Category: World

  • Who Will Govern Gaza?

    Who Will Govern Gaza?

    Fifteen months after Hamas’s deadly assault on Israel and the subsequent military retaliation, a fragile ceasefire has paused the violence, leaving Gaza battered and broken. This narrow strip of land along the Mediterranean, once envisioned as a cornerstone of a Palestinian state, has again drawn global focus, fueling both solidarity across the Muslim world and a rise in antisemitic episodes. Since seizing control from the Palestinian Authority in 2007, Hamas has claimed to govern on behalf of Gaza’s population, despite the absence of electoral legitimacy. Its prolonged confrontation with Israel, however, has left its leadership fractured, its regional alliances shaken, and its infrastructure gutted. A rapid return to strength appears improbable, creating a perilous vacuum that has plunged Gaza’s residents into profound uncertainty. Yet history and geopolitics are unforgiving to ungoverned spaces. The question remains: Who will step in to lead Gaza, and by what mandate? 

    With Iran under severe strain and Russian influence in the Middle East waning, the key players left in the region’s shifting dynamics appear to be Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states. The U.S. alignment with Israel is unmistakable, exemplified by President Trump’s policies favoring Israel, such as recognizing Jerusalem as its capital. A similar approach is anticipated concerning Gaza, raising fears of undermining any prospects for Palestinian statehood—a significant concern for Muslim-majority nations. The absence of effective governance in Gaza exacerbates the crisis, further punishing the population and risking the resurgence of Islamic extremism. To avoid a dangerous political vacuum, Arab states are pressing Israel and the U.S. to enable the UN relief agency UNRWA to take the lead in stabilizing and rebuilding the territory.

    Discussions on Gaza’s future governance will begin 16 days after the ceasefire takes effect, as part of the second stage of negotiations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has avoided addressing the issue since the war began, viewing any “day after” talks as a potential trigger for destabilizing political divisions within his already fragile coalition, which was strained by the ceasefire agreement. Meanwhile, the Israeli government plans to terminate all cooperation with UNRWA by January 30, accusing the agency of aiding terrorists. This move raises significant doubts about how the anticipated post-ceasefire surge in aid will be distributed in Gaza.

    Concerns are rising that Israel will move forward with its plan to sever all cooperation with UNRWA, a decision backed by the Trump administration, especially as aid to Gaza is set to increase. In the U.S., allegations against UNRWA include claims that it has been infiltrated by Hamas sympathizers and has assumed an ideological role in advocating for Palestinian refugees. The Knesset has passed legislation aimed at ending UNRWA’s operations in Palestinian territories, following Israeli allegations that UNRWA staff in Gaza were involved in the October 7 Hamas attacks. The UN subsequently launched an investigation, resulting in the firing of nine UNRWA employees. Now, it seems unlikely that Trump, who also hates UNRWA will persuade Netanyahu to backtrack on this decision.

    Arab states, supported by most European powers, argue that no organization other than UNRWA has the scope and capacity to oversee the urgent distribution of food and supplies in Gaza. They also do not believe the Palestinian Authority (PA), which currently governs the West Bank. The PA is often accused of high levels of corruption and lacking effective administrative bodies. Arab diplomats maintain that while Hamas may be willing to step aside if the PA is granted authority over Gaza, it would reassert itself if it perceives the move as resembling colonial rule. Furthermore, they acknowledge that the PA remains deeply unpopular in the West Bank.

    The likelihood of a governance body being formed under the direction of the U.S. and Israel now seems the most probable outcome for Gaza. Israel, unwilling to relinquish valuable territory or risk another assault, is hesitant to jeopardize what it perceives as strategically vital. Netanyahu, evidently unwilling to risk his own political future, will not hand over Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. A systematic occupation, reinforced by the steady expansion of Jewish settlements under heavy security, would transform Gaza into a reflection of the West Bank, gradually erasing any vestige of a Palestinian state.

  • Can Turkey Mend Its Fractured Ties with the Kurds?

    Can Turkey Mend Its Fractured Ties with the Kurds?

    Turkey played a key role in ousting the Assad regime from Damascus, earning international praise for its support of HTS and its involvement in ending Syria’s 13-year civil war. This victory marked Turkey’s return to regional politics, an arena once dominated by Israel, Iran, and the Gulf states. For Erdoğan, whose aspirations have long aligned with neo-Ottoman ideals, this achievement was a significant triumph. However, at home, Erdoğan has faced increasing challenges, particularly after setbacks in the recent local elections. Eager to restore his standing, he seeks to present a major accomplishment. As military operations in Syria bolster his narrative, Erdoğan now focuses on resolving Turkey’s long-standing Kurdish conflict, which, if addressed, could strengthen Erdoğan’s domestic position.

    Turkey is actively working to improve relations with its Kurdish population. Three months ago, Erdoğan’s coalition partner, Devlet Bahceli, leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), launched a reconciliation process between the Turkish government and the Kurds. The MHP has long been linked to violent paramilitaries and organized crime, earning a reputation as neo-fascist. In October, Bahceli showed a significant political shift when he reached out to politicians from the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), a group he had previously condemned as an extension of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and called for its ban. This move signals a significant shift,  suggesting that Erdoğan plans to resolve long standing issues by bridging two previously opposing forces. Reflecting on his government’s future agenda, President Erdoğan emphasized that decisive steps would be taken to achieve a vision of a terror-free Turkey and region.

    For decades, Turkey and the Kurds have been locked in a violent history marked by bloodshed, with both sides accusing each other of terrorism. At the heart of the conflict lies the PKK, the Kurdish Workers’ Party, which initially sought independence from Turkey before turning to violent resistance. The PKK, designated a terrorist organization by multiple Western countries, including the EU and the US, has been in armed conflict with the Turkish state since 1984. The conflict has claimed around 40,000 lives between 1984 and 2009. Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK founder, has been serving a life sentence on Imrali Island near Istanbul since 1999. In a surprising twist, Bahceli, known for his tough stance, recently suggested that Öcalan could be released in exchange for renouncing violence and dissolving the PKK. This came as a shock, given that Bahceli’s party had previously called for reinstating the death penalty, particularly to execute Öcalan.

    Shortly afterward, Bahceli publicly addressed the “Millennial Brotherhood” between Turks and Kurds, clarifying that Turkey’s issue was not with the Kurdish people, but with their separatist terrorist organization. Öcalan responded, asserting that he had the competence and determination to contribute positively to the new paradigm. On December 28, two representatives from the pro-Kurdish DEM visited Öcalan at Imrali prison and expressed optimism about the future. Currently, DEM politicians are engaged in discussions with both Erdoğan’s government and the opposition. Significant developments are unfolding that could potentially bring an end to the decade-long hatred and violence.

    At the same time, across the border in Syria, Turkish-backed militias continue to battle Kurdish YPG fighters, whom Turkey sees as a threat to its territorial integrity. While Turkey regards the YPG as a Syrian offshoot of the PKK, the US supports the Kurdish YPG fighters in Syria, further complicating the region’s balance of power. Meanwhile, Turkey demands that Syria’s transitional government disband the YPG militia, which controls significant parts of northern Syria. However, achieving this is not easy. After years of conflict, the YPG has established itself as a powerful force in northeastern Syria. Regardless of potential agreements with Turkey, it remains highly unlikely that the YPG will disarm. Turkey now fears that Kurdish extremists from its territory could gain a permanent foothold in northeastern Syria under YPG control and continue their operations against Turkey. Many experts believe that Erdoğan’s efforts to bring peace aim to integrate the Kurds within Turkey’s borders while seeking to avoid the rise of pan-Kurdish nationalism.

    While many in Turkey remain hopeful about the possibility of building stronger ties between Turks and Kurds, some view this as little more than election-driven politics rather than a genuine shift in public sentiment. Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) can no longer win elections without the Kurdish vote, which represents 15% to 20% of Turkey’s population. The Erdoğan administration faces a significant political and economic crisis, as evidenced by the spring 2023 local elections. In the current climate, Kurdish voters tend to lean toward opposition candidates, forcing Erdoğan and his party to secure their support to remain in power. Politics can sometimes be a catalyst for peace.

  • At Last, a Ceasefire—Will it Last?

    At Last, a Ceasefire—Will it Last?

    After much uncertainty, Israel and Hamas have agreed to a ceasefire, offering hope to the people of Gaza, the relatives of hostages taken by Hamas, advocates of peace and humanity, and the incoming U.S. President, Donald Trump. Weeks of rumors about efforts to broker a truce, primarily driven by Trump’s team, culminated in Qatar’s prime minister announcing on Thursday that the parties had reached an agreement. However, Israel’s delayed announcement caused confusion, raising fears of a breakdown reminiscent of past failures. Finally, Israel ratified the ceasefire deal to exchange dozens of hostages held by Hamas for Palestinians imprisoned in Israel and to pause the 15-month war in Gaza for an initial six weeks. Approved in a cabinet meeting early Saturday morning, the agreement specifies that the ceasefire will take effect on Sunday. Despite this progress, doubts persist about the durability of the ceasefire.

    Israel’s military actions in Gaza, following Hamas’s brutal terrorist attack, have claimed nearly 50,000 lives. This figure remains uncertain due to the absence of unbiased sources, but the devastating impact is clear. Hamas launched a brutal assault, and Israel responded with fierce retaliation that left Gaza in ruins. Now, the conflict appears to be nearing a pause. Israel’s security cabinet approved a ceasefire agreement despite an unexpected delay on Friday. Far-right members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government threatened to oppose the agreement or resign, risking months of efforts to halt the violence. After a six-hour cabinet meeting extending well past the start of the Jewish sabbath, the government announced the agreement’s approval just after 1 a.m. Jerusalem time on Saturday, underscoring the critical importance of this moment.

    In a separate meeting in Cairo, negotiators from Egypt, Qatar, the U.S., and Israel finalized all necessary arrangements to implement the Gaza truce deal, as reported by Egyptian state-linked media. However, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Netanyahu’s hardline national security minister, who had earlier threatened to quit the government if it ratified the ceasefire deal—potentially collapsing the ruling coalition—issued a last-minute plea for other parliamentarians to vote against it. He claimed that the terrorists would inevitably try to harm and kill again. According to Israeli media, Ben-Gvir and far-right finance minister Bezalel Smotrich opposed the deal, while other ministers voted in favor. David Amsalem, a minister not part of the security cabinet’s voting plenary, also expressed opposition during the vote.

    Under the first phase of the agreement, which will last 42 days, Hamas will release 33 hostages, including children, women , and men over the age of 50, who were captured during their October 7th raid that killed around 1,200 Israelis. In exchange, Israel will release hundreds of Palestinians linked to Hamas currently held in Israeli jails. About 100 of the Palestinians scheduled for release are serving life sentences for violent attacks on Israelis, including a minor detained for a 2023 shooting attack in Jerusalem that injured an Israeli soldier. The agreement also includes an exchange of bodies of deceased hostages and Hamas members and outlines the launch of a reconstruction plan for Gaza.

    The future governance of Gaza remains an unsettled and fraught question. The Biden administration, along with much of the international community, has championed the idea of reinstating the Palestinian Authority—based in the semi-autonomous West Bank, and ousted from Gaza by Hamas during a brief civil war in 2007—as the governing entity for the strip. This proposal, however, faces staunch opposition from Israel, which has consistently dismissed the suggestion. The result is a murky outlook for Gaza’s political trajectory, emblematic of the broader challenges in untangling the region’s layered crises.

    As both parties frequently reach and break ceasefire agreements, the longevity of the current truce remains uncertain. It is evident that peaceful coexistence is unlikely, as Hamas, rooted in an ideology that considers the destruction of the Jewish state an Islamic duty, fuels hostility among the population in Gaza. Meanwhile, Israeli politics revolve around security concerns, making future ceasefire violations almost inevitable.

    Much of the situation depends on Netanyahu’s leadership. While the ceasefire may enhance his standing internationally and among the families of released hostages, it has left others deeply dissatisfied. This tension threatens to destabilize Netanyahu’s administration and pave the way for an even more hardline government, aligned with global trends toward the far right, which could adopt harsher measures in Gaza.

    Currently, neither Hamas nor its primary backer, Iran, can effectively escalate their campaigns against Israel. Both have been severely weakened by the ongoing conflict, and their former levels of international support, aside from some backing from staunch Islamist factions and liberal voices, have waned. As a result, any attacks for Palestine risk further marginalization in the global arena.

    The most significant hope for a lasting ceasefire may rest with Donald Trump, who has interests in the region and has previously succeeded in fostering alliances between Israel and several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia. His efforts to strengthen ties with Gulf nations and apply greater pressure on Iran could potentially reshape the region’s dynamics, enhancing Israel’s security and providing relatively safer borders. Israel already maintains strong relationships with its neighboring countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. While Syria under Bashar al-Assad once posed challenges, the current Turkey-aligned government in charge appears less hostile toward Israel. Meanwhile, Lebanon now features a pro-Western president who aims to curtail Hezbollah’s influence. As a result, Israel’s primary security concern has been largely reduced to Gaza.

    Though its endurance remains uncertain, the agreement has briefly interrupted the persistent violence, providing a fleeting but hopeful prospect for lasting peace in a region long plagued by conflict. For now, Israel, Qatar, and the United States deserve credit for facilitating an accord that prevents further bloodshed in Gaza—though, as with all previous truces, its durability remains a matter of considerable doubt

  • Armenia Deepens Its Ties with the West

    Armenia Deepens Its Ties with the West

    Amid the complex geopolitical tensions in the Caucasus, Armenia, traditionally aligned with both Russia and Iran, is shifting its focus firmly toward the West. As the world’s oldest Christian nation, Armenia is now resolute in its efforts to sever long-standing ties with Moscow and navigate the hurdles of Turkish blockades to move closer to Europe and Western powers.

    In recent days, Armenia has taken important steps to strengthen its growing relationship with the United States and the European Union. On January 14, US and Armenian diplomats signed a strategic partnership agreement, laying the foundation for deeper trade, political, and strategic ties. A few days earlier, Armenia passed key legislation aimed at advancing its bid for European Union membership. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called the EU Integration Act, adopted on January 9, a historic milestone but emphasized that the path to EU membership would be long and challenging, requiring sustained political will and broad public support. He later clarified that the adoption of the law does not automatically mean Armenia is joining the EU, as that decision can only be made through a referendum, not by legislation or a government decree.

    On January 13, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held talks with European Council President António Costa, focusing on the fragile peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Efforts toward a long-term resolution to their protracted conflict faced a setback when Baku revived its demand for extraterritorial rights, seeking a land corridor to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. This renewed demand poses a risk of further territorial losses and humiliation for Armenia, already struggling with significant setbacks, and is escalating hostilities toward Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia. In a social media post, Costa reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to strengthening its partnership with Armenia, highlighting their shared values and outlining initiatives to deepen cooperation in areas such as security, economic growth, democratic governance, and people-to-people ties.

    Throughout the post-Soviet era, Armenia had heavily relied on Russia for economic and strategic support. Traditionally, it was considered firmly within Moscow’s orbit as a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, after suffering a decisive defeat in Karabakh, Pashinyan’s government began reassessing the value of its relationship with Russia. For Armenia, it became evident that Russia preferred Azerbaijan, largely due to shared economic activities and mutual interests, which proved deeply unsettling. This alignment comes at a time when Armenia is already uneasy about the growing influence of the Turkic world, with Turkey to its west and Azerbaijan to its east promoting a unified Islamic Turkic identity that makes Armenia feel isolated. With Russia aligning itself more closely with this bloc, Armenia finds itself cornered, prompting what appears to be a tentative outreach to Europe.

    Armenia’s geopolitical challenges are compounded by its lack of direct geographical connectivity to Europe. Unlike Georgia, which enjoys access to the Black Sea, Armenia is landlocked, making its path to stronger ties with Europe particularly difficult. Georgia’s political gridlock, with its government leaning toward Russia, further isolates Armenia from Europe, creating significant logistical and security hurdles for both Armenia and the EU. Despite these challenges, Armenians appear confident in addressing these obstacles. Some observers suggest that Europe may have broader strategic motives for fostering closer ties with Armenia. By strengthening its relationship with Yerevan, Europe could be positioning itself to exert influence on neighboring Iran, where discontent with the Islamic regime persists among segments of the population who take pride in their rich Persian heritage. For Europe, Iran’s cultural and historical legacy remains appealing, making such a shift strategically enticing.

    The Kremlin has responded to Armenia’s recent moves with a mix of irritation and indifference. On January 14, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated that Russia continues to view Armenia as a close partner. At the same time, he criticized the United States for allegedly instigating instability in the Caucasus, claiming that Washington seeks to undermine emerging nations and has never contributed to stability in the region.

    Armenia’s adoption of the EU Integration Act has raised immediate questions about its future in the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). While Armenian officials have suspended the country’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), they insist there are no plans to leave the EAEU. Russian officials, however, have firmly stated that dual alignment with both the EAEU and the European Union is untenable. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk clarified that the two unions are fundamentally incompatible because both demand the elimination of customs barriers and the unrestricted movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. He described EAEU membership as a privilege and likened EU membership to a doomed endeavor, drawing a comparison to boarding the Titanic because of the economic and social challenges within the EU. Overchuk further predicted that Armenians would face substantially higher costs for consumer goods and energy if the country were to leave the EAEU. Which is a decent threat targeting common people. 

    The EU Integration Act represents a milestone for Yerevan, marking what feels like the conclusion of the opening chapter in its long and complex journey toward full membership. Yet, this moment is less a victory than a harbinger of the monumental challenges that lie ahead. Beyond the Herculean task of aligning Armenian legislation with the rigorous standards of the European Union, the nation faces the equally daunting imperative of brokering peace with Azerbaijan—a prerequisite for any substantive progress.

    In recent months, the prospects of a durable peace agreement have grown increasingly tenuous. However, the dynamics of the Caucasus have long been characterized by their mercurial nature, where stasis can suddenly give way to opportunity. Take, for instance, the undercurrent of tension between Azerbaijan and Russia, fueled by the Kremlin’s refusal to assume responsibility for the downing of an Azerbaijani airliner by its air defenses in Chechnya. Should this rift deepen, Baku might find itself recalibrating its hardline stance toward Armenia, offering a glimmer of hope for the peace process to regain momentum.

  • With the New President, Can Lebanon Chart a Course Toward the West?

    With the New President, Can Lebanon Chart a Course Toward the West?

    Lebanon, grappling with political, economic, and social unrest, seems to be shifting away from Iran’s influence by electing a new president who is supported by the West and advocates for a stronger Lebanon. The country’s parliament has chosen Army Commander Joseph Aoun as the new president, ending a two-year vacancy and raising hopes for the long-term stability of a ceasefire with Israel. Aoun received 99 out of 128 votes in the parliament’s 13th attempt to select a new head of state, succeeding former President Michel Aoun—who is unrelated to Joseph Aoun—after his departure in October 2022.

    Lebanon’s political system often undermines democratic principles, with a convoluted structure built around a confessionalist framework that allocates key political positions to religious communities through quotas. The system requires the president to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister to come from the Sunni branch of Islam, and the speaker of Parliament to be from the Shia branch of Islam—reflecting a fragile power-sharing arrangement. Political appointments, from the presidency to parliamentary seats, strictly follow sectarian divisions. The parliament elects the president for a single six-year term, and the president works with lawmakers to appoint the prime minister, adhering to the same quota system. Sectarian interests dominate political parties, complicating governance and eroding democratic values. This flawed structure has led to Lebanon’s mismanagement, resulting in one of the most severe economic and sociological crises in modern history. According to the United Nations, over 80%—or four out of five—of Lebanon’s population now lives in poverty.

    While the presidency in Lebanon holds limited authority, the election of Joseph Aoun hints at a significant shift in the country’s political trajectory. Aoun, who has built strong ties with international powers like Saudi Arabia, France, and the United States during his time as the head of Lebanon’s armed forces, reflects a broader trend of Lebanon leaning westward and distancing itself from Iran’s influence.

    Iran’s sway has been steadily diminishing, a process notably accelerated by the 2022 parliamentary elections. In those elections, the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement and its allies lost their majority in parliament, signaling a notable decline in Tehran’s grip on the country. At the same time, Hezbollah’s Christian ally, the Free Patriotic Movement of outgoing President Michel Aoun, was overtaken as the dominant Christian faction by the Lebanese Forces, a party led by Samir Geagea, who shares close ties with Saudi Arabia.

    The evolution in Lebanon’s politics mirrors the broader regional shifts, particularly Turkey’s efforts to limit Iran’s influence in Syria. Now, with Saudi Arabia—another U.S. ally—on the scene, it seems likely that the Kingdom will play a central role in weakening Iran’s hold over Lebanon, marking a strategic recalibration in the delicate balance of power.

    International leaders, particularly from the West, expressed optimism over the election of Lebanon’s new president, Joseph Aoun. A spokesman for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres described the election as an important step toward resolving Lebanon’s long-standing political and institutional impasse, which had persisted for over two years due to the presidential vacancy. U.S. President Joe Biden praised Aoun as a suitable leader for the current challenges facing Lebanon.

    Aoun’s primary focus will be on strengthening the Lebanese army, especially in southern Lebanon, where its authority has been challenged since the late 1970s by groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hezbollah. His efforts are expected to be bolstered by assistance from Saudi Arabia, the United States, and France, and Israel is likely to view these developments positively as they improve security along its northern border. After his election, Aoun addressed parliament, emphasizing the state’s right to control the possession of weapons and highlighting the importance of the army in safeguarding Lebanon’s borders.

    The 2004 UN resolution required all armed groups in Lebanon to disarm, but Hezbollah has refused to comply, insisting it is the only force capable of defending Lebanon from Israel. However, he has an opportunity to act as Hezbollah grapples with mounting difficulties, including Iran’s waning regional influence and reduced support from Syria. During Lebanon’s prolonged leadership vacuum, Hezbollah exploited the instability to tighten its grip on southern Lebanon and engage in skirmishes with Israel. By reinforcing the army, Aoun can directly counter Hezbollah’s dominance in the region.

    Hope is on the rise in Lebanon with the election of a new, Western-backed president and the diminishing influence of both Hezbollah and Iran. Now, the country stands at a pivotal moment to rebuild and strengthen its institutions. However, this task will not be simple, as Lebanon’s deep-rooted divisions remain a significant obstacle. Yet, with strong leadership, support from global powers, and a weakened opposition, the Lebanese president is presented with a better opportunity. Though President Aoun faces limitations due to Lebanon’s unique constitution, his six-year term gives him a critical platform to shape the nation’s future. He will also play a vital role in the 2026 parliamentary elections—or potentially in a snap election—that could break the long-standing political deadlock. This moment marks a potential shift toward the West, signaling that Lebanon is indeed charting a new course in its international orientation.

  • Is Trump Pushing for a Gaza Ceasefire?

    Is Trump Pushing for a Gaza Ceasefire?

    The Gaza war, specifically Israel’s military action against Hamas, has evolved, as expected, from a regional conflict into a global issue. People have rallied around religious solidarities across countries, deepening divisions in many societies. In retaliation for the brutal killing of 1,200 Israelis, Israel has now killed over 45,000 people in Gaza and continues its operations with the aim of preventing future terrorist attacks from the region. Though a ceasefire is essential to help those suffering in this punishing war, the Gaza ceasefire remains nothing more than a plea. Despite ongoing discussions over the past 15 months of conflict, no agreement has been reached.

    As Donald Trump prepares to begin his second term as U.S. president on January 20, there is a sense of optimism surrounding his strong relationships with Middle Eastern leaders and his bold, hero-like persona. He is positioned to prioritize the Gaza ceasefire, focusing on securing it as soon as possible. His administration is likely to build on the efforts of outgoing President Joe Biden, whose peace initiatives were thwarted by the competing demands of various stakeholders. Known for his deal-making prowess, Trump now has a significant opportunity to act swiftly in his presidency. Successfully mediating peace could satisfy global calls for resolution and cement his reputation as a decisive and effective leader.

    Steve Witkoff, the U.S. Middle East envoy appointed by President-elect Donald Trump, is leading efforts to broker a Gaza ceasefire. He met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Saturday to push forward with negotiations for a hostage deal and a ceasefire, according to an Israeli official cited by The Guardian. Before meeting Netanyahu, Witkoff met Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani on Friday to discuss recent developments and the push for a Gaza ceasefire, as outlined by the Qatari foreign ministry. Qatar plays a pivotal role as a mediator, maintaining connections with various Islamist groups, including those linked to Iran. After his visit to Qatar, Witkoff, who reassured that the U.S. remains committed to a swift resolution, flew to Israel to meet with Netanyahu and accelerate the talks. Trump’s administration aims to engage all its allies to advance peace and strengthen regional ties.

    The main obstacle now lies in the status of the hostages taken by Hamas during the October 7th raid on Israel and their release. Israel has previously stated that it would only engage in peace talks after the release of all hostages, but Hamas has shown no willingness to comply. Following the discussions with Witkoff, Netanyahu’s office announced that the prime minister would send Mossad chief David Barnea to Qatar’s capital to continue pushing for a deal to release the hostages. It remains unclear when Barnea will travel to Doha, but the U.S. is pressing for an agreement before Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20. Barnea’s involvement indicates that high-level Israeli officials, who must approve any deal, are now directly involved in the process.

    Several rounds of negotiations, mediated by the U.S., Egypt, and Qatar, have failed to yield a lasting ceasefire. Despite officials’ repeated optimism that a breakthrough was imminent, talks have consistently stalled. Over the course of 15 months of war, only one brief ceasefire was achieved during the early stages of fighting, with no substantial agreement since. However, political dynamics have shifted. The initial fury over Hamas’ terrorist actions in Israel has lessened, and the focus has now shifted to the hostages. In recent weeks, the hostage issue and a potential ceasefire have dominated discussions in Israeli media. There are growing doubts that Netanyahu is using the war to prolong his political tenure while also leveraging Trump’s influence. On Hamas’ side, while initial celebrations of their actions in Gaza were widespread, the consequences are now clear, and many have grown disillusioned with the group. The Islamists and their media may still support Hamas, but the wider public recognizes its failed strategy. Hezbollah, and Iran—Hamas’ major supporter—are all reeling from significant setbacks. 

    The call for an end to the war is intensifying, with Trump positioning himself to play a crucial role in negotiations. While any ceasefire agreement he brokers is likely to favor Israel, all parties now need an end. During his previous term, the historic Abraham Accords happened, and his efforts to strengthen relations with Israel and other Middle Eastern nations are viewed as positive moves toward peace. While some of his supporters advocate for a Nobel Prize for him. If Trump succeeds in brokering a Gaza ceasefire, he will further solidify his reputation as a key peace broker, and it truly deserves the Nobel Prize.

  • Kazakhstan’s Shrewd Neutrality in Azerbaijan-Russia Tensions

    Kazakhstan’s Shrewd Neutrality in Azerbaijan-Russia Tensions

    Russia finds itself in an embarrassing position, forced to apologize to Azerbaijan over a significant aviation incident that has created an unexpected rift between the two former Soviet republics. Once allies, their relationship—marked by Azerbaijan’s support for Russia during sanctions and Russia’s backing of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia—has been strained by the crash. The tensions evolved when Russia, amid its war with Ukraine and ongoing drone threats, accidentally shot down an Azerbaijani civilian plane. In response, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev demanded full accountability, sharply criticizing Russia’s apology while avoiding full responsibility. While some see this as political posturing by two authoritarian leaders, the discord is adding a new layer of complexity to their partnership. Kazakhstan, a common ally of both and the site of the plane crash, is now caught in the middle. As authorities prepare to hand over the black box data to Kazakhstan, the country faces the challenge of managing the geopolitical fallout.

    Kazakhstan is effectively mediating between two feuding partners, both critical to its interests. Leaning too far toward one risks alienating the other, particularly if they reconcile. Russia, as Kazakhstan’s protector and economic partner, wields considerable influence over the country’s actions. Russia holds leverage through the pipeline transporting oil from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field to export markets via the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Managed by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, this pipeline handles around 80% of Tengiz oil exports. Moscow could disrupt operations to influence Kazakhstan’s decisions or punish it for perceived missteps. As seen in the summer of 2022, Russia can halt the transportation of Kazakh oil to Europe under the guise of infrastructure repairs. This could result in significant losses for Kazakhstan, signaling a harsh warning from Russia.

    At this juncture, Kazakhstan may have even more to lose by alienating Azerbaijan. The two countries are crucial transit points for East-West trade along the Middle Corridor, and they are also collaborating on a consortium to ship solar- and wind-generated power to Western markets. For Astana, Baku is a very important partner, and in the future, an even more vital one, particularly in the joint development of the Trans-Caspian route.

    Despite Kazakhstan’s central role in the investigation, Kazakh officials have sought to remain aloof from the growing controversy. In the hours following the crash, they appeared to amplify alternative theories promoted by Russia, including the now-debunked claim that an oxygen tank inside the aircraft exploded. Kazakh officials also initially supported a Russian proposal for a CIS commission to handle the investigation, which would have given Moscow greater influence over both the scope and final report of the probe. As mounting evidence, including survivor testimonies, pointed to a shoot-down, Kazakhstan shifted to a more neutral stance. In the final days of December, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held telephone conversations with both Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as reported by the presidential press service, though the substance of those talks remained undisclosed.

    State-controlled media in Kazakhstan has largely refrained from speculating on the cause of the crash, instead highlighting the government’s commitment to uncovering the truth. Official publications emphasize that Kazakhstan is diligently working to determine what happened, strictly adhering to international guidelines. Transport Minister Marat Karabayev, for example, cited the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Chicago Convention to justify sending the jet’s black boxes to Brazil—a move likely to irk Russia, given its apparent desire to suppress evidence of a shoot-down. Independent media outlets in Kazakhstan, such as Orda.kz, have taken a more critical approach, often highlighting statements from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Western officials who attribute responsibility for the tragedy to Russia. However, the Kazakhstan government  has notably refrained from directly blaming Russia, a stance that remains intriguing.

    On most occasions, these three countries manage to resolve their issues due to the connection between flawed administrations, shared interests in blocking Western influence, and a convenient yet unholy alliance between businesses and politicians. The current drift is part of an authoritarian theater, meant to keep their populations in check. However, it’s noteworthy that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have reached a point where they can challenge Russia, showcasing the evident decline of Russian power. If this shift continues and the political theater backfires, Azerbaijan may lean closer to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., further escalating tensions. Caught between the Russian and Turkic spheres, Kazakhstan could face even more significant challenges. A shift in alliances seems to be unfolding in Central Asia, and this evolving tension deserves careful monitoring.

  • The Emirates Strategic Charm Offensive in Africa

    The Emirates Strategic Charm Offensive in Africa

    Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two ambitious nations seeking superpower status, have invested heavily in this pursuit, leveraging their immense wealth. Both have utilized Islam as their principal tool of influence, channeling resources into spreading their interpretations of the faith worldwide. Their efforts have included significant investments in conversion campaigns, mosque construction, and the global promotion of their ideologies. In addition, they have financed a variety of political and extremist groups, strengthening their foothold in numerous countries across the globe. More recently, however, the two states have turned to sports as their latest vector for influence. Qatar’s successful bid to host the FIFA World Cup stands as a remarkable testament to this strategy, while both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have secured high-profile sports deals and events. Beyond these pursuits, the Gulf states continue to invest in myriad ways—enhancing their soft power, cementing their global stature, and attempting, with varying success, to stake their claim as new superpowers.

    However, there is another country in the Gulf region that employs strategies to increase its soft power in a quieter, more effective way: the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Often seen in the shadow of Saudi Arabia, the UAE has pursued its own distinct agenda. Over time, it has crafted a positive image, positioning itself as a force separate from the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Today, the UAE is the most invested and influential country in Africa, gradually establishing itself as a superpower through calculated diplomacy and strategic investments.

    The influence of the United Arab Emirates in Africa has grown unmistakably in recent years, as it has quietly cemented itself as the leading backer of new business ventures across the continent.  With many African nations eager to meet their urgent development needs, the UAE has positioned itself as a key partner, offering substantial investments with a sharp focus on green energy and infrastructure. Between 2019 and 2023, Emirati companies committed $110 billion to various projects, $72 billion of which was dedicated to renewable energy, according to FT Locations, a data firm owned by the Financial Times. This surpasses the combined pledges of the UK, France, and China, whose investments in African infrastructure have waned due to disappointing returns. As many African leaders grow increasingly disillusioned by the underwhelming climate finance commitments from Western governments, the UAE’s persistent investment strategy has earned it a reputation for reliability. At the COP29 conference, while Western nations promised a mere $300 billion annually—far less than the $1.3 trillion requested by developing countries—the UAE’s ongoing contributions stand as a clear and deliberate contrast, signaling not only economic strength, but an increasingly strategic diplomatic footprint across the African continent.

    The UAE’s influence in Africa has grown with subtlety and purpose, particularly in North and East Africa, where it has been an unspoken yet significant actor in the conflicts that have plagued Libya and Sudan. Unlike the international powerhouses of China and India, the UAE has kept a low profile in the global superpower race, often escaping the glaring scrutiny of the Western media or outlets such as Al Jazeera. This relative invisibility, in fact, has worked to the UAE’s advantage. Far from courting attention or controversy, it operates in the shadows, its investments flowing with far less opposition or critique, thus allowing its strategic engagement across Africa to unfold with remarkable ease.

    The UAE’s influence in Africa has grown with quiet determination too, largely through the early efforts of Dubai’s port and airline companies, which were among the first to establish a robust presence on the continent. Emirates, the airline controlled by the Dubai royal family, now services 20 African nations, a footprint that underscores its growing reach. Similarly, DP World, a state-owned giant, has been a fixture in the region since 2006. It currently oversees six ports and is planning to expand its footprint with two more. Abu Dhabi Ports has also made significant inroads, managing Kamsar Port in Guinea since 2013, and recently securing new concessions in Egypt, the Republic of Congo, and Angola. Angola stands out as the only country where both DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports are active. The UAE has not been swayed from its commitment to East Africa, but rather is seeking to extend its influence and connectivity toward the Americas, particularly Latin America.

    The UAE’s economic interests are equally broad, as Emirati firms diversify investments across sectors like agriculture and telecoms. Notably, since 2022, Dubai royal Sheikh Ahmed Dalmook al-Maktoum has brokered deals to sell carbon credits from vast forests in several African nations—spanning 20% of Zimbabwe, 10% of Liberia, 10% of Zambia, and 8% of Tanzania. The UAE’s investments are shaping a new kind of geopolitical engagement—strategic, expansive, and far-reaching, yet executed largely beneath the radar.

    Emirati investments are reshaping long standing power dynamics in the mining sector too. One of the more surprising moves came when International Resource Holdings (IRH), a company controlled by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed, Abu Dhabi’s national security adviser, secured a $1.1 billion deal to acquire a 51% stake in Zambia’s Mopani Copper Mines. The announcement caught many off guard, as the shortlist of potential investors had long been expected to feature China’s Zijin Mining and South Africa’s Sibanye Stillwater. This shift occurred after Zambia’s state-run mining company, ZCCM, took over the ailing Mopani Copper Mines from Glencore in 2021, a transaction weighed down by crippling debt and the need for a fresh infusion of capital. Despite Sheikh Tahnoon’s company having no prior mining experience, the deal ultimately won over Zambian officials. IRH’s promise to invest heavily in the mine while maintaining jobs, coupled with its recruitment of world-class expertise, proved a compelling combination that outweighed conventional expectations. The transaction not only symbolized the UAE’s growing role in the sector, but also reflected a shift in how capital from the Gulf is infiltrating industries long dominated by larger, more established players. And there is the growing amount of illegally smuggled gold from African countries to Dubai. Research by the NGO Swissaid revealed a significant discrepancy between official exports from African nations to Dubai and the emirate’s actual imports. From 2012 to 2022, this difference amounted to 2,569 tons of gold, valued at an astonishing $115.3 billion. This surge in illicit gold trade further exemplifies the UAE’s influence in Africa.

    There is little doubt that pouring money into sporting events like the World Cup has granted Saudi Arabia and Qatar significant attention and influence, particularly within global sporting bodies. This is a form of influence, yes, but one rooted in wealth rather than subtlety. What sets the UAE apart is how its investments have drawn politicians, not only to its coffers, but also closer to its vision for regional and global dominance. In Africa, it can be argued that UAE influence is more refined and effective than that of its neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The latter maintains control over some of the most conservative Islamic nations, but it is the UAE’s diverse portfolio—spanning trade, infrastructure, and energy—that has given it the upper hand.

    While investment from traditional Western powers such as the United States and Europe has dwindled, often discouraged by the outspoken stances of African leaders, and the investments from China, India, and Russia have similarly faltered amid American political concerns, a perfect opening has emerged for the UAE. With fewer competitors and a clearer path forward, the UAE has seized the opportunity. As it continues to amplify its investments and diplomatic strategies, the Emirates have become arguably the most influential Gulf state in Africa, marking a significant shift in the region’s geopolitical landscape.

  • India’s Khalistan Paradox: Divisions That Endure

    India’s Khalistan Paradox: Divisions That Endure

    Sikhs, one of the many religious communities in India, have long pursued political ambitions and established their own territories in the northern part of the Indian subcontinent over the centuries. The religion, a blend of Hinduism and Islam, was once the state religion of the Khalsa Raj, which existed on the map from 1799 to 1849 and stretched over a large area during its period. Sikhs fought against the rulers of India, the Mughals and the British, but ultimately, their kingdom fell under British rule and became part of British India. After the British split the kingdom’s territory between India and Pakistan, Punjab, the heart of the Sikh kingdom, was divided into Western Punjab, which went to Pakistan, and Eastern Punjab, which remained part of India. While most of the Sikh population moved to Eastern Punjab after facing persecution from Islamist forces in Pakistan, India warmly welcomed them and appointed Sikhs to key positions in the government. The initial harmony between Sikhs and Hindus was strong, as Sikhs did not share the same rivalry with Hindus as they did with Muslims. However, the demand for an independent Sikh state, under the name of Khalistan, soon began to trouble the relationship.

    Besides India and Pakistan, a large Sikh diaspora existed in English-speaking countries due to prolonged British rule. As Sikhs gained wealth and influence, they amplified the demand for a separate state by carving it out of India. Khalistan, the proposed land for the Sikh state, was supported by overseas Sikhs and Western governments, who feared India’s growing alignment with the Soviet Union. The demand for Sikh statehood received heavy funding from the West and Pakistan, which, after losing East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) due to India’s intervention, saw this as an opportunity to support Sikh youth. This eventually led to the Sikh insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the region of Punjab experienced a wave of terrorist acts, prompting the Indian government to respond with a strong stance. This led to the assassination of India’s then-Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, by her Sikh bodyguards. The assassination caused widespread anger and riots against Sikhs, with propaganda spreading in India that equated Sikhs with Muslims—suggesting both prioritize religion over their motherland. Anti-Sikh campaigns were carried out across India. Once a beloved community, Sikhs became increasingly viewed with suspicion. Overseas Sikhs exploited these tensions to rally youth, recruit them, and spread their propaganda both abroad and in India. They used both peaceful and violent means to keep the issue alive among the Sikh diaspora and in India.

    As India’s domestic politics shifted toward Hindu nationalism, with the BJP holding a strong majority and Narendra Modi emerging as a powerful figure, overseas Sikhs feared that India would assimilate the Sikh population through nationalism. Sikh leaders, who are highly influential in Canadian politics, and community leaders in the UK, USA, and other countries, began attacking Modi and the BJP, pressuring their respective governments to take a tougher stance against him. In response, Modi targeted Khalistan supporters fiercely. The clashes became more frequent, and Sikhs supporting Khalistan attempted a coup under the guise of the farmers’ protests. As Modi tightened his grip on India, the Khalistan movement shifted its focus to foreign countries, particularly Canada, the USA, the UK, and Australia, where Khalistan supporting Sikhs launched large campaigns against India, attacking Hindus, delivering hate speeches, and desecrating the Indian flag.

    By the 2020s, Sikh leaders, long recognized for their provocative rhetoric against India and Hindus, began to face an alarming wave of anonymous attacks. On June 18, 2023, one of the most prominent voices in this movement, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, was fatally shot in the parking lot of a Sikh temple in Surrey, British Columbia This triggered a huge outcry in the Sikh diaspora against India, with some accusing Indian diplomats and the Indian spy agency RAW of orchestrating the attack. A few weeks later, Khalistani supporters set fire to the Indian consulate in San Francisco, and Indian diplomats were subsequently targeted by Khalistanis. Canada used this attack to criticize India. Justin Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister and a staunch supporter of Sikhs, directly entered the conflict, turning it into an India-Canada dispute. In 2023, the United States also came out against India by alleging a plot by the Indian government to assassinate New York–based Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a spokesperson for the pro-Khalistan group Sikhs for Justice, who openly threatened to bomb Indian planes, among other actions.

    India will not allow any further secession, as it now has a Hindu nationalist government working toward an Akhand Bharat, a union of all Indian subcontinent countries. However, Sikhs are receiving significant support from Canada, which has a large Sikh voter base and influential leaders like Jagmeet Singh. As a result, the demand for Khalistan will likely continue to grow. If India does not make serious efforts to improve the living conditions of Sikhs within the country, the diaspora can easily utilize them. Moreover, regardless of whether China is involved, the West does not want a superpower to emerge in Asia and may sponsor attempts at secessionism in India to destabilize it. As a result, Khalistan will likely receive continued support from the West. This will push India closer to Russia and China, creating turbulence in its relations with the West. Therefore, Khalistan will continue to act as a barrier between India and the West.

  • As Sanctions Suffocate Russia, Kazakhstan Struggles to Breathe

    As Sanctions Suffocate Russia, Kazakhstan Struggles to Breathe

    Landlocked and deeply intertwined with Russian politics and economics, Kazakhstan has long felt the gravitational pull of its northern neighbor. For decades, the nation has relied on Russia as its gateway to the globe. But as Russia faces its toughest period in recent years and endures a deluge of sanctions over its war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s dependence has become costly.

    When the war began and Western sanctions were imposed on Russia, many speculated that Kazakhstan might benefit from Russia’s economic isolation, with businesses redirecting trade through its borders. However, the reality has been far harsher. Kazakhstan now finds itself burdened by unavoidable sanctions. The surging U.S. dollar, a weakening ruble, and a flood of Russian migrants, goods, and businesses have further strained the country’s economy. This mounting pressure has battered the tenge, stretched public finances, and made daily life increasingly difficult for its citizens.

    Over the past two weeks, the Kazakh tenge has steadily weakened, unsettling citizens just ahead of the holiday season. On December 4, the currency dropped to 522 against the U.S. dollar. Although it briefly regained ground, it slid again, trading at 521 by December 11. This sharp decline—nearly 10 percent in just ten days—has ignited a firestorm on social media across Kazakhstan. The tenge’s rapid depreciation is fueling inflation, especially for food and consumer goods, much of which is imported from Russia. In Almaty and other cities, prices continue to rise, compounding the stress on an already uneasy population.

    Kazakhstan’s National Bank, in a statement on November 28, attributed the tenge’s sharp decline to a number of external fundamental factors. The bank identified Russia’s faltering economy, grappling with a steep ruble devaluation, as a key driver of the currency’s struggles. The tenge’s drop closely followed reports of the ruble hitting its lowest level in over two years after the announcement of a fresh round of U.S. sanctions.

    The National Bank highlighted the strengthening U.S. dollar as a significant factor driving the tenge’s decline, noting that a strong dollar is traditionally a negative factor for raw materials. It also cited the worsening geopolitics and energy market price volatility as additional pressures on foreign exchange markets.

    Kazakhstan’s reliance on raw materials like oil and gas as its primary exports has heightened speculative pressure, increasing the likelihood of further currency volatility.  Energy companies, a major source of government revenue in Kazakhstan, pay their taxes in dollars. As a result, the tenge’s recent decline is not expected to significantly impact the state budget in the short term. Despite this, economic analysts remain concerned about the near future.

    In late November, the National Bank sold more than $1 billion in assets from the National Fund, the country’s strategic reserves, and plans to allocate another $900 million in December to stabilize the tenge. To curb inflation, the bank also increased the base rate by one percentage point, raising it to 15.25 percent.

    Analysts worry that Kazakhstan’s heavy dependence on the National Fund to prop up the tenge may undermine the country’s economic resilience in the medium term. In October, the International Monetary Fund called on Astana to establish clearer fiscal policy guidelines to safeguard the National Fund’s ability to finance social and economic infrastructure projects and shield the economy from future shocks.

    By the end of November, the National Bank revised its inflation forecast for 2025, raising the projected range to 6.5-8.5 percent from the earlier estimate of 5.5-7.5 percent. However, actual price increases significantly outpace the official inflation figures, as highlighted by price comparisons in stores and markets frequently shared by bloggers.

    Many investors have started to withdraw their money from the country. Despite higher interest rates and rising credit costs, people continue to take out loans, which inevitably pushes prices higher and places additional pressure on the tenge. The weakening ruble against both the U.S. dollar and the tenge could also lead to an influx of Russian food and goods into the Kazakh market. This influx, experts warn, could erode the competitiveness of local producers and further destabilize Kazakhstan’s economy. Tough times lie ahead for the country. Although the government and National Bank claim they are addressing the issue and try to spread optimism, the public remains unconvinced.

    In reality, Kazakhstan has little control over the situation, as it remains deeply tied to Russia, an influence it cannot escape. While China recently surpassed Russia as Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner in overall turnover, Russia still held the top spot as Kazakhstan’s primary source of imports during the first eight months of 2024, accounting for nearly 30 percent of the total, according to official government statistics. 

    Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia is largely a result of the country’s corrupt political elites. For over 30 years, these leaders have prioritized political maneuvering, self-promotion, and resource distribution, rather than working to strengthen the nation’s statehood. They have neglected vital areas such as economic development, infrastructure diversification (including alternative oil export routes), the creation of a secure information environment, improving public welfare, and fostering a stable middle class. By mirroring Russia’s political system, they constructed a false democracy that silences opposition and preserves their own grip on power. Closing the door to the West, they guaranteed continued alignment with Russia. As long as the current administration remains in power, Kazakhstan’s ties to Russia will endure, despite Western attempts to intervene. Meanwhile, the burden of this relationship continues to fall on the people.