Category: Opinion

  • After Fifty Years: Where Will Vietnam Move in a Changing World?

    After Fifty Years: Where Will Vietnam Move in a Changing World?

    It remains one of the most iconic narratives of modern history—a true David and Goliath struggle. The formidable United States was ultimately brought to a halt by a small Southeast Asian nation still emerging from the long shadows of colonization. The Vietnam War has come to symbolize the power of popular resistance against imperialism. Decades later, on April 30th, 2025, thousands of Vietnamese gathered to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the war’s end.

    The occasion marks a pivotal chapter in Vietnam’s history: the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, when Communist North Vietnam captured the capital of the U.S.-backed South. It was the first step toward national reunification, arriving two years after the withdrawal of the last American combat troops. The war’s end brought closure to a brutal 20-year conflict that claimed the lives of some 3 million Vietnamese and nearly 60,000 Americans—many of them young conscripts sent to fight a distant and devastating war.

    Vietnam: The New China

    Vietnam increasingly mirrors China in its trade practices, political structure, and aspects of its cultural development. This resemblance is no coincidence. Over the years, Vietnam has adopted key elements of China’s state-led development model while maintaining close ties between the ruling Communist parties of both nations. These relations remain strong today, despite a shared history marked by ideological fractures and armed conflict.

    During the Sino-Soviet split, Vietnam initially attempted to balance its alliances with both Moscow and Beijing. However, internal divisions surfaced, and a pro-Soviet faction led by Lê Duẩn eventually prevailed—particularly after China began normalizing relations with the United States, a move Hanoi saw as a betrayal of revolutionary solidarity. The rivalry between the two communist nations eventually escalated into open war.

    Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam began rebuilding its relationship with China. Over the decades, cooperation deepened in areas such as trade, infrastructure, and governance. Vietnam’s development trajectory began to echo China’s—with rapid industrialization, a centralized one-party system, and increasing integration into global supply chains.

    Still, significant obstacles persist. Historical animosities, ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea, and economic tensions—particularly the flood of cheap Chinese imports—continue to strain the relationship. These challenges have pushed Vietnamese leaders to diversify the country’s foreign partnerships and reduce overreliance on any single power.

    Despite underlying friction, symbolic displays of unity continue. At a recent ceremony commemorating Vietnam’s struggle for independence, 118 Chinese troops marched alongside Vietnamese forces—a gesture that underscored both the enduring camaraderie and the lingering complexity of relations between the two communist neighbors.

    The Tricky Relationship With the U.S.

    The scars of war have largely healed, and the relationship between the U.S. and Vietnam is no longer hostile, despite the immense damage the conflict caused to Vietnam. Today, Vietnam is a manufacturing powerhouse and holds a deep admiration for the U.S. economy. Politically, though, it does not fully align with the United States, even as both nations share common interests in the South China Sea.

    Vietnam and the United States formalized diplomatic ties in 1995, marking a significant shift two decades after the war. Yet it was in 2023, during a visit to Hanoi by former President Joe Biden, that their relationship truly blossomed, as Biden’s evident focus on Vietnam heralded a new chapter. What had been a promising partnership, however, now stands at a precarious juncture, threatened by the specter of a punishing 46% tariff on Vietnamese goods, imposed by Biden’s successor, Donald Trump, in April.

    The tariffs have been largely suspended until July, with talks ongoing. However, if enacted, they could undermine Vietnam’s export-driven growth, which has attracted significant foreign investment. To show goodwill, Washington sent Susan Burns, the U.S. consul general in Ho Chi Minh City, to represent the country at the parade. Both nations are striving to repair their ties, acknowledging the challenges but also the opportunities ahead.

    To Be a Friend to All, but close to none

    Vietnam now positions itself as a friend to all, while remaining ideologically anchored in communism. When faced with punitive tariffs, it has taken a pragmatic path—unlike some other communist states. Instead of responding aggressively to recent U.S. tariff threats, which pose a serious risk to its export-driven economy, Vietnam chose diplomacy, sending officials to Washington for negotiations. This is the new Vietnam—independent, practical, and no longer simply following China’s lead.

    China is working to keep Vietnam within its sphere of influence. President Xi Jinping’s visit to Hanoi was a calculated effort to reaffirm ties and ensure Vietnam’s actions do not stray from Beijing’s interests. The Chinese Communist Party remains committed to its relationship with Vietnam’s ruling party, despite past conflicts and ongoing mistrust. Yet Vietnam continues to assert its own identity.

    Beyond its ties with China and the U.S., Vietnam is also expanding its relations with European nations. High-level officials from countries like Germany now make frequent visits, reflecting deepening partnerships. Vietnam plays an active role in ASEAN as well, positioning itself as one of the bloc’s most engaged and forward-looking members.

    Moreover, Vietnam is deepening economic ties with other emerging powers like India, a vast and growing market, as it works to diversify trade and avoid overreliance on any one partner. Through it all, Vietnam remains distinctly itself—firmly rooted in history, yet increasingly global in outlook.

  • Faith, Land, and Votes: The Waqf Act and the Tightrope Walk of India’s Opposition

    Faith, Land, and Votes: The Waqf Act and the Tightrope Walk of India’s Opposition

    Religion has long been one of the most sensitive and polarizing forces in India. This is hardly surprising in a country that is not only the birthplace of several major religions but also home to a population that has, for centuries, defended its faiths with fervor. Religion is deeply woven into the nation’s social and political life, continuing to shape both public discourse and electoral outcomes. Unsurprisingly, any legislation that touches on religious matters tends to ignite fierce debate.

    A recent example is the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, which has now been enacted into law. The Act introduces a host of new complexities in the functioning of the Waqf Board, the institution responsible for managing properties endowed for religious and charitable use within the Muslim community. Historically, particularly during the era of Muslim rule, large swathes of land—including those with pre-Islamic temples and long-established non-Muslim settlements—were brought under Waqf ownership. The current Hindu nationalist government, asserting a reformist agenda, has framed the new law as a measure to enhance transparency, secure property rights, and promote gender equality.

    Given the government’s commanding parliamentary majority, the passage of the amendment was all but assured. The more precarious political challenge, however, has landed on the shoulders of the opposition. Parties like the Indian National Congress—long proponents of secular modernism in contrast to the religious nationalism espoused by Prime Minister Modi and the BJP—now find themselves compelled to oppose the amendment in order to retain the support of their Muslim base. Yet doing so places them in direct conflict with their own stated ideals of progressivism and modernity.

    This is not the first time such a dilemma has emerged. Much like the controversy surrounding the triple talaq legislation, the Waqf amendment forces secular parties into an impossible balancing act: resisting the law may alienate liberal and secular-minded constituents, while endorsing it could be seen as abandoning a key electoral bloc. The BJP, meanwhile, has seized the opportunity to cast its rivals as beholden to Islamist interests—a narrative that not only undermines the opposition’s credibility but also complicates their path back to political relevance.

    What’s the Waqf Act?

    Waqf, an Islamic tradition, entails the permanent dedication of property for religious or charitable purposes. Though its roots in India trace back to the period of Muslim rule, the institution of Waqf expanded significantly under British colonial administration and continued to grow well after independence. Today, the Waqf Board manages an estimated 870,000 properties across 940,000 acres, with a cumulative value exceeding ₹1 lakh crore (approximately $12 billion). This makes it the third-largest landowner in the country, after the Indian Railways and the Armed Forces. Much of this expansion—particularly in the post-independence era—has been shaped by political patronage and legal ambiguities, prompting persistent calls for reform. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has made addressing these issues a recurring theme in its electoral platforms.

    Mounting public pressure culminated in the passage of the Waqf (Amendment) Bill in 2024, which became law the following year. The legislation introduced sweeping changes to the governance of Waqf properties. Under traditional Islamic jurisprudence, such endowments can be established in three ways: by formal declaration, by long-standing public use (waqf by user), and through familial endowments (waqf-alal-aulad). The amended Act abolished the waqf by user provision and now permits only individuals who have practiced Islam for at least five years and who hold legal ownership of the property to declare it as Waqf. It also safeguards inheritance rights—particularly for women—by ensuring that familial endowments cannot override lawful claims by heirs.

    The amendment also redistributed key administrative responsibilities. The task of surveying Waqf properties was transferred from the Survey Commissioner to district-level authorities such as District Collectors. It mandated the inclusion of Muslim women and members of non-Muslim communities on both the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards. Additionally, the Act called for the establishment of separate Auqaf Boards for the Bohra and Agakhani communities, thereby expanding representation beyond the traditional Sunni-Shia divide and amplifying the voices of historically marginalized Muslim sects.

    To improve transparency, the Act mandated the creation of a centralized online registry for Waqf properties and streamlined procedures for property mutation to align with existing revenue laws. It introduced a requirement for prior notice to all stakeholders before any property is designated as Waqf. The amendment also overhauled the tribunal system: Waqf Tribunal decisions are now subject to appeal in High Courts within a 90-day window. Outdated provisions, including Section 107, were repealed, bringing Waqf disputes under the purview of the Limitation Act of 1963.

    Experts have largely welcomed the Waqf (Amendment) Act of 2025 as a timely and necessary reform. It advances gender equity by mandating female representation in governance, protects inheritance rights, and fosters greater sectarian inclusion. It also grants the Central Government expanded authority over registration, auditing, and financial oversight, aiming to bring more accountability to a system long criticized for opacity.

    The politics of Act

    Indian politics today is largely shaped by the assertive direction of the Narendra Modi government, while the opposition remains disoriented, struggling to define its own priorities. The Waqf Amendment Bill has become emblematic of this divide. For the BJP, the bill represents a legal instrument to address longstanding land disputes involving the Waqf Board—an effort framed as reclaiming public and historical land holdings for broader civic use.

    In contrast, opposition parties, heavily reliant on Muslim electoral support, have consistently resisted legislation related to Muslim affairs—often regardless of its merit or potential benefit. Their opposition to the triple talaq ban, despite the practice being abolished in many Muslim-majority countries, was widely criticized as political appeasement. Such positions have increasingly alienated secular and liberal voters, many of whom now find themselves more aligned with the BJP’s reformist narrative.

    The government has also capitalized on public dissatisfaction with the Waqf Board, particularly its claims over properties predating Islam, including ancient temples and heritage structures. In many cases, even local Muslim residents are unaware that the land they occupy is registered as Waqf—based on historical claims dating back to the medieval period. These issues have stirred broader debates over the legitimacy of religious land endowments rooted in conquest and the relevance of vast religious land holdings in a secular republic decades after partition.

    By opposing the Waqf Amendment Bill and labeling it anti-Muslim, the opposition has inadvertently strengthened the BJP’s political positioning. Instead of recalibrating their stance, opposition leaders and Muslim political parties have turned to the Supreme Court—further reinforcing the BJP’s portrayal of them as obstructionist and disconnected from contemporary reformist sentiment.

    What happens next?

    The Waqf Act 2025 has triggered widespread protests among Muslim communities across India, highlighting the deep religious importance of the issue. In several areas, these protests turned violent, with some taking on openly anti-Hindu tones. In West Bengal—especially in regions with large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants—the unrest escalated into full-blown riots, resulting in deaths, injuries, looting, and widespread chaos.

    These incidents have deepened existing communal tensions. At the same time, the violence in West Bengal has helped rally Hindu nationalist sentiment across the state. BJP supporters quickly closed ranks, using the unrest to argue that the opposition’s policy of communal appeasement has gone too far. This growing polarization is working in the ruling party’s favor, strengthening its political position ahead of the next round of elections.

  • Is Gaza Finally Turning Against Hamas?

    Is Gaza Finally Turning Against Hamas?

    Should Gazans be seen as separate from Hamas? This question has loomed since Israel’s military response to the brutal October 7 attack, which Hamas launched on Israel, igniting the ongoing conflict. But what about the civilians caught in the crossfire?

    Reactions are divided. Some view Gaza’s suffering as the result of both Hamas and Israel’s relentless bombardment, while others argue that many in Gaza supported Hamas, celebrated the October 7 attack, and now face the consequences. Social media is rife with competing narratives—some vilifying all Gazans, others framing them only as victims.

    One thing is clear: Hamas has long used Gazans as pawns, embedding itself within civilian areas, manipulating global sympathies, and ensuring that ordinary people bear the brunt of the conflict. With Israel unlikely to relinquish control of Gaza anytime soon, a crucial question emerges—will Gazans finally reject Hamas?

    Some already are. In northern Gaza, hundreds have staged unprecedented protests, chanting anti-Hamas slogans and calling for an end to the war. This marks the largest public uprising against Hamas since October 7, potentially signaling the start of a deeper shift.

    People are fed up

    Israel’s bombardment of Gaza has continued for more than a year and a half, with no signs of mercy. For those already living in dire conditions or caught in the crossfire, life has become a nightmare—forced from their homes, stripped of their belongings, and trapped in constant danger. Many are fed up.

    Though some still endure their suffering as a test of faith, frustration is mounting. Protests against Hamas, the group at the center of their ordeal, have begun to emerge. Videos and photos circulating on social media late Tuesday showed hundreds of demonstrators in Beit Lahiya chanting against Hamas, calling for its removal and blaming it for their suffering. The protests, which erupted near the Indonesia Hospital in northern Gaza, came just days after Israel resumed its intense bombing campaign following nearly two months of truce. Some protesters carried banners demanding an end to the war and a chance to live in peace.

    Unlike previous demonstrations, these protests were not backed by any known organization. At least one call to join was spread through Telegram. Many protesters expressed their exhaustion with the ongoing war and the hardships they have endured. Some noted that Hamas security forces, dressed in civilian clothing, were seen breaking up the demonstration. Others questioned why Hamas refuses to relinquish power if doing so could prevent further suffering.

    Separate clips showed dozens of people in the Jabaliya refugee camps, in the western part of Gaza City, burning tires and demanding an end to the war. Some protesters expressed their desperation for food. Gaza residents suggested that the protests could spread to other parts of the war-ravaged territory, where people are exhausted and traumatized after a year and a half of conflict. Since Hamas launched its attacks on southern Israel on October 7, occasional small-scale protests have erupted in Gaza, with demonstrators calling for an end to the war, but none directly opposing Hamas.

    Who is behind the protests?

    Many of the slogans chanted on Tuesday echoed those of the Bidna N’eesh (“We Want to Live”) movement, which emerged during the 2019 economic protests in Gaza. Those demonstrations were violently suppressed by Hamas, which claimed they were orchestrated by its rival, Fatah.

    Fatah was once a dominant force in the region until Hamas rose to prominence, but its supporters remain active in Gaza. Additionally, other anti-Hamas Palestinian factions are there in the territory, and many believe they are behind the recent demonstrations. While some protests explicitly target Hamas, others simply call for an end to the war—possibly as a direct plea for peace and a cry for help from a suffering population.

    Meanwhile, Israel has repeatedly urged Gaza’s residents to rise against Hamas, which has ruled the territory since 2007. While there is no direct link between these protests and Israel’s calls, some demonstrators may be attempting to show they do not support terrorism. It is also evident that Israel and Western powers are seeking alternatives to Hamas’s rule, and they could potentially cultivate a new movement in Gaza to weaken Hamas’s grip.

    What happens next?

    Israel will continue its operations, driven by various factors, including the pursuit of retribution, domestic political pressures, Netanyahu’s desire to retain power, efforts to curb Iran’s regional influence, and broader geopolitical strategies. While Hamas’s offer to release more hostages could momentarily halt further bombardment, any peace achieved is expected to be fleeting.

    Meanwhile, Gaza is facing an increasingly dire humanitarian crisis, a situation set to worsen as international support dwindles. In light of this, severing ties with Hamas could be Gaza’s most pragmatic course of action. The rising number of anti-Hamas protests within Gaza could reshape international perceptions, challenging the narrative that Hamas still represents the people of Gaza and heightening pressure on Israel.

  • Israel Faces Deepening Political Crisis and Courtroom Fights

    Israel Faces Deepening Political Crisis and Courtroom Fights

    As the world remains divided over Israel and Palestine—evident in both online clashes and street demonstrations—Israel itself is split along internal political lines: pro-Netanyahu versus anti-Netanyahu. While these divisions predate the latest Gaza war and its fragile ceasefire, the resumption of hostilities has brought the country’s internal politics back into sharp focus.

    Israel fights on multiple fronts, yet its people continue to protest. The renewed military operation in Gaza has driven tens of thousands into the streets, accusing Netanyahu of prioritizing his government’s survival—now closely tied to the war—over the lives of hostages. As Netanyahu tightens his hold on power by removing top legal and security officials, experts warn that escalating legal battles and a deepening political crisis could soon follow.

    The Firing of Ronen Bar

    Last week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Ronen Bar, head of the Shin Bet internal security service, blaming the agency for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attacks. While a newly released Shin Bet report on the attack indirectly criticized Netanyahu, stating that Israel’s long-standing strategy of maintaining “quiet” had allowed Hamas to significantly expand its military capabilities.

    Rather than accepting responsibility, Netanyahu shifted blame onto military and Shin Bet leaders, once again claiming that the “deep state” is working against him. Critics viewed Bar’s removal as an attempt to weaken Israel’s independent institutions and possibly retaliate against the agency for investigating Netanyahu’s office. Meanwhile, the Shin Bet is probing a possible foreign intelligence infiltration of Netanyahu’s office, while Netanyahu himself remains on trial for corruption—developments that could further destabilize his government.

    Bar stated that he had planned to resign after completing sensitive investigations, including one examining whether Qatar—a country with close ties to Hamas—had hired Netanyahu’s advisers to run an influence campaign in Israel. Netanyahu, with little evidence, has claimed the probe resulted from collusion between Bar and the attorney general to prevent him from ousting the security chief.

    At the same time, Netanyahu’s government has moved to remove Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, accusing her of obstructing its agenda. On Sunday, the government voted to begin the process, a move that could take weeks.

    Unfolding Legal Crisis

    In a country without a formal constitution and a single parliamentary chamber controlled by Netanyahu’s coalition, Israel’s Supreme Court has long acted as a crucial check on government power. In early 2023, Netanyahu’s government introduced a sweeping judicial overhaul that critics argued would erode Israel’s system of checks and balances by consolidating excessive power in his hands.

    Opponents also accused Netanyahu of pushing these changes while on trial for corruption, stressing that an independent judiciary is essential to preserving democracy. The Hamas attacks on October 7, which triggered the war in Gaza, temporarily halted the judicial overhaul but deepened divisions over accountability for Israel’s deadliest day.

    The Supreme Court has already intervened in Netanyahu’s dismissal of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, issuing an injunction that temporarily blocks the move pending further hearings. In the coming weeks, the court is expected to determine whether the dismissal was legally justified and whether a conflict of interest exists, given the ongoing investigation into Qatar’s alleged influence over Netanyahu’s office.

    If Netanyahu’s committee proceeds with removing Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, the decision will almost certainly face a Supreme Court challenge. The court will once again be tasked with ruling on whether Netanyahu has a conflict of interest, considering that he seeks to oust the official overseeing his corruption prosecution.

    What remains uncertain is whether Netanyahu’s government will comply with an unfavorable ruling. The most volatile scenario would be outright defiance of the court’s decision, triggering a constitutional crisis over whether judicial or executive authority prevails, potentially plunging Israel into deep political turmoil.

    Political Crisis Ahead

    Breaking the ceasefire has helped Netanyahu’s government remain in power by facilitating the return of far-right politician Itamar Ben-Gvir to the coalition, bolstering Netanyahu’s position ahead of a crucial budget vote.

    However, political tensions have intensified since efforts to remove top officials began. Over the weekend, Aharon Barak, Israel’s foremost legal scholar, warned in a series of interviews that the country could be on the brink of civil war. He also joined nearly 20 former Supreme Court justices in signing a letter on Sunday, arguing that the attorney general’s dismissal threatens the rule of law.

    Opposition leader Yair Lapid has called for a tax revolt if the government ignores the court’s ruling, while the head of Israel’s largest labor union warned that defying a judicial decision would be a red line, raising the possibility of general strikes.

    The coming days will be pivotal for Netanyahu and his coalition. Defying the courts could trigger widespread civil disobedience—an outcome that may ultimately spell the downfall of his government.

  • Is China Taking Over Uzbekistan?

    Is China Taking Over Uzbekistan?

    China, a major investor in global infrastructure, is often accused of using its financial power to bind countries to its influence, exploit resources, and bribe local politicians. Many nations have fallen into debt traps, ultimately ceding control of critical infrastructure to China—a form of economic colonization without territorial rule.

    This strategy is becoming increasingly visible in mineral-rich Central Asia. As Russia’s dominance in the region wanes, China is rapidly expanding its investments, securing access to natural resources, and integrating local economies into its business networks. In these poorly managed economies, Chinese influence is growing, raising concerns among citizens. However, with limited political opposition—reminiscent of Russia’s model—public frustration is largely channeled through social media.

    A Deep Relationship

    Although Uzbekistan and China do not share a border, their historical and economic ties run deep. The land and cities that now make up Uzbekistan were once integral to China’s ancient Silk Road, serving as key hubs of trade and cultural exchange. Today, this connection endures through modern diplomatic and economic frameworks between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

    China is Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, though this relationship has created a significant trade imbalance. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $13.8 billion, with Uzbekistan exporting only $2 billion worth of goods while importing $11.8 billion from China. Additionally, China is the country’s largest creditor—President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s administration, which has been borrowing heavily to fund economic modernization, now owes Beijing at least $3.8 billion.

    Beyond trade, cultural ties between the two nations have deepened through official agreements. Since 2017, China and Uzbekistan have engaged in cultural exchanges, including seminars, exhibitions, and performances. China has also contributed to the restoration of Uzbekistan’s cultural heritage sites, while Chinese and Uzbek state media collaborate on joint productions.

    Intensifying Anti-China Sentiment

    While the Uzbek government maintains strong ties with China at the official level, public sentiment tells a different story. Anti-Chinese sentiment is rising in Uzbekistan, driven by influential social media channels. In February, reports surfaced alleging that Chinese entities and individuals were purchasing and securing long-term leases on properties in major Uzbek cities, including Tashkent, as well as acquiring prime land for mining and agricultural ventures.

    Many online discussions have framed China’s growing economic footprint as a direct threat to Uzbekistan’s sovereignty. A widely shared video on the Demokrat UZ YouTube channel garnered over a million views, amplifying concerns over Chinese influence. Similarly, Fazliddin Shahobiddin, an influential YouTuber who analyzes current affairs from an Islamic perspective, claimed that Uzbekistan is being bought up by China. His post attracted more than 1.8 million views, with a majority of the 12,000 comments echoing anti-Beijing sentiment, some even urging Uzbeks to recognize what they see as an encroaching Chinese presence in the country.

    How will it evolve?

    Uzbekistan depends on China. While the United States, Europe, and their Asian allies—such as Turkey, South Korea, and Japan—are seeking closer ties with the resource-rich nation, Uzbekistan’s leadership remains firmly aligned with Russia. Without Moscow’s backing, the country risks political instability, including potential unrest and challenges to the current government. Given Uzbekistan’s consistently low rankings on global democracy indices, meaningful cooperation with the West remains difficult.

    In this context, China emerges as Uzbekistan’s most viable partner—economically dominant, technologically advanced, and closely linked to Russia. Beijing is taking full advantage of this dynamic, even working to curb the influence of other Russian allies like India, which lacks both the financial muscle and, perhaps, the political will to compete in Uzbekistan through large-scale investments or transactional diplomacy as China does.

    Amid growing public resentment toward China, the Uzbek government is actively working to suppress negative sentiment. Officials are eager to avoid a scenario like that in Pakistan, where anti-Chinese backlash led to targeted violence against Chinese nationals. To counter the rising hostility, authorities have launched a media campaign emphasizing the benefits of deeper economic cooperation. Yet initial efforts to reassure the public have failed to stem the tide of online criticism, forcing the government to intensify its PR strategy. 

    Given the government’s reliance on China, its efforts will likely go beyond media campaigns to include suppressing dissent, particularly on social media. Like many other authoritarian regimes in Asia, Uzbek authorities understand that their political survival is increasingly intertwined with their ties to Beijing. While not a direct takeover, China’s expanding influence is gradually steering Uzbekistan’s political landscape in its favor.

  • Syria’s Constitutional Declaration: A Step Toward Inclusion or a Veil for Exclusion?

    Syria’s Constitutional Declaration: A Step Toward Inclusion or a Veil for Exclusion?

    Syria’s diverse social fabric has long been a source of tension. Despite the dominance of Arab and Muslim identities, deep internal divisions persisted. Slogans like “One, one, one! The Syrian people are one!” were widespread, but they failed to bridge the sectarian and ethnic divides that shaped the country’s reality.

    For decades, the Assad family ruled Syria by consolidating power within the Alawite minority to which they belonged, a strategy that deepened resentment among other communities. Before the civil war, Sunni Arab Muslims made up approximately 68% of the population, while Alawites accounted for 9% to 13%. Kurds comprised 8% to 10%, alongside Druze, Christians, Armenians, Circassians, Turkmen, Palestinians, and Yazidis. The Assad regime skillfully exploited these divisions to maintain its grip on power.

    With the regime’s collapse in December, a new Sunni-majority government, led by former militant factions, took power, reigniting debates over political inclusion. While Kurdish groups have expressed willingness to integrate, Druze remain skeptical, and Alawites face escalating persecution, raising concerns about their place in the emerging political order. Despite resisting meaningful minority representation, the government faces mounting international pressure, with the European Union and other global actors conditioning the lifting of sanctions on the establishment of an inclusive political framework.

    Constitutional Declaration

    Late last week, Syria’s interim government unveiled a preliminary draft of the country’s new constitution, which will serve as the governing framework for the coming years until a permanent constitution is established. The interim constitution establishes a presidential system, concentrating executive power in the hands of the president, who appoints ministers without the presence of a prime minister. Strongly Islamic in orientation, the document offers little accommodation for Syria’s ethnic diversity, leaving minorities uncertain about their place in the post-Assad era.

    Speaking at the presidential palace on Thursday, Sharaa hailed the constitutional declaration as a turning point, stating that the government was replacing oppression with justice and suffering with mercy as he signed the document.

    Abdul Hamid al-Awak, a member of the drafting committee, emphasized that the declaration guarantees women’s rights in employment, education, and politics. However, it also mandates that the president must be a Muslim and designates Islamic jurisprudence as the primary source of legislation. Executive authority remains heavily concentrated in the presidency, with the president retaining sole power to declare a state of emergency. Additionally, one-third of the legislature will be appointed by the executive. While the legislature is responsible for drafting laws, it lacks the authority to impeach the president, and the president cannot dissolve the legislative body.

    Defending the centralized structure, Awak argued that strong executive power is essential for maintaining stability during the transition. The declaration also guarantees judicial independence and upholds freedoms of speech, expression, and the press. A separate committee will be tasked with drafting a permanent constitution.

    Despite these assurances, constitutional experts have highlighted a major omission: the document makes no reference to Syria’s minority groups. Local communities have also voiced concerns over their exclusion from the recent National Dialogue event, where key decisions about the transition were made.

    Meanwhile, the caretaker government, which is expected to remain in power indefinitely as elections remain uncertain, continues to maintain close ties to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former Sunni extremist group that led the December offensive that ousted Bashar al-Assad. An analysis of 21 cabinet ministers and 154 senior appointments made between December and late February reveals that Sunni Muslim men overwhelmingly dominate the government. While experts acknowledge the exceptional circumstances under which these appointments were made, they warn that the continued exclusion of minorities could lead to serious long-term instability.

    Representation of Minorities

    A quota system that distributes administrative positions among different sects was initially expected to be part of Syria’s new political framework. However, the recently unveiled constitutional declaration has rejected this approach, dismissing both sectarian quotas and the idea of reserving parliamentary seats for specific groups.

    Pro-government factions argue that sectarian power-sharing has repeatedly failed in the region and should be abandoned. Lebanon’s 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the country’s civil war, institutionalized sectarian representation in government, yet instead of fostering stability, it led to widespread dysfunction. Similarly, in Iraq, following the 2003 U.S. invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein, American authorities introduced a power-sharing system that allocated governance among the country’s three main demographic groups, further deepening societal divisions.

    Response to the New Order

    The Kurdish-led administration in northeastern Syria has strongly criticized the newly unveiled constitutional declaration, arguing that it contradicts Syria’s diverse reality. Earlier this week, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the military arm of the Kurdish-led administration, reached an agreement with authorities in Damascus to integrate into state institutions. However, Kurdish officials swiftly rejected the declaration, stating that it does not represent the aspirations of their people and undermines efforts to achieve true democracy. Without Kurdish participation, a unified and stable Syria is unlikely. The Kurdish administration is highly organized and efficient, and its exclusion could lead to further conflict.

    Similarly, the Alawite community, long associated with the Assad regime and now targeted by the new government, has also rejected the constitutional declaration. Reports indicate that Alawites are facing massacres, raising fears of systematic persecution. Beyond the staggering death toll, what makes these killings particularly alarming is that many of the perpetrators belong to the newly established Syrian army, formed under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The violence has cast a dark shadow over Syria’s future, raising serious doubts about the government’s ability to control its forces and rein in the patchwork of militias that now wield power.

    The massacre of Alawite civilians has also raised concerns among influential evangelical members of the Trump White House, who view the protection of Syria’s religious minorities as a key benchmark for engaging with the new government. In such a volatile environment, the absence of a quota system in the constitutional declaration is particularly alarming. While quota-based governance has its flaws, it at least ensures some degree of representation for marginalized communities—a safeguard that is currently lacking in Syria’s new political framework.

    What happens next?

    Ensuring inclusive governance in post-conflict societies is rarely straightforward, as every approach to improving minority representation faces counterarguments. In this context, federalism is often proposed as a solution. Some of the world’s most complex democracies, including Germany, the United States, and Russia, operate under federal systems that divide power between national and subnational governments. While central authorities typically handle defense and foreign policy, state or regional governments oversee local matters and can influence national decision-making.

    However, Syria currently lacks leadership capable of implementing such a system effectively. A government that excludes minority participation and enforces strong centralized control will only deepen the crisis. As a result, Syria’s instability is likely to persist.

    The declaration comes amid the deadliest violence since Assad’s overthrow, which analysts view as the greatest threat to the transitional process. Mass killings, primarily targeting Alawites, have left at least 1,476 civilians dead at the hands of security forces and allied militias, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. President Ahmed al-Sharaa has vowed to prosecute those responsible, and authorities have announced several arrests. However, with a newly consolidated Sunni-dominated government, Syria’s problems seem far from over—raising concerns that the country may simply transition from an Assad-led regime to a Sunni-dominated authoritarian rule.

  • Are New Rail Routes Enhancing Kazakhstan’s Strategic Role?

    Are New Rail Routes Enhancing Kazakhstan’s Strategic Role?

    Kazakhstan, the world’s ninth-largest country, is often overlooked despite its rich history, vibrant culture, and vast natural resources. For much of its modern existence, it remained a satellite of Russia, never fully stepping into its own spotlight. Its landlocked geography and strategic vulnerabilities kept it tethered to Moscow’s influence, even after gaining independence in 1991 following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Russia continued to shape its political trajectory, limiting its ability to assert true sovereignty.

    However, more than three decades after independence, Kazakhstan is now finally charting its own course. While maintaining political ties with Russia, it has strengthened its partnership with China, expanded relations with India and the Gulf states, and deepened engagement with Europe and the United States. No longer solely reliant on Moscow, Kazakhstan is leveraging its growing ties with Beijing to bolster its economic and strategic standing.

    At the heart of this transformation is the Middle Corridor—a trade route linking China to Europe through Kazakhstan while bypassing Russia. This corridor has strengthened Kazakhstan’s geopolitical standing and opened new economic opportunities, firmly establishing the country as a vital hub in global trade.

    The Middle Corridor

    The Middle Corridor, a high-stakes trade route, provides the shortest overland link between China and Europe, sidestepping war-ravaged Russia and the increasingly congested Suez Canal. More than a mere alternative, it reflects shifting geopolitical tides and economic realignments, emerging as a transformative force in global trade. Kazakhstan’s national railway company emphasizes that the corridor not only expands regional transport capacity but also improves the speed, flexibility, and reliability of international logistics.

    Beijing, driven by strategic economic ambitions, is actively expanding its access to European markets while bypassing Russia and strengthening its foothold in Central Asia by leading this project. This shift not only deprives the Kremlin of crucial transit revenue but also weakens its geopolitical leverage. As the Ukrainian news outlet Dialog notes, Chinese goods that once flowed through Russia are now shifting to these new routes—an unmistakable sign of Moscow’s declining influence over Eurasian trade. Meanwhile, rising regional powers like Kazakhstan and Turkey are positioning themselves as key players in this evolving economic landscape.

    The Corridor is Filling Out

    Despite Russia’s extensive transit network, a legacy of the Soviet era, the Middle Corridor still demands substantial infrastructure upgrades and investment. Yet, as its strategic importance becomes undeniable, countries along the route are accelerating efforts and channeling funds into its development.

    China and Kazakhstan have officially launched a new freight rail transit line to transport Chinese goods to Europe while bypassing Russia. Additionally, China is developing two more westbound freight corridors through Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea, further diminishing Moscow’s role as a key transit hub.

    According to Kazakhstan’s State Railway company, the first container train on this route departed from Chengdu in central China on March 4, bound for the Polish city of Łódź. Carrying televisions and other electronic components, the train is expected to complete its 40-day journey through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey before reaching the European Union’s border. Its success is expected to pave the way for more trains along the route.

    Kazakhstan at the Center

    Kazakhstan has strengthened its global standing by rapidly developing its infrastructure and managing its resources more effectively. Its growing geopolitical importance has allowed it to stand more confidently before Moscow and negotiate with Russia on equal footing. Analysts point to several key moments that highlight this shift, including Kazakhstan’s neutral stance during the Azerbaijan-Russia tensions following the downing of an Azerbaijani civilian plane.

    Moscow has lost its grip over land logistics between China and Europe, as Kazakhstan, China, and Turkey now control this crucial transit route. With its geopolitical influence expanding, Kazakhstan is increasingly seen as a rising power. More nations recognize its strategic importance, making it an indispensable player in regional trade and diplomacy.

    Reflecting this growing influence, Uzbekistan’s state railway agency recently launched a new freight transit route connecting India to Kazakhstan. Workers loaded twelve containers onto a freighter at India’s Mundra port, sending them to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port. From there, the shipment will travel by rail through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan before reaching its final destination near Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital. Expected to take 25 to 30 days, the new route could significantly reduce transport costs while creating more opportunities for exporters and importers.

    Russia’s war in Ukraine, far from merely redrawing battle lines, has inadvertently accelerated Kazakhstan’s ascent, hastening the emergence of a more self-assured and strategically independent Central Asia.

  • India’s Linguistic Battle: A Threat to Unity?

    India’s Linguistic Battle: A Threat to Unity?

    The Narendra Modi government’s National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 has reignited India’s long-standing language tensions. The policy enforces a three-language formula in schools, widely seen as an attempt to expand Hindi’s influence—aligning with the BJP’s ideological vision.

    Approved by the Union Cabinet on July 29, 2020, NEP 2020 aims to reform India’s education system, replacing the 1986 National Policy on Education. With decades passing since the last major policy change, reforms were inevitable. However, the three-language formula has met strong resistance, especially from southern states, which take great pride in their linguistic heritage and have long opposed Hindi imposition. The controversy has deepened as the central government prioritizes funding for states that implement the policy.

    Tamil Nadu, known for its strong linguistic identity and opposition to Hindi imposition, has led the resistance. The state government’s formal rejection of the policy has escalated the debate. Online protests and social media campaigns continue to amplify tensions, occasionally sparking concerns about national unity.

    The Land of Linguistic Diversity

    India, a nation of extraordinary linguistic diversity, ranks second only to Papua New Guinea in the number of languages spoken within its borders—780, according to the People’s Linguistic Survey of India. This multiplicity of tongues has long been both a source of cultural richness and a point of contention. Unlike many nations, including its erstwhile twin, Pakistan, India did not designate a single national language. Instead, its framers took a characteristically intricate approach: they recognized Hindi—the country’s most widely spoken language—and English for official purposes but refrained from declaring any language as the national language. This decision was not merely an effort to avoid conflict but a conscious attempt to hold together a vast and diverse republic, fostering a sense of inclusivity.

    Article 343 of the Indian Constitution declares Hindi in the Devanagari script as the official language of the Union, with English permitted for official use for 15 years after independence. The inclusion of English as an official language was met with strong opposition, as many viewed it as a colonial vestige. However, the Official Languages Act of 1963 extended the use of English indefinitely, unless modified by future legislation. The original 15-year timeframe was intended to allow Hindi to gradually replace English as the sole official language, but this vision never materialized due to staunch resistance, particularly from the southern states.

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has ramped up efforts to make Hindi the country’s primary link language. The BJP has placed the National Education Policy (NEP) at the center of this linguistic push, presenting it as a vehicle for national cohesion. By introducing Hindi instruction in non-Hindi-speaking states, the NEP’s three-language formula has revived old tensions, drawing fierce resistance from regions that see the policy as yet another attempt to impose linguistic uniformity on a country that has long resisted it.

    Why Hindi?

    With an estimated 600 million speakers, Hindi dominates northern India and ranks as the world’s third most spoken language. Yet, it remains a minority within India, where non-Hindi speakers outnumber those who speak it. The 2011 Census shows that only 43.63% of Indians identify Hindi as their first language. Despite this, Hindi’s numerical strength gives it a significant advantage. Even without including its dialects and closely related languages, no other Indian language comes close in terms of speakers. The political influence of Hindi-speaking regions is particularly strong in the Indian capital, Delhi, and in populous states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which send a large number of assembly members to the legislature.

    The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), rooted in Hindu nationalist ideology, has consistently pushed for Hindi as a pillar of its vision for national unification. For centuries, Hindi,  a Sanskritized version of Hindustani, has dominated northern India, and the BJP sees its promotion as a way to reinforce national identity. By advancing Hindi, the party aligns with its broader cultural and political objectives.

    Tamil Nadu’s Resistance to Hindi

    Tamil Nadu, one of India’s most economically and culturally vibrant states, has expressed the strongest opposition to the new education policy, reigniting a fresh political dispute. For the people of Tamil Nadu, their language is deeply intertwined with their identity, and their politics often diverge sharply from the rest of the country, sometimes even challenging national unity in the name of Tamil nationalism.

    The ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), known for its strong Tamil identity politics, has seized this issue to counter the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has been trying to establish a foothold in the state’s political landscape. Tamil, with its centuries-old literary heritage and one of the world’s richest linguistic traditions, is neither endangered nor under threat. However, many in Tamil Nadu fear that mandating Hindi education will gradually detach future generations from their Tamil roots—similar to how several northern Indian languages lost prominence after adopting Hindi-centric education policies.

    Beyond the cultural debate, the DMK also sees a political challenge: it fears that the promotion of Hindi could pave the way for national parties like the BJP to gain influence in Tamil Nadu, posing an existential threat to the state’s distinct political landscape.

    Future of the Language Rift?

    The National Education Policy (NEP) has sparked strong opposition, particularly in Tamil Nadu, while other major states, despite some resistance, have largely accepted it. However, if the central government pursues a more assertive language policy, linguistic tensions could spread beyond Tamil Nadu to other regions. Many in the South fiercely oppose any imposition of Hindi on their linguistic identity. At the same time, the aggressive enforcement of regional languages in southern states has, at times, fueled resentment toward Hindi speakers, further straining national unity.

    Political analysts argue that India’s constitutional commitment to multilingualism has been essential in preventing fragmentation. They warn that imposing a single language could have far-reaching consequences—not only for the country’s political landscape but for its very unity. India is not a monolithic nation bound by a single language, ethnicity, or religion; rather, it is a diverse federation held together by the principles enshrined in its Constitution.

  • Will Bold Governance Reforms Help Vietnam?

    Will Bold Governance Reforms Help Vietnam?

    Vietnam is undertaking a sweeping administrative overhaul in an effort to streamline governance and address long-standing inefficiencies within its bureaucracy. Over the next five years, the government aims to cut one in five public sector jobs, a significant reduction affecting state-owned media, the civil service, the police, and the military.

    As part of the restructuring, four ministries—transport, planning and investment, communications, and labor—have been dissolved. On Tuesday, the country’s parliament approved a plan to reduce the number of ministries from eighteen to fourteen. Government projections indicate that around 100,000 employees will either be laid off or offered early retirement.

    The Communist Party, under the leadership of To Lam, has positioned these reforms as a crucial step in its fight against entrenched corruption. The emphasis, officials say, is on fiscal discipline and ministerial efficiency rather than expanding government employment.

    What are the main changes?

    Among the most significant changes, the Ministry of Planning and Investment, which oversees foreign investment approvals, will be merged with the Ministry of Finance—a move that signals an effort to curb corruption tied to foreign capital, particularly as Vietnam seeks greater investment from Europe. Similarly, the Ministry of Transport will be combined with the Ministry of Construction, while the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment will be folded into the Ministry of Agriculture.

    Why now?

    Vietnam has experienced a surge in foreign investment in recent years, yet its rigid bureaucracy has failed to convert these inflows into concrete economic gains. Once regarded as an emerging economic powerhouse, the country has instead become a case study in bureaucratic gridlock, where excessive red tape and inefficiency have stifled growth. Now, in an effort to rein in an overstretched public sector—where government jobs are not just sources of employment but symbols of social standing—the government is pushing through a sweeping restructuring plan. The planned cuts are expected to ease financial pressure on the state while streamlining governance.

    At the same time, Vietnam is navigating external pressures, particularly in its trade relationship with its largest market, the United States. As an export-driven economy, it faces uncertainty over Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House. Trump has repeatedly threatened broad tariffs of 10–20% on all imports and has singled out Vietnam as “the worst abuser” of U.S. trade, pointing to its rapidly growing trade surplus since 2019. In this context, cost-cutting measures have become even more critical.

    What will be the result?

    Vietnam’s administrative overhaul is being presented as a bold step toward modernizing its state apparatus and addressing long-standing inefficiencies that have hindered governance and economic growth. The consolidation of ministries and commissions is expected to reduce bureaucratic hurdles for investment, infrastructure, and real estate projects. The reforms also seek to eliminate institutional redundancies that often create contradictions within the government, where one authority mandates a particular course of action while another demands the opposite. By reducing a bloated bureaucracy, the restructuring aims to reshape the country’s administrative landscape, potentially solidifying the legacy of To Lam—widely regarded as Vietnam’s most powerful politician—and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh as pragmatic reformers.

    Analysts highlight that the current restructuring is unprecedented in both scale and speed, with Communist Party General Secretary To Lam describing it as an institutional revolution. While the government frames these reforms as essential for efficiency and modernization, their ultimate impact depends on execution. Whether they will result in meaningful administrative improvements or merely serve to consolidate power within the bureaucracy remains uncertain.

    What Are the Broader Implications?

    The timing of these reforms carries significant political weight, coming just a year before the Communist Party’s 2026 congress, where To Lam’s leadership will be up for confirmation. While he is widely expected to secure another term as general secretary, there are murmurs of discontent within the party. His push to restructure the government aligns with his apparent strategy of placing trusted allies in key positions, reinforcing his grip on power.

    The political dynamics surrounding this overhaul are impossible to ignore. To Lam ascended to the party’s top position in August following the death of his predecessor, Nguyen Phu Trong, the architect of Vietnam’s sweeping blazing furnace anti-corruption campaign. As a former minister of public security, he cemented his influence through high-profile graft investigations, and since 2021, the Ministry of Public Security, the military, and the police have increasingly dominated the Politburo, the party’s most powerful decision-making body. His rise has also been accompanied by growing accusations of authoritarianism. Earlier this year, he briefly held both the roles of party chief and state president—an almost unprecedented consolidation of power in Vietnam’s modern political history.

  • Balochistan: A Deepening Fault Line and Rising Death Toll

    Balochistan: A Deepening Fault Line and Rising Death Toll

    Violence grips Balochistan once again as the region’s long-standing unrest escalates. Calls for secession grow louder, with military crackdowns forcing Baloch civilians into disappearance while rebel attacks target Pakistani nationals. The divide between the two sides widens, fueling an unrelenting cycle of bloodshed. Baloch nationalists seize the moment, using social media to amplify their cause and strengthen their movement. Meanwhile, Pakistan scrambles to maintain control. The crisis threatens not just its grip on Balochistan’s vast mineral wealth but also the fragile stability of the state itself. Pakistan, already teetering as a failed state, recognizes that Balochistan may only be the beginning—other regions could soon follow. As secessionist movements gain momentum, instability tightens its hold, pushing the country further into uncertainty.

    The latest escalation in the Balochistan-Pakistan conflict reveals a clear pattern: the struggle has evolved into an open confrontation between Baloch rebels and Punjabis. Rebels view Punjabis as the architects of Pakistan’s military and political dominance, holding them responsible for decades of repression against Baloch activists and civilians. Each wave of violence has only deepened their resentment. Now, that hostility is driving a surge in attacks deliberately targeting Punjabi civilians.

    On Tuesday night, gunmen ambushed a passenger bus bound for Lahore, killing seven people in what appeared to be an ethnically motivated attack. They struck in Balochistan’s Barkhan district, a volatile area bordering Afghanistan and Iran. According to senior government official Saadat Hussain, the attackers burst the bus’s tires, forced the passengers to show their identification cards, and dragged those from Punjab off the vehicle. They lined them up and executed them in cold blood.

    Just days earlier, on Friday, an explosion ripped through a vehicle carrying laborers in southwest Pakistan, near the Afghan border, killing at least ten people. The workers were traveling to a market in Harnai when an improvised explosive device obliterated their vehicle. Reports from local media, including Geo News, later confirmed the death toll had risen to eleven, with several of the injured in critical condition. Harnai, located about 160 kilometers east of Quetta, has long remained a flashpoint in Balochistan’s insurgency, where targeted violence continues to escalate.

    The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) leads the region’s insurgency, relentlessly attacking security forces and targeting Pakistani nationals from other provinces. Last year alone, they killed at least 39 ethnic Punjabis in targeted assaults. Expanding its campaign beyond domestic targets, the BLA has also struck Chinese-backed projects in Balochistan, framing its resistance as a battle against exploitation. The group argues that while foreign investors and Pakistani elites profit from the province’s vast natural resources, local communities remain trapped in poverty, fueling deeper resentment and armed rebellion.

    However, the surge in attacks against Punjabis—who wield significant influence over Pakistan’s political, military, and cultural spheres—is not only escalating the conflict between Baloch insurgents and the state but also creating fractures within the Baloch community itself. While hardliners push for direct retaliation against Pakistanis, others worry that such violence will invite even harsher military crackdowns, fueling more enforced disappearances and civilian casualties.

    Pakistan has already labeled Baloch nationalist leaders as terrorists, including internationally recognized activist Mahrang Baloch. Yet, many believe that further military action in Balochistan will only deepen Baloch resentment toward both the Pakistani government and its people. A forceful crackdown risks alienating foreign allies, whose financial support remains crucial for the country’s survival. This strategic deadlock has left Pakistan hesitant to escalate, even as large swaths of Balochistan slip further from its control.

    The relentless cycle of bloodshed, driven by both sides, has only entangled the conflict further. Any hope for peaceful negotiations grows increasingly remote, as neither party shows a willingness to engage without external pressure. Yet, no such force is actively shaping the situation. The United States, once deeply involved in Pakistan’s affairs, has largely withdrawn. The Baloch reject any intervention from China, while Britain and the Arab states would only act with Pakistan’s approval—an unlikely scenario given the current tensions.

    Until someone steps in to mediate talks and broker a resolution, the violence will continue. Pakistani forces will detain or kill more Baloch in crackdowns, while desperate, jobless Pakistanis will keep moving to Balochistan, risking their lives only to become targets of insurgent attacks. In the coming days, Pakistan’s headlines will report the same grim reality: escalating bloodshed, deepening divisions, and a nation failing to contain a conflict spiraling beyond its control.