Category: Asia

  • Uneasy Allies: The Quiet Growth of India’s Ties with Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan

    Uneasy Allies: The Quiet Growth of India’s Ties with Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan

    Afghanistan has always been immensely important to Indian rulers, serving as a gateway to the Persian-Turkic world. After gaining independence in 1947, India recognized Afghanistan’s strategic value as a counterweight to Pakistan’s hostility. India invested heavily in Afghanistan’s development and actively participated in its social, economic, and cultural spheres. During Afghanistan’s short-lived democratic period, following the United States overthrow of the first Taliban emirate, India and Afghanistan forged their strongest ties, with Indian investments and relations reaching unprecedented heights.

    However, the Taliban, an Islamic extremist organization, has consistently opposed India and its involvement in Afghanistan. When the Taliban first seized control in 1996 and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with support from Pakistan and the United States, they pushed India to the margins. Their rigid Islamic ideology, including calls for the Islamization of India, directly threatened Indian interests too. The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 raised immediate concerns about India’s diminishing influence in Afghanistan, jeopardizing its strategic presence in the region.

    Though In recent years, a significant shift has unfolded. The current Taliban leadership has grown increasingly at odds with its longtime ally, Pakistan, leading to escalating tensions that risk boiling over into open conflict. This rift presents an unexpected opportunity for India, under a Hindu nationalist government, to pursue strategic engagement with the Taliban despite the stark ideological differences. What once seemed an improbable partnership has begun to take shape, with recent developments pointing to a surprising and growing rapprochement between India and the Taliban.

    As much of the international community maintains its distance from the Taliban’s repressive rule, India has quietly intensified its outreach. On Wednesday, in Dubai, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri sat down with Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, marking the highest-level official meeting between India and the Taliban since the latter’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021.

    The discussions, as outlined by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, touched upon a range of pressing issues: the evolving security situation within Afghanistan, India’s role in supporting humanitarian efforts and development initiatives, and the use of Iran’s Chabahar Port to open trade routes to the beleaguered nation. The Taliban’s statement, framed within the context of what it termed a “Balanced” foreign policy focused on economic priorities, pointed to its aim of deepening political and economic ties with India—an acknowledgment of India’s growing importance as both a regional and economic player in this complicated geopolitical landscape.

    India has also expressed its support for the burgeoning relationship. After the meeting, India’s Foreign Office stated that in response to a request from the Afghan side, India would provide additional material assistance, initially focusing on the health sector and refugee rehabilitation. The two sides also discussed strengthening cooperation in sports, particularly in cricket.

    The Taliban, for its part, is in desperate need of financial support. The United States has fully disengaged from Afghanistan, the Gulf countries have limited capacity without U.S. backing, and Russia is now weak, leaving China and India as the primary players. Afghanistan, rich in minerals and strategically located, makes it a target for both countries. India, driven by its desire to not only challenge Pakistan but also compete with China, seeks to reassert itself in a key regional theater.

    The recent meeting between India’s Foreign Secretary and Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister is part of a series of ongoing talks between the two countries. In November, senior Indian Foreign Ministry official JP Singh held multiple meetings with Taliban representatives, including a notable discussion with Acting Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob. Earlier, in June 2022, India sent a “Technical Team” to Kabul to oversee the delivery of humanitarian aid and assess how New Delhi could further assist the Afghan people. Since the opening of the technical mission, the Taliban has repeatedly sought to station its own representative in Delhi. In response, India has allowed a Taliban representative, Ikramuddin Kamil, to work at the Afghan consulate in Mumbai.

    No nation has yet reached the point of formally recognizing the Taliban regime, especially given its ongoing brutal suppression of women. This meeting, however, will likely be seen as highly favorable by the Taliban, which is currently facing military pressure and additional stress from Pakistan. As an old Indian proverb goes, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Despite the stark ideological differences between the two countries, Afghanistan has effectively become a de facto ally for India.

  • How South Korea’s Political Crisis Is Troubling Its Economy

    How South Korea’s Political Crisis Is Troubling Its Economy

    Amid the growing challenges faced by Asian economic powerhouses, South Korea is mired in political unrest and ongoing protests, with its economy suffering the consequences. The political crisis has already unsettled the nation’s economic foundations—stock markets are volatile, the South Korean won continues to weaken, and foreign investors are seeking more stable markets. Deep-seated political divisions, marked by intense rivalries and a fragmented parliament without a clear majority, have stalled efforts to craft effective policies to address the economic damage. Instead of tackling these pressing concerns, South Korea’s political leaders remain absorbed in escalating tensions and deepening divisions, leaving the country vulnerable to further economic instability.

    South Korea, one of the United States’ closest allies and Asia’s fourth-largest economy, faces mounting challenges with the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. His ‘America First’ agenda and economic policies pose significant threats to South Korea. During his previous term, Trump labeled South Korea a ‘money machine,’ suggesting demands for Seoul to pay billions more to host U.S. troops—a substantial financial burden. He also pledged sweeping tariffs as part of his agenda. These measures would heavily impact South Korean exports and potentially cause a global economic ripple effect.

    Trump’s focus on reducing U.S. bilateral trade deficits places South Korea at risk, as the country holds one of the largest trade surpluses with the U.S. Combined with domestic political instability, these external pressures contribute to an increasingly precarious economic outlook. South Korea’s currency, the won, which was already weak against the dollar, has further depreciated due to ongoing political unrest. The absence of clear leadership is creating uncertainty for businesses, making it difficult for them to plan for the year ahead and further deepening the nation’s economic challenges.

    A recent poll by the Bank of Korea found that business sentiment has hit its lowest level in four years. The Composite Business Sentiment Index fell by 4.5 points from November, marking the lowest reading since September 2020, when the economy was reeling from the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In a separate report, the central bank projected that South Korea’s economic growth in 2025 will fall below 2%, driven by weak export performance and declining consumer spending. The report further cautioned that growth could worsen if global trade tensions continue to escalate.

    South Korea stands at a critical crossroads, where both politicians and economists should be working together to address the country’s faltering economy. Yet, neither side seems able to take meaningful action. Instead, the nation is mired in a deepening political crisis, leaving little room for economic solutions. President Yoon’s efforts to evade arrest following his declaration of martial law and reclaim the presidency are only likely to escalate the turmoil, stoking anger among large segments of the public. Meanwhile, his weakened position in a legislature dominated by the opposition jeopardizes even the most fundamental tasks.

    Another possible outcome is the call for a new presidential election. The main opposition party, the Democratic Party, which holds a parliamentary majority and won the last election, is pushing for this. They are likely to emerge victorious once again. Should this occur, it could bring the political stability South Korea desperately needs, aligning the presidency and parliamentary majority under the same party—a critical step in steering the country out of its current crisis. While the toxic political climate will remain, this may be the only viable path to resolving the quagmire South Korea now faces.

  • Public Fury Mounts, Yet the South Korean President Holds Firm

    Public Fury Mounts, Yet the South Korean President Holds Firm

    Amid South Korea’s frostbitten winter, a political storm grips the nation as President Yoon Suk Yeol fights to retain his hold on power. Wielding every tool at his disposal, Yoon relies heavily on incendiary rhetoric and calculated political maneuvers to discredit his critics. By labeling dissenters as traitorous or anti-national, he doubles down on a strategy rooted in far-right populism. Yoon maintains a defiant stance, resolute in his determination to fight to the end. His supporters argue that removing him would jeopardize the stability of South Korea’s hard-won democratic institutions.

    Yet, on icy streets thick with police presence, crowds of citizens defy this narrative, demanding Yoon’s resignation. Their anger has intensified since Yoon’s recent move to consolidate power by undermining parliamentary authority and imposing martial law—a bold and controversial act that eventually led to his impeachment. The day after a failed arrest attempt against Yoon, rival protesters flooded the capital, their voices rising in a bitter standoff over the nation’s democratic future.

    Since December 3, the nation has been engulfed in political turmoil, sparked by the declaration of martial law, which triggered a series of dramatic events. These included a failed impeachment attempt against President Yoon, followed by a successful impeachment, the appointment of an acting president, his removal, and a high-stakes yet unsuccessful attempt to arrest Yoon. Holed up in the presidential residence, Yoon is surrounded by hundreds of loyal security officers, successfully fending off prosecutors repeated efforts to detain him. On Saturday, thousands of protesters filled the streets of Seoul, demanding Yoon’s arrest. Members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, the country’s largest labor organization, tried to march on the presidential residence but were met with a strong police blockade.

    Yoon faces criminal charges of insurrection, one of the rare offenses exempt from presidential immunity, carrying potential penalties ranging from imprisonment to, in extreme cases, the death penalty. If the arrest warrant is executed, Yoon would become the first sitting South Korean president to be detained. Investigators have urged Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok, who assumed the role of acting president last week, to endorse the warrant by instructing the presidential security service to cooperate. However, the security service reported that two senior officials had declined police requests for questioning, citing the “Grave Responsibilities” of safeguarding Yoon.

    On Friday, dramatic scenes unfolded as Yoon’s guards and military personnel blocked investigators, forcing them to abandon the arrest attempt due to safety concerns. The Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO) may attempt to detain him again before the warrant expires, or they could seek a new one. Meanwhile, the constitutional court has scheduled Yoon’s impeachment trial to begin on January 14. The trial will proceed in his absence if he chooses not to attend, following precedent set by former presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Park Geun-hye, who also refrained from appearing during their impeachment proceedings.

    All eyes are now on the constitutional court, where a single vote in Yoon’s favor could solidify his mandate to remain in power, while a unanimous ruling against him risks plunging the nation into deeper turmoil. This uncertainty has intensified unease across the political landscape and among the public, who are increasingly alarmed at the prospect of Yoon holding onto power. Calls for his resignation have grown more urgent, with protesters demanding his immediate departure. Many argue that the ongoing crisis has profoundly embarrassed the country on the international stage, jeopardizing South Korea’s growing reputation as a cultural powerhouse.

    Despite mounting pressure, Yoon shows little inclination to step down voluntarily. He has intensified far-right rhetoric to rally his base, accusing the opposition of eroding public trust with claims of electoral malpractice in the last parliamentary election. Surprisingly, this strategy has attracted some support, bolstering his defiance. By refusing to resign, Yoon appears intent on casting himself as both a victim and a hero, using this narrative to fortify his image and consolidate his political standing.

  • Will Myanmar’s Rebels Trouble Bangladesh’s Borders?

    Will Myanmar’s Rebels Trouble Bangladesh’s Borders?

    Bangladesh shares its land borders with only two nations: India and Myanmar. While political uncertainty prevails under an interim government taking an anti-India stance, much of the focus has been directed towards the India-Bangladesh border. Yet, the more pressing and complex developments are unfolding along Bangladesh’s southeastern frontier with Myanmar. This border region is increasingly dominated by the Arakan Army, an ethno-nationalist militant group rooted in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Known for its violent clashes with Islamist Rohingya factions and its contentious history with Bangladesh, the Arakan Army’s growing influence raises critical concerns. Could these escalating dynamics along the southeastern border exacerbate Bangladesh’s challenges further?

    Bangladesh and Myanmar are both mired in political instability. In Bangladesh, the removal of the democratically elected government has not yet threatened the country’s territorial integrity unlike Myanmar. However, with a new constitution proposed by the interim government. If the constitution manages to unite disparate groups—Islamists, students, and communists—stability could be maintained. If it fails, Bangladesh risks sliding into unrest, potentially mirroring Myanmar’s descent into chaos. Myanmar’s turmoil began with the military coup of February 2021, which overthrew the democratically elected government. The coup ignited mass protests that escalated into a widespread uprising, especially in ethnic minority areas. Opposition to the junta has formed alliances between ethnic armed groups and civilian-led defense forces, leaving the country deeply fragmented, with regions under the control of various militias.

    In recent months, opposition forces have gained significant ground against Myanmar’s junta, securing control over extensive territories, particularly in northern Shan State and Rakhine State in the west. Among these groups, the Arakan Army (AA) has made notable advances, seizing dozens of townships and military outposts over the past 15 months. The group’s expanding influence and unrelenting momentum have fueled speculation about its long-term objectives. The AA operates as the armed wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA), a political organization representing the Buddhist population of western Rakhine State. Both the AA and the ULA have expressed a commitment to establishing an autonomous region in Rakhine that includes both the Buddhist Rakhine and the Muslim communities. For now, the AA appears focused on driving the Myanmar military out of Rakhine State. However, regarding the region’s political future, the group remains deliberately ambiguous, leaving open the possibility of pursuing an independent nation.

    The future of tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar may largely depend on the Arakan Army’s evolving alliances and interests. While the group was once linked to China, its current ties with Beijing appear diminished, even though China remains the most influential external actor in Myanmar. Some Islamist factions claim the Arakan Army is now aligned with India, although this is questionable given the group’s previous opposition to India-backed projects in Rakhine and the limited influence India exerts over them. Pakistan, despite its weakened state, could exploit the situation by backing Islamist narratives. Such actions might position the Arakan Army as a threat to Islam, potentially provoking Islamist groups to launch attacks in Myanmar or use Rohingya Muslims as a proxy force—escalating into broader conflict. The United States also has an interest in the region, seeking to counter India’s dominance in the Bay of Bengal.

    Bangladesh’s political trajectory will also play a pivotal role. If it transforms into an Islamic republic, its stance on the Rohingya issue may shift toward open support, potentially exacerbating regional tensions. 

    At the same time, The Arakan Army, as it consolidates control over border areas, appears poised to deepen engagement with both Bangladesh and India, aiming to reduce its reliance on central Myanmar and establish stronger regional footholds.

    It goes without saying that both Bangladesh and Myanmar stand at a pivotal crossroads. These already fragile states, fractured by internal strife, appear poised for even deeper disintegration in the days ahead. As interested players—be they nation-states or other insurgent groups—maneuver to advance their agendas, they will exploit these divisions. The resulting tensions seem destined to escalate into outright conflict, likely sooner rather than later.

  • Manmohan Singh: A Legacy of Quiet Courage and Economic Reform

    Manmohan Singh: A Legacy of Quiet Courage and Economic Reform

    Manmohan Singh did not possess the fiery charisma many consider essential for a successful Indian politician. He refrained from delivering biting insults, stirring animosity, or crafting electrifying slogans that sparked frenzied devotion among the masses. Instead, he embodied a quieter virtue—a man of action who quietly transformed policy into progress. India mourns and bids farewell to one of its most transformative leaders, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who passed away at the age of 92 in New Delhi due to age-related health issues. The economist-turned-politician is regarded as one of the most impactful figures in modern India, having saved the Indian Union from economic collapse and helped shape the country into a globally competitive economic powerhouse.

    Singh entered politics in 1991 when India was facing one of its most severe economic crises, teetering on the brink of default. Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao appointed Singh, a renowned economist, as Finance Minister. Amid the chaos, Singh stood at the precipice, tasked with averting disaster. With the nation on the edge of collapse, his bold reforms dismantled the remnants of a Soviet-style command economy and introduced a liberalized system that revitalized India’s prospects. Singh drew from Victor Hugo’s words, stating that when the time is right, no power on earth can stop an idea. He believed that India’s emergence as a major economic power in the world was one such idea whose time had come. He dismantled the restrictive “license raj,” which controlled factory production and limited the types of products available. He devalued the rupee to stimulate exports, opened key industrial sectors to private and foreign investment, and slashed taxes. These transformative steps sparked rapid economic growth and earned Singh the title of India’s economic “liberator.” His actions did more than save the nation—they reoriented India’s future, protecting it from the economic unraveling experienced by the Soviet Union.

    The same deft economic leadership defined his first term as Prime Minister. Under his stewardship, India emerged as a rising economic powerhouse, with the economy growing at more than 8%. Singh championed initiatives like the Food Security Act to combat hunger on a national scale and institutionalized the Right to Information Act. He introduced transformative initiatives like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), designed to uplift the country’s most disadvantaged citizens. Additionally, he negotiated vital nuclear energy agreements and played an instrumental role in the landmark Indo-US civil nuclear deal, which not only ended India’s nuclear isolation but also secured the nation’s energy future for generations.

    Despite his considerable achievements, Singh Often portrayed as the “Remote-controlled” Prime Minister of the Gandhi dynasty, he faced intense media criticism, accused of being a passive leader in a highly charged political landscape. His reserved demeanor and reluctance to step into the spotlight only fueled these perceptions, earning him the label of an “Accidental Prime Minister.” His second term was overshadowed by a series of massive corruption scandals that undermined public trust in his administration. Though personally incorruptible, Singh was criticized for failing to assert control over his coalition partners. His former adviser, Sanjaya Baru, in his memoir, observed that while Singh upheld the highest standards of integrity, he did not enforce these standards on others. Singh’s perceived deference to Sonia Gandhi further led to allegations that he was merely her “Puppet.”

    The debates surrounding Manmohan Singh’s legacy underscore both his remarkable achievements and the perceived limitations of his leadership. While many in today’s middle class, burdened by the weight of taxes, look back with nostalgia at his tenure, it is impossible to ignore the fact that his second term paved the way for the rise of the BJP and Narendra Modi, ushering in an era marked by Hindu nationalism. In the process, his leadership precipitated the near-collapse of the Congress Party. Though Singh himself did not directly contribute to this downfall, his tenure marked the beginning of a slow but irreversible decline for the party. Once a dominant force in Indian politics, Congress has since withered into a shell of its former self, its relevance in both the electoral arena and in political discourse shrinking ever smaller.

    Even though Singh distanced himself from politics after his time as Prime Minister, the weight of his legacy lingers—compelling and contradictory. On one side of history’s ledger, he saved India from an economic abyss and oversaw a profound transition in the country’s economy and global standing. Yet, his era also witnessed the decline of Nehruvian socialism and the Congress Party’s weakening grip on power. Ultimately, history may well be kinder to him than many of his contemporaries, remembering him as a figure who, without fanfare or spectacle, steered India through turbulent waters—a hero not of blaring headlines, but of quiet determination.

  • Cambodian Opposition Leader Jailed on Usual Charges

    Cambodian Opposition Leader Jailed on Usual Charges

    Cambodia, a monarchy concealed beneath a veneer of constitution, is notorious for its history of authoritarian regimes and the relentless suppression of opposition. Today, the latest iteration of this authoritarian state is defined by Hun Sen, the nation’s most influential figure, and his family. Other political parties exist largely for ceremonial purposes, ensuring that they never challenge the dominance of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party. With more than 95 percent of parliamentary seats secured, Hun Sen’s power remains unchallenged, despite his formal transfer of the prime ministership to his eldest son. While the title may have passed, control is still concentrated within the family, and political dissent is met with swift retribution. Most recently, the government imprisoned opposition leader Sun Chanty on the ever-ubiquitous charge of “Inciting Disorder”—a familiar tactic used by authoritarian regimes to silence their critics. This act of repression is merely the latest in a series of moves under Hun Sen’s rule, one in which the judiciary has been weaponized to muzzle political adversaries and activists, while independent media is systematically silenced, ensuring the regime’s stranglehold on power endures.

    Sun Chanthy, president of the Nation Power Party and a prominent opposition figure, was found guilty in a Phnom Penh court, sentenced to two years in prison, and banned from running for office after being convicted of inciting social disorder. The court also imposed a fine of 4 million riel (£800) and stripped him of his right to vote or stand for election. The case focused on Sun Chanthy’s social media posts, including a video recorded during a meeting with supporters in Japan, in which he criticized the government. Pro-government media reports at the time of his May arrest claimed he had accused the government of burdening citizens with debt through bank loans and denounced its social welfare system. This was enough for the authoritarian regime to target him. Given the ruling party’s strong influence over the courts, the verdict was widely anticipated.

    The defense lawyer, Choung Choungy, called the ruling an injustice to his client and stated that they were considering whether to appeal. He told Agence France-Presse that the punishment was excessively harsh and emphasized that Sun Chanthy’s comments were not a mistake, but rather constructive criticism aimed at development.

    Sun Chanthy was previously a senior member of the Cambodia National Rescue Party, the former opposition party that was dissolved by the courts ahead of the 2018 elections. He later joined its unofficial successor, the Candlelight Party, which was banned from participating in last year’s election—a one-sided contest that was won by the longtime authoritarian leader, Hun Sen. In late 2023, Sun Chanthy played a key role in forming a new opposition party, the Nation Power Party.

    Hun Sen, who ruled Cambodia for nearly four decades, transferred power to his son, Hun Manet, shortly after the controversial 2023 general election. As prime minister, Hun Sen cemented his control over the country, methodically silencing opposition, activists, and independent media. When he appointed his eldest son, Hun Manet, as his successor, some dared to hope that civil liberties would improve. Manet had studied in the United States and Britain, where he was exposed to more liberal ideas about elections and human rights. However, since he took power in August 2023, those hopes, though modest, have evaporated. Despite frequently emphasizing the need for independent media and civil society, Manet’s government has moved in the opposite direction. Meanwhile, Hun Sen remains a powerful figure, leading the Cambodian People’s Party and heading the Senate. It’s clear that this type of governance can’t encourage fearless opposition and leaders like Sun Chanthy.

    As usual, the authorities have denied that the case against Sun Chanthy is politically motivated. Yet, he is merely the latest in a long line of targets—among many others. Rong Chhun, an adviser to the Nation Power Party, is also facing incitement charges and could face up to six years in prison if convicted. This year, similar charges have been levied against union leaders, environmental activists, and Mech Dara, an award-winning Cambodian journalist renowned for exposing corruption and human trafficking. Dara’s arrest in September sparked an international outcry. The regime has also extended its crackdown on dissent to Cambodians abroad, securing deportations from Thailand and Malaysia. The authoritarian machine marches on, unyielding in its pursuit. Though many have grown accustomed to the regime’s tactics, history shows that there is a time for every regime.

  • The New China? Vietnam’s Quest to Silence Opposition and Critique

    The New China? Vietnam’s Quest to Silence Opposition and Critique

    At its core, communism seeks not only to shape society but also to command the very essence of human existence — from daily routines to private thoughts. The ideology thrives on pervasive control, and history provides a stark record of its manifestations. The Soviet Union and Cuba epitomized the authoritarian model of communist regimes, enforcing conformity through relentless oversight and suppression.

    However, communist China has charted a unique path. While many contemporaneous communist states collapsed under the weight of popular dissent, China adapted by providing its people with what they desire while maintaining tighter governmental control. By intertwining its authoritarian governance with technological prowess, it has created a model where digital tools not only entertain but also enforce seamless and far-reaching control over its citizens. Through surveillance, censorship, and data collection, the government wields the internet as its most effective weapon.

    Vietnam seems intent on following China’s lead. Historically seen as an iteration of Chinese communism, its government has sought to mirror China’s trade successes while upholding a communist structure. Now, with a new internet law set to take effect, Vietnam appears ready to tighten its grip. This legislation grants the government broad powers over internet services and their users, facilitating meticulous surveillance and censorship. By leveraging digital platforms as tools of authoritarian control, Vietnam is paving the way for a more intense model of communist governance — one in which dissent is quickly silenced and every digital footprint is monitored.

    This is the perfect communism for the digital age: control, refined and perfected through the internet.

    Social media users in Vietnam, including those on platforms like Facebook and TikTok, will be required to verify their identities under strict new internet regulations. The law, which took effect on Christmas Day, mandates tech companies operating in Vietnam to store user data, provide it to authorities upon request, and remove content deemed “Illegal” by the government within 24 hours. Known as Decree 147, the law builds on the controversial 2018 cybersecurity law, which drew sharp criticism from the U.S., EU, and advocates for internet freedom, who claimed it mirrors China’s repressive internet censorship model.

    Under the new regulations, tech companies, along with all “Foreign Organizations, Enterprises, and Individuals,” must verify user accounts through phone numbers or Vietnamese identification numbers and store that information alongside users full names and dates of birth. They are required to provide this data to the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) or the Ministry of Public Security upon demand. Decree 147 significantly expands the government’s control over online access to information, citing concerns over “National Security” and “Social Order”. The law also obligates social media platforms to remove content deemed “Illegal” by authorities within 24 hours, further tightening state oversight of the internet.

    Vietnam’s hardline government has a well-established record of swiftly silencing dissent and imprisoning critics, particularly those who gain prominence on social media. In October, blogger Duong Van Thai, who had nearly 120,000 followers on YouTube, where he frequently live streamed critiques of the government, was sentenced to 12 years in prison for publishing anti-state content. Months earlier, prominent independent journalist Huy Duc, known for his popular blog critical of the government on issues like media control and corruption, was arrested on charges that his posts “Violated the Interests of the State”.

    Critics warn that Decree 147 will further expose dissidents—especially those posting anonymously—to the risk of arrest. Nguyen Hoang Vi, a blogger and rights activist based in Ho Chi Minh City, explained that many people work quietly but effectively in advancing universal human rights. She also cautioned that the new decree may encourage self-censorship, with people refraining from expressing dissenting views to safeguard their safety, ultimately stifling the development of democratic values in Vietnam.

    Former political prisoner Le Anh Hung called it the latest sign of infringement on basic freedoms, noting the vague distinction between what is considered legal and what is not. She added that no one wants to go to jail, so some activists will undoubtedly become more cautious and fearful of this decree. In a chilling reminder of the government’s stance on dissent, Duong Van Thai’s October conviction underlines the escalating crackdown on those who challenge the state.

    Le Quang Tu Do, from the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC), told state media that Decree 147 would regulate behavior to maintain social order, national security, and sovereignty in cyberspace. The decree also stipulates that only verified accounts will be allowed to livestream, which could impact the growing number of people earning a living through social commerce on platforms like TikTok.

    In addition to its impact on social media companies, the new laws impose restrictions on gaming for individuals under 18, aimed at curbing addiction. Game publishers are expected to enforce a time limit of one hour per session and a maximum of 180 minutes of gameplay per day. Do remarked that games are “Designed to be Addictive”, noting that players often spend hours engaged in continuous matches.

    According to data from research firm Newzoo, just over half of Vietnam’s 100 million people regularly play such games. A significant portion of the population is also active on social media, with the MIC estimating around 65 million Facebook users, 60 million on YouTube, and 20 million on TikTok.

    While many pro-communist individuals believe the law will help protect people from the addiction to social media and the influence of Western culture, many young people have noted that their time spent on social media and playing games has negatively affected their lives. The harmful consequences are drawing increasing attention as the government’s actions unfold. The country is experiencing a resurgence of communist ideologies, reinforced by sweeping government and authority-led initiatives, such as the widely praised anti-corruption drive. These measures, framed as necessary to safeguard the state from its enemies, reflect a growing shift toward controlling governance and suppressing dissent.

  • Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 with a brutality few could have foreseen, has, in a technical sense, reached its conclusion. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, worn down by years of conflict and international sanctions, now belongs to history. In its place, Damascus is now under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist faction left to govern a fractured nation, torn apart by sectarian divisions and shaped by decades of authoritarian rule.

    To much of the world, HTS remains an organization shrouded in infamy, its name still marked by the stigma of terrorism. Yet, in the alleys of the capital and the corridors of power, its leaders—chief among them Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—project an image of determined ambition. Their rhetoric emphasizes a break from the grim patterns of extremist rule, rejecting comparisons to the Taliban and pledging an approach guided by pragmatism and, perhaps, restraint. However, words, however carefully crafted to reassure a skeptical world, cannot erase the unease of minorities—Shia, Kurds, and countless others—whose fragile existence on the nation’s periphery remains haunted by the specter of displacement, discrimination, or worse.

    HTS’s tenure in Idlib, long a laboratory for its ambitions, hardly inspires confidence. Reports from the years of its administration there paint a picture of a governing apparatus that struggled to transcend its militant origins, marred by accusations of repression and ineptitude. Now, thrust into the complexities of running a modern state—an endeavor demanding more than rhetoric and religious zeal—the group must wrestle with a task that has humbled leaders far better prepared.

    The biggest challenge for Syria’s new administration is shedding the “Terrorist” label attached to its leadership—a designation that complicates its path to recognition, international aid, and the maneuvering room needed in Syria’s fragmented political landscape. For Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), securing legitimacy could unlock vital support from foreign powers, bolstering its position in a potential tug-of-war with rival factions and even a looming conflict with Kurdish forces.

    Diplomacy, often defined as the art of achieving the improbable, has become the tool of choice for Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Blacklisted as a terrorist by the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and United Nations, al-Sharaa has managed to carve out surprising diplomatic inroads. Shedding his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and the trappings of militant rebellion, he has recast himself as a statesman intent on steering Syria out of five decades of Assad rule. His overtures to Western officials have already borne fruit, with the United States recently lifting a $10 million bounty on his head following what he described as “Productive” talks.

    Winning Western support could prove transformative. Access to international aid would accelerate Syria’s reconstruction after more than a decade of ruinous war. Al-Sharaa’s government, if granted a modicum of trust by the West, could also leverage Sunni solidarity to attract funds from Gulf powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. An alignment with Sunni-majority nations might ease tensions with Israel, paving the way for regional stability—or at least détente.

    The Kurdish question, however, remains a stumbling block. Turkey, HTS’s largest benefactor, vehemently opposes Kurdish autonomy in Syria, while the United States may pressure Damascus to seek a fragile coexistence with Kurdish factions as part of any broader reconciliation. Al-Sharaa’s ability—or inability—to navigate this minefield could define his administration’s relationship with the West.

    Iran poses an equally complex challenge. Maintaining the fragile allegiance of Syria’s Shia minority will require delicate handling, particularly if Tehran views the new Sunni-led administration as a threat to its regional ambitions. Any missteps here risk turning Shia groups, with Iranian support, into a destabilizing force within Syria.

    Russia, meanwhile, cannot be ignored. Marginalized on the global stage but entrenched in Syria, Moscow remains a power broker capable of influencing Damascus’s fortunes. Al-Sharaa must walk a tightrope, balancing old alliances while pursuing new ones—a test of his diplomatic finesse as much as his political will.

    The harsh realities cannot be ignored: over 90 percent of Syrians live in poverty, more than six million have fled the country, and another seven million remain displaced within its borders. A decade of war has crippled the economy, leaving the nation in ruins. For HTS, the road ahead demands more than lofty promises—it requires pragmatic leadership and skilled diplomacy to secure the support essential for Syria’s reconstruction and renewal.

    A stable Syria offers more than just domestic benefits. Refugee returns could ease migration pressures on Turkey and Europe, but the UN has cautioned that hasty repatriation without international support risks reigniting the country’s deep-seated conflicts. Damascus must aim higher than mere stability; it must pursue sustainable peace within a unified state. That vision demands foreign powers, such as Israel, which continues to occupy Syrian territory illegally, step back to allow the country to heal.

    Sharaa’s calls for revisiting Syria’s political transition, particularly the relevance of the 2015 UN Security Council resolution that shaped it, carry merit. Yet his next steps will be decisive. If he insists on entrusting the drafting of a new constitution to a handpicked committee of loyalists, he risks repeating the mistakes of his predecessors. A meaningful constitution must emerge from an assembly elected by Syrians or representatives of the country’s vast diversity—not from a closed circle of ideological allies.

    Failure to adopt an inclusive approach could erode the legitimacy of a new charter, reducing it to a document as disregarded as the Assad regime’s defunct constitution. Sharaa’s rhetoric suggests he understands the stakes, but his actions will determine whether Syria’s long-awaited renewal can take hold—or whether its divisions will only deepen.

  • The Sixties, Revisited: How Bangladesh Found Its Echoes

    The Sixties, Revisited: How Bangladesh Found Its Echoes

    Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, stands as an undeniable military and diplomatic victory for India. The small yet densely populated country emerged amidst escalating tensions between India and Pakistan, culminating in the 1971 war, which claimed countless lives on both sides. Despite securing victory, India faced significant geopolitical challenges. The United States and China aligned with Pakistan, isolating India on the international stage. Furthermore, the war drained India of substantial resources and finances, contributing to the eventual decline of its then-leader, Indira Gandhi. However, India gained a strategic ally in the East, easing threats on its eastern flank and allowing a concentrated focus on its borders with Pakistan and China.

    Now, 50 years after Bangladesh’s independence, the tides seem to be turning. In Bangladesh, Bangla nationalism has been sidelined, anti-India sentiment is on the rise, minorities face increasing persecution, and Islamism is regaining ground. It feels like a scene from Back to the Future, where someone travels back in time and creates an alternate history—perhaps one where Pakistan won over India in the 1971 war. 

    Pakistan was carved out of British India in 1947, encompassing Muslim-majority regions under the demand of Islamists, with religion as the sole basis for division. Present-day Bangladesh, then East Bengal, joined the state of Pakistan. However, the people of West Pakistan and East Pakistan were vastly different in ethnicity, language, customs, food, and culture. There was no leadership capable of uniting these two distinct regions. Eventually, West Pakistan reduced East Pakistan to the status of a colony. The West treated the East’s people as second-class citizens, humiliating them for their color, height, language, and food. This discrimination sparked a political revolution in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League, which championed Bangla nationalism. Tensions escalated into violent conflicts with Islamists and the Pakistani army during the 1960s, culminating in bloody years.

    As refugees poured into India due to the humanitarian crisis, India decided to intervene, leading to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. India’s victory gave rise to Bangladesh, a new nation in South Asia.

    Yet, peace remained out of reach. The lingering influence of Islamism fueled unrest, while competing ideologies, such as communism, began to take root. Foreign powers, from the United States to China, advanced their own agendas in the region, leaving Bangladesh weighed down by overpopulation and entrenched poverty. Despite signs of progress under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership in the 21st century, rising accusations of authoritarianism cast a shadow over her rule. Like many other Islamic nations grappling with internal strife, the political landscape unraveled, ultimately driving her into exile.

    Bangladesh appears to be drifting into anarchy, a state that seems woven into its history. The current interim government looks confused and uncertain about the direction it should take. Everything the country achieved after the 1970s, including its vision and progress, has been effectively dismantled. The people now harbor resentment towards their founding figure, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who led Bangladesh to independence by fighting against Pakistan and Islamists. They despise the Awami League, the party that once brought prosperity to the country. Anti-India sentiment is pervasive; they reject being overshadowed by India, even though they lack the capacity to thrive independently. Social media fuels this hostility, spreading hatred toward India and Hindus, with extreme acts like placing Indian flags on the floor as doormats. Bangladesh seems to be revisiting the chaos of the 1960s, an era marked by Islamist dominance, student-driven anarchy, and rampant anti-Indian propaganda

    They have seemingly traveled through time, reaching a point where their path diverged into an independent Bangladesh. But where are they headed now? Islamism is the only unifying factor left in the country. Will they return to Pakistan? No chance—Pakistan has collapsed, and joining it would only make matters worse. Could they become a pro-Western country, as some, like Yunus, hope? That too seems impossible, as Islamism currently drives the nation. Nor can they become Chinese satellites.

    Bangladesh is unable to direct its own path independently. Its economy is in tatters, and it remains highly vulnerable to even minor climate shifts. The country can rely only on India, given the shared border and India’s relative strength in the region. But relying on India, while fostering intense anti-India sentiment, could plunge the country back into anarchy.

    The nation appears stuck, confused, and without direction. The only hope for Bangladesh’s future is the rise of a strong leader, like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the 1960s, who can guide the country toward a clear vision

  • Will the Taliban-IS Conflict Worsen in Afghanistan?

    Will the Taliban-IS Conflict Worsen in Afghanistan?

    “Are our rulers betraying Islam?” This question looms ominously over every government in the Islamic world, from Morocco to Indonesia. It has the power to stir mobs, fuel unrest, and, in certain cases, bring down entire regimes. Whether in prosperous monarchies or fragile republics, no administration is immune to its weight. Curiously, not even the Taliban’s rule over the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan escapes its shadow. Afghanistan, a country founded on Islamic Sharia law and rejecting modern values, remains vulnerable to such threats. Among those threats is a call for even stricter adherence to the faith—most notably, from the Islamic State.

    The Islamic State’s Khorasan wing, known as ISIS-K, remains active in Afghanistan despite losing the territory it once controlled. It retains personnel, leadership, conducts attacks, and spreads its ideology effectively, making it a formidable force in the region. However, the Taliban, now governing Afghanistan, does not maintain good relations with ISIS-K. Since seizing control in August 2021, following the U.S. withdrawal and the collapse of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Taliban has been locked in a violent struggle against ISIS-K. Both groups compete for control of Afghanistan, a land they both view as a prized possession.

    Meanwhile, ISIS-K seeks to establish the Khorasan Province as part of a broader Islamic State on Afghan soil. It aims to destabilize the Taliban regime, which it labels an “Apostate” and a “Western Puppet,” in a bid to reclaim influence and territory in Afghanistan. According to ISIS-K, they are the true flag-bearers of Islam. This rivalry sets the stage for yet another conflict in the war-torn country.

    In a significant escalation of the conflict between the Taliban and ISIS, a suicide bomber killed Khalil Haqqani, the Taliban’s refugee minister, inside his ministry in Kabul yesterday. The attack, which also claimed the lives of six others, marks the Taliban’s most high-profile loss since regaining power in Afghanistan in 2021. Interior ministry sources reported that the blast occurred as Haqqani was leaving his office. According to a statement from ISIS’s “News Agency,” Amaq, one of its operatives waited outside the minister’s office and detonated explosives as Haqqani stepped out. A Taliban spokesperson confirmed that ISIS was responsible for the attack, as reported by Reuters. Given Haqqani’s prominence as a key figure in the Taliban, the movement will likely seek revenge for his killing. However, the Taliban will avoid an all-out hunt for ISIS, as this could undermine their support among some Islamist factions. Instead, they will likely act more strategically against ISIS. While ISIS strongholds are clearly marked, many are also linked to the Taliban.

    ISIS-K is currently engaged in a prolonged, low-intensity conflict with the Taliban. While both groups fought against the United States, ISIS-K has primarily targeted Taliban forces. In contrast, the Taliban has made efforts, with debated effectiveness, to target ISIS-K militants through raids, protect foreign diplomats and investors from ISIS-K attacks, and downplay ISIS’s presence in Afghanistan. Despite their ongoing opposition, there have been occasional instances of cooperation between the two groups during the NATO war in Afghanistan, particularly in attacks on the minority Shia Hazara. In August 2017, the Taliban and ISIS-K jointly launched a major assault on Hazara villages in northern Afghanistan, killing dozens of men, women, and children in Sar-e Pol Province. The National Security Department of the former Afghan government repeatedly stated that the Haqqani network and the Taliban supported ISIS-K fighters. However, their relationship worsened starting in late 2022 and continued through 2023, when ISIS-K launched attacks on diplomats from China and Pakistan—two countries with warmer relations towards the Taliban. These attacks aimed to deter foreign recognition, investment, and support for the Taliban government by exposing its inability to provide security.

    While the Taliban may be seen as a star in the Islamic world, having brought the United States to its knees, why are they still challenged by the Islamic State? Both share the same ideology, so the questions arise. But here comes the curse of the Islamic world. Who is Real Islam or true Islam is a heated topic and Muslim people always choose to fight to define it. And it flares up if there is no strong, tight governance. And it is not in Afghanistan. The country is still under tribal rule, the country remains entrenched in poverty, and young people are easily attracted to extremist ideologies. Thus, we must consider that the wars in Afghanistan will persist, and in this ongoing struggle, the Taliban may be seen as the “good guy” that the West supports. Maybe Python is better than Viper.