Category: Asia

  • Duterte On Arrest: What’s Next for His dynasty?

    Duterte On Arrest: What’s Next for His dynasty?

    The relentless drama of Philippine politics has taken another dramatic turn with the arrest of former President Rodrigo Duterte at Manila’s international airport, following a request from the International Criminal Court (ICC). A towering figure in one of the country’s two dominant political dynasties, Duterte’s detention is more than a legal reckoning—it is a moment of profound political consequence. With the general elections fast approaching in May, the Duterte family, now steered by its next generation, is fighting to preserve its influence in an increasingly hostile landscape.

    President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s decision to comply with the ICC’s warrant, coming after his earlier move to remove Duterte’s daughter from the vice presidency, appears to be a calculated bid to erode the family’s power. In a time when ICC warrants are often dismissed or ignored, Marcos Jr.’s cooperation is widely seen as a strategic maneuver—one that not only neutralizes a formidable rival but could also signal the decline of a once-dominant political dynasty.

    Duterte Indicted

    As his 80th birthday nears, an international tribunal closes in on the former president. Prosecutors at the International Criminal Court (ICC) accuse him of crimes against humanity for orchestrating a ruthless anti-drug campaign that claimed up to 30,000 lives. Gunmen, acting under his war on drugs, executed most of the victims—men from the country’s poorest urban enclaves—in the streets, blurring the line between state policy and unrestrained violence..

    Duterte’s rise to the presidency in 2016 was built on a promise of unrelenting violence. Before assuming national office, he had already cultivated a fearsome reputation as the mayor of Davao City, where he was accused of deploying criminal gangs to carry out extrajudicial executions. On the campaign trail, he vowed to rid the country of drugs with a crackdown so ruthless that, he boasted, Manila Bay’s fish would grow fat on the bodies of the slain. Once in power, he made good on his threats, publicly endorsing the killing of suspected drug dealers and even encouraging ordinary citizens to take up arms against addicts.

    Since his election, estimates cited by the ICC suggest that between 12,000 and 30,000 civilians have been killed in anti-drug operations. His long-anticipated arrest came as he arrived at Manila’s international airport from Hong Kong, where the prosecutor general served him with an ICC warrant, formally charging him with crimes against humanity. He was swiftly taken into custody and has since boarded a flight bound for The Hague.

    The Political Impact

    Despite the international outcry over his administration’s bloody drug war, Duterte remained a deeply entrenched political force, particularly in his stronghold of Davao. Yet even his most devoted supporters, for all their outrage over his arrest, are unlikely to transform their defiance into a large-scale People Power-style uprising. For now, their resistance is largely confined to the digital sphere, far removed from the historic street protests that once altered the course of Philippine politics. Still, Duterte is not merely an individual; he is the patriarch of a powerful political dynasty, with his family wielding influence at both the local and national levels. How they navigate this crisis will determine whether the Duterte name retains its political clout or fades into irrelevance.

    Many analysts see his arrest as the beginning of his dynasty’s decline. Unlike Duterte, whose strongman persona and incendiary rhetoric cultivated a nationwide following, his children have yet to command the same level of appeal. His downfall, they argue, is more than just a legal reckoning—it is a repudiation of the brand of politics he embodied, one that valued brute force over diplomacy. Meanwhile, Marcos Jr. has capitalized on this shift, recasting himself as a pragmatic and responsible leader—one who champions human rights and the rule of law. In doing so, he not only consolidates his own power but also leaves an already fragmented opposition struggling to find its footing.

    For years, Duterte sought to insulate himself from prosecution by pulling the Philippines out of the Rome Statute in 2019, effectively shielding himself from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. But Marcos Jr. reversed course, rejoining the treaty and clearing the way for the ICC’s case against Duterte to move forward. His arrest marks the final and irrevocable fracture in the Marcos-Duterte alliance, a strategic partnership that secured their joint electoral victory in 2022. The alliance had propelled Duterte’s daughter, Sara, to the vice presidency while helping Marcos Jr. mobilize Duterte’s voter base. But the split had been brewing for some time. Marcos methodically distanced himself, rejoined the ICC, and systematically sidelined Sara—moves that now seem less like routine political repositioning and more like the calculated dismantling of a former ally.

    Time for another Duerte?

    Rodrigo Duterte’s children—Sara, Paolo, and Sebastian—occupy key positions of power, ensuring the family’s continued political relevance. Sara Duterte currently serves as the 15th Vice President of the Philippines, having been elected alongside Bongbong Marcos in 2022, when he secured the presidency in a decisive landslide. Before assuming the vice presidency, Sara was the mayor of Davao City, a position she first held in 2010 after succeeding her father, who had completed his third term. She returned to the post in 2016 when Rodrigo Duterte launched his presidential bid, having previously served as his vice mayor in 2007.

    Paolo Duterte, the eldest son, has represented Davao City’s 1st District in Congress since 2019 and previously served as Deputy Speaker for Political Affairs. His political trajectory includes stints as vice mayor to his father in 2013 and later to his sister in 2018. Meanwhile, Sebastian Duterte, who ran unopposed in 2019, succeeded Paolo as vice mayor and later replaced Sara as Davao City mayor following the May 2022 elections. The Duterte family’s hold over Davao’s mayoralty has been nearly unbroken since 1988, with the only exception occurring between 1998 and 2001, when Rodrigo Duterte was briefly succeeded by Benjamin de Guzman before reclaiming the post.

    As the Duterte dynasty faces a political reckoning, the question of who will emerge as its next standard-bearer looms large. Sara Duterte, despite her position as Marcos Jr.’s vice president, has openly positioned herself as his rival. Her confrontational stance, including incendiary rhetoric that at times suggests her allies are prepared to remove Marcos from power, has resonated with a significant segment of Filipinos while also exposing her to political risk. Now facing an impeachment process that threatens to derail her career, she could either see her ambitions cut short or find herself elevated as the leader of an opposition movement, paving the way for another Duterte resurgence.

    Many believe the Duterte family will use Rodrigo Duterte’s arrest to craft a narrative of persecution, portraying him as a martyr punished for his leadership. This framing could rally public sympathy, reinforcing the dynasty’s influence even in adversity. In response, the family may attempt to introduce a new figurehead, ensuring the continuity of the Duterte brand in Philippine politics. Whether Filipinos embrace or reject this strategy remains to be seen, but the dynasty’s capacity to shape the country’s political landscape is far from diminished.

  • Is Syria’s Islamist Government Turning Against the Alawites?

    Is Syria’s Islamist Government Turning Against the Alawites?

    As Damascus fell under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a former jihadist faction now rebranded as Syria’s new rulers, some hoped the country might finally emerge from its long nightmare. The civil war was over, Assad was gone, and the new government spoke of reconciliation and democratic transition. Everything seemed promising—but within months, sectarian divisions, far from fading, had only deepened. The Kurds remained locked in uneasy negotiations over their hold on northeastern Syria. Christians, their numbers already dwindling, watched warily from the sidelines. But it was the Alawites—the sect once represented by Assad—who found themselves most at risk.

    Reports describe a brutal crackdown by the Islamist-led government against Alawites, with thousands killed, systematic torture, and sexual violence carried out under the pretext of rooting out traitors. Videos and eyewitness accounts depict mass executions and forced expulsions. Yet Syrian officials, in statements reminiscent of past regimes, insist that Alawite factions were the true instigators of the violence, provoking the clashes that have since spiraled into bloodshed.

    Latakia Violence

    More than 1,000 people, including 745 civilians, have been killed in two days of clashes in Latakia, the western coastal region of Syria. The violence erupted as Syrian security forces battled fighters loyal to the former Assad regime, followed by a wave of revenge killings that has deepened fears of sectarian bloodshed, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

    The UK-based monitor reported that 745 civilians were executed, while 125 security personnel and 148 Assad loyalists also lost their lives. Some reports suggest the death toll may be even higher.

    According to The Guardian, the fighting began on Thursday when Assad loyalists ambushed security forces in Jableh, a city in Latakia province. Meanwhile, some Arab media outlets have reported an Alawite rebellion, while pro-Alawite social media accounts claim that Syrian opposition forces were the true instigators, carrying out raids and executions targeting Alawites.

    Damascus Turns to Iron Fist?

    To suppress the rebellion, the Syrian government called for reinforcements, leading to the deployment of thousands of fighters to the country’s coastal region. While these forces officially operate under the new Syrian government, militias—some with histories of human rights abuses—continue to act with little oversight or discipline.

    The government has attributed civilian killings to “Individual Actions” and claimed that the influx of fighters has contributed to human rights violations. In a speech on Friday, President Ahmad al-Sharaa vowed that “anyone who harms civilians will face severe punishment.” However, on the ground, serious crimes against civilians persist, with Syrian forces themselves implicated in the violence.

    Videos circulating online reveal fighters in security uniforms executing captives at point-blank range, forcing men to bark like dogs, and brutally beating detainees. In the town of al-Mukhtariya, footage shows dozens of civilians lying dead, with the Syrian Network for Human Rights reporting that at least 40 people died in a single incident.

    Alawites in Uncertainty

    Though most Alawites had no direct ties to the Assad regime, they are now being targeted and punished for his legacy. Syria’s new authorities assured the Alawite community of their safety, promising that there would be no acts of revenge. Yet that promise has proven hollow, offering no real protection. The recent killing of hundreds of Alawite civilians by government security forces has only intensified fear among the community.

    Reports of atrocities continue to surface. Alawites who spoke to the Media recounted the murder of family members, widespread looting, and deteriorating conditions in Alawite neighborhoods. They described a dire situation—no water or electricity for more than 24 hours, armed factions killing indiscriminately, and corpses piling up in the streets. Many see these actions as collective punishment, deepening the community’s sense of uncertainty and dread.

    Syria Unfixed

    The scale of violence against Alawites was unexpected, raising fears that Jolani is reverting to his old ways—those of an Islamist extremist. This resurgence has unsettled Syria’s minorities, with Christians growing increasingly anxious and the Kurds facing a decisive choice: to resist and risk prolonging the conflict or to negotiate and shape Syria’s fragile transition. Beyond political survival, Syria’s new rulers must also contend with the pressing need to secure international funding for the country’s post-war reconstruction. For international backing, Jolani may attempt—or at least pretend to attempt—to curb escalating violence and include Alawites who opposed Assad in the new government. 

    Political experts stress that a genuine commitment to transitional justice and inclusive governance is critical to preventing Syria from sliding back into chaos. As the country’s transitional authorities prepare to announce a new government this month, its composition will be closely scrutinized, particularly for its treatment of Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities in light of the recent bloodshed.

  • Iran’s Reformist VP Ousted: A Door Closes to the West

    Iran’s Reformist VP Ousted: A Door Closes to the West

    Iran’s reformist government has suffered a significant setback with the forced resignation of Mohammad Javad Zarif, its most prominent reformist figure. Zarif, who served as vice president for strategic affairs, stated that he had been ordered to step down by an unnamed senior official. While he refrained from directly mentioning Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his remarks strongly implied the decision had Khamenei’s approval.

    His removal follows the recent impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati, as Iran’s conservative factions escalate their efforts to weaken President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration. Hardliners, long hostile to Pezeshkian’s reformist agenda, have used the country’s worsening economic crisis—particularly the sharp decline of the currency—to push for a shift in policy.

    Although many of Iran’s economic troubles predate Pezeshkian’s presidency, conservatives have placed the blame squarely on his government for failing to halt the downturn. The consecutive dismissals have only deepened uncertainty, triggering further stock market losses as businesses grow increasingly wary of a political climate that appears to be shutting the door to the West.

    Who is Mohammad Javad Zarif?

    Mohammad Javad Zarif, a career diplomat and Iran’s most prominent reformist, has been the country’s most articulate voice in presenting its foreign policy to Western audiences. Serving as foreign minister from 2013 to 2021 under moderate President Hassan Rouhani, he was instrumental in shaping Iran’s international engagements and played a key role in Pezeshkian’s presidential campaign, effectively running as his closest ally.

    Zarif is widely recognized for his role in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which eased Western sanctions in exchange for independent UN inspections to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remained strictly civilian. Throughout his career, he has advocated for a stronger role for the foreign ministry in shaping Iran’s international policy, challenging the dominance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in foreign affairs.

    Throughout his career, he has been a frequent target of hardliners, particularly over allegations that his American-born children hold dual Iranian-US citizenship. Opponents, many of whom reject negotiations with the US, argue that his appointment violated a 2022 law barring individuals with Western ties from holding senior government positions. Concerns over his children’s nationality, stemming from his tenure as a diplomat in the US, were among the reasons he initially attempted to resign from Pezeshkian’s administration in August 2024.

    His appointment as vice president for strategic affairs—a role created largely to accommodate him—was widely seen as an effort by the reformist government to restore ties with the US and Europe and to ease Iran’s economic struggles under severe sanctions. However, this strategy now faces significant obstacles, as President Donald Trump—who withdrew the US from the nuclear deal in 2018 and reinstated crippling sanctions—has adopted an even more hardline approach toward Iran, leaving little room for diplomatic maneuvering.

    Conservatives Tighten Grip

    In his resignation note, Zarif suggested that his departure was not voluntary, highlighting the growing influence of conservatives over reformists within the administration and fueling internal discontent. A high-ranking official had reportedly instructed Pezeshkian to dismiss him and send him back to academia. Pezeshkian refused, instead insisting that the directive be delivered to Zarif directly.

    Pezeshkian himself appears uneasy with the conservative push to sideline Zarif and other reformists. With Donald Trump expected to take a more confrontational stance in the coming days, reformists are likely to face increasing pressure, as his administration is unlikely to engage meaningfully with Iran. This shift could further reinforce conservative claims that diplomacy with the West is futile.

    Trump’s push to reinstate maximum economic sanctions has already weakened reformists advocating for a new global agreement on nuclear oversight. A deepening economic crisis could provide conservatives with a pretext to tighten their grip on power, potentially leading to further crackdowns on reformist elements within the government. Meanwhile, conservatives have cited Trump’s recent Oval Office humiliation of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a cautionary tale for those in Iran who still believe negotiations with the U.S. president are possible.

    What Happens Next?

    The Islamic Republic of Iran is facing mounting pressure, not only from external forces but also from its own citizens. Protests against the regime are becoming increasingly visible, amplified by social media, where pre-Islamic Persian sentiments are resurging. Amid this unrest, Iran’s economy continues to deteriorate, and Trump’s sanctions are likely to accelerate its decline, further fueling public discontent toward the regime.

    In this context, the regime may seek to shift blame onto the reformist government while allowing conservatives to reclaim control in an effort to preserve the Islamic Republic. Recent developments suggest that the regime, which initially attempted to negotiate a path forward with Pezeshkian and Zarif, is now reasserting control. 

  • Can Bangladesh’s Riotous Student Leaders Build a New Political Order?

    Can Bangladesh’s Riotous Student Leaders Build a New Political Order?

    The pattern was all too familiar—much like in many Islamic states, the ousting of a strong secular leader often signals not democratic renewal but the rise of Islamist factions, followed by a descent into instability. Initially, Bangladesh appeared set to follow this trajectory, with Hasina’s removal fueled by mass protests.

    However, six months on, the forces of Islamization have not surged to dominance, nor has the country spiraled into complete chaos—offering a glimmer of hope for democracy. The upcoming general election now stands as a pivotal moment for a nation already fractured by political uncertainty. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is maneuvering for a political resurgence, the Awami League remains paralyzed by fear, and Islamist parties add further complexity to the landscape.

    Amid this turbulence, the student activists who once spearheaded Hasina’s ouster have launched their own political faction, presenting it as an effort to reshape Bangladesh’s future. Whether they can move beyond their revolutionary roots and establish a sustainable political alternative remains an open question.

    The New Student Party

    Forged in the chaos of the riots that unseated Sheikh Hasina, the National Citizen Party (NCP) was founded by student leaders who once stood at the front lines of the uprising. They chose Nahid Islam—one of Bangladesh’s most prominent protest figures—to lead their movement. Until recently, Islam advised the interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the administration that took charge in the wake of Hasina’s departure.

    Speaking at a public rally in Dhaka on Friday, the NCP formally outlined its political vision and ambitions. Party leaders, including Nahid Islam, emphasized their commitment to drafting a new democratic constitution to prevent the return of constitutional autocracy. They presented the NCP as a fresh alternative to the long-dominant Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), pledging to break the cycle of corruption and authoritarianism that has long plagued the country’s politics.

    Bangladeshi voters have historically faced limited choices at the ballot box, and some analysts believe that the emergence of a third or fourth political force could ease the electorate’s frustrations. NCP representative Akhtar Hossain reaffirmed the party’s commitment to participatory politics and its opposition to both Islamophobia and religious extremism in the Muslim-majority nation. He noted that Bangladesh has experienced both anti-Islamic sentiment and extremism, and the NCP aims to counter both by prioritizing civic dignity and inclusive political participation.

    However, some critics find the party’s stance contradictory, questioning whether it can maintain a balanced position between secularism and religious influences while appealing to a diverse electorate.

    Duopoly in Bangladesh Politics

    Since Bangladesh emerged from the 1971 Indo-Pak war, its political landscape has been less a contest of ideas than a dynastic struggle between two entrenched forces. The Awami League (AL), buoyed by India’s backing, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), with historical ties to Pakistan, have alternated between dominance and opposition, their rivalry defining the nation’s turbulent democracy. Smaller leftist and Islamist parties have struggled to gain significant voter support. Both parties have faced allegations of corruption, authoritarianism, and a failure to address systemic inequality, discrimination, and social injustice.

    With the Awami League weakened by Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, the BNP has emerged as the most powerful political force. However, the National Citizen Party (NCP), the newly formed youth-led party, is attempting to carve out space for itself—often at the expense of both. In some areas, NCP activists have clashed with BNP supporters as they seek to claim AL strongholds, leading to heightened political tensions.

    Samantha Sharmin, a leading figure in the NCP, has accused the BNP—without naming it directly—of obstructing national unity. She argued that every effort to build a new political consensus after Hasina’s fall has been disrupted by a party that views itself as Bangladesh’s rightful political leader.

    The BNP has dismissed such accusations, maintaining that its priority is to contest the next elections and restore democracy. BNP politician Harunur Rashid welcomed the emergence of the NCP but downplayed its significance, arguing that his party has already earned the trust of voters and that the NCP lacks the political strength to challenge them. According to him, the BNP is unwilling to allow the NCP to rise at its expense.

    Disagreements between the two parties extend to the nature of the elections. The NCP has called for the formation of a new constituent assembly to draft a fresh constitution, while the BNP insists that parliamentary elections should be held first. Additionally, the NCP has urged the interim government to ban the Awami League entirely—a demand the BNP has refused to support, arguing that the AL’s fate should be decided through elections. This position allows the BNP to maintain a more democratic image, but critics argue that it is also a strategic move to keep the political fight between the BNP and the AL, excluding new challengers like the NCP. 

    Sharmin has harshly criticized the BNP’s approach, accusing it of manipulating public sentiment, betraying the spirit of the 2024 uprising, and keeping the Awami League politically relevant. However, some analysts believe that despite its weakened state, the AL remains a significant force, still commanding between 30% and 35% of the vote. If NCP is sidelined, the AL opposition base may consolidate behind the BNP, further strengthening the party and shaping the upcoming elections into yet another AL-BNP contest—exactly the scenario the NCP is trying to disrupt.

    Evolving Political Landscape

    While the interim government has regained control, sporadic mob attacks and rising tensions continue to fuel unrest. Public frustration is mounting over delays in drafting a new constitution and holding elections. Any further postponement risks triggering another wave of violent protests, with political parties like the BNP and NCP likely to seize the moment to position themselves as successors—potentially plunging Bangladesh into deeper chaos.

    The political battle is increasingly shaping up between the BNP and the NCP. However, despite its removal from power, the Awami League still holds significant influence. If elections are further delayed, the AL could reenter the political arena, presenting itself as the only viable option for stability. Even if legally barred from returning to power, the party may find an alternative political platform to retain its presence. How intelligence agencies navigate this evolving landscape could be instrumental in shaping future alliances. At the same time, Islamist factions may once again push for Islamic rule.

    In the coming months, Bangladesh may witness the rise of additional political parties, as various factions seek to exploit the prevailing uncertainty—each attempting to “Catch fish in muddy waters.”

  • PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    One of the deadliest conflicts of the past few decades—the struggle between the Turkish state and the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency—may finally be nearing its end. After forty years of violence that has claimed at least 40,000 lives, a landmark declaration has been made. On Thursday, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdish insurgency and an almost mythical figure among his followers, called on PKK fighters to lay down their arms after years of negotiations. In a written statement from his prison cell, where he has spent 25 years in isolation, Öcalan not only urged disarmament but also called for the complete dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

    This announcement could mark the end of a long and bloody chapter, yet optimism is cautious. A decade ago, a two-year ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish state collapsed, triggering some of the deadliest fighting in the conflict’s history, with more than 7,000 lives lost, including hundreds of civilians. Still, political analysts suggest that this time, there is reason to believe the fragile peace may hold.

    A Great Win for Erdoğan

    A staunch conservative, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long taken a hardline stance on Kurdish politics, making a lasting peace initiative under his leadership seem unlikely. Yet, this does not mean he has never pursued negotiations. The last meaningful attempt to negotiate a settlement with the PKK—a group labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey and its Western allies—occurred in a vastly different political climate, before Erdoğan’s illiberal rule fully took shape, but ultimately collapsed. However, with shifting political dynamics both domestically and regionally, he now appears more open to cooperation and more determined to end the conflict.

    Erdoğan’s ambitions to extend his rule, despite Turkey’s constitutional term limits, are well known. He has openly hinted at seeking another term if there is public support, a move that would require either early elections or a constitutional amendment. Achieving this would require backing beyond his current coalition—potentially from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). To appeal to both the party and the broader Kurdish population, Erdoğan has signaled a willingness to engage in negotiations—an ironic shift for a leader who has spent decades as one of the PKK’s fiercest opponents.

    In a calculated move, he entrusted negotiations to his ultranationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli, a figure who once demanded the execution of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This strategic gamble is designed to appease both nationalist hardliners and Kurdish factions. For Erdoğan, it is a delicate balancing act—one that allows him to present himself as a peacemaker while safeguarding the loyalty of his conservative base. A deft political maneuver from a leader adept at navigating power dynamics.

    PKK and Kurds

    The PKK’s demands have long shifted from seeking an independent Kurdish state to pushing for greater autonomy within Turkey and expanded rights for Kurds, who make up nearly a fifth of the country’s population. Yet, even with these more modest aspirations, a settlement may not necessarily lead to significant progress. Instead of political concessions, Ankara may opt for economic incentives—it recently unveiled a development plan for the Kurdish-majority southeast.

    A crucial question is whether thousands of PKK fighters—most now outside Turkey—can be persuaded to disarm. The conflict is deeply rooted in ethnic divisions and spans generations, raising concerns about how these fighters can reintegrate into society. There is also the risk that disillusioned groups may emerge, continuing the struggle for an independent Kurdish homeland.

    Another pressing issue is the broader cost of any agreement for both the Kurds and Turkey. For many Kurds, a deal may bring little meaningful change. While any step toward ending decades of bloodshed should be welcomed, there is also a fear that peace could come at the cost of indefinitely extending Erdoğan’s strongman rule. A lasting resolution would require genuine democratic representation for Kurds—something they continue to demand.

    Geopolitics of the Move

    The ongoing instability in the Middle East has strengthened Turkey’s push for security-focused strategies. Just over a month after Bahçeli’s call, Bashar al-Assad unexpectedly fell from power in Syria—partly due to Turkey’s support for the victorious rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Meanwhile, the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces remain firmly in control of their autonomous region in northeastern Syria, though they are aware that the Trump presidency may not favor their cause.

    For Turkey, neutralizing the Kurdish threat in Syria starts with eliminating the insurgency within its own borders. This is where the dissolution of the PKK becomes a strategic priority—allowing Turkey to consolidate control over its Kurdish regions. Ankara has repeatedly targeted Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria, accusing them of supporting militants inside Turkey. There is growing concern that Turkey and Syria could align against the Kurds, a move that would provoke significant backlash. Kurdish forces have gained substantial support in the West, particularly for their role in dismantling the Islamic State and their progressive stance on social issues like gender equality—areas where much of the Middle East remains deeply conservative.

    If Turkey succeeds in dismantling militant Kurdish factions in Syria, it could more easily confront Kurdish groups in Iraq, weakening their influence and furthering Ankara’s longstanding goal of regional dominance.

    What Happens Next? 

    The agreement brings together Turkey’s right-wing nationalists, driven by Ottoman-era ambitions, and Kurdish hardliners who have long fought for independence, leaving little room for dissent on either side. If the upcoming election shifts the political landscape and Erdoğan’s main rival, the center-left CHP, takes power, its leadership is also expected to pursue reconciliation. Meanwhile, DEP, the rising Kurdish political force, has signaled its willingness to collaborate with Ankara.

    However, if Syria’s new government moves to suppress Kurdish groups, the fallout will inevitably spill over into Turkey, potentially strengthening calls for Kurdish autonomy—an outcome no Turkish administration, regardless of its leadership, is willing to accept. Decades of conflict have entrenched deep divisions, making integration a daunting challenge. For the Kurdish people, the legacy of struggle and resistance makes the path to reconciliation fraught with difficulty. 

  • With Ties to Afghanistan Fraying, Pakistan Escalates Crackdown on Refugees

    With Ties to Afghanistan Fraying, Pakistan Escalates Crackdown on Refugees

    The relationship between Pakistan, an Islamic republic, and Afghanistan, an Islamic emirate, is deteriorating, particularly as Kabul strengthens its ties with India—Islamabad’s longtime adversary. However, India is only one of Pakistan’s growing concerns. Rising tensions with Afghanistan are compounded by broader security fears, including the large number of Afghan refugees and growing unease over its own Pashtun population, who share deep ethnic and cultural ties with Afghans.

    Islamabad fears that the Baloch nationalist movement could trigger unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a Pashtun-majority region where resentment toward increasing Punjabi dominance in the government is already evident. If Islamist movements in the region gain momentum, factions within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could align with Afghanistan, posing a serious threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Authorities also worry that Afghan refugees in the country, many living in poor conditions, could be easily exploited by these factions.

    As tensions between the two countries escalate, Pakistan has intensified its deportation of Afghan refugees, many of whom originally sought asylum during the U.S.-Taliban conflict. Thousands are being forced across the border in what Islamabad claims is a security measure. However, this crackdown has triggered a severe humanitarian crisis. While some deportees may be vulnerable to recruitment by the Taliban or other Islamist groups, many had fled Afghanistan to escape Taliban persecution due to their associations with the U.S. or the former Western-backed Afghan government. Their forced return now places them at grave risk of retribution, including trials and executions under the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islamic law.

    Refugees whose life under threat 

    In 2023, Pakistan launched a large-scale effort to repatriate nearly four million Afghans who had entered the country over the past four decades. While authorities initially allowed some flexibility, the government has now set a firm deadline of March 31 to expel all undocumented foreign nationals, with search operations intensifying since January.

    Since the beginning of the year, authorities have detained over 1,000 Afghans in Islamabad and forced more than 18,000 to leave the capital and its neighboring city under government orders. Among them are individuals who worked with the U.S. against the Taliban, some of whom were awaiting evacuation to America. Their relocation was halted after former President Donald Trump issued an executive order suspending the refugee resettlement program.

    Today, nearly 20,000 Afghans in Pakistan remain in limbo, waiting for U.S. approval to resettle. For many, returning to Afghanistan is a life-threatening prospect. Forcibly sending them back is akin to sentencing some to death.

    The Politics Behind Refugee Expulsions

    A stronger alliance between India and Afghanistan could further escalate Pakistan’s already deteriorating political climate. Beyond the risk of instability in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Islamabad fears that anti-government factions could gain support from the Taliban to establish an Islamic emirate—one that is even more hardline than Pakistan’s Islamic republic and does not recognize its current leadership as truly Islamic. Additionally, Pakistan has long been a hub for militant training, attracting jihadists from around the world. Many of these fighters, Islamabad worries, could easily be mobilized by Afghanistan as well.

    Pakistan holds the Taliban-led government responsible for failing to rein in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group that has repeatedly targeted Pakistani security forces since its formation in 2007. 

    As cross-border tensions escalate, reports of intimidation and mass arrests of Afghan refugees in Pakistan have drawn international criticism. The UN special rapporteur has urged Islamabad to treat Afghan nationals more humanely, while Pakistan has dismissed allegations of mistreatment as “misplaced,” calling on Kabul to facilitate their repatriation. For many Afghans, this forced exodus is not only a humanitarian crisis but also a source of humiliation—one that Afghanistan could exploit in its anti-Pakistan rhetoric.

    For decades, Pakistan, established as a homeland for Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, took pride in its Islamic identity, offering refuge to Afghan migrants and supporting groups working to shape Afghanistan’s Islamic trajectory, including the Taliban. That era is over. Confronted with political backlash and economic hardship, Pakistan has shifted from providing sanctuary to enforcing mass expulsions, prioritizing national survival over Islamic solidarity.

    Broader Implications 

    Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are struggling states, plagued by instability and deep economic crises, worsened by a lack of foreign investment that leaves little hope for recovery. Yet, despite Pakistan’s low ranking on the Human Development Index and weak GDP per capita, it still offers better living conditions than Afghanistan. For many Afghans, staying in Pakistan is a desperate choice—sometimes the lesser of two evils.

    However, Pakistan can no longer afford to bear this burden, either economically or politically. Its decision to forcibly expel Afghan refugees may relieve short-term pressures, but it risks igniting deeper unrest. The move could fuel domestic resistance against the government while creating opportunities for Afghanistan to exploit Pakistan’s growing instability. Caught in the middle are ordinary people—forced to suffer as politics dictate their fate.

  • Turkmenistan Eyes a Future in the Middle Corridor

    Turkmenistan Eyes a Future in the Middle Corridor

    For decades, Turkmenistan has stood apart—an authoritarian state wrapped in bureaucracy and wary of foreign influence. Visas are notoriously difficult to obtain, and for many Turkmen citizens, the prospect of traveling abroad remains out of reach. Since breaking from Moscow, its leadership has upheld a policy of strict isolation, maintaining a state-controlled economy and a political system defined by secrecy.

    But as Central Asia’s geopolitical currents shift, Turkmenistan is beginning to reorient itself. No longer content with isolation, Ashgabat is making calculated moves to integrate into the region’s expanding trade networks. With East-West commerce surging through the Middle Corridor, the government is channeling resources into infrastructure projects that could turn the country from a reclusive state into a key transit hub.

    Path to Integration

    In early February, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Ministry announced that its officials had participated in a virtual meeting with counterparts from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Romania to discuss enhancing East-West trade connectivity. These countries are key partners in the Middle Corridor, which links China and Kazakhstan to Europe while bypassing Russian territory. According to the ministry, Ashgabat is preparing to sign a quadripartite agreement to establish a new trade route through the Middle Corridor, connecting the Caspian and Black Seas. The agreement is expected to play a crucial role in facilitating cargo transport between Central Asia and Europe.

    However, progress on the transit deal may not be swift. Turkmenistan has a history of unpredictable negotiations, as evidenced by its prolonged pricing dispute with Turkey over a gas swap deal originally agreed upon in early 2024. After months of back-and-forth, the gas flow is now set to begin on March 1, with Turkmenistan expected to supply 1.3 billion cubic meters by the end of 2025.

    The government is ramping up infrastructure development with an emphasis on aligning it with key trade routes. According to the government-affiliated Turkmenportal, a new airport near the village of Jebel in western Balkan province is nearing completion. Strategically positioned along the railway linking Ashgabat to the Caspian port city of Turkmenbashy, the airport features a 3,200-meter runway and is primarily intended for air cargo, though it may also accommodate passenger flights. Turkmenportal reports that the facility is expected to boost trade, increase transport capacity, and support the country’s broader economic ambitions.

    The Middle Corridor

    The Middle Corridor, an important international trade route, connects China, a major global production hub, to Europe, one of the world’s largest markets. It passes through Kazakhstan, crosses the Caspian Sea by ship, and continues through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. This route serves as an alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia and the congested maritime passage via the Suez Canal. Despite the Caspian Sea crossing, the Middle Corridor remains the shortest land connection between Western China and Europe. China has invested heavily in its infrastructure, completing the Trans-Kazakhstan railway—which runs east to west across Kazakhstan—in 2014 and inaugurating the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, which links the Caucasus region, three years later.

    After the Ukraine war began, cargo traffic along the Middle Corridor—bypassing Russian and Ukrainian territory—surged, reaching 3.2 million tons in 2022 as trade shifted away from the Northern Corridor. However, the route still faces challenges, including limited port capacity in the Caspian Sea, insufficient railway infrastructure, and persistent geopolitical tensions along the transit countries. While Russia plays a minimal role in this corridor, Turkey has positioned itself as a key player through the Organization of Turkic States, driving a six-fold increase in cargo transport over the past decade.

    Despite its strategic location, Turkmenistan remains outside the Middle Corridor, which primarily runs through Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Decades of neglect, compounded by the country’s insular and ultra-conservative politics, left its transportation infrastructure underdeveloped, limiting regional trade integration. However, Ashgabat is now ramping up infrastructure projects, positioning itself for potential connectivity with key trade routes. Strengthened transport links could not only facilitate energy exports to China but also provide a more efficient route for delivering Turkmenistan’s vast natural gas reserves to energy-hungry Western markets.

    What Will It Deliver?

    Turkmenistan’s economy is still recovering from the 2014 collapse in hydrocarbon prices, a downturn further exacerbated by prolonged low gas prices, the suspension of gas exports to Russia between 2016 and 2019, and poor agricultural yields. The country remains heavily reliant on natural gas, oil, and petrochemicals—sectors in which Russia is also a dominant player with limited demand for Turkmen exports. As Russia’s regional influence declines, Turkmenistan is exploring alternative economic partnerships. Despite possessing the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, its investment climate remains high risk, particularly for U.S. foreign direct investment. Strengthening ties with the Middle Corridor could boost investment in Turkmenistan, improve its connectivity, and create broader economic opportunities.

  • Curtains for Democracy? Hong Kong’s Longest-Standing Opposition Party to Dissolve

    Curtains for Democracy? Hong Kong’s Longest-Standing Opposition Party to Dissolve

    Hong Kong, once a gateway between the West and Asia, has lost its distinct identity under Beijing’s tightening grip. After China imposed a new constitution, erasing the city’s autonomy, authorities systematically dismantled its pro-democracy movement. Viewing democracy as a relic of British rule and a threat to Hong Kong’s integration with China, the government cracked down harshly—arresting, jailing, and even torturing politicians while severely punishing protests. Fear silenced dissent, and opposition parties were gradually wiped out. Now, Hong Kong’s oldest pro-democracy party, once a powerful voice against Beijing’s control, is preparing to dissolve. Its closure marks not only the final chapter of democracy in Hong Kong but also the end of the city’s unique identity.

    Lo Kin-hei, chair of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, announced on Thursday that the party is beginning the process of dissolution, stating that they will move forward with studying the necessary steps and procedures for disbanding. He explained that the decision was made after assessing Hong Kong’s political environment and future prospects. While the final vote on dissolution will be left to party members, he did not specify a timeline, though it is expected to take place soon.

    As the first step in the multi-stage process, a three-person team, including Lo, will review the legal and accounting requirements. Despite having 400 members, the party is not facing immediate financial difficulties. However, disbanding will require the approval of 75% of meeting participants in a final vote.

    Lo acknowledged the longstanding challenges and noted that many civil society groups and political parties have disbanded in recent years. The Civic Party, once Hong Kong’s second-largest opposition group, dissolved in 2023. When asked whether Beijing had pressured the Democrats to fold, he declined to disclose details of internal discussions, leaving the question open to speculation.

    The Democratic Party was founded in 1994, near the end of British colonial rule, through the merger of Hong Kong’s leading liberal groups. Its early leaders played a key role in shaping the framework that promised Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy and protections for civil rights under Chinese rule. After the city’s handover to China in 1997, the party emerged as the most influential opposition voice in Hong Kong’s legislature and led peaceful street demonstrations.

    However, its influence waned as Beijing tightened control, particularly after the imposition of the national security law following the large-scale and sometimes violent pro-democracy protests in 2019. The passage of a second security law last year effectively eliminated any remaining space for opposition. Four of the party’s former lawmakers, including ex-leader Wu Chi-wai, are currently serving prison sentences after being convicted of subversion under the national security law. The party no longer holds any seats in the legislature after Hong Kong’s electoral system was overhauled in 2021 to ensure that only candidates loyal to Beijing could take office.

    Lo expressed hope that Hong Kong could one day reclaim the values that once defined its success—diversity, inclusion, and democracy. These principles had been tested, implemented, and ultimately dismantled. Among the party’s most well-known figures were Martin Lee, often regarded as the father of Hong Kong’s democracy, and Albert Ho, who for years organized the city’s annual vigils commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Though the pro-democracy movement has been largely erased from Hong Kong’s political landscape, its legacy will endure—if not in the city’s institutions, then at least in the pages of history, preserved in languages beyond Beijing’s reach.

  • In Nepal, a Rare Political Consensus—But Against Social Media

    In Nepal, a Rare Political Consensus—But Against Social Media

    Nepal, once a bastion of political turmoil, has carved out a reputation as one of Asia’s freest nations—a distinction that rests firmly on the foundation of its 2015 constitution, which enshrined the right to free speech. In 2024, this hard-won freedom found a fresh affirmation when Nepal ranked 74th out of 180 on Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index—an enviable position in a region where such liberties remain precarious. Yet, this hard-fought freedom is now under siege. A proposed bill to regulate social media has ignited fears that both Nepali citizens and foreign visitors might once again find their voices stifled, evoking the specter of past repressions under monarchic and communist rule. Critics have raised alarms, arguing that its broad, ambiguous language could be used to suppress political dissent and undermine the very rights the constitution was designed to protect. Even more alarming, Nepal’s political parties—long divided on nearly every issue—have found rare consensus on this bill, either remaining silent or, more troubling still, lending their endorsement. This unusual unity points to a disconcerting shift in the nation’s democratic trajectory, one that could redefine the landscape of free expression in the years to come.

    The new bill certainly has its merits, particularly in its focus on addressing online crimes—a concern that is echoed in similar measures around the world. There are legitimate reasons for regulating digital spaces, such as combating cyberbullying and misinformation, and few would argue against the importance of ensuring online safety. However, while the government frames the bill as a necessary step for digital regulation, several provisions seem to mirror the tactics of authoritarian regimes globally. The bill mandates social media account registration for businesses and grants authorities expansive powers to remove content deemed indecent or misleading. It would require all platforms operating in Nepal—including Facebook and X—to obtain government approval. Platforms that fail to comply could face bans, while individuals found guilty of spreading false information could face hefty fines and up to five years in prison. 

    Additionally, the bill criminalizes the use of anonymous or pseudonymous identities on social media, which raises serious concerns about privacy and freedom of expression. The legislation also imposes broad restrictions on digital expressions, prohibiting any online actions deemed harmful to national interests. Offenses such as hate speech, trolling, and the use of graphic images or videos to attack individuals would be punishable by law. While such restrictions are not uncommon in certain parts of Southeast Asia, the bill’s sweeping nature and vague language present a significant risk to free speech in Nepal—a country with a multiparty democracy that spans ideologies from communism to Hindu nationalism.

    The bill adopts a strict crime-and-punishment approach, criminalizing actions such as spreading rumors, using pseudonyms, or creating social media accounts without prior government approval. Critics argue that these provisions could encourage widespread self-censorship, particularly among intellectuals, and disproportionately affect those with limited digital literacy, who may unknowingly share misleading content. By penalizing anonymity through vague definitions and excessive state control, the legislation poses a significant threat to diverse voices and could severely curtail free expression in an increasingly digital world.

    It’s no surprise that many critics view the bill as an attempt to silence dissent and stifle public criticism, which has intensified due to the government’s underperformance despite its strong parliamentary majority. While social media influencers have rallied behind the hashtag #BolnaDeSarkar, meaning “Let us speak, government,” major political parties and mainstream media outlets have largely remained silent. Opposition parties, having supported similar measures when in power, have little incentive to oppose the bill. Meanwhile, mainstream media may see social media as a growing threat, with its erosion of both audience and revenue. In this context, social media has become a common target for many institutions.

    Under Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, the government remains resolute in advancing the bill. Nepal’s Information Minister, Prithvi Subba Gurung, has defended the proposal, arguing that it is essential to combat cyberbullying and other online offenses. Once the Rastriya Sabha approves the bill, lawmakers will have the opportunity to propose amendments. The bill will then move to the Pratinidhi Sabha for further deliberation before returning to the Rastriya Sabha for final review. Afterward, it will be sent to the president’s office for signing into law. With broad support from all political parties and mainstream media, the bill is expected to be enacted swiftly. This would place Nepal’s social media landscape under total government control, effectively silencing dissenting voices.

  • How Azerbaijan Found the Nerve to Stand Up to Russia

    How Azerbaijan Found the Nerve to Stand Up to Russia

    Russia is floundering on all fronts. Humiliated on the battlefield and steadily losing once-friendly nations in Europe, it faces mounting economic hardship, forced to sell its resources at cut-rate prices to China and India. Yet perhaps the greater indignity lies in the defiance of its former satellite states—once obedient, now emboldened to seek new alliances. The war in Ukraine, one of Putin’s most catastrophic miscalculations, has become a lingering nightmare for the Kremlin. Countries that once deferred to Moscow now openly challenge its authority. The latest to break ranks is Azerbaijan, a small but strategically significant Caucasus nation long dependent on Russia. As tensions rise over the downing of an Azerbaijani passenger jet, the standoff is yet another sign of Moscow’s eroding influence over its former empire.

    Azerbaijan has every right to be outraged after losing its citizens in what it considers a Russian mistake. Few, however, could have anticipated that the fallout would escalate into a full-blown standoff.

    On December 25, an Azerbaijan Airlines plane crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people after being rerouted across the Caspian Sea from southern Russia. In the aftermath, Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev—a close ally of Vladimir Putin—accused Russia of accidentally shooting down the aircraft with its air defense system. He condemned Moscow for attempting to conceal the incident for days, calling the response shocking, regrettable, and a legitimate cause for indignation in Baku.

    In an unusual move, Putin expressed condolences and referred to the crash as a tragic incident, though he stopped short of admitting Russia’s responsibility—a response that only deepened Azerbaijan’s anger.

    Tensions have been high since the incident. On Wednesday, the APA news agency, closely tied to the Azerbaijani government, reported that Baku was preparing to take Russia to international court over the alleged downing of the plane. The agency disclosed that facts and evidence were being collected, with preparations underway for an official appeal. The article also delivered a pointed criticism of Moscow, accusing it of trying to evade responsibility for the incident.

    The report revealed that Azerbaijan had identified both the individuals who gave the order to fire and those who followed through with it. The article implied that Russia was trying to craft a scenario similar to the Malaysia Airlines incident, drawing a parallel to Moscow’s ongoing denial of responsibility for the 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine. APA warned that unless Russia publicly acknowledged its role and took responsibility, Baku would escalate its response.

    The article, widely believed to have been published with the approval of local authorities in tightly controlled Azerbaijan, appeared a day after a report from Kazakh officials, which revealed that the plane had sustained external damage and had numerous holes in its fuselage. The report, however, was carefully worded and refrained from specifying the cause of the damage, including to the plane’s stabilizers, hydraulics, and trim systems. 

    On Thursday, tensions further escalated when Azerbaijan ordered Moscow to shut down the Russian House cultural center in Baku. The center, operated by Rossotrudnichestvo—a Russian federal agency viewed as a tool of Russian soft power and often suspected of functioning as a front for espionage and covert operations—was the target of this action. Simultaneously, Azerbaijani state media reported that Baku had sent a rare shipment of non-military aid to support Ukraine.

    What gives this small state, traditionally within Russia’s sphere of influence, the courage to engage in a dispute with the mighty Russia? Several factors are at play. First, Russia’s downfall is a significant motivator. When the war in Ukraine began, many expected that Ukraine would fall within a month, but now, three years later, Ukraine is still standing strong and has become a major ally of the West. Meanwhile, states like Sweden and Finland who refused to join the west previously  have joined NATO, and Russia has been unable to block them. Militarily, Russia is no longer perceived as a superpower, and Azerbaijan believes it can withstand challenges from Russia.

    Second, there’s the economic factor. Beyond the surface, Russia’s economy and businesses are struggling under the weight of sanctions. Tying Azerbaijan’s economy to Russia could cause trouble for Azerbaijan’s business interests as well. However, distancing itself from Russia opens up more economic freedom for Azerbaijan. This newfound confidence is also fueled by Azerbaijan’s growing role in the West’s energy plans, especially after the EU sought alternatives to Russian fossil fuels.

    Azerbaijan’s stance is also part of a broader regional trend. Its longtime rival, Armenia, publicly broke with the Kremlin after Russian peacekeeping forces failed to prevent Azerbaijan from seizing control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Armenia became the first country to leave the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and began turning to the West and Iran for support. Recently, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan even hinted at pursuing EU membership.

    In neighboring Georgia, thousands have taken to the streets, pushing for Western support. Azerbaijan, however, is not necessarily looking to Europe for support. With Turkey, a key ally and fellow ethnic partner, in power, Azerbaijan sees strengthening its ties with Turkey as a route to greater Western alignment. This shift also reflects a broader change in the Middle East, where Iran’s influence, along with Russia’s, is waning. More countries, including Lebanon and Syria, are gravitating toward pro-Western governments, and Azerbaijan could easily join this trend.

    Many still believe that President Aliyev is playing a delicate game, leveraging his close ties with Moscow to manage the situation. By escalating tensions with Russia, he may be attempting to redirect public anger over the incident, easing pressure on his regime and preventing mass protests. Despite the apparent standoff, Azerbaijan and Russia remain deeply intertwined economically and politically, and some caution against assuming a complete break.

    In recent years, Azerbaijan has solidified its economic ties with Russia, with Moscow increasingly dependent on Azerbaijan as a crucial transit hub. Perched on the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan facilitates the movement of goods to and from Iran and the Persian Gulf, helping Russia circumvent Western sanctions and tap into new markets. While some in Moscow hold out hope that a genuine apology could mollify tensions and restore the status quo, one cannot help but wonder: Has Azerbaijan grown strong enough to challenge the once-unstoppable Russia? Or could it be that Russia’s grip has weakened to such a degree that even a small power like Azerbaijan now dares to stand in opposition?