Category: Asia

  • Why Can’t the Indian Government Fix Manipur?

    Why Can’t the Indian Government Fix Manipur?

    India’s northeast, a hilly region inhabited by various tribal communities, has long been plagued by ethnic clashes. The territory has experienced ongoing tensions between different tribes but has been held together primarily through strong intervention from New Delhi. With foreign powers, including China and the United States, showing interest in the region, the Indian government has often sought peaceful solutions to resolve these conflicts. As part of these efforts, the Union government has accommodated numerous demands, granting various rights, authorities, and even statehood to different tribes. 

    However, there have been several instances where demands for separate rights, administrative systems, and statehood have led to significant unrest, and the central government has at times struggled to intervene, as these conflicts are deeply rooted in generational tribal animosities. This hostility often extends to the central government itself when it attempts to intervene. National political parties used these disputes to gain influence in the region, escalating ethnic clashes to the political level. Many states in the region are now ruled by national parties in alliance with tribal parties, forcing the government to weigh political interests when trying to neutralize ethnic tensions.

    While such scenarios are common in the northeast, Manipur has now become the focal point, with a deadly clash between two ethnic groups escalating into what resembles a civil war. Despite efforts, the situation remains unresolved. As horrifying news continues to emerge from Manipur, the issue has become a national concern, with international media criticizing the Indian government, which now appears ineffective. Why is this happening?

    Two ethnic groups, the Meitei and the Kuki-Zo, are fighting each other with weapons, each attempting to control their territories, attacking, and ousting the other. Women are increasingly targeted in these clashes. The conflict between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo has a long history, dating back centuries, with frequent clashes. The situation has worsened now, and the Hindu nationalist BJP government, in power at both the national and state levels, has failed to quell the violence The national government is protecting the state government and its Chief Minister, Biren Singh, who is from the Meitei community. The government is now accused of supporting the Meitei, the original and majority Hindu community, against the Kuki-Zo, who are predominantly Christian. Earlier media reports outside India highlighted the Hindu-Christian nature of the conflict, though both ethnic groups include people from various religions, including Islam. The latest wave of attacks, which made headlines in May 2023, followed a High Court verdict that granted reservations to the Meitei community, which was expected to affect the Kuki-Zo people. Experts believe this was only one factor contributing to the escalation. Since then, the violence has resulted in at least 221 deaths, over 1,000 injuries, 60,000 people displaced, and numerous homes and buildings burned.

    These ethnic clashes have become a serious political debate in Indian Parliament, with opposition parties and even BJP-affiliated organizations criticizing the central government’s inaction. The state government has undoubtedly failed, but the central government has not taken steps to address the situation, such as removing Chief Minister Biren Singh, who is accused of exacerbating the conflict. The opposition is pointing fingers at Narendra Modi, alleging that he is indifferent to the state’s plight.

    In the political arena, there is growing concern about why the central government is allowing the situation to escalate. Despite the Indian Army being one of the most powerful in the world, its deployment in the region has been minimal. The central government has permitted the state government to manage the situation, although experts believe that a military intervention might draw international attention, as the Kuki-Zo are ethnically linked to Myanmar and could attract foreign influence, potentially worsening the conflict.

    The Kuki-Zo are now demanding a separate state, which could further inflame tensions from Meiteis if statehood is granted. Such developments would likely lead to increased demands for more states from the region, creating more tribal nature. Additionally, removing Biren Singh could cause discontent among the Meitei population. Therefore, the central government is currently focusing on conducting negotiations between the conflicting parties.

    While addressing the crisis at the central level appears to be the most viable option, the central government faces an uphill battle as both ethnic groups remain entrenched in their positions. Resolving this issue cannot be achieved simply by attempting to appease all parties involved. Instead, the central government might develop temporary measures to address the immediate concerns, though a permanent solution will undoubtedly be a protracted process.

    It is noteworthy that the Indian judiciary is increasingly assuming a more proactive role than the government itself. On July 31, the Supreme Court demanded a comprehensive breakdown of around 6,000 FIRs related to the violence in Manipur. The court was deeply shocked to learn that it took 14 days for the police to register even a zero FIR concerning the brutal assault and public humiliation of two women. During the hearing on August 1, the Supreme Court criticized the police investigations as slow and described the situation as an absolute breakdown of the constitutional machinery. The court’s intervention is hoped to accelerate peace negotiations and bring about a resolution.

  • Is Nepal Finally Delivering Justice for Civil War Crimes?

    Is Nepal Finally Delivering Justice for Civil War Crimes?

    Nepal, a country cradled in the Himalayas, holds strategic importance due to its geographical location between India and China. This positioning has made Nepal an arena of power politics between the two nations. The ousted Hindu monarchy and several Hindu organizations were aligned with India, while the communist parties opposed this alignment and sought closer ties with China, leading to a decade-long civil war that culminated in the assassination of the royal family and the rise of the Maoist government. However, thousands of people in Nepal are still waiting for justice 20 years after tens of thousands were tortured, raped, killed, and forcibly disappeared during the conflict between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and government forces. The country now functions as a federal democratic republic with a multi-party system, including the Communist Party of Nepal, and is marked by instability, with frequent and rapid changes of government that have delayed justice for the civil war’s victims. Recent developments, however, offer a glimmer of hope: long-overdue amendments to the legislation are poised to address these historical injustices and finally deliver justice for the atrocities committed during the 1996-2006 civil war.

    The brutal Maoist insurgency, led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) to overthrow the monarchy, ended in 2006, leaving over 13,000 people dead and around 1,300 missing. Many still do not know the fate of those who disappeared and continue to seek answers to perform death rituals. Justice for those who suffered, went missing, or were killed has been delayed by political and legal complications. On November 21, 2006, almost 17 years ago, the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA). This agreement established two transitional justice mechanisms: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP). These bodies were intended to address human rights violations and crimes against humanity from the conflict. However, they have encountered legal challenges. In 2015, Nepal’s Supreme Court struck down parts of the legislation that created the TRC and CIEDP, particularly because these bodies were empowered to grant amnesty to perpetrators of serious international crimes.

    The weakness of the law made it difficult for victims, human rights activists, and civil society to effectively collaborate with the commissions. The government further delayed the appointment of commission members, risking the destruction of crucial criminal evidence. Lawmakers, including former government officials and Maoists, blocked international intervention to ensure impunity for actions taken during the conflict. This led to widespread discontent among victims, who accused political parties of betraying the people through political deals with one another. Calls for revisions came from all sides, and even Supreme Court instructed the government to revise specific sections of the act. Finally, after significant public outcry, the three major parties – the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) – formed a mechanism in July to find common ground on the disputed provisions in the bill. They reached a written agreement earlier this month, and on August 14, Nepal’s lower house of parliament approved the long-delayed amendments to the transitional justice act.

    There’s no doubt that this is a significant step for Nepal’s democracy. A joint statement from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists pointed out that, while the law includes several positive provisions, it also contains elements that could undermine its effectiveness. They emphasized that transitional justice should not become merely an exercise where victims are encouraged to accept compensation without receiving truth and justice. The decision to bring together various political parties to address the issue is part of an effort to build Nepali politics beyond the influence of India and China. This comes at a time when public sentiment is drifting away from both democracy and communism, with pro-monarchy protests calling for the return of the monarchy gaining momentum. Thus, it is also seen as an attempt to safeguard democracy in the face of these challenges.

  • Why Did Outrage Erupt Over the Gaza War in Israel?

    Why Did Outrage Erupt Over the Gaza War in Israel?

    As Netanyahu’s government tightens its siege on Gaza and inflames tensions in the West Bank, a profound wave of protests has swept through Israel. On Sunday night, the streets were thronged with thousands of demonstrators, and a general strike was called in a dramatic response to escalating public outrage, particularly following the deaths of six hostages held underground by Hamas. What initially seemed to reinforce Netanyahu’s position – despite a fractured coalition and persistent corruption allegations – has now emerged as a considerable liability, fueling a growing tide of opposition against him.

    The discovery of the hostages’ bodies in Gaza over the weekend has intensified the divisions over the war, pushing tensions to their breaking point. In Tel Aviv, Israel’s bustling commercial center, around 100,000 people rallied, while demonstrations also unfolded in Jerusalem, amplifying pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to secure a ceasefire and bring the remaining hostages home. That night, protesters blocked the Ayalon highway in Tel Aviv, igniting a bonfire in the road near Hashalom and filling the streets with drumming and chanting. Despite the efforts of a few dozen police officers, the protest continued unabated. The nationwide general strike, the first since the Hamas attacks on October 7, was organized to advocate for a deal to free the hostages. It ended after eight hours with a court order mandating that workers return to their jobs.

    The findings indicating that Hamas executed the hostages did little to shift the widespread anger directed at Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition for failing to secure a US-backed hostages-for-peace deal with Hamas, which has been under negotiation since late May. Hamas believed that holding the hostages would leverage Israel into conducting talks and releasing their members from Israeli prisons. However, Netanyahu chose to use the situation as a bargaining tool, despite warnings that Hamas might kill the hostages. In a statement mourning the six hostages, Netanyahu blames Hamas for rejecting the deal. Hamas official Izzat al-Rishq, however, blamed the deaths on Israel and the US, citing Israel’s failure to agree to a ceasefire deal that he claimed Hamas had accepted. Rishq did not address how the hostages died or comment on IDF claims of executions.

    It seems that the country’s left-wing and center-left factions are increasingly opposed to the war, advocating for a hostage deal that could potentially lead to at least a temporary peace. Announcing the general strike, Histadrut trade union federation leader Arnon Bar-David stated that it was impossible to continue standing by as children are murdered in the tunnels of Gaza. He added that the nation is no longer united and that this situation must be stopped. According to Bar-David, Israel needs to return to normal, as the country is receiving body bags instead of a deal. He concluded that only their intervention might compel those who need to act.

    During Sunday night’s demonstration, many protesters felt that the country might have reached a critical juncture. The strike was supported by the Hostage and Missing Families Forum, a group of relatives of the abductees who have been leading the protest movement and calling for a ceasefire deal. However, the right-wing faction views these leftist efforts as making the country vulnerable to Hamas’s demands and future risks.

    In October of last year, Hamas executed a brutal terrorist attack on Israel, leading to 1,200 fatalities. Of the 250 hostages captured, eight have been rescued, and over 100 were released as part of a temporary ceasefire deal in November. The recent discovery of six more bodies leaves 101 hostages still missing in Gaza. The IDF has confirmed that 35 of these hostages have died after more than ten months in captivity.  The lives of those still presumed alive are highly valuable to Israel, and as protests escalate, political pressure on Netanyahu is expected to mount. If Netanyahu continues to disregard these protests, opposition and anti-Netanyahu sentiment are likely to intensify. The ongoing war, which supports Netanyahu’s coalition government formed with various interest groups, also serves to bolster his position despite the growing unrest.

  • Why Is the Bangladesh Interim Government Delaying Elections?

    Why Is the Bangladesh Interim Government Delaying Elections?

    Bangladesh was spared from further anarchy by the formation of an interim government under the leadership of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. This is not the first time the country, with its relatively short history, has experienced mass protests, government cancellations, and temporary administrations. However, the current interim government, which includes a chief adviser, 19 advisers, and two special assistants to the chief adviser, faces the critical task of conducting a snap election while the country remains volatile.

    The task assigned to Yunus is far from straightforward. Organizing an election in an overpopulated and economically strained country involves numerous challenges. The political landscape is turbulent, with a substantial number of Awami League supporters still present. Sheikh Hasina’s party, which upholds the legacy of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh, remains influential and is likely to regain support due to its strong foundation. Meanwhile, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is reasserting its presence, and the release of Islamist leaders has bolstered Jamaat-e-Islami – a party dedicated to Islamizing Bangladesh. Jamaat-e-Islami has emerged as a key player in the protests, with its student wing being particularly active, and is anticipated to benefit significantly from the unrest that led to Hasina’s removal.

    Additionally, it is unclear whether India, Bangladesh’s largest supporter and contributor, will cooperate, especially given the strained relations following attacks on the Hindu population in Bangladesh. The prospect of an election is further complicated by ongoing flood conditions, which continue to afflict the population.

    Chief Advisor Yunus office has stated that a free and fair election will be held once reforms are implemented in the election commission, judiciary, civil administration, and security forces. In a televised address on August 25, Yunus announced that the interim government has begun taking corrective measures  to restore public trust in state institutions. However, reforming Bangladesh’s institutions is a massive task for the interim government, which must first address the deep entrenchment of Awami League influence after over 15 years of uninterrupted rule. And the interim government has yet to present a clear outline of its proposed reforms, according to the chief advisor’s office.

    Certainly, there is pressure on the interim government, but it’s still too early to assess the specific reforms it will pursue. Since its members are unaffiliated with any political party or group, internal conflicts are likely.  If it fails to establish itself, especially through concrete reform initiatives, it could soon face a crisis of legitimacy. Although its primary mandate is to hold elections, if the interim government views itself as a revolutionary force, delaying the polls might not be a major concern.

    This interim government differs significantly from previous caretaker governments. In the past, actions taken by interim administrations were often reversed by the subsequent democratically elected government. However, this interim government has come to power as a result of a revolution. Despite not being elected and therefore unable to directly reflect public demand, it has already introduced considerable chaos. To successfully implement reforms, gaining the consensus of all political parties is essential, and the interim government may need to be given reasonable time to hold the election.

    Rushing toward polls could empower existing, entrenched political actors who have little motivation to pursue structural reforms. In discussions about forming the interim government after Hasina’s departure, Bangladesh’s army chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, met with the BNP, Jatiya Party, and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, but the Bangladesh Awami League was notably absent from the meeting.
    So, There are valid reasons for the government to delay the election, such as cooling political tensions, stabilizing political institutions, addressing the political party dynamics, and improving relations with India. However, some believe that delaying the election is part of Yunus and his sponsors’ agenda. The interim government has expressed plans to rewrite the constitution and pursue other reforms, which may lead to further agenda-pushing by interested parties and potentially another wave of mass protests.

  • China and Japan delegate efforts to ease tensions

    China and Japan delegate efforts to ease tensions

    China and Japan, two powerhouses in Asia, share a long history of conflicts and conquests, a dynamic that continues into the modern era. Currently, their relationship is considered to be in one of its worst phases. As the world’s second and third largest economies, both countries are positioning themselves for potential conflict, seeking triggers that could escalate tensions. Their actions significantly influence the political landscape of the Asia-Pacific region and could potentially lead to a global conflict, with the United States likely to support Japan and Russia aligning with China. Numerous other countries could also join either side.

    Both China and Japan have their own reasons for accusing each other. The Chinese government claims that relations with Japan have been strained by Japan’s failure to fully acknowledge its wartime crimes to China’s satisfaction. On the other hand, the Japanese government attributes the tension to the expansion and assertive actions of the People’s Liberation Army, as well as China’s revisionist statements. The two countries also face serious territorial disputes and frequently provoke each other, as evidenced by a recent incident where China allegedly attempted to breach Japanese airspace.

    Despite the tense situation over the South China Sea, efforts are being made at diplomatic level. Recently, veteran Chinese diplomat Liu Jianchao urged visiting Japanese lawmakers to adopt a long-term perspective on bilateral relations and manage their differences constructively. During a meeting with a cross-party delegation from the Japan-China Friendship Parliamentarians Union – a platform that fosters dialogue and collaboration between lawmakers from both countries – Liu highlighted that relations were at a critical juncture. He expressed hope that both sides would approach Sino-Japanese relations with a broader and long-term view, enhance strategic communication, collaborate across various fields, and handle their differences constructively. Liu also called for increased dialogue and exchange visits from all Japanese political factions to China to strengthen strategic communication and mutual understanding.

    Nikai, a prominent figure in the Japanese parliament, stated that the visit aimed to improve communication between the two countries. He emphasized the goal of fostering deeper dialogue with China, strengthening communication between relevant departments of both nations, and creating favorable conditions for resolving differences and enhancing cooperation in politics, economics, culture, and tourism.

    Liu, head of the International Department for China’s ruling Communist Party, is leading the discussions with a group from Japan headed by Toshihiro Nikai, a prominent member of the House of Representatives and a key figure in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The group is on a three-day visit and met Zhao Leji, the head of China’s top legislative body, on Wednesday morning. During the meeting, Nikai expressed regret over the recent intrusion of Chinese military aircraft into Japanese airspace, as reported by Jiji Press. Key topics of discussion are expected to include China’s ban on Japanese seafood imports, the reinstatement of pre-pandemic visa-free entry for short-term visits by Japanese nationals, and the detention of Japanese nationals in China on espionage charges. Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japan’s chief government spokesman, expressed hope that this visit—the first by the union in five years – would further strengthen multifaceted exchanges and communication between Beijing and Tokyo. 

    In May, Liu led a delegation to Japan and consented to reinitiate regular discussions between the ruling parties, marking the first such meetings in six years. In July, Hiroshi Moriyama, chairman of the LDP’s decision-making general council, visited China and met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who called for enhanced communication and cooperation. Additionally, Chinese Foreign Vice Minister Ma Zhaoxu resumed the China-Japan strategic dialogue with his Japanese counterpart in Tokyo after a four-year hiatus and held a candid and in-depth discussion with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa. Despite these efforts, the situation does not seem to have significantly improved, and the results are still pending.

  • Malaysian Opposition Leader Faces Charges for Insulting Royalty

    Malaysian Opposition Leader Faces Charges for Insulting Royalty

    Southeast Asian nations are known for rigorously enforcing lese majeste or royal insult laws to suppress dissenting voices, whether they are republics or constitutional monarchies. Thailand frequently makes headlines for its enforcement of these laws, while Malaysia, another constitutional monarchy in the region, has generally been viewed as more democratic and less prominent in this regard. However, a notable development has emerged from Malaysia: former prime minister and current opposition leader Muhyiddin Yassin was charged with sedition on Tuesday over alleged comments about the previous king’s decision to appoint Anwar Ibrahim instead of him following a closely contested 2022 general election.

    Malaysia has filed sedition charges against Muhyiddin Yassin for allegedly insulting the country’s former king during a political speech on August 15. Muhyiddin, who served as prime minister from 2020 to 2021 and currently leads Malaysia’s conservative, Malay-centric opposition bloc, has pleaded not guilty. Though Under Malaysia’s Sedition Act, which dates back to the colonial era, remarks deemed disrespectful to the country’s largely ceremonial and highly revered royalty can lead to prosecution. Muhyiddin is the first former leader in Malaysia to face charges under this law and could face a fine of up to 5,000 ringgit, a prison sentence of up to three years, or both if convicted. He is also dealing with separate corruption and money laundering charges, which he argues are politically motivated.

    Prosecutors allege that Muhyiddin questioned why the former king did not summon him to be sworn in as prime minister following the 2022 general election, which produced a hung parliament. Despite his claims of having ample support from lawmakers, it was Al-Sultan Abdullah, who concluded his five-year reign in January, who ultimately appointed Anwar Ibrahim as prime minister. Anwar secured the necessary backing from rival factions to forge a unity government. Muhyiddin’s remarks, made during a by-election campaign in Kelantan, are viewed by prosecutors as a challenge to the former king’s credibility. Although Al-Sultan Abdullah has not publicly commented, his son has criticized Muhyiddin’s remarks as dangerous and undermining the monarchy. 

    Muhyiddin expressed frustration at not being invited to the palace for his swearing-in, despite claiming support from 115 of the 222 parliamentarians. In the 2022 election, Muhyiddin’s Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, which includes the Malaysian United Indigenous Party and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, won 74 seats, while Anwar Ibrahim’s Pakatan Harapan bloc secured 82 seats. The third-place alliance, Barisan Nasional (BN), chose to support Pakatan Harapan and received cabinet posts in the new government. Muhyiddin believes that Sultan Abdullah’s decision to appoint Anwar Ibrahim strengthened Anwar’s position in negotiations with other parties, resulting in support that excluded his coalition from power. Last week, Muhyiddin provided the police with evidence to support his part, asserting that his loyalty to the constitutional monarchy should not be questioned. Nevertheless, Malaysia’s police chief, Razarudin Husain, has confirmed that Muhyiddin will be charged under Section 4(1) of the Sedition Act for allegedly acting with seditious intent.

    Under Malaysia’s unique monarchy, nine sultans alternate on the royal throne every five years, a role traditionally seen as ceremonial. However, the constitutional monarchy is increasingly worried that rising criticism and rising political Islam could jeopardize their position. Analysts suggest that Muhyiddin’s alleged criticism of the king’s choice of prime minister may have been a key factor in the recent by-election, damaging Perikatan Nasional’s (PN) image as a defender of ethnic Malay supremacy and Islam, where respect for the king is crucial. PN, the incumbent, lost the seat to Barisan Nasional, a key ally in Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s administration. Last Monday, Pahang Crown Prince Tengku Hassanal Ibrahim Alam Shah accused Muhyiddin of implying that his father had unfairly appointed Anwar as prime minister and of inciting distrust in the Malay royal institution. The tense political climate in Thailand might also affect sentiments in Malaysia, leading authorities to likely take stringent measures to safeguard the constitutional monarchy.

  • Is India Responsible for Bangladesh Floods?

    Is India Responsible for Bangladesh Floods?

    Bangladesh, a densely populated country grappling with political uncertainties, was severely impacted by a massive flood that worsened over the weekend, affecting more than five million people. Flooding is common during the monsoon season in Bangladesh, which is situated at the delta of two major rivers, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, along with numerous smaller rivers that flow into them or directly into the Bay of Bengal. However, this flood has garnered special attention due to accusations from netizens, the media, and some Bangladeshi politicians who blame India, claiming that the opening of large dams on rivers flowing into Bangladesh caused the disaster. This situation has strained relations between Bangladesh and India, despite both governments’ reluctance to escalate the issue, and it is clear that it has already harmed public perception in both countries.

    Photo Credit: Banglapedia

    Many districts in eastern Bangladesh have experienced severe flooding, one of the worst in the country’s history. Images and videos show widespread suffering in submerged areas, with all low-lying regions underwater. Public outrage has been directed at India after a viral video on social media purportedly showed water being released from the Dumbur Dam in Tripura, blaming it for the floods. However, the video actually shows the Srisailam Dam in Telangana, a southern Indian state. The Dumbur Dam, which has been accused by Bangladeshi media as the cause of the flooding, is situated on the transboundary Gomati River and is approximately 120 kilometers from the Bangladesh border. This river flows from Tripura in northeastern India into eastern Bangladesh, eventually merging with the Meghna River. Although the flow of water in the river has increased, India has stated that no floodgates were deliberately opened; rather, excess water from the Gomti reservoir was automatically released once it reached full capacity. India later clarified that while the water from the Gomti contributes to the flooding, the seasonal floods are primarily attributed to climate-related factors.

    The impact is severe because Bangladesh’s low-lying, densely populated areas are highly vulnerable to flooding. As the Dumbur Dam video went viral, Bangladeshis became concerned about other Indian dams that block rivers flowing into Bangladesh, fearing they might be used by India to cause flooding. While India argues that these dams actually protect low-lying Bangladesh from floods – common during the heavy monsoon rains when rivers swell – severe flooding in Bangladesh results when these swollen rivers meet India’s major rivers, which carry water from up to 2,000 kilometers away, including regions in India and Tibet. Interestingly, the longstanding dispute between Bangladesh and India over the Farakka Barrage focuses not on flooding but on the reduced water flow to Bangladesh.

    Since Wednesday night, the flooding has significantly worsened, submerging 11 districts and large areas of a city with nearly 1.5 million residents. Various groups are exploiting the crisis for their own agendas. Islamic factions opposed to India are spreading misinformation, blaming India for the suffering and loss of life, and inciting protests that have contributed to the fall of the Hasina government. Political parties, driven by anti-India sentiment, have joined the protests, and students, mostly millennials who are not influenced by the emotional legacy of the 1971 war and the nation’s founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, are also expressing their frustration against India. Meanwhile, the Indian media is using the situation to advance anti-Bangladesh agendas, highlighting anti-Hindu and anti-India protests in Bangladesh to foster Hindu unity and increase animosity towards Islam in India.

    While India is being blamed for the crisis, Bangladesh, a climate-vulnerable country, is struggling to address the real causes. Under an interim government, it is challenging to implement effective climate policies or manage the situation, especially with elections delayed and an uncertain future ahead. If Bangladesh fails to confront its vulnerabilities and address the realities of its situation, it will face one of the most significant humanitarian crises.

  • Will Balochistan Secede from Pakistan?

    Will Balochistan Secede from Pakistan?

    Independent Balochistan, a demand for ethnic statehood, dates back decades. It is quite similar to the demand for Kurdistan, an ethnic state for Kurds, by seceding Kurdish-majority regions from different countries. In the case of Balochistan, the land of the Baloch tribes, they seek to form a new state by seceding Baloch-dominated territories in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Although the demand for statehood is significant across Baloch territories in these countries, the demand from Pakistan is more intense, as they have acted more forcefully against it than others. This has led to full-scale conflicts between the Pakistani army and Baloch militants in 1948, 1958–59, 1962–63, and 1973–1977, with a new ongoing insurgency at varying levels since 2003.

    Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons

    Although the Baloch are now Sunni Muslims, they have historically opposed the creation of Pakistan, and some even opposed the partition of India. In response, Pakistan has consistently treated the Baloch harshly. It is clear that Pakistan will never agree to secede its largest province, which is roughly the size of France and one of the largest provinces by area within any country. However, despite Balochistan being rich in natural resources such as gold, diamonds, silver, and copper, it is sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped, and one of the poorest regions in Pakistan.

    Pakistan has attempted several measures to assimilate Balochistan with the rest of the country, such as promoting the national language Urdu while suppressing native languages like Balochi and Brahui, and arresting local leaders by branding statehood advocates as terrorists and Indian supporters. Additionally, Pakistan has encouraged migration to Balochistan to alter the demographics, but the people have resisted, with Baloch organizations resorting to extreme measures like suicide bombings and targeted killings. This has allowed Pakistan to label Baloch organizations as terrorist groups.

    The region has always attracted the interest of Pakistani politicians due to its valuable mineral resources and strategic location. When China initiated the Gwadar port project in Balochistan – a natural deep-sea port at the mouth of a critical trade route – Pakistani politicians tried to use the situation to benefit from the migration of workers from the rest of Pakistan. However, this move was met with significant opposition. As Pakistan’s political and economic situation worsens day by day, the secessionist movement in Balochistan is rising to an unprecedented level.

    The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), an ethno-nationalist militant group operating out of Afghanistan, regularly targets the Pakistan Armed Forces, civilians, and foreign nationals. Recognized as a terrorist organization in multiple countries, the BLA recently launched Operation Herof, striking Pakistani army checkpoints and camps along key highways in Balochistan. This operation reportedly claimed the lives of nearly 102 people, including civilians, and led to the capture of significant parts of the Bela army camp. The BLA has also set up checkpoints across the province to ambush military convoys, indicating a broader effort to achieve secession from Pakistan.

    The BLA claimed that over 40 soldiers were killed in the attack on the main army camp in Bela. According to the group, its Fidayeen unit maintained control over a substantial portion of the camp for six hours as part of Operation Herof, with the Majeed Brigade spearheading the assault on the occupying forces in Bela, resulting in the deaths of more than 40 military personnel.

    Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif condemned the violence, asserting that the separatists aim to disrupt China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) development projects, which seek to expand Beijing’s influence in Pakistan and across Central and South Asia. This is viewed as a counter to the influence of the United States and India in the region. Sharif vowed retaliation, noting that the violence coincided with a visit from a top Chinese general to Islamabad.

    Pakistan will definitely retaliate, as it has a history of doing so. According to Amnesty International, over 10,000 Baloch have disappeared in Pakistan since 2011. This challenge presents opportunities for both the Pakistani army and the government. The Pakistani army, which holds control over the state, will likely use the situation to act more aggressively in Balochistan, gaining control over more areas and justifying actions in other problematic regions. The Pakistani government, which is not well-liked due to issues like banning opposition, corruption, nepotism, and poor governance, sees this as an opportunity to strengthen its grip on the state.

    There was opposition to the government over Chinese-run projects that have led to significant debt for Pakistan and offered little benefit to local communities. Now, the government has a reason to suppress this dissent and push its anti-India agenda, which could unify the nation and seek warmer relations with Iran and Afghanistan – both of which are also dealing with secessionist movements from their Baloch populations.

    How Pakistan handles this situation will be crucial in determining the country’s future. Pakistan already faces significant challenges in its northwestern territories, and if it fails in Balochistan, India will most likely intervene, leading to the loss of occupied Kashmir. Furthermore, Pakistan could face mass protests in Sindh and Punjab that could weaken the union’s control, similar to what happened in former East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Therefore, the management of the Balochistan issue will play a key role in shaping the future of the world’s first Islamic republic.

  • Will China Push the Thai Land Bridge Project to Reality?

    Will China Push the Thai Land Bridge Project to Reality?

    China’s interest in the Indian Ocean is as strong as its interest in the South China Sea. The Indian Ocean connects China to Europe, the Middle East, and its future key market, Africa. However, China’s route to the Indian Ocean is increasingly threatened, as it relies on major U.S. allies in the region – Singapore and Malaysia, along with Indonesia, which share the Malacca Strait. This narrow passage connects the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Interestingly, at the entrance of the Malacca Strait, India is establishing a strategic presence by building a port city, effectively positioning itself as a gatekeeper for this vital route.

    In this context, the discussion of the Thai Land Bridge Project has resurfaced as an alternative passage that connects the Gulf of Thailand, part of the South China Sea, with the Andaman Sea, part of the Indian Ocean. The project promises to reduce distance and costs for ships navigating traditionally congested routes. For China, it offers greater access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing Singapore and U.S.-controlled gates. For Thailand, the project could bring significant economic benefits, boosting its wealth and positioning it as a leading player in Southeast Asia, potentially diminishing the strategic importance of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore.

    The revived Kra Canal project, now known as the Land Bridge Project, proposes an alternative to digging a canal similar to the Panama Canal through the Kra Isthmus, the narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula. Instead, it plans to build two deep-sea ports in Ranong and Chumphon provinces. These ports would be connected by 90 kilometers of highways, railways, and pipelines across the Kra Isthmus. The project requires substantial investment, time, and engineering. China, with its engineering capabilities and funding, is well-positioned to support the project. The Land Bridge Project has gained renewed enthusiasm for its expected boost to the southern Thai economy. And The passage would alleviate some of the congestion in the Malacca Strait, a crucial transport route for a significant portion of China’s crude oil imports from the Middle East and raw materials from Africa, with approximately 94,000 ships passing through or using its 40-plus ports each year.

    As political events in Thailand unfold and the gap between the royal-backed government and the public widens, it is anticipated that the new Thai Prime Minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, from a prominent political family with royal support, will take extensive measures to gain public support. The Thai government under Paetongtarn is expected to pursue large infrastructure projects to enhance her public image and contribute to Thailand’s economy. It is also clear that Paetongtarn is likely to continue her predecessors’ efforts to strengthen economic ties with Beijing. Therefore, the current political climate in Thailand appears favorable for China to intervene and advance the project.

    The Thai government is seeking financing for a project estimated to cost at least $28.6 billion. The Bangkok Post reported last October that the state-owned China Harbour Engineering Co was considering a contribution, according to the Thai government. Additionally, Hong Kong property developer New World Development has shown interest. Without the government’s push for the project, contractors may not need to appear immediately, so it is important to consider that China is taking it seriously. However, challenges may arise at the administrative level, even if China supports the project. China would likely seek a favorable deal similar to other Belt and Road Initiative projects, while stakeholders from Bangkok to Washington may question it. But It is clear that Thailand’s ambitious project will not advance without Chinese assistance. If China invests some money, it stands to gain significant political, economic, and strategic benefits.

  • Public Outcry Leads to Withdrawal of Indonesia’s Pro-Dynasty Law

    Public Outcry Leads to Withdrawal of Indonesia’s Pro-Dynasty Law

    Indonesia, a country with a long history of dynastic politics, saw massive protests outside the parliament building as citizens rallied to defend democracy from the influence of powerful political families. In response to these widespread demonstrations, Indonesian legislators were compelled to abandon their plans to ratify revisions to election laws. With thousands of protesters gathered outside, lawmakers postponed an emergency session. The demonstrators set tires on fire, ignited firecrackers, and chanted slogans against President Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi. The unrest soon spread to other cities as well.

    On Thursday, the Indonesian Parliament was poised to overturn a Constitutional Court order regarding age requirements for candidates in the upcoming regional elections. This reversal would counter a ruling that had disqualified President Joko Widodo’s 29-year-old son, Kaesang Pangarep, from running. The Constitutional Court had recently dismissed a challenge to the age limit, which prevents those under 30 from running for regional governorships and would have barred Kaesang from participating in a key contest in Central Java. If implemented, the proposed changes could further amplify the outgoing president’s political influence, drawing criticism that the move aims to establish a political dynasty. The incoming president, Prabowo Subianto, who is set to take office in October, also hails from a prominent political dynasty, leading to concerns and protests over the concentration of power between these two dynasties. In response to the escalating unrest following news of the new law that could overturn the court’s verdict, Widodo’s office has sought to ease tensions.

    This development is seen as a setback for Joko Widodo’s efforts to place his son and several relatives in key positions of power. Last year, a similar ruling allowed his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, 36, to become Indonesia’s youngest vice president, which sparked allegations of nepotism. At that time, the court was headed by Widodo’s brother-in-law, Anwar Usman. Now, Widodo’s younger son, Kaesang Pangarep, is expected to seek a prominent role in November’s regional elections. To bypass the minimum age requirement of 30 for candidates, the president’s allies had proposed applying the age criterion at the time of inauguration, as Kaesang will turn 30 in December. However, this strategy has been blocked, thwarting Widodo’s plans. Additionally, Widodo faces criticism for allegedly supporting his successor, defense chief Prabowo Subianto, who is set to assume office in October, to maintain his family’s political influence. Furthermore, Joko’s son-in-law, Bobby Nasution, is running for governor of North Sumatra after his tenure as mayor of Medan. Experts observe that Indonesians are growing disillusioned with Widodo and his efforts to retain political influence as he prepares to step down after two five-year terms as president.

    People are deeply frustrated with the frequent and rapid manipulation of democratic system, driven by a clear desire to extend power. Protests have erupted in Yogyakarta, Makassar, Bandung, and Semarang, reflecting the so-called Generation Z revolution in Bangladesh. The government may act quickly on this issue, recognizing the parallels between the situations in Bangladesh and Indonesia, both of which grapple with political Islam. The Indonesian government is unlikely to retreat from its efforts to consolidate control and bolster its influence through political dynasties, and is expected to continue reinforcing its grip on power.