the northeast. These two factions, previously engaged in violent conflict causing significant casualties, have now struck a deal that could bring some stability to Damascus new rulers. The agreement aligns with their efforts to unify the fractured country and gain international recognition.

    As part of the deal, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which currently control the northeast, will integrate into the national army, paving the way for a nationwide ceasefire. The flag of the new Syrian administration—green, white, and black—will now be raised in Rojava as well.

    Toward a United Syria

    After the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government, under Al-Sharra, and its military coalition ousted Assad’s regime in Damascus, they assumed the daunting task of rebuilding Syria after a decade-long civil war. Yet, the country remained deeply fractured, with various regions establishing their own autonomous administrations. Chief among these was the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controlled the northeast. Strong and well-organized, the SDF posed a significant challenge, raising concerns that tensions between Damascus and the Kurds could escalate into another prolonged conflict.

    Contrary to expectations, Syria’s new HTS-led administration and the SDF reached an agreement that allowed the central government to reclaim much of its former territory, leaving only a few smaller, weaker enclaves outside its control. Over time, these remaining areas are expected to align under HTS leadership, with Al-Sharra overseeing interim governance and the eventual transition to elections.

    Now, both HTS and the SDF are spearheading efforts to rebuild Syria, seeking to restore stability after years of destruction. Their cooperation—despite stark ideological differences—marks a critical turning point in the country’s recovery. However, questions remain about whether the SDF will fully integrate into the Islamist-led government in Damascus, given its distinct governance model, particularly its emphasis on women’s rights and decentralization, which diverges sharply from the political traditions of Arab states.

    The End of Kurdish State

    The agreement will bring northeast Syria under Damascus’ control for the first time since the Kurdish-led administration gained autonomy over the region in 2012 during the civil war. Set for implementation by the end of the year, the deal will transfer authority over all public institutions—including borders, airports, and oilfields—to the central government.

    Crucially, the agreement also recognizes Kurdish rights, which had long been suppressed under the Assad regime, where Kurdish language education was banned and Kurdish holidays were prohibited. The text affirms that all Syrians, regardless of religious or ethnic background, will have the right to participate in the country’s new political process.

    However, the deal represents a significant setback for the long-standing Kurdish aspiration of an independent Kurdistan. This area had long been considered the most viable location for a Kurdish state, but the agreement effectively closes that path. The news comes amid similar developments in other Kurdish territories, where aspirations for statehood are increasingly being curtailed. In Turkey, Kurdish political integration has deepened as the separatist PKK has largely withdrawn. In Iraq, Baghdad has tightened its grip over Kurdish regions. With Syrian Kurds now aligning with Damascus, the dream of an independent Kurdistan appears more elusive than ever.

    Al Sharaa’s Big Win

    The agreement marks a major victory for Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who prioritized negotiations with the SDF as part of his effort to consolidate government control. Rather than resorting to force, he pursued diplomacy, engaging directly with the SDF and addressing their key demands to swiftly resolve one of Syria’s most pressing internal conflicts.

    For a former militant leader, this moment signifies a remarkable transformation. Once a battlefield commander, Al-Sharaa now emerges as a shrewd diplomat, navigating Syria’s turbulent political landscape with pragmatism and restraint. His success in brokering this deal is expected to strengthen his government’s credibility on the international stage—recognition that Syria’s new leadership urgently seeks.

    News of the agreement ignited celebrations, with crowds taking to the streets of Raqqa, northeast Syria, and Damascus. For a nation long fractured by war, it was a rare moment of unity—an image unseen for years and a defining milestone for Al-Sharaa.

    Focus to the Northwest

    While diplomacy was being celebrated between Damascus and the Kurds, and hopes for peace grew in the northeast, trouble was brewing in the northwest, threatening to overshadow these gains. Though Al-Sharaa may have neutralized a powerful adversary in the northeast, some minority factions in the northwest continue to challenge his authority and that of the Damascus government.

    The escalating clashes between the Syrian army and Alawite fighters have drawn international scrutiny and heightened concerns. A brutal five-day battle in northwestern Syria claimed over 1,000 lives, including at least 745 civilians. The violence also sparked retaliatory attacks, as the army targeted Alawite civilians in villages across the region.

    The Syrian defense ministry announced the end of its military operations against Assad loyalists along the Syrian coast. Fighting had erupted when regime loyalists launched a coordinated assault on Syrian security forces last Thursday. Now, with the northeast stabilized, Syrian forces can shift their focus to quelling Alawite resistance in the northwest.

    What Happens Next?

    While trouble is visible in the northwest and along the Israeli border, the accord with the Kurds provides a significant boost for Damascus to move forward. Al-Sharaa is acting more diplomatically and has pledged accountability for the recent violence, stating that anyone involved in the bloodshed of civilians, mistreatment of civilians, overreach of state authority, or abuse of power for personal gain will be held accountable with full decisiveness.

    However, uncertainty looms over how this wave of killings will affect the SDF’s transition of military authority to the state. Syria’s Kurdish population, long subjected to oppression under the Assad regime, remains deeply wary. Any disruption to the agreement risks reigniting the cycle of marginalization and conflict they have fought to overcome.