Tag: Bangladesh

  • Bangladesh beckons China, offering a strategic foothold

    Bangladesh beckons China, offering a strategic foothold

    Bangladesh’s interim government has harbored resentment toward India from the outset, frequently expressing its hostility through political actions and rhetoric on social media. From symbolic gestures—such as placing Indian flags beneath their feet—to inflammatory online discourse, nationalist factions in Bangladesh regularly voice their disdain for India, despite its crucial role in the country’s independence.

    With relations with India strained and facing economic, demographic, and cultural challenges, Bangladesh has consistently sought external support. A decade ago, Pakistan might have been a viable ally, but its internal crises have rendered it ineffective. The West, which once backed efforts to unseat the Hasina government, now maintains its distance, wary of provoking Bangladesh’s growing Islamist factions. Russia, reluctant to jeopardize its strong ties with India, has similarly refrained from direct involvement—leaving China as the most viable alternative for Dhaka’s new leadership.

    As the geopolitical landscape of South Asia shifts, Beijing is steadily entrenching itself in Bangladesh, weaving a web of economic and strategic entanglements that grant it a firmer grip on the Bay of Bengal. This maneuvering is more than a matter of regional diplomacy—it is a calibrated challenge to India’s long-standing influence, a quiet but deliberate push to reshape power dynamics in the subcontinent. For New Delhi, the implications are clear. The alignment between Dhaka and Beijing is not just a passing phase but a structural shift, one that threatens to redefine the balance of power. 

    Evolving Bilateral Cooperation with China

    After meeting with Muhammad Yunus, the leader of Bangladesh’s interim government, Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to deepening bilateral ties, emphasizing China’s readiness to elevate cooperation with Bangladesh. According to Yunus office, the trip secured $2.1 billion in Chinese investments, loans, and grants.

    A substantial portion of this funding is earmarked for establishing a Chinese Industrial Economic Zone (CIEZ) in Bangladesh, with nearly 30 Chinese companies pledging $1 billion to the project. This aligns with Yunus push for increased private Chinese investment in Bangladesh’s manufacturing sector.

    Additionally, China plans to provide a $400 million loan to modernize Mongla, Bangladesh’s second-largest port. Further cooperation on projects like Mongla’s modernization and the potential Teesta River initiative is drawing Bangladesh deeper into China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Discussions also covered water resource management, and Beijing reaffirmed its support for Bangladesh’s efforts to repatriate over a million Rohingya refugees still living in overcrowded camps after fleeing persecution in Myanmar.

    For Bangladesh’s interim government, Yunus meeting with Xi was a significant diplomatic breakthrough. While many countries remain hesitant to engage in large-scale agreements with an interim administration, China has shown no such reservations, actively reviving ties that had remained stagnant since the previous government’s fall.

    However, a pressing concern is the widening trade imbalance. Bangladesh’s exports to China, primarily textiles, account for only a fraction of the $23 billion bilateral trade volume. In response, China has granted zero-tariff market access to Bangladeshi products, creating new opportunities for industries such as leather goods. Agricultural exports, including mangoes and jackfruits, are already in the pipeline, with the potential for further expansion into China’s vast agricultural market.

    Yet, concerns persist over the nature of Chinese investments. Unlike Western economic partnerships, Chinese funding often comes with minimal social or environmental safeguards, raising questions about how much Bangladesh’s labor force and broader population will truly benefit from these deals.

    Worsening Bilateral Cooperation with India

    India maintained a strong relationship with Sheikh Hasina’s government, but her departure has disrupted cross-border ties. This shift became evident when Muhammad Yunus chose China for his first state visit, despite reports suggesting that he initially sought to visit New Delhi first.

    According to Yunus press secretary, Shafiqul Alam, the interim government had formally requested a bilateral visit to India as early as December last year—weeks before finalizing the trip to China. However, India did not respond favorably. Meanwhile, speculation remains that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, known for his Hindu nationalist stance, may explore engagement with the Yunus administration, despite growing allegations of violence against Hindu minorities.

    Analysts suggest that Bangladesh’s interim government is aware of the strategic imperative to maintain stable relations with India. Bangladesh is equally important for India, both as a regional partner and a key player in maintaining stability in South Asia. Modi’s recent meeting with Yunus during a major regional summit underscored ongoing cooperation, and his Independence Day message to Bangladesh’s leadership reaffirmed the significance of strong bilateral ties.

    However, tensions persist, exacerbated by Hasina’s continued presence in India. The growing closeness between Yunus and China is likely to further strain relations, deepening the rift between Dhaka and New Delhi.

    Future of India-Bangladesh Relations

    Given the profound historical and cultural ties between the two nations, the restoration of diplomatic relations remains essential. Yet, the trajectory appears to be diverging. China’s chief interest in Bangladesh lies in its strategic position, a development that poses a considerable risk for India. The Bay of Bengal, a critical extension of the Indian Ocean, serves as India’s most secure maritime domain, anchoring key naval installations along its eastern seaboard.

    India’s vulnerability is further compounded by the narrow corridor that connects its mainland to the landlocked northeastern states, a passage running along the Bangladesh border. Any shift in Bangladesh’s geopolitical stance could disrupt India’s regional security strategy. Yunus recent remarks on the issue have heightened concerns in India, fueling growing hostility toward the Bangladeshi government. Meanwhile, similar apprehensions are reportedly rising in Dhaka, further deepening the divide.

    India may choose to hold off on any decisive diplomatic moves until after Bangladesh’s elections, with Modi likely to steer clear of direct engagement until a new government is formally in place in Dhaka.

  • Can Bangladesh’s Riotous Student Leaders Build a New Political Order?

    Can Bangladesh’s Riotous Student Leaders Build a New Political Order?

    The pattern was all too familiar—much like in many Islamic states, the ousting of a strong secular leader often signals not democratic renewal but the rise of Islamist factions, followed by a descent into instability. Initially, Bangladesh appeared set to follow this trajectory, with Hasina’s removal fueled by mass protests.

    However, six months on, the forces of Islamization have not surged to dominance, nor has the country spiraled into complete chaos—offering a glimmer of hope for democracy. The upcoming general election now stands as a pivotal moment for a nation already fractured by political uncertainty. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is maneuvering for a political resurgence, the Awami League remains paralyzed by fear, and Islamist parties add further complexity to the landscape.

    Amid this turbulence, the student activists who once spearheaded Hasina’s ouster have launched their own political faction, presenting it as an effort to reshape Bangladesh’s future. Whether they can move beyond their revolutionary roots and establish a sustainable political alternative remains an open question.

    The New Student Party

    Forged in the chaos of the riots that unseated Sheikh Hasina, the National Citizen Party (NCP) was founded by student leaders who once stood at the front lines of the uprising. They chose Nahid Islam—one of Bangladesh’s most prominent protest figures—to lead their movement. Until recently, Islam advised the interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the administration that took charge in the wake of Hasina’s departure.

    Speaking at a public rally in Dhaka on Friday, the NCP formally outlined its political vision and ambitions. Party leaders, including Nahid Islam, emphasized their commitment to drafting a new democratic constitution to prevent the return of constitutional autocracy. They presented the NCP as a fresh alternative to the long-dominant Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), pledging to break the cycle of corruption and authoritarianism that has long plagued the country’s politics.

    Bangladeshi voters have historically faced limited choices at the ballot box, and some analysts believe that the emergence of a third or fourth political force could ease the electorate’s frustrations. NCP representative Akhtar Hossain reaffirmed the party’s commitment to participatory politics and its opposition to both Islamophobia and religious extremism in the Muslim-majority nation. He noted that Bangladesh has experienced both anti-Islamic sentiment and extremism, and the NCP aims to counter both by prioritizing civic dignity and inclusive political participation.

    However, some critics find the party’s stance contradictory, questioning whether it can maintain a balanced position between secularism and religious influences while appealing to a diverse electorate.

    Duopoly in Bangladesh Politics

    Since Bangladesh emerged from the 1971 Indo-Pak war, its political landscape has been less a contest of ideas than a dynastic struggle between two entrenched forces. The Awami League (AL), buoyed by India’s backing, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), with historical ties to Pakistan, have alternated between dominance and opposition, their rivalry defining the nation’s turbulent democracy. Smaller leftist and Islamist parties have struggled to gain significant voter support. Both parties have faced allegations of corruption, authoritarianism, and a failure to address systemic inequality, discrimination, and social injustice.

    With the Awami League weakened by Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, the BNP has emerged as the most powerful political force. However, the National Citizen Party (NCP), the newly formed youth-led party, is attempting to carve out space for itself—often at the expense of both. In some areas, NCP activists have clashed with BNP supporters as they seek to claim AL strongholds, leading to heightened political tensions.

    Samantha Sharmin, a leading figure in the NCP, has accused the BNP—without naming it directly—of obstructing national unity. She argued that every effort to build a new political consensus after Hasina’s fall has been disrupted by a party that views itself as Bangladesh’s rightful political leader.

    The BNP has dismissed such accusations, maintaining that its priority is to contest the next elections and restore democracy. BNP politician Harunur Rashid welcomed the emergence of the NCP but downplayed its significance, arguing that his party has already earned the trust of voters and that the NCP lacks the political strength to challenge them. According to him, the BNP is unwilling to allow the NCP to rise at its expense.

    Disagreements between the two parties extend to the nature of the elections. The NCP has called for the formation of a new constituent assembly to draft a fresh constitution, while the BNP insists that parliamentary elections should be held first. Additionally, the NCP has urged the interim government to ban the Awami League entirely—a demand the BNP has refused to support, arguing that the AL’s fate should be decided through elections. This position allows the BNP to maintain a more democratic image, but critics argue that it is also a strategic move to keep the political fight between the BNP and the AL, excluding new challengers like the NCP. 

    Sharmin has harshly criticized the BNP’s approach, accusing it of manipulating public sentiment, betraying the spirit of the 2024 uprising, and keeping the Awami League politically relevant. However, some analysts believe that despite its weakened state, the AL remains a significant force, still commanding between 30% and 35% of the vote. If NCP is sidelined, the AL opposition base may consolidate behind the BNP, further strengthening the party and shaping the upcoming elections into yet another AL-BNP contest—exactly the scenario the NCP is trying to disrupt.

    Evolving Political Landscape

    While the interim government has regained control, sporadic mob attacks and rising tensions continue to fuel unrest. Public frustration is mounting over delays in drafting a new constitution and holding elections. Any further postponement risks triggering another wave of violent protests, with political parties like the BNP and NCP likely to seize the moment to position themselves as successors—potentially plunging Bangladesh into deeper chaos.

    The political battle is increasingly shaping up between the BNP and the NCP. However, despite its removal from power, the Awami League still holds significant influence. If elections are further delayed, the AL could reenter the political arena, presenting itself as the only viable option for stability. Even if legally barred from returning to power, the party may find an alternative political platform to retain its presence. How intelligence agencies navigate this evolving landscape could be instrumental in shaping future alliances. At the same time, Islamist factions may once again push for Islamic rule.

    In the coming months, Bangladesh may witness the rise of additional political parties, as various factions seek to exploit the prevailing uncertainty—each attempting to “Catch fish in muddy waters.”

  • Is Support for Hasina on the Rise in Bangladesh?

    Is Support for Hasina on the Rise in Bangladesh?

    Bangladesh has been in deep political turmoil for the past six months, marked by the ousting Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in mass protests led by students and Islamists. These demonstrations escalated into violent attacks on Hasina’s supporters and minorities. Even after Hasina fled the state and her official residence was vandalized and looted—down to her personal belongings—the unrest did not subside. Despite Western-backed Yunus Khan assuming the role of interim leader and promising imminent elections, even at the cost of constitutional changes, the situation remains unstable. After six months of chaos, the country’s deepening economic troubles and worsening living conditions have led many to lose hope and many to shift their support back to Hasina. Her party is witnessing a revival, and pro-Hasina hashtags are resurfacing on social media, fueling fears of further political turmoil in the days ahead.

    The country is now sharply divided into two factions. On one side are the forces that led the mass protests that ousted Sheikh Hasina—students, leftists, Islamists, and anti-India groups—who not only oppose Hasina but also reject the legacy of the nation’s founding leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and the Awami League, along with any historical ties to India.

    On the other side are Awami League supporters and those disillusioned with the interim government’s rule. This group remained largely silent over the past six months due to intense crackdowns, but they are slowly resurfacing. As part of this resurgence, Sheikh Hasina, now in exile in India, addressed her supporters, sparking widespread outrage. In response, violent attacks erupted against symbols of her legacy, including her family home and institutions built during her tenure in Bangladesh.

    Bangladesh police have arrested over 1,500 people since Saturday amid reports of mob violence and a sweeping security crackdown. The interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, called for calm following the attack on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s residence. Hours later, members of the student-led movement that ousted Hasina were attacked in Gazipur, near Dhaka, prompting students to demand action.

    The police crackdown, dubbed Operation Devil Hunt, is a joint effort between the army and police to suppress groups involved in recent violent incidents, targeting both supporters and opponents of the ousted premier. As Islamist factions gain ground, liberals and minorities who were once safeguarded under Hasina’s rule are increasingly becoming targets. On Monday, police placed publisher Shatabdi Bhaba under protective custody after a group of enraged Islamist students surrounded his stall at the Amar Ekushey Book Fair in Dhaka, where works by exiled feminist author Taslima Nasrin were on display.

    The interim government, grappling with instability, fears Sheikh Hasina’s return as the nation’s identity remains closely tied to the Awami League, which still commands a loyal and sizable support base. Alarmed by the party’s potential resurgence, the government is reportedly considering a constitutional ban to curb its influence. On Monday, Bangladesh National Party (BNP) Secretary-General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir met with interim leader Muhammad Yunus to voice concerns over the escalating unrest, according to AFP.

    Global perceptions of the Bangladesh riots that erupted in August have shifted in recent months. India appears to be leaning toward supporting Sheikh Hasina, wary of the prospect of Islamist rule on its eastern border. The viral image of Bangladeshi students desecrating Indian and Israeli flags circulated widely in India and the West, shaping opinions on the interim government.

    Western governments have also voiced serious concerns over the rise in extrajudicial killings in Bangladesh. In early February, Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), a Bangladeshi human rights organization monitoring attacks on minority communities, reported that 17 people had died in law enforcement custody during the interim government’s first five months, including a BNP leader. The report highlights an alarming increase in extrajudicial killings, fueling international criticism of human rights violations.

    Despite this, support for Hasina and the Awami League appears to be growing. Even as party offices and homes of Awami League leaders were targeted—attacks spanning 35 districts, including the residence of A.K.M. Mozammel Haque, Minister for Liberation War Affairs—Hasina’s leadership continues to command significant backing. Both the interim government and Islamist factions remain wary of the Awami League. If constitutional changes are not implemented and elections are further delayed, support for Hasina will likely continue to surge, raising the possibility of yet another political upheaval. Bangladesh has a long history of mass mobilization, and the prospect of a new uprising looms large.

  • Will Myanmar’s Rebels Trouble Bangladesh’s Borders?

    Will Myanmar’s Rebels Trouble Bangladesh’s Borders?

    Bangladesh shares its land borders with only two nations: India and Myanmar. While political uncertainty prevails under an interim government taking an anti-India stance, much of the focus has been directed towards the India-Bangladesh border. Yet, the more pressing and complex developments are unfolding along Bangladesh’s southeastern frontier with Myanmar. This border region is increasingly dominated by the Arakan Army, an ethno-nationalist militant group rooted in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Known for its violent clashes with Islamist Rohingya factions and its contentious history with Bangladesh, the Arakan Army’s growing influence raises critical concerns. Could these escalating dynamics along the southeastern border exacerbate Bangladesh’s challenges further?

    Bangladesh and Myanmar are both mired in political instability. In Bangladesh, the removal of the democratically elected government has not yet threatened the country’s territorial integrity unlike Myanmar. However, with a new constitution proposed by the interim government. If the constitution manages to unite disparate groups—Islamists, students, and communists—stability could be maintained. If it fails, Bangladesh risks sliding into unrest, potentially mirroring Myanmar’s descent into chaos. Myanmar’s turmoil began with the military coup of February 2021, which overthrew the democratically elected government. The coup ignited mass protests that escalated into a widespread uprising, especially in ethnic minority areas. Opposition to the junta has formed alliances between ethnic armed groups and civilian-led defense forces, leaving the country deeply fragmented, with regions under the control of various militias.

    In recent months, opposition forces have gained significant ground against Myanmar’s junta, securing control over extensive territories, particularly in northern Shan State and Rakhine State in the west. Among these groups, the Arakan Army (AA) has made notable advances, seizing dozens of townships and military outposts over the past 15 months. The group’s expanding influence and unrelenting momentum have fueled speculation about its long-term objectives. The AA operates as the armed wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA), a political organization representing the Buddhist population of western Rakhine State. Both the AA and the ULA have expressed a commitment to establishing an autonomous region in Rakhine that includes both the Buddhist Rakhine and the Muslim communities. For now, the AA appears focused on driving the Myanmar military out of Rakhine State. However, regarding the region’s political future, the group remains deliberately ambiguous, leaving open the possibility of pursuing an independent nation.

    The future of tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar may largely depend on the Arakan Army’s evolving alliances and interests. While the group was once linked to China, its current ties with Beijing appear diminished, even though China remains the most influential external actor in Myanmar. Some Islamist factions claim the Arakan Army is now aligned with India, although this is questionable given the group’s previous opposition to India-backed projects in Rakhine and the limited influence India exerts over them. Pakistan, despite its weakened state, could exploit the situation by backing Islamist narratives. Such actions might position the Arakan Army as a threat to Islam, potentially provoking Islamist groups to launch attacks in Myanmar or use Rohingya Muslims as a proxy force—escalating into broader conflict. The United States also has an interest in the region, seeking to counter India’s dominance in the Bay of Bengal.

    Bangladesh’s political trajectory will also play a pivotal role. If it transforms into an Islamic republic, its stance on the Rohingya issue may shift toward open support, potentially exacerbating regional tensions. 

    At the same time, The Arakan Army, as it consolidates control over border areas, appears poised to deepen engagement with both Bangladesh and India, aiming to reduce its reliance on central Myanmar and establish stronger regional footholds.

    It goes without saying that both Bangladesh and Myanmar stand at a pivotal crossroads. These already fragile states, fractured by internal strife, appear poised for even deeper disintegration in the days ahead. As interested players—be they nation-states or other insurgent groups—maneuver to advance their agendas, they will exploit these divisions. The resulting tensions seem destined to escalate into outright conflict, likely sooner rather than later.

  • The Sixties, Revisited: How Bangladesh Found Its Echoes

    The Sixties, Revisited: How Bangladesh Found Its Echoes

    Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, stands as an undeniable military and diplomatic victory for India. The small yet densely populated country emerged amidst escalating tensions between India and Pakistan, culminating in the 1971 war, which claimed countless lives on both sides. Despite securing victory, India faced significant geopolitical challenges. The United States and China aligned with Pakistan, isolating India on the international stage. Furthermore, the war drained India of substantial resources and finances, contributing to the eventual decline of its then-leader, Indira Gandhi. However, India gained a strategic ally in the East, easing threats on its eastern flank and allowing a concentrated focus on its borders with Pakistan and China.

    Now, 50 years after Bangladesh’s independence, the tides seem to be turning. In Bangladesh, Bangla nationalism has been sidelined, anti-India sentiment is on the rise, minorities face increasing persecution, and Islamism is regaining ground. It feels like a scene from Back to the Future, where someone travels back in time and creates an alternate history—perhaps one where Pakistan won over India in the 1971 war. 

    Pakistan was carved out of British India in 1947, encompassing Muslim-majority regions under the demand of Islamists, with religion as the sole basis for division. Present-day Bangladesh, then East Bengal, joined the state of Pakistan. However, the people of West Pakistan and East Pakistan were vastly different in ethnicity, language, customs, food, and culture. There was no leadership capable of uniting these two distinct regions. Eventually, West Pakistan reduced East Pakistan to the status of a colony. The West treated the East’s people as second-class citizens, humiliating them for their color, height, language, and food. This discrimination sparked a political revolution in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League, which championed Bangla nationalism. Tensions escalated into violent conflicts with Islamists and the Pakistani army during the 1960s, culminating in bloody years.

    As refugees poured into India due to the humanitarian crisis, India decided to intervene, leading to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. India’s victory gave rise to Bangladesh, a new nation in South Asia.

    Yet, peace remained out of reach. The lingering influence of Islamism fueled unrest, while competing ideologies, such as communism, began to take root. Foreign powers, from the United States to China, advanced their own agendas in the region, leaving Bangladesh weighed down by overpopulation and entrenched poverty. Despite signs of progress under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership in the 21st century, rising accusations of authoritarianism cast a shadow over her rule. Like many other Islamic nations grappling with internal strife, the political landscape unraveled, ultimately driving her into exile.

    Bangladesh appears to be drifting into anarchy, a state that seems woven into its history. The current interim government looks confused and uncertain about the direction it should take. Everything the country achieved after the 1970s, including its vision and progress, has been effectively dismantled. The people now harbor resentment towards their founding figure, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who led Bangladesh to independence by fighting against Pakistan and Islamists. They despise the Awami League, the party that once brought prosperity to the country. Anti-India sentiment is pervasive; they reject being overshadowed by India, even though they lack the capacity to thrive independently. Social media fuels this hostility, spreading hatred toward India and Hindus, with extreme acts like placing Indian flags on the floor as doormats. Bangladesh seems to be revisiting the chaos of the 1960s, an era marked by Islamist dominance, student-driven anarchy, and rampant anti-Indian propaganda

    They have seemingly traveled through time, reaching a point where their path diverged into an independent Bangladesh. But where are they headed now? Islamism is the only unifying factor left in the country. Will they return to Pakistan? No chance—Pakistan has collapsed, and joining it would only make matters worse. Could they become a pro-Western country, as some, like Yunus, hope? That too seems impossible, as Islamism currently drives the nation. Nor can they become Chinese satellites.

    Bangladesh is unable to direct its own path independently. Its economy is in tatters, and it remains highly vulnerable to even minor climate shifts. The country can rely only on India, given the shared border and India’s relative strength in the region. But relying on India, while fostering intense anti-India sentiment, could plunge the country back into anarchy.

    The nation appears stuck, confused, and without direction. The only hope for Bangladesh’s future is the rise of a strong leader, like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the 1960s, who can guide the country toward a clear vision

  • A Fragile State: Bangladesh’s Deepening Divide

    A Fragile State: Bangladesh’s Deepening Divide

    Bangladesh, like many republics in the Islamic world, seems to be descending into complete anarchy and escalating communal conflict. A popular uprising in August, driven by calls for “true democracy,” toppled the secular government, and the “Revolutionaries” gradually paved the way for an Islamic populist regime. This familiar pattern recalls the Arab Spring. Today, Bangladesh is under the control of an interim government with significant Islamist influence, actively dismantling the progress achieved by its secular predecessors. The interim leadership, which views neighboring India as an enemy, has allowed the Hindu community in the state to become a target. Minorities, labeled as threats by the Islamists, face escalating persecution. Their leaders are imprisoned on trumped-up charges, and even Muslims who dare to defend Hindu rights are targeted. As a state forged from a blend of irreconcilable ideologies, Bangladesh now stands under grave threat, with the deepening divide between communities and politics intensifying.

    Born out of tensions between India and Pakistan, Bangladesh has long been caught in a tug of war between these two nations. Domestic politics have been shaped by parties aligned either with India or Pakistan. While the government in Dhaka has generally supported India, Islamist and Pakistan-backed parties have stirred turmoil, and vice versa. In the past decade, Sheikh Hasina, supported by India, led the administration and targeted Islamists, many of whom ended up in prison. Under her leadership, the country experienced rapid economic growth and became a model for development. However, much like the Arab Spring, anti-Hasina forces reignited Islamic politics to unite the people. As left-wing groups joined the movement, Hasina lost control and fled to India. The people celebrated her downfall, intruding into her official residence and taking her personal belongings, including her underwear. Hasina’s flight to India angered both Islamists and left-wing groups, fueling even more animosity toward India. While Pakistan has remained less active, its Islamist political factions have exploited this anger to their advantage. As a result, Bangladesh’s identity—a unique blend of Islamic and Bengali identity that once defined the country—now seems overshadowed by a growing Islamic identity. Islamists are turning against the foundational principles of Bangladesh, rejecting the vision of those who fought for independence from Pakistan and championed a nationalism rooted in Bengali identity, not Islamic unity. The interim government now aims to establish a new identity, erasing the legacy of India’s support in the struggle for independence, the founding leaders, and the founding political party. This marks the end of old Bangladesh and the emergence of a new Bangladesh that has no past.

    It is clear that an Islamic Bangladesh is on the horizon, sparking tensions over the treatment of minorities, particularly the Hindu community and its relationship with India. The Hindu community, once supported by the Hasina government, served as a bridge between India and Bangladesh. With the Islamists coming to power, the community now fears they will be targeted and persecuted. Reports of violence against Hindus during the protests that led to Hasina’s ouster were widespread. Initially, it seemed that the interim government, formed under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus with guidance from the West, had brought things under control and would protect minorities. However, that peace was short-lived. As people’s lives descended into greater turmoil under the new leadership, minorities once again became targets, with many believing they are anti-national. Hindu leaders and organizations in the country are increasingly targeted, and the arrest of prominent figure and leader of the Hindu organization ISKCON, Chinmoy Krishna Das, further escalated tensions.

    The interim government is drafting new policies and a constitution before the elections that will shape Bangladesh’s future. It is clear that more Islamic elements will be included, despite the current constitution recognizing Islam as the state religion while adopting secularism as a policy. The call to remove secularism has already gained traction. Anti-Hasina protests are driving the interim government, and prolonging its rule will likely ignite riots against them. Jamaat-e-Islami, strengthened after Hasina’s ouster, aims to establish an Islamic republic. Khaleda Zia, the former prime minister, is likely to try to regain power, while left-wing student movements, influenced by the West, may push for another revolution. Bangla nationalists remain active and could revive their efforts if the interim government fails. If the persecution of Hindus continues, India may intervene. Tough days lie ahead for Bangladesh, and uniting all these factions will be a significant challenge. Without that unity, Bangladesh faces the threat of collapse.

  • Why Is South Asia So Involved in the Israel-Palestine Conflict?

    Why Is South Asia So Involved in the Israel-Palestine Conflict?

    There are countless problems to be fixed in the poor South Asian countries, including India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Nepal. Even though they have different positions and perspectives, they all struggle with poor living conditions, lack of employment, corruption, political dynasties, and more. While these issues dominate the daily lives of their populations, they are increasingly focused on a different concern: the Israel-Palestine conflict, which they seem to adopt as their own. In India, society is divided between pro-Israel and pro-Palestine supporters, and it has become a heated topic in Pakistan, where pro-Israel sentiment is almost unthinkable, but people have taken to the streets in support of Palestine. On September 29, pro-Hezbollah protesters clashed with police in the streets of Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city, after demonstrators attempted to reach the U.S. Consulate. The police fired tear gas as protesters threw stones and attempted to breach barriers. A similar wave of unrest is also rising in Bangladesh. Why? Why are these countries so deeply involved in this conflict?

    The answer is clear and specific: religion. South Asia is deeply intertwined with religion. Both the population and administration are heavily influenced by religious beliefs. The region, which is the birthplace of prominent religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism, is also home to around 600 million Muslims. Clashes between followers of Indian religions and Islam, as well as intra-Islamic conflicts, are common in these countries. Since Palestine is an emotional issue for Muslims globally, it has always featured prominently in South Asian society and politics. The Islamic countries in the region—Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives – harbor strong animosity toward Israel. Every incident in Gaza and the West Bank brings people to the streets, sparking anti-Israel protests. Calls for tougher actions by their governments against Israel, as well as protests against Western embassies and consulates, are common in these nations. Fundamentalist and terrorist groups unite in their anti-Israel stance, advocating for the boycott of Israeli products. Politicians in these countries are often reluctant to engage with Israeli officials because, regardless of their achievements, they risk being labeled as anti-religious or anti-national. The ongoing events in Gaza and Lebanon have further fueled hatred towards Israel among the population. Many Pakistanis believe that, as a nuclear power, Pakistan could do more to support groups fighting the holy war against Israel by supplying weapons, and they are willing to join the fight. A similar sentiment prevails in Bangladesh. Many believe that if the current conflict escalates into regional wars, people from Pakistan and Bangladesh, who are largely poor, unemployed, but deeply religious, could be recruited by these groups.

    In India, the situation is more complex. The socialist, communist, and Islamist parties, which rely on the votes of the more than 15 million-strong Muslim population, have consistently raised the Israel-Palestine issue in the public sphere. The Indian National Congress (INC), the grand old socialist party that led the government for most of independent India’s history, supported the two-state solution, recognizing both Israel and Palestine. However, the party and its government gave a clear preference to Palestine and its leaders, who were often celebrated as revolutionaries, with the Indian media also contributing to India’s pro-Palestine stance.

    However, when Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party, came to power in 2014, the situation changed dramatically. While the government did not abandon the two-state solution, it shifted away from its pro-Palestine stance and gave more support to Israel. Modi, who developed a personal friendship with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, strengthened the relationship on a national level as well. Consequently, the Indian government became more aggressive in countering pro-Palestine narratives, promoting India’s historical ties with Jews, and pushing a more pro-Israel perspective.

    Cities in India that once saw massive rallies in solidarity with Palestine now witness almost no demonstrations for the cause. As the public became more educated about the Israel-Palestine conflict from its roots, many began to see Palestine as primarily an Islamist issue. As a result, Islamist organizations in India no longer receive the widespread public support they once did, causing significant disappointment among the country’s Muslim population

    This evolving landscape of distrust and fundamentalism has become another major concern in the region. South Asia has no direct connection to the Israel-Palestine conflict beyond religious ties, but it is now causing further divisions within societies, most visibly in India. India’s shifting stance towards Israel has generated significant discontent among its Islamic neighbors, causing their hatred for Israel to also evolve into hostility towards India. This is clearly evident in social media spaces, where Indian groups and those from neighboring Islamic countries are often in conflict. As always, this deepens the divisions within societies that are already fractured by religious views. Therefore, we can say that, aside from Israel and its immediate neighbors, South Asia is also heating up under the mounting tensions between Israel and Hezbollah.

  • Why Is the Bangladesh Interim Government Delaying Elections?

    Why Is the Bangladesh Interim Government Delaying Elections?

    Bangladesh was spared from further anarchy by the formation of an interim government under the leadership of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. This is not the first time the country, with its relatively short history, has experienced mass protests, government cancellations, and temporary administrations. However, the current interim government, which includes a chief adviser, 19 advisers, and two special assistants to the chief adviser, faces the critical task of conducting a snap election while the country remains volatile.

    The task assigned to Yunus is far from straightforward. Organizing an election in an overpopulated and economically strained country involves numerous challenges. The political landscape is turbulent, with a substantial number of Awami League supporters still present. Sheikh Hasina’s party, which upholds the legacy of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh, remains influential and is likely to regain support due to its strong foundation. Meanwhile, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is reasserting its presence, and the release of Islamist leaders has bolstered Jamaat-e-Islami – a party dedicated to Islamizing Bangladesh. Jamaat-e-Islami has emerged as a key player in the protests, with its student wing being particularly active, and is anticipated to benefit significantly from the unrest that led to Hasina’s removal.

    Additionally, it is unclear whether India, Bangladesh’s largest supporter and contributor, will cooperate, especially given the strained relations following attacks on the Hindu population in Bangladesh. The prospect of an election is further complicated by ongoing flood conditions, which continue to afflict the population.

    Chief Advisor Yunus office has stated that a free and fair election will be held once reforms are implemented in the election commission, judiciary, civil administration, and security forces. In a televised address on August 25, Yunus announced that the interim government has begun taking corrective measures  to restore public trust in state institutions. However, reforming Bangladesh’s institutions is a massive task for the interim government, which must first address the deep entrenchment of Awami League influence after over 15 years of uninterrupted rule. And the interim government has yet to present a clear outline of its proposed reforms, according to the chief advisor’s office.

    Certainly, there is pressure on the interim government, but it’s still too early to assess the specific reforms it will pursue. Since its members are unaffiliated with any political party or group, internal conflicts are likely.  If it fails to establish itself, especially through concrete reform initiatives, it could soon face a crisis of legitimacy. Although its primary mandate is to hold elections, if the interim government views itself as a revolutionary force, delaying the polls might not be a major concern.

    This interim government differs significantly from previous caretaker governments. In the past, actions taken by interim administrations were often reversed by the subsequent democratically elected government. However, this interim government has come to power as a result of a revolution. Despite not being elected and therefore unable to directly reflect public demand, it has already introduced considerable chaos. To successfully implement reforms, gaining the consensus of all political parties is essential, and the interim government may need to be given reasonable time to hold the election.

    Rushing toward polls could empower existing, entrenched political actors who have little motivation to pursue structural reforms. In discussions about forming the interim government after Hasina’s departure, Bangladesh’s army chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, met with the BNP, Jatiya Party, and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, but the Bangladesh Awami League was notably absent from the meeting.
    So, There are valid reasons for the government to delay the election, such as cooling political tensions, stabilizing political institutions, addressing the political party dynamics, and improving relations with India. However, some believe that delaying the election is part of Yunus and his sponsors’ agenda. The interim government has expressed plans to rewrite the constitution and pursue other reforms, which may lead to further agenda-pushing by interested parties and potentially another wave of mass protests.

  • Is India Responsible for Bangladesh Floods?

    Is India Responsible for Bangladesh Floods?

    Bangladesh, a densely populated country grappling with political uncertainties, was severely impacted by a massive flood that worsened over the weekend, affecting more than five million people. Flooding is common during the monsoon season in Bangladesh, which is situated at the delta of two major rivers, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, along with numerous smaller rivers that flow into them or directly into the Bay of Bengal. However, this flood has garnered special attention due to accusations from netizens, the media, and some Bangladeshi politicians who blame India, claiming that the opening of large dams on rivers flowing into Bangladesh caused the disaster. This situation has strained relations between Bangladesh and India, despite both governments’ reluctance to escalate the issue, and it is clear that it has already harmed public perception in both countries.

    Photo Credit: Banglapedia

    Many districts in eastern Bangladesh have experienced severe flooding, one of the worst in the country’s history. Images and videos show widespread suffering in submerged areas, with all low-lying regions underwater. Public outrage has been directed at India after a viral video on social media purportedly showed water being released from the Dumbur Dam in Tripura, blaming it for the floods. However, the video actually shows the Srisailam Dam in Telangana, a southern Indian state. The Dumbur Dam, which has been accused by Bangladeshi media as the cause of the flooding, is situated on the transboundary Gomati River and is approximately 120 kilometers from the Bangladesh border. This river flows from Tripura in northeastern India into eastern Bangladesh, eventually merging with the Meghna River. Although the flow of water in the river has increased, India has stated that no floodgates were deliberately opened; rather, excess water from the Gomti reservoir was automatically released once it reached full capacity. India later clarified that while the water from the Gomti contributes to the flooding, the seasonal floods are primarily attributed to climate-related factors.

    The impact is severe because Bangladesh’s low-lying, densely populated areas are highly vulnerable to flooding. As the Dumbur Dam video went viral, Bangladeshis became concerned about other Indian dams that block rivers flowing into Bangladesh, fearing they might be used by India to cause flooding. While India argues that these dams actually protect low-lying Bangladesh from floods – common during the heavy monsoon rains when rivers swell – severe flooding in Bangladesh results when these swollen rivers meet India’s major rivers, which carry water from up to 2,000 kilometers away, including regions in India and Tibet. Interestingly, the longstanding dispute between Bangladesh and India over the Farakka Barrage focuses not on flooding but on the reduced water flow to Bangladesh.

    Since Wednesday night, the flooding has significantly worsened, submerging 11 districts and large areas of a city with nearly 1.5 million residents. Various groups are exploiting the crisis for their own agendas. Islamic factions opposed to India are spreading misinformation, blaming India for the suffering and loss of life, and inciting protests that have contributed to the fall of the Hasina government. Political parties, driven by anti-India sentiment, have joined the protests, and students, mostly millennials who are not influenced by the emotional legacy of the 1971 war and the nation’s founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, are also expressing their frustration against India. Meanwhile, the Indian media is using the situation to advance anti-Bangladesh agendas, highlighting anti-Hindu and anti-India protests in Bangladesh to foster Hindu unity and increase animosity towards Islam in India.

    While India is being blamed for the crisis, Bangladesh, a climate-vulnerable country, is struggling to address the real causes. Under an interim government, it is challenging to implement effective climate policies or manage the situation, especially with elections delayed and an uncertain future ahead. If Bangladesh fails to confront its vulnerabilities and address the realities of its situation, it will face one of the most significant humanitarian crises.

  • How Foreign Influence Shapes Bangladesh?

    How Foreign Influence Shapes Bangladesh?

    Even though Bangladesh claims a constructed identity of Islamic Bangla, it is actually a product of conflict between the region’s superpowers, India and Pakistan. This former part of Pakistan became an independent state in 1971 with the intervention of India. The conflict nearly escalated into a world war, as Pakistan received strong support from the United States, while the Soviet Union aligned with India. Even after independence, Bangladesh has remained entangled in power politics, with foreign powers interfering and causing various political incidents, including assassinations, coups, and student protests. Political analysts point to this foreign interference as a cause of the recent wave of protests that led to the toppling of the government. Why is Bangladesh subject to such interference, and who is making it prone to unrest?

    Bangladesh, a small and densely populated country, has highly congested living conditions. A spark can lead to mass unrest that can affect the administration in Dhaka. This is why Bangladesh is often in turmoil, with mass mob actions being common, making it susceptible to foreign interference. India’s and Pakistan’s involvement in Bangladesh stems from their mutual fears. India is particularly concerned that any instability in Bangladesh could destabilize its eastern regions. Since Bangladesh shares the majority of its border with India, any conflict within Bangladesh could result in a significant influx of refugees into India, posing substantial political and economic challenges. Many districts in India have become Muslim-majority due to this influx, leading to cultural tensions as Hindus and tribal communities feel outnumbered. Many immigrants to India are reportedly attracted to Islamist organizations and become radicalized. Consequently, India has consistently supported Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League party to stabilize the country and its borders and promote cultural ties. Through this alliance, India has emphasized a Bangla identity over an Islamist identity, enhancing cultural exchange between Bangladesh and the Indian state of Bengal.

    Pakistan, which lost the war with India and was forced to grant independence to Bangladesh, has never given up on the country. They have attempted to disrupt Bangladesh’s growing ties with India by supporting the anti-Indian Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its leader, Khaleda Zia. While India has promoted a Bangla identity, Pakistan has pushed for an Islamic identity and anti-Indian propaganda. Pakistan also supported Jamaat-e-Islami, an organization advocating for the Islamization of the Indian subcontinent, which has worked to promote Islamic values in Bangladesh. Many accuse the recent riots that led to Sheikh Hasina’s ousting of being influenced by Pakistan-supported Islamic factions. Indian media have reported on these accusations and are investigating whether the riots involved persecution of minorities in Bangladesh.

    India and Pakistan are not the only interested parties in Bangladesh. The United States and the UK, which did not support Bangladesh’s independence and even opposed India for backing it, are also implicated according to some political analysts. Sheikh Hasina has consistently blocked U.S. attempts to acquire St. Martin’s Island, which was reportedly part of a U.S. plan to establish a military base and boost its military dominance in the region. Some believe that the United Kingdom has plans to create a Christian nation in the Indian subcontinent while forming a Muslim nation elsewhere, and sees an opportunity in Bangladesh. Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which have supported Islamist factions in Bangladesh, have helped to bolster the Islamic identity of the country. China, which seeks to reduce India’s dominance in the Bay of Bengal, also disapproves of Hasina’s alignment with India and has therefore been accused of intervening in Bangladesh as well.

    Bangladesh is currently in a transitional phase, and foreign countries are closely watching the situation. Despite previous authoritarian tendencies during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, Bangladesh has recorded growth and emerged from India’s shadow. It will be interesting to see what Bangladesh will be like after Hasina. The country is now under an interim government led by Younus, who has the support of the West. The upcoming election will be a battleground for various parties with different agendas and foreign influences. If Bangladesh cannot form a strong government, foreign interference will likely continue.