Category: Asia

  • Indonesia Expands Military’s Role, Raising Fears of Democratic Erosion

    Indonesia Expands Military’s Role, Raising Fears of Democratic Erosion

    In a nation that has endured military brutality and struggled to reclaim democracy, fears of a return to military-dominated governance are once again resurfacing. Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy, stands at a critical juncture. President Prabowo Subianto—an ex-special forces general and former son-in-law of Suharto, the country’s longtime autocrat—has ratified contentious amendments to military law, expanding the role of armed forces personnel in civilian governance. This shift raises concerns that Indonesia could be inching back toward military dominance, reminiscent of the New Order era, when the armed forces wielded sweeping political power under Suharto’s rule.

    The controversial revision

    Indonesia’s parliament has passed sweeping revisions to the country’s military law, expanding the presence of active-duty military personnel in civilian government roles. The new legislation increases the number of agencies where military members can serve from 10 to 14, adding institutions such as disaster mitigation and the attorney general’s office. Previously, officers seeking civilian posts outside a select group—including the defense ministry and state intelligence agency—were required to resign or retire from military service.

    The revisions further extend these privileges to key government bodies, including the state secretariat, the counterterrorism agency, and the narcotics agency. Additionally, the law raises the retirement age for officers, a change critics argue deepens military influence in governance.

    The amendments were approved on Thursday in a plenary session led by a parliament dominated by President Prabowo Subianto’s ruling coalition. Speaker Puan Maharani presided over the unanimous vote, asserting that the revisions uphold democratic principles and human rights—claims that activists and political analysts have met with deep skepticism.

    What the government says

    Indonesia’s law minister, Supratman Andi Agtas, has rejected concerns that the revised law signals a return to the military dominance of the Suharto era, insisting that the changes are necessary to address domestic and geopolitical challenges. Defending the amendments, Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin told parliament that shifting geopolitical dynamics and advancements in global military technology require the armed forces to adapt to both conventional and unconventional threats.

    Despite initially opposing the revisions, the main opposition party ultimately endorsed them—a decision critics argue undermines democracy and reflects the growing political alignment in favor of Prabowo since his election last year.

    What Critics Say

    Critics contend that President Prabowo is intent on reinstating the military’s influence in civilian affairs, arguing that the swift passage of these amendments undermines the government’s stated commitment to human rights and accountability. The bill was approved in under two months after the president formally requested the amendment, raising concerns over the hasty legislative process and lack of transparency.

    The creeping militarization of government has been apparent for some time, reinforcing fears within civil society. However, some argue that warnings of a full-scale return to the New Order era may be overstated.

    Student organizations have vowed to protest outside parliament in Jakarta, with one group condemning the law as a threat to democracy. By Thursday evening, nearly a thousand protesters had gathered, holding banners as police officers and military personnel maintained a heavy presence around them.

    Undermining Democracy

    Despite 25 years of efforts to curb military influence in politics and governance, local human rights watchdog Imparsial found that nearly 2,600 active-duty officers were already serving in civilian roles even before the latest legal revisions. The recent changes further entrench military presence in government under Prabowo.

    During Suharto’s rule, the armed forces exercised a dual function, controlling both security and administrative affairs—a structure many see mirrored in Prabowo’s legislative amendments. Critics warn that his presidency could erode Indonesia’s hard-won but fragile democracy. Since taking office last October, he has already expanded the military’s role in public affairs. His flagship $4 billion free-meal program for children and pregnant women, for instance, relies on logistical support from the armed forces. Given these developments, concerns over growing military influence appear well-founded.

  • Myanmar’s Junta Moves Toward Elections, but Fears of a Farce Persist

    Myanmar’s Junta Moves Toward Elections, but Fears of a Farce Persist

    Despite Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, the junta is pressing ahead with plans for an election. Rather than seeking peace or addressing the country’s deepening crisis, it is focused on tightening its grip on key cities through political maneuvering and the familiar tactics of sham elections used by other authoritarian regimes.

    On the surface, this move appears to be an attempt to pacify critics and draw advancing rebel groups into the political process. Yet, with the junta widely despised across the country, its promise of elections in December 2025 or January 2026 is seen as little more than political theater. A genuinely fair vote would almost certainly result in the military’s defeat—an outcome it is unlikely to accept. So, instead of bringing stability, the election is expected to escalate violence, fuel repression, and serve as yet another means for the junta to cling to power.

    The Call for an Election

    Myanmar’s military junta announced on Saturday, through state media, that it would hold a long-promised election—its first time specifying a timeline since seizing power in a 2021 coup. The announcement follows junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s recent visit to Moscow, where Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly endorsed the plan.

    China, a key military ally with significant economic interests in Myanmar, has also expressed support for the elections. Meanwhile, Belarus, another close partner of the junta, has signaled its willingness to assist in the process. However, most Western governments and election watchdogs are expected to dismiss the vote as a sham, lacking both credibility and legitimacy.

    A challenging election

    An election—if conducted under genuine democratic principles—would be fraught with challenges, as opposition parties are either banned or have chosen to boycott the process. Nearly 22,000 political prisoners remain behind bars, according to a local monitoring group, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, whose government was overthrown in 2021. Her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), was dissolved after failing to re-register under an electoral law imposed by the junta following the coup.

    Beyond political repression, the feasibility of holding nationwide elections remains highly questionable. The military has lost control of vast swathes of the country to a patchwork of opposition groups actively resisting its rule. The junta’s territorial losses have been so severe that it managed to conduct a full census—intended to prepare voter lists—in fewer than half (145) of the country’s 330 townships. A BBC-commissioned study estimates that the military now controls only 21% of Myanmar’s territory, though it still dominates key, densely populated cities.

    So, the prospect of holding nationwide elections that genuinely represent the entire country and all its people is not only a formidable challenge but an almost impossible task.

    Path to more bloodshed

    Rather than bringing peace or stability, the election is expected to escalate violence. For ordinary people in Myanmar, it represents a source of fear and uncertainty. When the military conducted its census last year, many were too afraid to respond, while those tasked with carrying it out feared being targeted by opposition forces. A similar scenario could unfold during the election.

    Analysts warn that the junta, which has brutally suppressed dissent since the coup, will likely resort to even greater force to ensure polling takes place in the areas it still controls, leading to intensified confrontations. It is almost certain that opposition groups, currently in an aggressive stance, will resist, increasing the risk of prolonged conflict.

    How will it unfold?

    Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has long pledged to hold elections but has repeatedly extended the state of emergency, delaying the process. During a visit to Belarus, he stated that the election would be held in December 2025 or by January 2026. He also claimed that 53 political parties had registered to participate.

    Min Aung Hlaing further announced that the military would invite Belarusian teams to observe the election. His statement came during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who has held power for more than three decades and recently secured a seventh five-year term in an election widely dismissed as a sham.

    The junta’s decision to align itself with regimes well-versed in orchestrating controlled elections raises serious concerns. Given past patterns across the region, the vote is likely to be carefully engineered to guarantee victory for junta-backed parties, ensuring the military’s continued grip on power.

  • A Peace Deal in the Caucasus, Sealed Under Baku’s Shadow

    A Peace Deal in the Caucasus, Sealed Under Baku’s Shadow

    One of history’s most entrenched rivalries has reached a critical moment. Azerbaijan and Armenia have finalized a peace agreement after a conflict that ended in Armenia’s crushing defeat. The foreign ministries of both Caucasus neighbors have confirmed the treaty, marking what could be a historic breakthrough—though deep-seated animosities remain.

    The hostility between these two ethnic groups stretches back centuries, shaped by a long history of massacres and territorial disputes that have left thousands dead. Their struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region deeply intertwined with Armenian identity, has been a focal point of bloodshed for generations. Wars erupted with the Soviet Union’s collapse and again in 2020, before Azerbaijan launched a swift and overwhelming offensive in September 2023, reclaiming Nagorno-Karabakh and fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitics.

    Today, relations between the two nations are at their lowest point. While international pressure—particularly from Europe and Russia—has long sought to push both sides toward reconciliation, negotiations have repeatedly collapsed under the weight of unresolved disputes.

    Finally, a Peace Deal

    Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister, Jeyhun Bayramov, declared that negotiations on the peace agreement with Armenia had concluded, stating that Armenia had accepted Azerbaijan’s proposals on the two previously unresolved articles. Armenia’s foreign ministry later confirmed that the draft agreement had been finalized and was ready for signing. However, highlighting lingering tensions, Armenia criticized Azerbaijan for announcing the deal unilaterally instead of issuing a joint statement. Despite this, it expressed willingness to discuss the timing and location for the formal signing.

    The peace deal ultimately took shape with Armenia conceding to Azerbaijan’s demands. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan formally recognized Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively ending three decades of Armenian separatist rule—a move widely viewed as a pivotal step toward normalization. Additionally, Armenia had already ceded four border villages to Azerbaijan the previous year, relinquishing territory held for decades. In the end, Azerbaijan secured an unquestionable victory, while Armenia endured a resounding and humiliating defeat.

    Who Made the Deal Happen?

    A peace deal had long been a priority for key regional players, particularly Russia and the European Union, both seeking to maintain their foothold in the region. Traditionally, Russia acted as the primary mediator between these deeply divided ethnic rivals, maintaining a peacekeeping presence. However, Armenia’s defeat in the war—and its sense of betrayal by Moscow—fundamentally shifted this dynamic.

    Tensions over the conflict further strained Armenia-Russia relations, with Yerevan openly accusing Moscow of failing to provide support. In response to what it saw as Russian inaction, Armenia suspended its participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) last year. While Russia, the United States, and the EU each attempted to mediate at different stages, Moscow’s waning influence became increasingly evident—not just in its inability to shape the outcome but also in the tone of official statements.

    The Minsk Group—formed in 1992 under the leadership of the United States, Russia, and France—was originally tasked with overseeing the peace process. However, its relevance diminished over the years, particularly as Azerbaijan accused it of favoring Armenia. As a result, the draft peace treaty was largely negotiated outside the Minsk Group framework, with the final agreement reached directly between the two countries.

    The credit for the peace deal goes to both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Despite the political fallout from Armenia’s defeat, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan chose to push forward with negotiations, ensuring that discussions remained on track. With international actors facilitating the process, Azerbaijan reaffirmed its commitment to ongoing dialogue, expressing its readiness to engage in bilateral talks on normalization and other unresolved issues.

    What Does It Mean for the Region?

    Deep-seated ethnic animosities endure, passed down through generations, ensuring that distrust remains deeply ingrained. True reconciliation remains elusive, as neither side fully trusts the other, and the scars of war—along with the terms of the peace deal—are unlikely to fade from their collective memory. Azerbaijan, having secured a decisive victory, still harbors ambitions for further territorial gains at Armenia’s expense, a demand shaped by historical grievances and nationalist aspirations.

    The region’s geopolitical complexities further heighten the uncertainty, deterring direct intervention from external powers. Russia has positioned itself firmly behind Azerbaijan while maintaining strategic ties with Turkey and, notably, Israel. Armenia, meanwhile, counts on support from Europe, the United States, and, unexpectedly, Iran—creating a tangle of alliances that makes the situation even more precarious.

    With Azerbaijan holding the upper hand, the potential for renewed conflict remains high. Should Europe strengthen its backing for Armenia, Russia may encourage further Azerbaijani assertiveness, exacerbating tensions. At the same time, any instability involving Iran could ripple across the region, adding another layer of volatility. While the peace deal may provide a temporary reprieve, its long-term viability remains uncertain, leaving the specter of future conflict looming over the region.

    More Issues to Be Settled

    Disputes also continued over proposals for both nations to withdraw legal cases from international courts. Armenia and Azerbaijan remain embroiled in litigation before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human Rights, each accusing the other of rights violations committed before, during, and after their armed conflicts.

    Pashinyan emphasized the need for clarity, stating that withdrawal from international courts must come with a complete renunciation of the cases. He warned that without such assurances, there could be a scenario where both sides formally drop their legal claims, only for Azerbaijan to later revive these issues bilaterally, potentially escalating tensions.

    Azerbaijan has also made additional demands. Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that Baku expects Armenia to amend its constitution by removing references to its declaration of independence, which asserts territorial claims over Nagorno-Karabakh. Such amendments would require a national referendum. Meanwhile, nearly all of Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population—more than 100,000 people—fled the region after Azerbaijan reclaimed it in a swift, 24-hour offensive.

    In the months leading up to the announcement that the peace treaty text had been finalized, bilateral relations deteriorated sharply, raising doubts about a near-term settlement. Azerbaijan hardened its stance on securing a land corridor to Nakhchivan, while Baku’s rhetoric grew increasingly aggressive. This hardline approach now appears to have pressured Armenia—still reeling from its disastrous defeat in the Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan’s reconquest of the region in late 2023—into making key concessions on the treaty’s most contentious issues.

    With their differences on two critical negotiating points now settled, Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to be advancing toward the formal signing of a peace agreement. However, this does not guarantee lasting peace for both of them.

  • Kurdish Accord: Al Sharra’s Big Break

    Kurdish Accord: Al Sharra’s Big Break

    In a surprising development, the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government—a Sunni Islamist administration led by former militant leader Al-Sharra—has reached an agreement with the Kurdish forces in the northeast. These two factions, previously engaged in violent conflict causing significant casualties, have now struck a deal that could bring some stability to Damascus new rulers. The agreement aligns with their efforts to unify the fractured country and gain international recognition.

    As part of the deal, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which currently control the northeast, will integrate into the national army, paving the way for a nationwide ceasefire. The flag of the new Syrian administration—green, white, and black—will now be raised in Rojava as well.

    Toward a United Syria

    After the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government, under Al-Sharra, and its military coalition ousted Assad’s regime in Damascus, they assumed the daunting task of rebuilding Syria after a decade-long civil war. Yet, the country remained deeply fractured, with various regions establishing their own autonomous administrations. Chief among these was the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controlled the northeast. Strong and well-organized, the SDF posed a significant challenge, raising concerns that tensions between Damascus and the Kurds could escalate into another prolonged conflict.

    Contrary to expectations, Syria’s new HTS-led administration and the SDF reached an agreement that allowed the central government to reclaim much of its former territory, leaving only a few smaller, weaker enclaves outside its control. Over time, these remaining areas are expected to align under HTS leadership, with Al-Sharra overseeing interim governance and the eventual transition to elections.

    Now, both HTS and the SDF are spearheading efforts to rebuild Syria, seeking to restore stability after years of destruction. Their cooperation—despite stark ideological differences—marks a critical turning point in the country’s recovery. However, questions remain about whether the SDF will fully integrate into the Islamist-led government in Damascus, given its distinct governance model, particularly its emphasis on women’s rights and decentralization, which diverges sharply from the political traditions of Arab states.

    The End of Kurdish State

    The agreement will bring northeast Syria under Damascus’ control for the first time since the Kurdish-led administration gained autonomy over the region in 2012 during the civil war. Set for implementation by the end of the year, the deal will transfer authority over all public institutions—including borders, airports, and oilfields—to the central government.

    Crucially, the agreement also recognizes Kurdish rights, which had long been suppressed under the Assad regime, where Kurdish language education was banned and Kurdish holidays were prohibited. The text affirms that all Syrians, regardless of religious or ethnic background, will have the right to participate in the country’s new political process.

    However, the deal represents a significant setback for the long-standing Kurdish aspiration of an independent Kurdistan. This area had long been considered the most viable location for a Kurdish state, but the agreement effectively closes that path. The news comes amid similar developments in other Kurdish territories, where aspirations for statehood are increasingly being curtailed. In Turkey, Kurdish political integration has deepened as the separatist PKK has largely withdrawn. In Iraq, Baghdad has tightened its grip over Kurdish regions. With Syrian Kurds now aligning with Damascus, the dream of an independent Kurdistan appears more elusive than ever.

    Al Sharaa’s Big Win

    The agreement marks a major victory for Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who prioritized negotiations with the SDF as part of his effort to consolidate government control. Rather than resorting to force, he pursued diplomacy, engaging directly with the SDF and addressing their key demands to swiftly resolve one of Syria’s most pressing internal conflicts.

    For a former militant leader, this moment signifies a remarkable transformation. Once a battlefield commander, Al-Sharaa now emerges as a shrewd diplomat, navigating Syria’s turbulent political landscape with pragmatism and restraint. His success in brokering this deal is expected to strengthen his government’s credibility on the international stage—recognition that Syria’s new leadership urgently seeks.

    News of the agreement ignited celebrations, with crowds taking to the streets of Raqqa, northeast Syria, and Damascus. For a nation long fractured by war, it was a rare moment of unity—an image unseen for years and a defining milestone for Al-Sharaa.

    Focus to the Northwest

    While diplomacy was being celebrated between Damascus and the Kurds, and hopes for peace grew in the northeast, trouble was brewing in the northwest, threatening to overshadow these gains. Though Al-Sharaa may have neutralized a powerful adversary in the northeast, some minority factions in the northwest continue to challenge his authority and that of the Damascus government.

    The escalating clashes between the Syrian army and Alawite fighters have drawn international scrutiny and heightened concerns. A brutal five-day battle in northwestern Syria claimed over 1,000 lives, including at least 745 civilians. The violence also sparked retaliatory attacks, as the army targeted Alawite civilians in villages across the region.

    The Syrian defense ministry announced the end of its military operations against Assad loyalists along the Syrian coast. Fighting had erupted when regime loyalists launched a coordinated assault on Syrian security forces last Thursday. Now, with the northeast stabilized, Syrian forces can shift their focus to quelling Alawite resistance in the northwest.

    What Happens Next?

    While trouble is visible in the northwest and along the Israeli border, the accord with the Kurds provides a significant boost for Damascus to move forward. Al-Sharaa is acting more diplomatically and has pledged accountability for the recent violence, stating that anyone involved in the bloodshed of civilians, mistreatment of civilians, overreach of state authority, or abuse of power for personal gain will be held accountable with full decisiveness.

    However, uncertainty looms over how this wave of killings will affect the SDF’s transition of military authority to the state. Syria’s Kurdish population, long subjected to oppression under the Assad regime, remains deeply wary. Any disruption to the agreement risks reigniting the cycle of marginalization and conflict they have fought to overcome.

  • Duterte On Arrest: What’s Next for His dynasty?

    Duterte On Arrest: What’s Next for His dynasty?

    The relentless drama of Philippine politics has taken another dramatic turn with the arrest of former President Rodrigo Duterte at Manila’s international airport, following a request from the International Criminal Court (ICC). A towering figure in one of the country’s two dominant political dynasties, Duterte’s detention is more than a legal reckoning—it is a moment of profound political consequence. With the general elections fast approaching in May, the Duterte family, now steered by its next generation, is fighting to preserve its influence in an increasingly hostile landscape.

    President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s decision to comply with the ICC’s warrant, coming after his earlier move to remove Duterte’s daughter from the vice presidency, appears to be a calculated bid to erode the family’s power. In a time when ICC warrants are often dismissed or ignored, Marcos Jr.’s cooperation is widely seen as a strategic maneuver—one that not only neutralizes a formidable rival but could also signal the decline of a once-dominant political dynasty.

    Duterte Indicted

    As his 80th birthday nears, an international tribunal closes in on the former president. Prosecutors at the International Criminal Court (ICC) accuse him of crimes against humanity for orchestrating a ruthless anti-drug campaign that claimed up to 30,000 lives. Gunmen, acting under his war on drugs, executed most of the victims—men from the country’s poorest urban enclaves—in the streets, blurring the line between state policy and unrestrained violence..

    Duterte’s rise to the presidency in 2016 was built on a promise of unrelenting violence. Before assuming national office, he had already cultivated a fearsome reputation as the mayor of Davao City, where he was accused of deploying criminal gangs to carry out extrajudicial executions. On the campaign trail, he vowed to rid the country of drugs with a crackdown so ruthless that, he boasted, Manila Bay’s fish would grow fat on the bodies of the slain. Once in power, he made good on his threats, publicly endorsing the killing of suspected drug dealers and even encouraging ordinary citizens to take up arms against addicts.

    Since his election, estimates cited by the ICC suggest that between 12,000 and 30,000 civilians have been killed in anti-drug operations. His long-anticipated arrest came as he arrived at Manila’s international airport from Hong Kong, where the prosecutor general served him with an ICC warrant, formally charging him with crimes against humanity. He was swiftly taken into custody and has since boarded a flight bound for The Hague.

    The Political Impact

    Despite the international outcry over his administration’s bloody drug war, Duterte remained a deeply entrenched political force, particularly in his stronghold of Davao. Yet even his most devoted supporters, for all their outrage over his arrest, are unlikely to transform their defiance into a large-scale People Power-style uprising. For now, their resistance is largely confined to the digital sphere, far removed from the historic street protests that once altered the course of Philippine politics. Still, Duterte is not merely an individual; he is the patriarch of a powerful political dynasty, with his family wielding influence at both the local and national levels. How they navigate this crisis will determine whether the Duterte name retains its political clout or fades into irrelevance.

    Many analysts see his arrest as the beginning of his dynasty’s decline. Unlike Duterte, whose strongman persona and incendiary rhetoric cultivated a nationwide following, his children have yet to command the same level of appeal. His downfall, they argue, is more than just a legal reckoning—it is a repudiation of the brand of politics he embodied, one that valued brute force over diplomacy. Meanwhile, Marcos Jr. has capitalized on this shift, recasting himself as a pragmatic and responsible leader—one who champions human rights and the rule of law. In doing so, he not only consolidates his own power but also leaves an already fragmented opposition struggling to find its footing.

    For years, Duterte sought to insulate himself from prosecution by pulling the Philippines out of the Rome Statute in 2019, effectively shielding himself from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. But Marcos Jr. reversed course, rejoining the treaty and clearing the way for the ICC’s case against Duterte to move forward. His arrest marks the final and irrevocable fracture in the Marcos-Duterte alliance, a strategic partnership that secured their joint electoral victory in 2022. The alliance had propelled Duterte’s daughter, Sara, to the vice presidency while helping Marcos Jr. mobilize Duterte’s voter base. But the split had been brewing for some time. Marcos methodically distanced himself, rejoined the ICC, and systematically sidelined Sara—moves that now seem less like routine political repositioning and more like the calculated dismantling of a former ally.

    Time for another Duerte?

    Rodrigo Duterte’s children—Sara, Paolo, and Sebastian—occupy key positions of power, ensuring the family’s continued political relevance. Sara Duterte currently serves as the 15th Vice President of the Philippines, having been elected alongside Bongbong Marcos in 2022, when he secured the presidency in a decisive landslide. Before assuming the vice presidency, Sara was the mayor of Davao City, a position she first held in 2010 after succeeding her father, who had completed his third term. She returned to the post in 2016 when Rodrigo Duterte launched his presidential bid, having previously served as his vice mayor in 2007.

    Paolo Duterte, the eldest son, has represented Davao City’s 1st District in Congress since 2019 and previously served as Deputy Speaker for Political Affairs. His political trajectory includes stints as vice mayor to his father in 2013 and later to his sister in 2018. Meanwhile, Sebastian Duterte, who ran unopposed in 2019, succeeded Paolo as vice mayor and later replaced Sara as Davao City mayor following the May 2022 elections. The Duterte family’s hold over Davao’s mayoralty has been nearly unbroken since 1988, with the only exception occurring between 1998 and 2001, when Rodrigo Duterte was briefly succeeded by Benjamin de Guzman before reclaiming the post.

    As the Duterte dynasty faces a political reckoning, the question of who will emerge as its next standard-bearer looms large. Sara Duterte, despite her position as Marcos Jr.’s vice president, has openly positioned herself as his rival. Her confrontational stance, including incendiary rhetoric that at times suggests her allies are prepared to remove Marcos from power, has resonated with a significant segment of Filipinos while also exposing her to political risk. Now facing an impeachment process that threatens to derail her career, she could either see her ambitions cut short or find herself elevated as the leader of an opposition movement, paving the way for another Duterte resurgence.

    Many believe the Duterte family will use Rodrigo Duterte’s arrest to craft a narrative of persecution, portraying him as a martyr punished for his leadership. This framing could rally public sympathy, reinforcing the dynasty’s influence even in adversity. In response, the family may attempt to introduce a new figurehead, ensuring the continuity of the Duterte brand in Philippine politics. Whether Filipinos embrace or reject this strategy remains to be seen, but the dynasty’s capacity to shape the country’s political landscape is far from diminished.

  • Is Syria’s Islamist Government Turning Against the Alawites?

    Is Syria’s Islamist Government Turning Against the Alawites?

    As Damascus fell under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a former jihadist faction now rebranded as Syria’s new rulers, some hoped the country might finally emerge from its long nightmare. The civil war was over, Assad was gone, and the new government spoke of reconciliation and democratic transition. Everything seemed promising—but within months, sectarian divisions, far from fading, had only deepened. The Kurds remained locked in uneasy negotiations over their hold on northeastern Syria. Christians, their numbers already dwindling, watched warily from the sidelines. But it was the Alawites—the sect once represented by Assad—who found themselves most at risk.

    Reports describe a brutal crackdown by the Islamist-led government against Alawites, with thousands killed, systematic torture, and sexual violence carried out under the pretext of rooting out traitors. Videos and eyewitness accounts depict mass executions and forced expulsions. Yet Syrian officials, in statements reminiscent of past regimes, insist that Alawite factions were the true instigators of the violence, provoking the clashes that have since spiraled into bloodshed.

    Latakia Violence

    More than 1,000 people, including 745 civilians, have been killed in two days of clashes in Latakia, the western coastal region of Syria. The violence erupted as Syrian security forces battled fighters loyal to the former Assad regime, followed by a wave of revenge killings that has deepened fears of sectarian bloodshed, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

    The UK-based monitor reported that 745 civilians were executed, while 125 security personnel and 148 Assad loyalists also lost their lives. Some reports suggest the death toll may be even higher.

    According to The Guardian, the fighting began on Thursday when Assad loyalists ambushed security forces in Jableh, a city in Latakia province. Meanwhile, some Arab media outlets have reported an Alawite rebellion, while pro-Alawite social media accounts claim that Syrian opposition forces were the true instigators, carrying out raids and executions targeting Alawites.

    Damascus Turns to Iron Fist?

    To suppress the rebellion, the Syrian government called for reinforcements, leading to the deployment of thousands of fighters to the country’s coastal region. While these forces officially operate under the new Syrian government, militias—some with histories of human rights abuses—continue to act with little oversight or discipline.

    The government has attributed civilian killings to “Individual Actions” and claimed that the influx of fighters has contributed to human rights violations. In a speech on Friday, President Ahmad al-Sharaa vowed that “anyone who harms civilians will face severe punishment.” However, on the ground, serious crimes against civilians persist, with Syrian forces themselves implicated in the violence.

    Videos circulating online reveal fighters in security uniforms executing captives at point-blank range, forcing men to bark like dogs, and brutally beating detainees. In the town of al-Mukhtariya, footage shows dozens of civilians lying dead, with the Syrian Network for Human Rights reporting that at least 40 people died in a single incident.

    Alawites in Uncertainty

    Though most Alawites had no direct ties to the Assad regime, they are now being targeted and punished for his legacy. Syria’s new authorities assured the Alawite community of their safety, promising that there would be no acts of revenge. Yet that promise has proven hollow, offering no real protection. The recent killing of hundreds of Alawite civilians by government security forces has only intensified fear among the community.

    Reports of atrocities continue to surface. Alawites who spoke to the Media recounted the murder of family members, widespread looting, and deteriorating conditions in Alawite neighborhoods. They described a dire situation—no water or electricity for more than 24 hours, armed factions killing indiscriminately, and corpses piling up in the streets. Many see these actions as collective punishment, deepening the community’s sense of uncertainty and dread.

    Syria Unfixed

    The scale of violence against Alawites was unexpected, raising fears that Jolani is reverting to his old ways—those of an Islamist extremist. This resurgence has unsettled Syria’s minorities, with Christians growing increasingly anxious and the Kurds facing a decisive choice: to resist and risk prolonging the conflict or to negotiate and shape Syria’s fragile transition. Beyond political survival, Syria’s new rulers must also contend with the pressing need to secure international funding for the country’s post-war reconstruction. For international backing, Jolani may attempt—or at least pretend to attempt—to curb escalating violence and include Alawites who opposed Assad in the new government. 

    Political experts stress that a genuine commitment to transitional justice and inclusive governance is critical to preventing Syria from sliding back into chaos. As the country’s transitional authorities prepare to announce a new government this month, its composition will be closely scrutinized, particularly for its treatment of Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities in light of the recent bloodshed.

  • Iran’s Reformist VP Ousted: A Door Closes to the West

    Iran’s Reformist VP Ousted: A Door Closes to the West

    Iran’s reformist government has suffered a significant setback with the forced resignation of Mohammad Javad Zarif, its most prominent reformist figure. Zarif, who served as vice president for strategic affairs, stated that he had been ordered to step down by an unnamed senior official. While he refrained from directly mentioning Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his remarks strongly implied the decision had Khamenei’s approval.

    His removal follows the recent impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati, as Iran’s conservative factions escalate their efforts to weaken President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration. Hardliners, long hostile to Pezeshkian’s reformist agenda, have used the country’s worsening economic crisis—particularly the sharp decline of the currency—to push for a shift in policy.

    Although many of Iran’s economic troubles predate Pezeshkian’s presidency, conservatives have placed the blame squarely on his government for failing to halt the downturn. The consecutive dismissals have only deepened uncertainty, triggering further stock market losses as businesses grow increasingly wary of a political climate that appears to be shutting the door to the West.

    Who is Mohammad Javad Zarif?

    Mohammad Javad Zarif, a career diplomat and Iran’s most prominent reformist, has been the country’s most articulate voice in presenting its foreign policy to Western audiences. Serving as foreign minister from 2013 to 2021 under moderate President Hassan Rouhani, he was instrumental in shaping Iran’s international engagements and played a key role in Pezeshkian’s presidential campaign, effectively running as his closest ally.

    Zarif is widely recognized for his role in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which eased Western sanctions in exchange for independent UN inspections to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remained strictly civilian. Throughout his career, he has advocated for a stronger role for the foreign ministry in shaping Iran’s international policy, challenging the dominance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in foreign affairs.

    Throughout his career, he has been a frequent target of hardliners, particularly over allegations that his American-born children hold dual Iranian-US citizenship. Opponents, many of whom reject negotiations with the US, argue that his appointment violated a 2022 law barring individuals with Western ties from holding senior government positions. Concerns over his children’s nationality, stemming from his tenure as a diplomat in the US, were among the reasons he initially attempted to resign from Pezeshkian’s administration in August 2024.

    His appointment as vice president for strategic affairs—a role created largely to accommodate him—was widely seen as an effort by the reformist government to restore ties with the US and Europe and to ease Iran’s economic struggles under severe sanctions. However, this strategy now faces significant obstacles, as President Donald Trump—who withdrew the US from the nuclear deal in 2018 and reinstated crippling sanctions—has adopted an even more hardline approach toward Iran, leaving little room for diplomatic maneuvering.

    Conservatives Tighten Grip

    In his resignation note, Zarif suggested that his departure was not voluntary, highlighting the growing influence of conservatives over reformists within the administration and fueling internal discontent. A high-ranking official had reportedly instructed Pezeshkian to dismiss him and send him back to academia. Pezeshkian refused, instead insisting that the directive be delivered to Zarif directly.

    Pezeshkian himself appears uneasy with the conservative push to sideline Zarif and other reformists. With Donald Trump expected to take a more confrontational stance in the coming days, reformists are likely to face increasing pressure, as his administration is unlikely to engage meaningfully with Iran. This shift could further reinforce conservative claims that diplomacy with the West is futile.

    Trump’s push to reinstate maximum economic sanctions has already weakened reformists advocating for a new global agreement on nuclear oversight. A deepening economic crisis could provide conservatives with a pretext to tighten their grip on power, potentially leading to further crackdowns on reformist elements within the government. Meanwhile, conservatives have cited Trump’s recent Oval Office humiliation of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a cautionary tale for those in Iran who still believe negotiations with the U.S. president are possible.

    What Happens Next?

    The Islamic Republic of Iran is facing mounting pressure, not only from external forces but also from its own citizens. Protests against the regime are becoming increasingly visible, amplified by social media, where pre-Islamic Persian sentiments are resurging. Amid this unrest, Iran’s economy continues to deteriorate, and Trump’s sanctions are likely to accelerate its decline, further fueling public discontent toward the regime.

    In this context, the regime may seek to shift blame onto the reformist government while allowing conservatives to reclaim control in an effort to preserve the Islamic Republic. Recent developments suggest that the regime, which initially attempted to negotiate a path forward with Pezeshkian and Zarif, is now reasserting control. 

  • Can Bangladesh’s Riotous Student Leaders Build a New Political Order?

    Can Bangladesh’s Riotous Student Leaders Build a New Political Order?

    The pattern was all too familiar—much like in many Islamic states, the ousting of a strong secular leader often signals not democratic renewal but the rise of Islamist factions, followed by a descent into instability. Initially, Bangladesh appeared set to follow this trajectory, with Hasina’s removal fueled by mass protests.

    However, six months on, the forces of Islamization have not surged to dominance, nor has the country spiraled into complete chaos—offering a glimmer of hope for democracy. The upcoming general election now stands as a pivotal moment for a nation already fractured by political uncertainty. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is maneuvering for a political resurgence, the Awami League remains paralyzed by fear, and Islamist parties add further complexity to the landscape.

    Amid this turbulence, the student activists who once spearheaded Hasina’s ouster have launched their own political faction, presenting it as an effort to reshape Bangladesh’s future. Whether they can move beyond their revolutionary roots and establish a sustainable political alternative remains an open question.

    The New Student Party

    Forged in the chaos of the riots that unseated Sheikh Hasina, the National Citizen Party (NCP) was founded by student leaders who once stood at the front lines of the uprising. They chose Nahid Islam—one of Bangladesh’s most prominent protest figures—to lead their movement. Until recently, Islam advised the interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the administration that took charge in the wake of Hasina’s departure.

    Speaking at a public rally in Dhaka on Friday, the NCP formally outlined its political vision and ambitions. Party leaders, including Nahid Islam, emphasized their commitment to drafting a new democratic constitution to prevent the return of constitutional autocracy. They presented the NCP as a fresh alternative to the long-dominant Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), pledging to break the cycle of corruption and authoritarianism that has long plagued the country’s politics.

    Bangladeshi voters have historically faced limited choices at the ballot box, and some analysts believe that the emergence of a third or fourth political force could ease the electorate’s frustrations. NCP representative Akhtar Hossain reaffirmed the party’s commitment to participatory politics and its opposition to both Islamophobia and religious extremism in the Muslim-majority nation. He noted that Bangladesh has experienced both anti-Islamic sentiment and extremism, and the NCP aims to counter both by prioritizing civic dignity and inclusive political participation.

    However, some critics find the party’s stance contradictory, questioning whether it can maintain a balanced position between secularism and religious influences while appealing to a diverse electorate.

    Duopoly in Bangladesh Politics

    Since Bangladesh emerged from the 1971 Indo-Pak war, its political landscape has been less a contest of ideas than a dynastic struggle between two entrenched forces. The Awami League (AL), buoyed by India’s backing, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), with historical ties to Pakistan, have alternated between dominance and opposition, their rivalry defining the nation’s turbulent democracy. Smaller leftist and Islamist parties have struggled to gain significant voter support. Both parties have faced allegations of corruption, authoritarianism, and a failure to address systemic inequality, discrimination, and social injustice.

    With the Awami League weakened by Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, the BNP has emerged as the most powerful political force. However, the National Citizen Party (NCP), the newly formed youth-led party, is attempting to carve out space for itself—often at the expense of both. In some areas, NCP activists have clashed with BNP supporters as they seek to claim AL strongholds, leading to heightened political tensions.

    Samantha Sharmin, a leading figure in the NCP, has accused the BNP—without naming it directly—of obstructing national unity. She argued that every effort to build a new political consensus after Hasina’s fall has been disrupted by a party that views itself as Bangladesh’s rightful political leader.

    The BNP has dismissed such accusations, maintaining that its priority is to contest the next elections and restore democracy. BNP politician Harunur Rashid welcomed the emergence of the NCP but downplayed its significance, arguing that his party has already earned the trust of voters and that the NCP lacks the political strength to challenge them. According to him, the BNP is unwilling to allow the NCP to rise at its expense.

    Disagreements between the two parties extend to the nature of the elections. The NCP has called for the formation of a new constituent assembly to draft a fresh constitution, while the BNP insists that parliamentary elections should be held first. Additionally, the NCP has urged the interim government to ban the Awami League entirely—a demand the BNP has refused to support, arguing that the AL’s fate should be decided through elections. This position allows the BNP to maintain a more democratic image, but critics argue that it is also a strategic move to keep the political fight between the BNP and the AL, excluding new challengers like the NCP. 

    Sharmin has harshly criticized the BNP’s approach, accusing it of manipulating public sentiment, betraying the spirit of the 2024 uprising, and keeping the Awami League politically relevant. However, some analysts believe that despite its weakened state, the AL remains a significant force, still commanding between 30% and 35% of the vote. If NCP is sidelined, the AL opposition base may consolidate behind the BNP, further strengthening the party and shaping the upcoming elections into yet another AL-BNP contest—exactly the scenario the NCP is trying to disrupt.

    Evolving Political Landscape

    While the interim government has regained control, sporadic mob attacks and rising tensions continue to fuel unrest. Public frustration is mounting over delays in drafting a new constitution and holding elections. Any further postponement risks triggering another wave of violent protests, with political parties like the BNP and NCP likely to seize the moment to position themselves as successors—potentially plunging Bangladesh into deeper chaos.

    The political battle is increasingly shaping up between the BNP and the NCP. However, despite its removal from power, the Awami League still holds significant influence. If elections are further delayed, the AL could reenter the political arena, presenting itself as the only viable option for stability. Even if legally barred from returning to power, the party may find an alternative political platform to retain its presence. How intelligence agencies navigate this evolving landscape could be instrumental in shaping future alliances. At the same time, Islamist factions may once again push for Islamic rule.

    In the coming months, Bangladesh may witness the rise of additional political parties, as various factions seek to exploit the prevailing uncertainty—each attempting to “Catch fish in muddy waters.”

  • PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    One of the deadliest conflicts of the past few decades—the struggle between the Turkish state and the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency—may finally be nearing its end. After forty years of violence that has claimed at least 40,000 lives, a landmark declaration has been made. On Thursday, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdish insurgency and an almost mythical figure among his followers, called on PKK fighters to lay down their arms after years of negotiations. In a written statement from his prison cell, where he has spent 25 years in isolation, Öcalan not only urged disarmament but also called for the complete dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

    This announcement could mark the end of a long and bloody chapter, yet optimism is cautious. A decade ago, a two-year ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish state collapsed, triggering some of the deadliest fighting in the conflict’s history, with more than 7,000 lives lost, including hundreds of civilians. Still, political analysts suggest that this time, there is reason to believe the fragile peace may hold.

    A Great Win for Erdoğan

    A staunch conservative, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long taken a hardline stance on Kurdish politics, making a lasting peace initiative under his leadership seem unlikely. Yet, this does not mean he has never pursued negotiations. The last meaningful attempt to negotiate a settlement with the PKK—a group labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey and its Western allies—occurred in a vastly different political climate, before Erdoğan’s illiberal rule fully took shape, but ultimately collapsed. However, with shifting political dynamics both domestically and regionally, he now appears more open to cooperation and more determined to end the conflict.

    Erdoğan’s ambitions to extend his rule, despite Turkey’s constitutional term limits, are well known. He has openly hinted at seeking another term if there is public support, a move that would require either early elections or a constitutional amendment. Achieving this would require backing beyond his current coalition—potentially from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). To appeal to both the party and the broader Kurdish population, Erdoğan has signaled a willingness to engage in negotiations—an ironic shift for a leader who has spent decades as one of the PKK’s fiercest opponents.

    In a calculated move, he entrusted negotiations to his ultranationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli, a figure who once demanded the execution of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This strategic gamble is designed to appease both nationalist hardliners and Kurdish factions. For Erdoğan, it is a delicate balancing act—one that allows him to present himself as a peacemaker while safeguarding the loyalty of his conservative base. A deft political maneuver from a leader adept at navigating power dynamics.

    PKK and Kurds

    The PKK’s demands have long shifted from seeking an independent Kurdish state to pushing for greater autonomy within Turkey and expanded rights for Kurds, who make up nearly a fifth of the country’s population. Yet, even with these more modest aspirations, a settlement may not necessarily lead to significant progress. Instead of political concessions, Ankara may opt for economic incentives—it recently unveiled a development plan for the Kurdish-majority southeast.

    A crucial question is whether thousands of PKK fighters—most now outside Turkey—can be persuaded to disarm. The conflict is deeply rooted in ethnic divisions and spans generations, raising concerns about how these fighters can reintegrate into society. There is also the risk that disillusioned groups may emerge, continuing the struggle for an independent Kurdish homeland.

    Another pressing issue is the broader cost of any agreement for both the Kurds and Turkey. For many Kurds, a deal may bring little meaningful change. While any step toward ending decades of bloodshed should be welcomed, there is also a fear that peace could come at the cost of indefinitely extending Erdoğan’s strongman rule. A lasting resolution would require genuine democratic representation for Kurds—something they continue to demand.

    Geopolitics of the Move

    The ongoing instability in the Middle East has strengthened Turkey’s push for security-focused strategies. Just over a month after Bahçeli’s call, Bashar al-Assad unexpectedly fell from power in Syria—partly due to Turkey’s support for the victorious rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Meanwhile, the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces remain firmly in control of their autonomous region in northeastern Syria, though they are aware that the Trump presidency may not favor their cause.

    For Turkey, neutralizing the Kurdish threat in Syria starts with eliminating the insurgency within its own borders. This is where the dissolution of the PKK becomes a strategic priority—allowing Turkey to consolidate control over its Kurdish regions. Ankara has repeatedly targeted Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria, accusing them of supporting militants inside Turkey. There is growing concern that Turkey and Syria could align against the Kurds, a move that would provoke significant backlash. Kurdish forces have gained substantial support in the West, particularly for their role in dismantling the Islamic State and their progressive stance on social issues like gender equality—areas where much of the Middle East remains deeply conservative.

    If Turkey succeeds in dismantling militant Kurdish factions in Syria, it could more easily confront Kurdish groups in Iraq, weakening their influence and furthering Ankara’s longstanding goal of regional dominance.

    What Happens Next? 

    The agreement brings together Turkey’s right-wing nationalists, driven by Ottoman-era ambitions, and Kurdish hardliners who have long fought for independence, leaving little room for dissent on either side. If the upcoming election shifts the political landscape and Erdoğan’s main rival, the center-left CHP, takes power, its leadership is also expected to pursue reconciliation. Meanwhile, DEP, the rising Kurdish political force, has signaled its willingness to collaborate with Ankara.

    However, if Syria’s new government moves to suppress Kurdish groups, the fallout will inevitably spill over into Turkey, potentially strengthening calls for Kurdish autonomy—an outcome no Turkish administration, regardless of its leadership, is willing to accept. Decades of conflict have entrenched deep divisions, making integration a daunting challenge. For the Kurdish people, the legacy of struggle and resistance makes the path to reconciliation fraught with difficulty. 

  • With Ties to Afghanistan Fraying, Pakistan Escalates Crackdown on Refugees

    With Ties to Afghanistan Fraying, Pakistan Escalates Crackdown on Refugees

    The relationship between Pakistan, an Islamic republic, and Afghanistan, an Islamic emirate, is deteriorating, particularly as Kabul strengthens its ties with India—Islamabad’s longtime adversary. However, India is only one of Pakistan’s growing concerns. Rising tensions with Afghanistan are compounded by broader security fears, including the large number of Afghan refugees and growing unease over its own Pashtun population, who share deep ethnic and cultural ties with Afghans.

    Islamabad fears that the Baloch nationalist movement could trigger unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a Pashtun-majority region where resentment toward increasing Punjabi dominance in the government is already evident. If Islamist movements in the region gain momentum, factions within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could align with Afghanistan, posing a serious threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Authorities also worry that Afghan refugees in the country, many living in poor conditions, could be easily exploited by these factions.

    As tensions between the two countries escalate, Pakistan has intensified its deportation of Afghan refugees, many of whom originally sought asylum during the U.S.-Taliban conflict. Thousands are being forced across the border in what Islamabad claims is a security measure. However, this crackdown has triggered a severe humanitarian crisis. While some deportees may be vulnerable to recruitment by the Taliban or other Islamist groups, many had fled Afghanistan to escape Taliban persecution due to their associations with the U.S. or the former Western-backed Afghan government. Their forced return now places them at grave risk of retribution, including trials and executions under the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islamic law.

    Refugees whose life under threat 

    In 2023, Pakistan launched a large-scale effort to repatriate nearly four million Afghans who had entered the country over the past four decades. While authorities initially allowed some flexibility, the government has now set a firm deadline of March 31 to expel all undocumented foreign nationals, with search operations intensifying since January.

    Since the beginning of the year, authorities have detained over 1,000 Afghans in Islamabad and forced more than 18,000 to leave the capital and its neighboring city under government orders. Among them are individuals who worked with the U.S. against the Taliban, some of whom were awaiting evacuation to America. Their relocation was halted after former President Donald Trump issued an executive order suspending the refugee resettlement program.

    Today, nearly 20,000 Afghans in Pakistan remain in limbo, waiting for U.S. approval to resettle. For many, returning to Afghanistan is a life-threatening prospect. Forcibly sending them back is akin to sentencing some to death.

    The Politics Behind Refugee Expulsions

    A stronger alliance between India and Afghanistan could further escalate Pakistan’s already deteriorating political climate. Beyond the risk of instability in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Islamabad fears that anti-government factions could gain support from the Taliban to establish an Islamic emirate—one that is even more hardline than Pakistan’s Islamic republic and does not recognize its current leadership as truly Islamic. Additionally, Pakistan has long been a hub for militant training, attracting jihadists from around the world. Many of these fighters, Islamabad worries, could easily be mobilized by Afghanistan as well.

    Pakistan holds the Taliban-led government responsible for failing to rein in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group that has repeatedly targeted Pakistani security forces since its formation in 2007. 

    As cross-border tensions escalate, reports of intimidation and mass arrests of Afghan refugees in Pakistan have drawn international criticism. The UN special rapporteur has urged Islamabad to treat Afghan nationals more humanely, while Pakistan has dismissed allegations of mistreatment as “misplaced,” calling on Kabul to facilitate their repatriation. For many Afghans, this forced exodus is not only a humanitarian crisis but also a source of humiliation—one that Afghanistan could exploit in its anti-Pakistan rhetoric.

    For decades, Pakistan, established as a homeland for Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, took pride in its Islamic identity, offering refuge to Afghan migrants and supporting groups working to shape Afghanistan’s Islamic trajectory, including the Taliban. That era is over. Confronted with political backlash and economic hardship, Pakistan has shifted from providing sanctuary to enforcing mass expulsions, prioritizing national survival over Islamic solidarity.

    Broader Implications 

    Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are struggling states, plagued by instability and deep economic crises, worsened by a lack of foreign investment that leaves little hope for recovery. Yet, despite Pakistan’s low ranking on the Human Development Index and weak GDP per capita, it still offers better living conditions than Afghanistan. For many Afghans, staying in Pakistan is a desperate choice—sometimes the lesser of two evils.

    However, Pakistan can no longer afford to bear this burden, either economically or politically. Its decision to forcibly expel Afghan refugees may relieve short-term pressures, but it risks igniting deeper unrest. The move could fuel domestic resistance against the government while creating opportunities for Afghanistan to exploit Pakistan’s growing instability. Caught in the middle are ordinary people—forced to suffer as politics dictate their fate.