Tag: Armenia

  • A Peace Deal in the Caucasus, Sealed Under Baku’s Shadow

    A Peace Deal in the Caucasus, Sealed Under Baku’s Shadow

    One of history’s most entrenched rivalries has reached a critical moment. Azerbaijan and Armenia have finalized a peace agreement after a conflict that ended in Armenia’s crushing defeat. The foreign ministries of both Caucasus neighbors have confirmed the treaty, marking what could be a historic breakthrough—though deep-seated animosities remain.

    The hostility between these two ethnic groups stretches back centuries, shaped by a long history of massacres and territorial disputes that have left thousands dead. Their struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region deeply intertwined with Armenian identity, has been a focal point of bloodshed for generations. Wars erupted with the Soviet Union’s collapse and again in 2020, before Azerbaijan launched a swift and overwhelming offensive in September 2023, reclaiming Nagorno-Karabakh and fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitics.

    Today, relations between the two nations are at their lowest point. While international pressure—particularly from Europe and Russia—has long sought to push both sides toward reconciliation, negotiations have repeatedly collapsed under the weight of unresolved disputes.

    Finally, a Peace Deal

    Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister, Jeyhun Bayramov, declared that negotiations on the peace agreement with Armenia had concluded, stating that Armenia had accepted Azerbaijan’s proposals on the two previously unresolved articles. Armenia’s foreign ministry later confirmed that the draft agreement had been finalized and was ready for signing. However, highlighting lingering tensions, Armenia criticized Azerbaijan for announcing the deal unilaterally instead of issuing a joint statement. Despite this, it expressed willingness to discuss the timing and location for the formal signing.

    The peace deal ultimately took shape with Armenia conceding to Azerbaijan’s demands. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan formally recognized Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively ending three decades of Armenian separatist rule—a move widely viewed as a pivotal step toward normalization. Additionally, Armenia had already ceded four border villages to Azerbaijan the previous year, relinquishing territory held for decades. In the end, Azerbaijan secured an unquestionable victory, while Armenia endured a resounding and humiliating defeat.

    Who Made the Deal Happen?

    A peace deal had long been a priority for key regional players, particularly Russia and the European Union, both seeking to maintain their foothold in the region. Traditionally, Russia acted as the primary mediator between these deeply divided ethnic rivals, maintaining a peacekeeping presence. However, Armenia’s defeat in the war—and its sense of betrayal by Moscow—fundamentally shifted this dynamic.

    Tensions over the conflict further strained Armenia-Russia relations, with Yerevan openly accusing Moscow of failing to provide support. In response to what it saw as Russian inaction, Armenia suspended its participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) last year. While Russia, the United States, and the EU each attempted to mediate at different stages, Moscow’s waning influence became increasingly evident—not just in its inability to shape the outcome but also in the tone of official statements.

    The Minsk Group—formed in 1992 under the leadership of the United States, Russia, and France—was originally tasked with overseeing the peace process. However, its relevance diminished over the years, particularly as Azerbaijan accused it of favoring Armenia. As a result, the draft peace treaty was largely negotiated outside the Minsk Group framework, with the final agreement reached directly between the two countries.

    The credit for the peace deal goes to both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Despite the political fallout from Armenia’s defeat, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan chose to push forward with negotiations, ensuring that discussions remained on track. With international actors facilitating the process, Azerbaijan reaffirmed its commitment to ongoing dialogue, expressing its readiness to engage in bilateral talks on normalization and other unresolved issues.

    What Does It Mean for the Region?

    Deep-seated ethnic animosities endure, passed down through generations, ensuring that distrust remains deeply ingrained. True reconciliation remains elusive, as neither side fully trusts the other, and the scars of war—along with the terms of the peace deal—are unlikely to fade from their collective memory. Azerbaijan, having secured a decisive victory, still harbors ambitions for further territorial gains at Armenia’s expense, a demand shaped by historical grievances and nationalist aspirations.

    The region’s geopolitical complexities further heighten the uncertainty, deterring direct intervention from external powers. Russia has positioned itself firmly behind Azerbaijan while maintaining strategic ties with Turkey and, notably, Israel. Armenia, meanwhile, counts on support from Europe, the United States, and, unexpectedly, Iran—creating a tangle of alliances that makes the situation even more precarious.

    With Azerbaijan holding the upper hand, the potential for renewed conflict remains high. Should Europe strengthen its backing for Armenia, Russia may encourage further Azerbaijani assertiveness, exacerbating tensions. At the same time, any instability involving Iran could ripple across the region, adding another layer of volatility. While the peace deal may provide a temporary reprieve, its long-term viability remains uncertain, leaving the specter of future conflict looming over the region.

    More Issues to Be Settled

    Disputes also continued over proposals for both nations to withdraw legal cases from international courts. Armenia and Azerbaijan remain embroiled in litigation before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human Rights, each accusing the other of rights violations committed before, during, and after their armed conflicts.

    Pashinyan emphasized the need for clarity, stating that withdrawal from international courts must come with a complete renunciation of the cases. He warned that without such assurances, there could be a scenario where both sides formally drop their legal claims, only for Azerbaijan to later revive these issues bilaterally, potentially escalating tensions.

    Azerbaijan has also made additional demands. Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that Baku expects Armenia to amend its constitution by removing references to its declaration of independence, which asserts territorial claims over Nagorno-Karabakh. Such amendments would require a national referendum. Meanwhile, nearly all of Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population—more than 100,000 people—fled the region after Azerbaijan reclaimed it in a swift, 24-hour offensive.

    In the months leading up to the announcement that the peace treaty text had been finalized, bilateral relations deteriorated sharply, raising doubts about a near-term settlement. Azerbaijan hardened its stance on securing a land corridor to Nakhchivan, while Baku’s rhetoric grew increasingly aggressive. This hardline approach now appears to have pressured Armenia—still reeling from its disastrous defeat in the Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan’s reconquest of the region in late 2023—into making key concessions on the treaty’s most contentious issues.

    With their differences on two critical negotiating points now settled, Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to be advancing toward the formal signing of a peace agreement. However, this does not guarantee lasting peace for both of them.

  • Armenia Deepens Its Ties with the West

    Armenia Deepens Its Ties with the West

    Amid the complex geopolitical tensions in the Caucasus, Armenia, traditionally aligned with both Russia and Iran, is shifting its focus firmly toward the West. As the world’s oldest Christian nation, Armenia is now resolute in its efforts to sever long-standing ties with Moscow and navigate the hurdles of Turkish blockades to move closer to Europe and Western powers.

    In recent days, Armenia has taken important steps to strengthen its growing relationship with the United States and the European Union. On January 14, US and Armenian diplomats signed a strategic partnership agreement, laying the foundation for deeper trade, political, and strategic ties. A few days earlier, Armenia passed key legislation aimed at advancing its bid for European Union membership. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called the EU Integration Act, adopted on January 9, a historic milestone but emphasized that the path to EU membership would be long and challenging, requiring sustained political will and broad public support. He later clarified that the adoption of the law does not automatically mean Armenia is joining the EU, as that decision can only be made through a referendum, not by legislation or a government decree.

    On January 13, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held talks with European Council President António Costa, focusing on the fragile peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Efforts toward a long-term resolution to their protracted conflict faced a setback when Baku revived its demand for extraterritorial rights, seeking a land corridor to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. This renewed demand poses a risk of further territorial losses and humiliation for Armenia, already struggling with significant setbacks, and is escalating hostilities toward Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia. In a social media post, Costa reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to strengthening its partnership with Armenia, highlighting their shared values and outlining initiatives to deepen cooperation in areas such as security, economic growth, democratic governance, and people-to-people ties.

    Throughout the post-Soviet era, Armenia had heavily relied on Russia for economic and strategic support. Traditionally, it was considered firmly within Moscow’s orbit as a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, after suffering a decisive defeat in Karabakh, Pashinyan’s government began reassessing the value of its relationship with Russia. For Armenia, it became evident that Russia preferred Azerbaijan, largely due to shared economic activities and mutual interests, which proved deeply unsettling. This alignment comes at a time when Armenia is already uneasy about the growing influence of the Turkic world, with Turkey to its west and Azerbaijan to its east promoting a unified Islamic Turkic identity that makes Armenia feel isolated. With Russia aligning itself more closely with this bloc, Armenia finds itself cornered, prompting what appears to be a tentative outreach to Europe.

    Armenia’s geopolitical challenges are compounded by its lack of direct geographical connectivity to Europe. Unlike Georgia, which enjoys access to the Black Sea, Armenia is landlocked, making its path to stronger ties with Europe particularly difficult. Georgia’s political gridlock, with its government leaning toward Russia, further isolates Armenia from Europe, creating significant logistical and security hurdles for both Armenia and the EU. Despite these challenges, Armenians appear confident in addressing these obstacles. Some observers suggest that Europe may have broader strategic motives for fostering closer ties with Armenia. By strengthening its relationship with Yerevan, Europe could be positioning itself to exert influence on neighboring Iran, where discontent with the Islamic regime persists among segments of the population who take pride in their rich Persian heritage. For Europe, Iran’s cultural and historical legacy remains appealing, making such a shift strategically enticing.

    The Kremlin has responded to Armenia’s recent moves with a mix of irritation and indifference. On January 14, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated that Russia continues to view Armenia as a close partner. At the same time, he criticized the United States for allegedly instigating instability in the Caucasus, claiming that Washington seeks to undermine emerging nations and has never contributed to stability in the region.

    Armenia’s adoption of the EU Integration Act has raised immediate questions about its future in the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). While Armenian officials have suspended the country’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), they insist there are no plans to leave the EAEU. Russian officials, however, have firmly stated that dual alignment with both the EAEU and the European Union is untenable. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk clarified that the two unions are fundamentally incompatible because both demand the elimination of customs barriers and the unrestricted movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. He described EAEU membership as a privilege and likened EU membership to a doomed endeavor, drawing a comparison to boarding the Titanic because of the economic and social challenges within the EU. Overchuk further predicted that Armenians would face substantially higher costs for consumer goods and energy if the country were to leave the EAEU. Which is a decent threat targeting common people. 

    The EU Integration Act represents a milestone for Yerevan, marking what feels like the conclusion of the opening chapter in its long and complex journey toward full membership. Yet, this moment is less a victory than a harbinger of the monumental challenges that lie ahead. Beyond the Herculean task of aligning Armenian legislation with the rigorous standards of the European Union, the nation faces the equally daunting imperative of brokering peace with Azerbaijan—a prerequisite for any substantive progress.

    In recent months, the prospects of a durable peace agreement have grown increasingly tenuous. However, the dynamics of the Caucasus have long been characterized by their mercurial nature, where stasis can suddenly give way to opportunity. Take, for instance, the undercurrent of tension between Azerbaijan and Russia, fueled by the Kremlin’s refusal to assume responsibility for the downing of an Azerbaijani airliner by its air defenses in Chechnya. Should this rift deepen, Baku might find itself recalibrating its hardline stance toward Armenia, offering a glimmer of hope for the peace process to regain momentum.

  • Putin Still Seeks to Mediate Peace in the Caucasus

    Putin Still Seeks to Mediate Peace in the Caucasus

    A notable shift in sentiment is occurring among the populations of former Soviet countries, commonly known as the Russosphere. Younger generations, largely unexposed to Soviet propaganda, are increasingly influenced by Western ways of living. Eastern Europe, with the exception of Belarus, which still has a pro-Russian government, appears to be slipping away from Russia’s influence. Russia now fears it may lose its grip on the Caucasus next. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has exposed Russia’s weaknesses, leading many to question its ability to act as the heir of the Soviet Union. Despite initiating the war two years ago, Russia has struggled to invade Ukraine and achieve its objectives, facing repeated humiliations. The Caucasus, a compact yet geopolitically pivotal region bridging Asia and Europe, once firmly under Russia’s sway, is now drifting towards Europe. In Georgia and Armenia, a growing Europhile sentiment is visible, as the people increasingly look westward, aligning their aspirations more closely with Europe Any significant move in this direction could pose a serious challenge to Moscow. Putin and the Kremlin seem to have recognized this changing mood and appear to be taking steps to address it.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent two-day visit to Azerbaijan makes it clear that he intends to maintain his role as a powerbroker in the Caucasus. However, whether he still has the influence to do so remains uncertain. Putin’s trip to Baku on August 18th and 19th occurred against the backdrop of Russia’s deteriorating strategic partnership with Armenia, where Yerevan has increasingly strengthened its political and security ties with the West, and a continuing Ukrainian offensive in Russia’s Kursk region. Despite these challenges, Putin adopted a business-as-usual attitude throughout his visit, highlighting the economic advantages of the Declaration of Alliance between Russia and Azerbaijan signed in 2022, just days before Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine. Putin mentioned that cooperation could extend beyond energy to include industrial collaboration, transport, logistics, and light industry. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, in turn, highlighted Azerbaijan’s commitment to preserving and promoting the Russian language, noting that over 160,000 students were enrolled in more than 300 Russian schools in the country. He also acknowledged Russia’s peacekeeping role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    With Russia’s strained relations with Armenia, the central question during Putin’s visit was whether Moscow could still play a meaningful role in brokering peace between Baku and Yerevan. Putin certainly seems eager to try. At one point, he expressed to Aliyev his willingness to facilitate efforts to delimit and demarcate the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as well as to broker a peace deal. Putin clearly does not want to see himself-or Russia-sidelined in the peace negotiations.

    Even though Russia can influence Armenian politicians with business ties to Moscow, significant discontent remains among the Armenian population. Many Armenians view the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh as a betrayal by Russia, believing that Russia now favors Azerbaijan, thus undermining their historical Orthodox alliance. It is important to recognize that public sentiment may differ from the views of their politicians. Putin and Russia have a vested interest in Azerbaijan due to its rich natural resources and its strategic position as a route from Turkey and the Middle East to Russia for money and investments. This interest aligns with Putin’s ambitious North-South Corridor project, which aims to boost direct trade with Iran and India, bypassing intermediaries. This initiative could help offset the loss of business with Europe and reduce Russia’s current overreliance on China, which greatly benefits from this dependence. Thus, Azerbaijan is a top priority in the Caucasus for Russia, even though Moscow does not want to lose Armenia entirely. If Russia cannot settle its issues with Armenia, it is likely that Armenia will turn more towards the West. With both Georgia and Armenia moving away from Russian influence, Russia faces severe security risks.

    Russia’s historical involvement in the South Caucasus underscores the necessity of its participation in the peace process. However, Armenian officials, who have accused Moscow of failing to uphold security guarantees during the Second Karabakh War, appear reluctant to accept further Russian involvement. On August 19, a representative from the Armenian Foreign Ministry criticized Russian diplomats for making biased and disrespectful remarks about Armenia and questioned Russia’s commitment to fostering constructive engagement between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials. It also seems that as countries increasingly challenge Putin and Russia in the region. On this occasion,  Putin is attempting to maintain a presence and their importance through his diplomatic meetings in Baku.

  • Armenia’s Blossoming Relationship with India

    Armenia, feeling abandoned after its humiliating loss in the war with Azerbaijan, struggles to make decisions in international relations. Russia has chosen to side with Azerbaijan, but Armenia cannot become hostile toward Russia as it still heavily relies on Russian military support and the Russian economy. Armenia cannot turn much toward the West either, as it observes the situation in Ukraine. Considering NATO is challenging for Armenia because Turkey, a NATO member, is a historical enemy. China does not prioritize its relationship with Armenia since Azerbaijan is one of its important trade partners. Therefore, no superpower is completely reliable for Armenia at the moment. However, in this situation, a surprising entry is gaining importance. Despite being a developing country, India is a rising superpower both militarily and economically, with aspirations for greater influence. India, which maintains friendly relations with both Russia and the USA, is becoming a great partner for Armenia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who heads a Hindu nationalist party and has shown past animosity towards Islam, is looking interested in strengthening ties with Armenia.

    For Armenia, partnering with India is an excellent option at present. Armenia seems interested in further developing its relationship with India, which has flourished through bilateral military cooperation. In March 2020, Armenia signed an important agreement to purchase four Swathi Weapon Locating Radars for $40 million from India. In September 2022, Armenia agreed to purchase four batteries of Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank rockets, and various types of ammunition from India for $240 million. Indian Aerospace Defence News reports that by the start of the current fiscal year 2024-25, Armenia’s total weapons purchases from India had reached $600 million, making it the largest buyer of Indian weapons.

    There will be restrictions on obtaining military equipment from Russia, which is at war and favors Azerbaijan. Buying U.S. weapons could send the wrong message to Russia, and Israel will not supply weapons to Armenia due to its good relationship with Palestine. Thus, Indian weapons are currently the best option for Armenia. Additionally, Indian weapons are inexpensive and compatible with those Turkey supplies to Azerbaijan. 

    For India, the relationship with Armenia is somewhat emotional. The current Indian government, led by Hindu organizations that are critical of Islamization, feels sympathy for Armenia’s Christians, who have been treated harshly by their Islamic neighbors. Pakistan, India’s Muslim-majority neighbor with whom India has ongoing conflicts, maintains a strong relationship with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Although not of Turkic ethnicity and predominantly of Indian background, Pakistan claims a Turkic heritage and seeks to ally with Azerbaijan and Turkey. This alliance of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan appears to have grown beyond social media, and Turkey’s criticism of India is considered part of the worsening relationship between these countries. As a result, India has decided to boost its relationship with Armenia.

    Armenia and India have had a strong relationship throughout history. Both countries have exchanged culture and trade since medieval times, even when they were under Islamic empires. Many people of Armenian origin still live in India, and Armenian Christians have churches there. The relationship between modern Armenia and India has also blossomed. Indian presidents and prime ministers visited Armenia when it was a socialist republic in the Soviet Union, and India was among the first to recognize Armenia’s independence. In 1995, 2003, and 2017, Armenian Presidents Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Robert Kocharyan, and Serzh Sargsyan visited India, resulting in the establishment of several agreements. In a 2019 interview, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan expressed Armenia’s support for India in the Kashmir conflict with Pakistan. This was a significant support for India, as Western countries and Islamic states tend to side with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Amid the deepening relationship between India and Armenia, calls for recognizing the Armenian Genocide have increased in India, though there is opposition from Islamist and liberal factions. And For the first time under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership, the Indian embassy in Armenia officially acknowledged the genocide, and in 2021, Indian Ambassador Kishan Dan Dewal paid tribute to its victims.

    India and Armenia are a perfect match, like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, as both nations have maintained their culture and beliefs despite significant regional changes. They now share common adversaries. Prime Minister Modi’s interest in cultures and histories fosters a desire for closer ties. This relationship is undoubtedly beneficial for Armenia, as it offers military, technological, and economic support without antagonizing Russia or the United States.

  • Why is the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace pact challenging?

    Why is the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace pact challenging?

    The Armenia-Azerbaijan war ended almost a year ago. Armenia lost the war, and Azerbaijan gained control of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, a historic Armenian region also claimed by Azerbaijan. The Republic of Artsakh, the entity established by ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, is officially dissolved, but tensions remain high. A peace treaty between the two countries is not yet possible, as this is not merely a political dispute over borders; it is an ethnic clash, and solving it is not easy.

    Coexistence was only possible while they were under the Soviet Union; otherwise, ethnic clashes were common and led to deep-seated resentment. Peace can only be achieved through a formal treaty. Now, Europe and the West are taking a greater interest in resolving the issue, while conflicts of interest among the parties involved in the region persist. Russia supports Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan has strong ties with Turkey, Turkey has historical animosity towards Armenia, Armenia maintains a relationship with Iran, and Iran is an ally of Russia. This complex web of connections complicates the situation.

    At the recent NATO summit in Washington, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken indicated that the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process might be nearing a resolution. However, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are currently adopting a cautious stance, hesitant to show too much eagerness to make concessions. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev were expected to hold direct talks in London during the European Political Community summit, but the meeting did not take place. As anticipated, both sides have accused each other of obstructing the discussion. Their most recent meeting occurred in Berlin in February, mediated by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. This was the first encounter since Azerbaijan’s complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. At that time, the prospects for a peace agreement seemed remote.

    In May, Pashinyan’s government made a significant breakthrough by agreeing to transfer four villages in disputed border areas to Azerbaijan. Since then, both sides have shown interest in finalizing a peace agreement. On July 20, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated at a media forum in the Karabakh town of Shusha that up to 90 percent of the draft peace treaty has been settled. However, reaching an agreement on the remaining 10 percent may prove challenging. Azerbaijan’s demands including Karabakh pose challenges for Armenian politicians. 

    One major condition set by Aliyev is Armenia’s formal agreement to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, which has traditionally overseen the peace process but has recently been largely ineffective. Aliyev has criticized the Minsk Group for being biased towards Armenia and has claimed that it has been dysfunctional for many months, possibly even for a couple of years.

    The second condition is more difficult: Azerbaijan is demanding that Armenia amend a provision in its constitution’s preamble that identifies Karabakh as part of Armenia. Aliyev has argued that this provision represents a territorial threat to Azerbaijan because it implies the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. This demand for a constitutional amendment could potentially derail the negotiations.

    On July 25, an Armenian Foreign Ministry representative said that the government is preparing a response to Azerbaijan’s demands. Pashinyan has started internal discussions about possible constitutional amendments, leading to speculation that his government might be exploring ways to meet Aliyev’s conditions. Daniel Ioannisyan, a member of the working group on constitutional amendments, noted that any changes are unlikely to be finalized before 2027, and that modifying the preamble’s wording is not currently being considered. Edmon Marukyan, a former ally of Pashinyan and ex-ambassador-at-large of Armenia, said that Armenians are seeking clarity on several unresolved issues, including the process for returning prisoners of war.

    While maintaining a tough stance on the constitutional provision, Aliyev’s administration extended an invitation to Armenia to attend the UN climate conference (COP29), which will be held in Baku in November. An administration representative described the invitation as a gesture of goodwill. Yerevan has not yet announced whether Armenian officials will attend COP29. 

    Countries situated in the small area  between the seas and mountain ranges are struggling to resolve their tensions. The region is drawing the attention of various external parties, which could lead to increased volatility in the future. As a result, resolving ongoing disputes through a peace pact is crucial. Armenia, grappling with both domestic and international challenges, faces extra hurdles in reaching an agreement, with some emotional issues likely to persist across generations.

  • Russia Seems Unhappy with the US Flirting with Armenia

    Russia Seems Unhappy with the US Flirting with Armenia

    Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia continued to control the politics of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. They cultivated and protected many authoritarian leaders in these regions and propagated anti-Western views. However, over the last decade, it has become evident that a new generation in these countries, free from Soviet nostalgia, desires better living standards and opportunities similar to those in the West. Consequently, the politics of many of these countries have shifted accordingly.

    Recognizing this change in sentiment, other parties began to seize the opportunity. The European Union has integrated parts of the former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe and is now extending its influence into the Caucasus. Meanwhile, Turkey is growing its presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, all contributing to the weakening of Russia’s sphere of influence. The United States has played a significant role in altering the mindset of politicians through diplomatic talks, investment plans, and various other initiatives aimed at shaping public sentiment. Together, they have slowly begun to lift the Iron Curtain. 

    Armenia, a long-term ally of Russia with deep religious and political ties, also joined the race and is now looking towards the West. Despite its Russian-linked politics, the public mood in Armenia has shifted considerably, particularly after the loss of the war with Azerbaijan, which resulted in the loss of a significant Armenian territory tied to their heritage. This defeat has fueled anger within the country, with many believing that Russia, which was supposed to protect them, contributed to Azerbaijan’s victory. There is a widespread belief that a wealthier Azerbaijan received more preferential treatment from Russia, and some suspect that Russia betrayed them.

    As a result, Armenia has started cooperating with the United States. The US, a country with a large Armenian diaspora, is making efforts to align Armenia with Western and European partners. This time, the United States does not want to repeat the mistakes made in Ukraine, and as a first step, they are discussing military collaboration.

    A joint military exercise involving a small number of American and Armenian troops is taking place at a base in the suburbs of Yerevan. Naturally, this has sparked a paroxysm of rage in Moscow. The 11-day exercise, dubbed Eagle Partner, began on July 15 and aims to boost interoperability between the US and Armenia during peacekeeping and stability operations. It’s not the number of troops involved that’s drawing attention; It’s the timing and symbolism of the joint exercise. This exercise is a tangible measure of Armenia’s progress in its geopolitical pivot away from Russia.

    According to US Ambassador to Armenia Kristina Kvien, the US and Armenian troops are at the forefront of a crucial and rapidly growing relationship and partnership. Simultaneously, the Armenian media outlet Hetq reported that a resident adviser from the Pentagon will be attached to Armenia’s Ministry of Defense. The adviser’s specific duties and responsibilities have not been publicly disclosed. Additionally, the US and Armenia are actively exploring cooperation on constructing a new nuclear power plant in Armenia. These fascinating and significant developments from both sides highlight a promising and dynamic relationship.

    Regarding Armenia’s rapid embrace of the West, exemplified by the Eagle Partner exercise, the vitriol expressed by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova was notable. She characterized the presence of American forces in the Caucasus in alarming terms, alleging that the United States and NATO aimed to disrupt the fragile balance in the region and provoke conflict. She also asserted that Western countries are obsessively involving Armenia in various interactions in Transcaucasia.

    Zakharova’s comments indicate that the Kremlin is alarmed by the rapid erosion of its influence in Armenia and is concerned that an expanding US strategic presence in the region could impede the development of the North-South corridor, a developing trade network connecting Russia, Iran, and India. This corridor has been crucial in supporting the Kremlin’s efforts to evade sanctions and its military operations in Ukraine. Moscow may also worry that the US presence in the region will influence other countries and restive regions within Russia, such as Chechnya. Furthermore, if Armenia fully aligns with the West, Russia would face a significant power check from NATO.

    Russia still maintains some levers of influence in Armenia. Yerevan is economically dependent on Russian trade and natural gas supplies, and the Kremlin also maintains a military base in Gyumri that hosts a Russian brigade. However, Armenia recognizes that this is an opportune moment to explore other opportunities, as it doubts Russia’s willingness to support them in the event of a conflict with Azerbaijan or Turkey. Consequently, Armenia is increasingly turning towards the United States, even as it retains ties with Russia. Interestingly, just before Eagle Partner commenced, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Yerevan would withdraw from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. This suggests that the United States is winning Armenia’s heart as Russia becomes increasingly unattractive.

  • What Led to Armenia’s Recognition of Palestine?

    What Led to Armenia’s Recognition of Palestine?

    Armenia and Israel, countries founded on religious identities, have had a historically strong relationship. Predominantly Christian Armenians and predominantly Jewish modern Israelis have maintained diplomatic relations, and their histories date back centuries. Both nations have experienced persecution under various kingdoms and share many similarities, including suffering from genocides that shocked the world with their cruelty. Many Jews lived in Armenia, and Israel still hosts Armenian Christians and a Jewish diaspora. There is even a quarter dedicated to Armenians in the holy city and disputed capital, Jerusalem.

    However, their relationship has not been entirely smooth. There has been reported discontent between the populations regarding each other’s history. Israel’s reluctance to recognize the Armenian genocide and its recent arming of Azerbaijani troops against Armenia have caused friction. Conversely, Israel perceives Armenia as aligning with Palestine and joining Muslims in the effort to establish a free Palestine. The latest development, with modern Armenia recognizing the State of Palestine after 30 years of its formation, is worsening the relationship with Israel.

    On July 23, Armenia became the ninth country since April to recognize Palestine as a direct response to the Gaza war. This was a unilateral decision, unlike many other countries. The Armenian Foreign Ministry highlighted that the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza and the ongoing military conflict are key issues on the international political agenda that demand resolution. However, many believe this situation is different.

    Despite ties between Armenia and Israel existing since Armenia’s independence from the Soviet Union, their relationship has not been smooth, with many diplomatic issues between the two countries. Tensions worsened significantly following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia feels betrayed after losing long-held Armenian heritage cities in Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, which received support from Armenia’s long-time rival, Turkey. To exacerbate the situation, Armenia believes that Russia and Israel, the only nearby non-Muslim countries, did not provide sufficient support. Since Russia cannot be targeted, Armenia’s fury is directed towards Israel. In a post-interview, Armenia’s ambassador to Israel, Arman Akopian, stated that Azerbaijan has been utilizing Israeli weapons to bolster its control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

    From Israel’s side, they consider Armenia’s relationship with Iran a threat. Political ties between Armenia and Iran are growing increasingly robust, extending beyond typical neighborly relations. Recently, Iranian media reported that Armenia plans to construct a new highway connecting to Iran. Additionally, Armenia has signed an arms deal with India, stipulating that the arms will be transported to Armenia through Iran. In 2023, reports emerged indicating the presence of Iranian soldiers stationed along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan. Such activities make Armenia a questionable ally for Israel.

    Israel believes Armenia’s decision to recognize Palestine as a state reflects underlying antisemitic sentiments within certain segments of Armenian society. There are reports of many Armenians in Israel believing they are considered third-class citizens and that Armenians prefer Muslims over Jews. This recent recognition can also be seen as a deepening relationship between Armenia and Shia countries in solidarity with the Palestinian population. Many anti-Israel social media groups celebrated Armenia’s decision, pointing out that Christians in Palestine are also suffering, emphasizing that it is not solely a Muslim-Jewish issue.

    “The Republic of Armenia has joined the resolutions of the UN General Assembly calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza”, the Armenian Foreign Ministry stated following the recognition of Palestinian statehood. This move is likely to impact Armenia’s aspirations to join the EU and align with the United States, signaling a shift towards closer relations with Iran and Russia.

  • Is Armenia’s Defense Strategy Changing with US Military Aid?

    Is Armenia’s Defense Strategy Changing with US Military Aid?

    Armenia was humiliated when Azerbaijan captured the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which had long been under the rule of Armenian Christians. It’s a historical rivalry between these former Soviet republics, but this time Armenia’s anger at the loss in the war was directed towards their Christian brother Russia, which provided military, economic, and political assistance to Armenia but considered staying neutral or allowing the takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan. The Armenian government accepted defeat and chose not to make comments against it, despite some protests and anger towards Russia. There was a general perception in Yerevan that the Kremlin had not lived up to its security obligations to Armenia. However, people with deep ties to Russia or those in geopolitically isolated situations refrained from making further protests against Russia.

    But Armenians are not only in Modern Armenia; they have a larger population in the United States and Western countries than in Armenia itself. They are angry. They believe Russia preferred richer Azerbaijan and strategically important Turkey and their interests over Armenia. They believe it’s time to shift their allegiance from Russia to the West. And when Russia weakens or is perceived as weak, Armenian politicians are removing the redline they aspire to join in Europe, and they have won some impressive military assistance from the Eagle, the United States.

    The European Union and the United States swiftly responded to Armenian overtures for closer security and economic ties. In early April, they jointly proposed an assistance package totaling over $350 million for Yerevan. Following this initiative, US Ambassador to Armenia Kristina Kvien stated that the relationship between the US and Armenia is expanding. She noted that Washington’s engagement with Yerevan has broadened and deepened across various sectors over the past year, including military cooperation. Kvien highlighted significant developments in this area, such as the joint US-Armenian military exercises held in early September in Armenia. Additionally, she mentioned plans for an American military advisor to collaborate with the Armenian Defense Ministry to implement reforms aimed at enhancing planning and operational standards to modern levels. This is enough to consider Europe’s interest is expanding to Armenia and the Russosphere is shrinking and Armenia leading to deep trouble. Ukraine’s desire to join NATO is perceived as motivation for Russia’s war on the nation. 

    Though Ambassador Kvien echoed they don’t have plans to disrespect Relationship with Russia , emphasizing that US assistance to Armenia does not come with a condition to sever ties with Russia. She highlighted the importance of having multiple allies and trade partners for Armenia’s strength and resilience, stating that diversification, rather than exclusion, is the goal. However, it’s evident that if Armenia strengthens its ties with the United States or Europe, it could strain its relationship with Russia, given the historical tensions between these countries. And Russia is already concerned about the United States growing interest in the former soviet republics. Russia and Azerbaijan responded strongly to the EU-US aid package announced on April 5th for Armenia. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addressed concerns in the Armenian parliament by emphasizing increased economic and security cooperation with the West.

    The possibility that the United States was going to provide significant military support to Armenia seemed unthinkable just a few years ago. However, situations have changed, and Washington is moving cautiously in its efforts to remove a geopolitical red line in the Caucasus, painted by the Soviet Union. While Russia and Iran will likely face increased confrontation with the expanding Eurosphere in the Caucasus, the region will become more unstable. The two spheres are evolving in this tiny region, with Georgia, Armenia, and Europe on one side, and Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan on the other side. Turkey’s involvement will only add complexity to the situation.