Is China Taking Over Uzbekistan?

China, a major investor in global infrastructure, is often accused of using its financial power to bind countries to its influence, exploit resources, and bribe local politicians. Many nations have fallen into debt traps, ultimately ceding control of critical infrastructure to China—a form of economic colonization without territorial rule.

This strategy is becoming increasingly visible in mineral-rich Central Asia. As Russia’s dominance in the region wanes, China is rapidly expanding its investments, securing access to natural resources, and integrating local economies into its business networks. In these poorly managed economies, Chinese influence is growing, raising concerns among citizens. However, with limited political opposition—reminiscent of Russia’s model—public frustration is largely channeled through social media.

A Deep Relationship

Although Uzbekistan and China do not share a border, their historical and economic ties run deep. The land and cities that now make up Uzbekistan were once integral to China’s ancient Silk Road, serving as key hubs of trade and cultural exchange. Today, this connection endures through modern diplomatic and economic frameworks between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

China is Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, though this relationship has created a significant trade imbalance. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $13.8 billion, with Uzbekistan exporting only $2 billion worth of goods while importing $11.8 billion from China. Additionally, China is the country’s largest creditor—President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s administration, which has been borrowing heavily to fund economic modernization, now owes Beijing at least $3.8 billion.

Beyond trade, cultural ties between the two nations have deepened through official agreements. Since 2017, China and Uzbekistan have engaged in cultural exchanges, including seminars, exhibitions, and performances. China has also contributed to the restoration of Uzbekistan’s cultural heritage sites, while Chinese and Uzbek state media collaborate on joint productions.

Intensifying Anti-China Sentiment

While the Uzbek government maintains strong ties with China at the official level, public sentiment tells a different story. Anti-Chinese sentiment is rising in Uzbekistan, driven by influential social media channels. In February, reports surfaced alleging that Chinese entities and individuals were purchasing and securing long-term leases on properties in major Uzbek cities, including Tashkent, as well as acquiring prime land for mining and agricultural ventures.

Many online discussions have framed China’s growing economic footprint as a direct threat to Uzbekistan’s sovereignty. A widely shared video on the Demokrat UZ YouTube channel garnered over a million views, amplifying concerns over Chinese influence. Similarly, Fazliddin Shahobiddin, an influential YouTuber who analyzes current affairs from an Islamic perspective, claimed that Uzbekistan is being bought up by China. His post attracted more than 1.8 million views, with a majority of the 12,000 comments echoing anti-Beijing sentiment, some even urging Uzbeks to recognize what they see as an encroaching Chinese presence in the country.

How will it evolve?

Uzbekistan depends on China. While the United States, Europe, and their Asian allies—such as Turkey, South Korea, and Japan—are seeking closer ties with the resource-rich nation, Uzbekistan’s leadership remains firmly aligned with Russia. Without Moscow’s backing, the country risks political instability, including potential unrest and challenges to the current government. Given Uzbekistan’s consistently low rankings on global democracy indices, meaningful cooperation with the West remains difficult.

In this context, China emerges as Uzbekistan’s most viable partner—economically dominant, technologically advanced, and closely linked to Russia. Beijing is taking full advantage of this dynamic, even working to curb the influence of other Russian allies like India, which lacks both the financial muscle and, perhaps, the political will to compete in Uzbekistan through large-scale investments or transactional diplomacy as China does.

Amid growing public resentment toward China, the Uzbek government is actively working to suppress negative sentiment. Officials are eager to avoid a scenario like that in Pakistan, where anti-Chinese backlash led to targeted violence against Chinese nationals. To counter the rising hostility, authorities have launched a media campaign emphasizing the benefits of deeper economic cooperation. Yet initial efforts to reassure the public have failed to stem the tide of online criticism, forcing the government to intensify its PR strategy. 

Given the government’s reliance on China, its efforts will likely go beyond media campaigns to include suppressing dissent, particularly on social media. Like many other authoritarian regimes in Asia, Uzbek authorities understand that their political survival is increasingly intertwined with their ties to Beijing. While not a direct takeover, China’s expanding influence is gradually steering Uzbekistan’s political landscape in its favor.