Syria’s Constitutional Declaration: A Step Toward Inclusion or a Veil for Exclusion?

Syria’s diverse social fabric has long been a source of tension. Despite the dominance of Arab and Muslim identities, deep internal divisions persisted. Slogans like “One, one, one! The Syrian people are one!” were widespread, but they failed to bridge the sectarian and ethnic divides that shaped the country’s reality.

For decades, the Assad family ruled Syria by consolidating power within the Alawite minority to which they belonged, a strategy that deepened resentment among other communities. Before the civil war, Sunni Arab Muslims made up approximately 68% of the population, while Alawites accounted for 9% to 13%. Kurds comprised 8% to 10%, alongside Druze, Christians, Armenians, Circassians, Turkmen, Palestinians, and Yazidis. The Assad regime skillfully exploited these divisions to maintain its grip on power.

With the regime’s collapse in December, a new Sunni-majority government, led by former militant factions, took power, reigniting debates over political inclusion. While Kurdish groups have expressed willingness to integrate, Druze remain skeptical, and Alawites face escalating persecution, raising concerns about their place in the emerging political order. Despite resisting meaningful minority representation, the government faces mounting international pressure, with the European Union and other global actors conditioning the lifting of sanctions on the establishment of an inclusive political framework.

Constitutional Declaration

Late last week, Syria’s interim government unveiled a preliminary draft of the country’s new constitution, which will serve as the governing framework for the coming years until a permanent constitution is established. The interim constitution establishes a presidential system, concentrating executive power in the hands of the president, who appoints ministers without the presence of a prime minister. Strongly Islamic in orientation, the document offers little accommodation for Syria’s ethnic diversity, leaving minorities uncertain about their place in the post-Assad era.

Speaking at the presidential palace on Thursday, Sharaa hailed the constitutional declaration as a turning point, stating that the government was replacing oppression with justice and suffering with mercy as he signed the document.

Abdul Hamid al-Awak, a member of the drafting committee, emphasized that the declaration guarantees women’s rights in employment, education, and politics. However, it also mandates that the president must be a Muslim and designates Islamic jurisprudence as the primary source of legislation. Executive authority remains heavily concentrated in the presidency, with the president retaining sole power to declare a state of emergency. Additionally, one-third of the legislature will be appointed by the executive. While the legislature is responsible for drafting laws, it lacks the authority to impeach the president, and the president cannot dissolve the legislative body.

Defending the centralized structure, Awak argued that strong executive power is essential for maintaining stability during the transition. The declaration also guarantees judicial independence and upholds freedoms of speech, expression, and the press. A separate committee will be tasked with drafting a permanent constitution.

Despite these assurances, constitutional experts have highlighted a major omission: the document makes no reference to Syria’s minority groups. Local communities have also voiced concerns over their exclusion from the recent National Dialogue event, where key decisions about the transition were made.

Meanwhile, the caretaker government, which is expected to remain in power indefinitely as elections remain uncertain, continues to maintain close ties to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former Sunni extremist group that led the December offensive that ousted Bashar al-Assad. An analysis of 21 cabinet ministers and 154 senior appointments made between December and late February reveals that Sunni Muslim men overwhelmingly dominate the government. While experts acknowledge the exceptional circumstances under which these appointments were made, they warn that the continued exclusion of minorities could lead to serious long-term instability.

Representation of Minorities

A quota system that distributes administrative positions among different sects was initially expected to be part of Syria’s new political framework. However, the recently unveiled constitutional declaration has rejected this approach, dismissing both sectarian quotas and the idea of reserving parliamentary seats for specific groups.

Pro-government factions argue that sectarian power-sharing has repeatedly failed in the region and should be abandoned. Lebanon’s 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the country’s civil war, institutionalized sectarian representation in government, yet instead of fostering stability, it led to widespread dysfunction. Similarly, in Iraq, following the 2003 U.S. invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein, American authorities introduced a power-sharing system that allocated governance among the country’s three main demographic groups, further deepening societal divisions.

Response to the New Order

The Kurdish-led administration in northeastern Syria has strongly criticized the newly unveiled constitutional declaration, arguing that it contradicts Syria’s diverse reality. Earlier this week, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the military arm of the Kurdish-led administration, reached an agreement with authorities in Damascus to integrate into state institutions. However, Kurdish officials swiftly rejected the declaration, stating that it does not represent the aspirations of their people and undermines efforts to achieve true democracy. Without Kurdish participation, a unified and stable Syria is unlikely. The Kurdish administration is highly organized and efficient, and its exclusion could lead to further conflict.

Similarly, the Alawite community, long associated with the Assad regime and now targeted by the new government, has also rejected the constitutional declaration. Reports indicate that Alawites are facing massacres, raising fears of systematic persecution. Beyond the staggering death toll, what makes these killings particularly alarming is that many of the perpetrators belong to the newly established Syrian army, formed under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The violence has cast a dark shadow over Syria’s future, raising serious doubts about the government’s ability to control its forces and rein in the patchwork of militias that now wield power.

The massacre of Alawite civilians has also raised concerns among influential evangelical members of the Trump White House, who view the protection of Syria’s religious minorities as a key benchmark for engaging with the new government. In such a volatile environment, the absence of a quota system in the constitutional declaration is particularly alarming. While quota-based governance has its flaws, it at least ensures some degree of representation for marginalized communities—a safeguard that is currently lacking in Syria’s new political framework.

What happens next?

Ensuring inclusive governance in post-conflict societies is rarely straightforward, as every approach to improving minority representation faces counterarguments. In this context, federalism is often proposed as a solution. Some of the world’s most complex democracies, including Germany, the United States, and Russia, operate under federal systems that divide power between national and subnational governments. While central authorities typically handle defense and foreign policy, state or regional governments oversee local matters and can influence national decision-making.

However, Syria currently lacks leadership capable of implementing such a system effectively. A government that excludes minority participation and enforces strong centralized control will only deepen the crisis. As a result, Syria’s instability is likely to persist.

The declaration comes amid the deadliest violence since Assad’s overthrow, which analysts view as the greatest threat to the transitional process. Mass killings, primarily targeting Alawites, have left at least 1,476 civilians dead at the hands of security forces and allied militias, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. President Ahmed al-Sharaa has vowed to prosecute those responsible, and authorities have announced several arrests. However, with a newly consolidated Sunni-dominated government, Syria’s problems seem far from over—raising concerns that the country may simply transition from an Assad-led regime to a Sunni-dominated authoritarian rule.