Tag: China

  • In the Shadow of Tariffs, Xi Makes His Rounds—But ASEAN Still Pins Its Hopes on the US

    In the Shadow of Tariffs, Xi Makes His Rounds—But ASEAN Still Pins Its Hopes on the US

    Southeast Asia, a region home to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies and crucial manufacturing hubs, has long been heavily reliant on the U.S. market. But in the last few weeks, the sweeping tariffs introduced by the Trump administration have created significant challenges for countries in the region, leaving businesses in trouble and governments facing growing economic instability.

    Amid this backdrop, President Xi Jinping arrived in Vietnam on Monday, marking the beginning of a diplomatic tour through Southeast Asia that will also take him to Malaysia and Cambodia. Chinese officials have marked the visit as being of major importance, reflecting Beijing’s desire to cement its influence in the region.

    Although China may not have the capacity to fully replace the U.S. in business, it is positioning itself as a more stable and reliable economic partner. Xi’s visit aims to reinforce this perception, portraying China as a dependable force aligned with the region’s development priorities. While ASEAN nations (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) deepen ties with Beijing, they continue to seek business relations with the U.S. and are open to compromise by fostering more dialogue and addressing trade imbalances, making the diplomatic talks in the region particularly interesting to watch.

    China: A Stable Partner

    Vietnam, a manufacturing hub, and Cambodia, where the garment and footwear industries are vital to the economy, were hit hard by U.S. tariffs—set at 46% and 49%, respectively—chosen by Xi for his visit. Washington’s approach has raised concerns in these countries. During Xi Jinping’s visit, China is expected to position itself as a stable and reliable partner, deliberately contrasting itself with the U.S., which has imposed—and then suspended—punitive tariffs. On Monday, China is likely to sign numerous agreements with Vietnam, including potential investments and cooperation on developing the country’s railway infrastructure, emphasizing a partnership built on worth and trust.

    Throughout Xi’s tour, China will likely present itself as the responsible guardian of a rules-based trade system, portraying the United States as an unpredictable force undermining established trade ties. While the meetings may not result in significant, tangible agreements, their symbolic weight is expected to be substantial

    Troubles with China

    Many experts argue that Southeast Asia’s businesses need to diversify and expand their trade relations with major economies like China, Europe, and India, as a way to mitigate the effects of U.S. trade policies from the Trump era. While these economies may not fully replace the U.S. market, the shift is vital for businesses that are heavily reliant on exports and have small, vulnerable domestic markets. Gaining access to larger economies provides a necessary lifeline for sustaining growth.

    However, turning toward China and other major economies presents its own set of challenges. Southeast Asian nations find themselves not only competing with China for market access and production opportunities but also grappling with complex geopolitical tensions. The South China Sea, in particular, remains a flashpoint, with several ASEAN countries embroiled in territorial disputes with China. For nations like Vietnam, which have been outspoken in their opposition to China’s actions in the region, balancing the pursuit of economic ties with the need to safeguard national interests adds a layer of diplomatic complexity.

    While confusion persists about U.S. trade policies, there are growing concerns in Southeast Asia that the 145% U.S. tariff on Chinese goods could lead to a flood of inexpensive Chinese exports into neighboring countries, jeopardizing local industries. According to Chinese customs data, ASEAN countries were the largest recipients of Chinese exports last year. Vietnam, which competes with and often mirrors China in various industries, could struggle if Chinese products flood the market. With U.S. exports accounting for 30% of Vietnam’s GDP, Hanoi needs them and is keen to avoid antagonizing Washington by aligning with China, particularly as it seeks relief from a new 46% tariff. As a result, the likelihood of Vietnam aligning closely with China following Xi Jinping’s visit has diminished.

    In a bid to mend relations and eliminate tariffs, Vietnam sent Deputy Prime Minister Ho Duc Phoc to Washington, offered to remove tariffs on U.S. imports, and pledged to purchase more American goods, including in defense. Simultaneously, Vietnam is tightening export controls, cracking down on Chinese goods funneled through its territory, and limiting sensitive exports to China, particularly dual-use items like semiconductors. Vietnam remains hopeful that the U.S. will respond positively.

    What happens next?

    For most ASEAN nations, preserving strong economic ties with the United States remains a central priority, prompting many to actively pursue relief from mounting tariff pressures. In this context, Xi Jinping’s regional tour marks a calculated bid by Beijing to blunt Washington’s expanding influence—particularly through arms deals and trade negotiations aimed at easing tariff penalties tied to trade imbalances.

    Xi is expected to extend offers of strategic partnerships, backed by infrastructure investments and deeper political engagement, presenting China as a stable and dependable counterweight to the U.S. In return, Beijing seeks to safeguard its access to Southeast Asian markets and cultivate diplomatic goodwill that could translate into increased backing in international forums. At its core, China’s strategy is to prevent ASEAN states from becoming strategic adversaries—and ideally, to draw them more firmly into its geopolitical orbit.

  • In Trump’s Expanding Trade War, China Is in No Hurry to Flinch

    In Trump’s Expanding Trade War, China Is in No Hurry to Flinch

    The trade war between the United States and China has cast aside any remaining illusion of measured diplomacy. What began as a calculated exchange of economic pressure has devolved into a bare-knuckled standoff—a battle of wills between two superpowers, neither prepared to retreat, both pushing toward a brink that threatens to destabilize the very architecture of global trade.

    Just hours after President Trump unveiled a sweeping 145 percent tariff increase on Chinese imports, Beijing retaliated with its own salvo: 125 percent tariffs on American goods, coupled with warnings that further reprisals were on the horizon. Chinese state media wasted no time in framing Trump’s tactics as doomed, dismissing the escalation as both futile and provocative—a declaration that China would not yield to economic pressure, no matter how intense.

    While Trump temporarily eased tariffs on several countries—capping them at 10 percent for a 90-day period—China was pointedly excluded. The message was unmistakable: this was no longer a dispute over trade imbalances or intellectual property, but a deeper ideological clash, rooted in national pride and rival visions of global dominance.

    What is unfolding now transcends economic policy; it is a confrontation of political identities. As the world’s manufacturing powerhouse and its most voracious consumer lock into a cycle of retaliatory measures, the ripple effects have pulled the global economy into the turbulence. Supply chains fracture, markets quiver, and the already fragile post–Cold War trade order teeters on collapse.

    In this high-stakes deadlock, compromise feels increasingly remote. Instead, we witness the slow constriction of a geopolitical vise—one that promises to reshape the foundations of the global economic order for generations to come.

    China doesn’t compromise

    President Trump continues to portray himself as a reluctant warrior in an escalating economic conflict, claiming that countries are “crying” for trade talks. Yet from Beijing’s perspective, the narrative looks far different—marked by rising defiance, not desperation. While Trump appears increasingly frustrated, China seems prepared for a drawn-out fight.

    On Thursday, China’s foreign ministry issued a pointed response. Spokesperson Lin Jian emphasized that although China does not seek confrontation, it will not back down if provoked. He made clear that Beijing would not be intimidated by U.S. threats, and predicted that Washington’s strategy would ultimately backfire.

    The Chinese commerce ministry adopted a more restrained tone, expressing a willingness to engage in dialogue. Still, it stressed the importance of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and cooperation built on shared benefit. At the same time, an editorial in the state-run China Daily removed any ambiguity—China would not yield to American pressure.

    For the first time since tensions reignited, President Xi Jinping addressed the dispute publicly. During a meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Xi stressed that trade wars benefit no one and that rejecting international norms would only lead to isolation. Still, he expressed confidence in China’s ability to withstand the pressure, stating that no matter the external challenges, the country would remain focused, steady, and committed to strengthening its domestic resilience.

    Global trade is bound to suffer

    WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala warned on Wednesday that the intensifying U.S.-China tariff war could reduce trade between the two countries by up to 80 percent. As their bilateral exchange represents around 3 percent of global trade, such a sharp decline could have serious consequences for the broader world economy.

    Chinese companies selling on Amazon are already preparing for sharp price increases in the U.S. market—or even a full withdrawal—due to the unprecedented effects of the tariffs, according to the head of China’s trade association. The fallout could reverberate globally, as any contraction in Chinese exports to the U.S. is likely to disrupt supply chains and reshape market dynamics around the world.

    Although China has reduced its dependency on the U.S. market over the years, the relationship remains economically significant. In 2024 alone, China exported nearly $440 billion worth of goods to the United States. Conversely, China is also a major destination for American exports, particularly agricultural commodities like soybeans and pork, as well as high-tech products.

    Whether a full economic decoupling between the two powers occurs will depend on how long the tit-for-tat tariff exchanges persist and whether the escalation remains confined to bilateral measures. In the meantime, some goods may be rerouted through third-party countries before reaching their intended markets in either China or the U.S., further complicating trade flows.

    Beijing, however, holds one key advantage: the U.S. is more reliant on Chinese imports than China is on U.S. exports. American imports from China are dominated by consumer products such as smartphones, computers, and toys. Analysts at Rosenblatt Securities predict that Trump’s tariffs—then standing at 54 percent—could raise the price of the cheapest iPhone in the U.S. from $799 to $1,142. Economist Diana Choyleva notes that Trump may struggle to shift blame to China for such cost increases.

    On the flip side, China’s imports from the U.S. are primarily industrial and manufacturing inputs, including fossil fuels, soybeans, and jet engines. These are less likely to affect Chinese consumers directly, as price increases in such sectors tend to be absorbed further upstream. However, any imbalance in global supply and demand for these commodities may still ripple across international markets, affecting everyday life in other countries.

    What happens next? 

    As neither side appears willing to act with restraint, both the U.S. and China seem to be seeking alliances elsewhere. While the U.S. may attract countries aligned with its economic interests, China is actively working to expand its trade relationships beyond the American sphere of influence—particularly with nations also affected by Trump’s tariffs.

    In talks with his Malaysian counterpart, China’s Commerce Minister Wang Wentao stressed Beijing’s commitment to strengthening cooperation within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He also met with the European Union’s trade and security commissioner on Tuesday, reaffirming China’s intent to deepen trade, investment, and industrial ties. Notably, China and the EU agreed to immediately resume talks on electric vehicle cooperation.

    What began as a bilateral trade dispute is now evolving into a sprawling global standoff, entangling international trade and politics in increasingly complex ways.

  • Bangladesh beckons China, offering a strategic foothold

    Bangladesh beckons China, offering a strategic foothold

    Bangladesh’s interim government has harbored resentment toward India from the outset, frequently expressing its hostility through political actions and rhetoric on social media. From symbolic gestures—such as placing Indian flags beneath their feet—to inflammatory online discourse, nationalist factions in Bangladesh regularly voice their disdain for India, despite its crucial role in the country’s independence.

    With relations with India strained and facing economic, demographic, and cultural challenges, Bangladesh has consistently sought external support. A decade ago, Pakistan might have been a viable ally, but its internal crises have rendered it ineffective. The West, which once backed efforts to unseat the Hasina government, now maintains its distance, wary of provoking Bangladesh’s growing Islamist factions. Russia, reluctant to jeopardize its strong ties with India, has similarly refrained from direct involvement—leaving China as the most viable alternative for Dhaka’s new leadership.

    As the geopolitical landscape of South Asia shifts, Beijing is steadily entrenching itself in Bangladesh, weaving a web of economic and strategic entanglements that grant it a firmer grip on the Bay of Bengal. This maneuvering is more than a matter of regional diplomacy—it is a calibrated challenge to India’s long-standing influence, a quiet but deliberate push to reshape power dynamics in the subcontinent. For New Delhi, the implications are clear. The alignment between Dhaka and Beijing is not just a passing phase but a structural shift, one that threatens to redefine the balance of power. 

    Evolving Bilateral Cooperation with China

    After meeting with Muhammad Yunus, the leader of Bangladesh’s interim government, Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to deepening bilateral ties, emphasizing China’s readiness to elevate cooperation with Bangladesh. According to Yunus office, the trip secured $2.1 billion in Chinese investments, loans, and grants.

    A substantial portion of this funding is earmarked for establishing a Chinese Industrial Economic Zone (CIEZ) in Bangladesh, with nearly 30 Chinese companies pledging $1 billion to the project. This aligns with Yunus push for increased private Chinese investment in Bangladesh’s manufacturing sector.

    Additionally, China plans to provide a $400 million loan to modernize Mongla, Bangladesh’s second-largest port. Further cooperation on projects like Mongla’s modernization and the potential Teesta River initiative is drawing Bangladesh deeper into China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Discussions also covered water resource management, and Beijing reaffirmed its support for Bangladesh’s efforts to repatriate over a million Rohingya refugees still living in overcrowded camps after fleeing persecution in Myanmar.

    For Bangladesh’s interim government, Yunus meeting with Xi was a significant diplomatic breakthrough. While many countries remain hesitant to engage in large-scale agreements with an interim administration, China has shown no such reservations, actively reviving ties that had remained stagnant since the previous government’s fall.

    However, a pressing concern is the widening trade imbalance. Bangladesh’s exports to China, primarily textiles, account for only a fraction of the $23 billion bilateral trade volume. In response, China has granted zero-tariff market access to Bangladeshi products, creating new opportunities for industries such as leather goods. Agricultural exports, including mangoes and jackfruits, are already in the pipeline, with the potential for further expansion into China’s vast agricultural market.

    Yet, concerns persist over the nature of Chinese investments. Unlike Western economic partnerships, Chinese funding often comes with minimal social or environmental safeguards, raising questions about how much Bangladesh’s labor force and broader population will truly benefit from these deals.

    Worsening Bilateral Cooperation with India

    India maintained a strong relationship with Sheikh Hasina’s government, but her departure has disrupted cross-border ties. This shift became evident when Muhammad Yunus chose China for his first state visit, despite reports suggesting that he initially sought to visit New Delhi first.

    According to Yunus press secretary, Shafiqul Alam, the interim government had formally requested a bilateral visit to India as early as December last year—weeks before finalizing the trip to China. However, India did not respond favorably. Meanwhile, speculation remains that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, known for his Hindu nationalist stance, may explore engagement with the Yunus administration, despite growing allegations of violence against Hindu minorities.

    Analysts suggest that Bangladesh’s interim government is aware of the strategic imperative to maintain stable relations with India. Bangladesh is equally important for India, both as a regional partner and a key player in maintaining stability in South Asia. Modi’s recent meeting with Yunus during a major regional summit underscored ongoing cooperation, and his Independence Day message to Bangladesh’s leadership reaffirmed the significance of strong bilateral ties.

    However, tensions persist, exacerbated by Hasina’s continued presence in India. The growing closeness between Yunus and China is likely to further strain relations, deepening the rift between Dhaka and New Delhi.

    Future of India-Bangladesh Relations

    Given the profound historical and cultural ties between the two nations, the restoration of diplomatic relations remains essential. Yet, the trajectory appears to be diverging. China’s chief interest in Bangladesh lies in its strategic position, a development that poses a considerable risk for India. The Bay of Bengal, a critical extension of the Indian Ocean, serves as India’s most secure maritime domain, anchoring key naval installations along its eastern seaboard.

    India’s vulnerability is further compounded by the narrow corridor that connects its mainland to the landlocked northeastern states, a passage running along the Bangladesh border. Any shift in Bangladesh’s geopolitical stance could disrupt India’s regional security strategy. Yunus recent remarks on the issue have heightened concerns in India, fueling growing hostility toward the Bangladeshi government. Meanwhile, similar apprehensions are reportedly rising in Dhaka, further deepening the divide.

    India may choose to hold off on any decisive diplomatic moves until after Bangladesh’s elections, with Modi likely to steer clear of direct engagement until a new government is formally in place in Dhaka.

  • Can East Asia Set Aside Old Rivalries to Forge a New Economic Order?

    Can East Asia Set Aside Old Rivalries to Forge a New Economic Order?

    While East Asia remains divided into two camps—one aligned with the U.S. and the other with China—recent developments have sparked speculation about a striking possibility: that the region’s economic giants—China, Japan, and South Korea—could set aside their long-standing rivalries to forge a new economic order. Such an alliance could emerge as a formidable force in Asia, challenging the U.S.-led global system and reshaping the balance of power.

    This idea gained traction after reports from China, initially shared by a social media account affiliated with Chinese state media and later picked up by major outlets like DW, captured widespread interest. As the world focuses on Trump’s escalating tariff threats, East Asian nations—long dependent on trade with the U.S. and deeply embedded in global production and innovation networks—find themselves particularly exposed.

    Despite historical tensions and political differences, Trump’s tariff war is increasingly seen as a common economic challenge. His policies, which make no distinction between allies and adversaries, aim to restore manufacturing to the U.S. or at least rebalance trade—a strategy that threatens to further slow growth in these East Asian economies.

    Amid this uncertainty, diplomatic engagements among these nations have taken on greater significance. Meetings that might have once drawn routine attention are now closely scrutinized, with Chinese reports of closer cooperation between these states gaining widespread recognition.

    The meeting in Seoul

    While the world was waiting for Trump’s Liberation Day announcements on new tariff rates, a pivotal meeting took place in Seoul. China, Japan, and South Korea came together to strengthen trade cooperation, bringing together South Korean Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun, Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Yoji Muto, and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao.

    In a joint statement released after the meeting, the three trade ministers committed to advancing comprehensive and high-level negotiations on a South Korea-Japan-China free trade agreement, aiming to bolster both regional and global trade, as reported by DW.

    South Korean Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun emphasized the need to reinforce the implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), in which all three nations participate. He also highlighted the importance of creating a framework to expand trade cooperation through Korea-China-Japan FTA negotiations.

    The countries further pledged to foster a stable and predictable trade and investment environment. Ahn pointed to the increasing fragmentation of the global economic landscape, stressing the necessity of collective efforts to tackle shared challenges.

    As part of their ongoing collaboration, the ministers agreed to hold their next meeting in Japan.

    Trump’s tariffs

    As Donald Trump announced new tariffs on Wednesday, East Asia is set to bear the brunt of the economic repercussions. A base tariff of 10% has been introduced, and in a bid to rebalance trade, China, Japan, and South Korea will face even steeper taxes, with no exceptions made for U.S. allies.

    Chinese imports will now be subject to a total tariff of 54%, combining a newly imposed 34% tariff with the existing 20%. Key U.S. partners have not been spared—South Korea will be hit with a 26% tariff, while Japan will face a 24% rate. The base tariffs will take effect on April 5, with the higher reciprocal rates coming into force on April 9.

    Adding to the economic strain, new tariffs on automobiles and auto parts have been introduced, delivering a heavy blow to the manufacturing sectors of China, Japan, and South Korea. As home to some of the world’s largest automakers, these nations rely heavily on their automotive industries, making the new trade barriers a serious threat to their economic stability.

    Obstacles outweigh potential?

    While the economic benefits of closer cooperation are real, the challenges outweigh the advantages. Generational animosity between these nations remains strong, and domestic politics in each country often thrives on such rivalries. Closer collaboration could destabilize the already fragile political landscapes of Japan and South Korea, both of which face significant internal challenges. Additionally, the ideological divide between China’s communist government and Japan and South Korea’s democracies raises further concerns about compatibility.

    Another major obstacle is the deep-rooted geopolitical ties—Japan and South Korea’s strong alliances with the U.S. contrast sharply with North Korea’s alignment with China. Both Tokyo and Seoul receive substantial economic and security support from Washington, and any shift toward deeper cooperation with China could put them in a difficult position. Trump, known for his retaliatory economic policies, could respond unfavorably to such a move.

    Amid these complexities, a report from a social media account affiliated with Chinese state media on Monday claimed that China, Japan, and South Korea had agreed on a joint response to U.S. tariffs. However, Seoul dismissed the claim as exaggerated, and Tokyo outright denied that such discussions took place. A spokesperson for South Korea’s trade ministry stated that the assertion was overstated and pointed to the official text of the countries’ joint statement.

    At a press conference on Tuesday, Japan’s Trade Minister Yoji Muto acknowledged that the trade ministers had met over the weekend but clarified that no such discussions had occurred. He described the meeting as a general exchange of views rather than a coordinated economic response. Yes, the fear is real.

    What if major economies join forces?

    According to the IMF, China is the world’s second-largest economy at $20 trillion, followed by Japan at $4 trillion and South Korea at $2 trillion. Together, they form a $26 trillion economy—larger than the European Union’s nominal GDP and nearing the $30 trillion U.S. economy. However, uniting these economic powerhouses remains a daunting challenge, despite their strong trade ties.

    Japan and South Korea depend on China for semiconductor raw materials, while China imports advanced chip products from both nations. Acknowledging this interdependence, all three countries have pledged to strengthen supply chain cooperation and expand discussions on export controls.

    At the Seoul meeting, trade ministers from China, Japan, and South Korea committed to expediting negotiations for a trilateral free trade agreement aimed at strengthening regional and global trade. A spokesperson for South Korea’s trade ministry stated that all three nations acknowledged evolving global trade dynamics and reaffirmed their dedication to ongoing economic cooperation.

    Some analysts speculate about the potential formation of an Asian economic bloc that includes ASEAN and India, creating a formidable economic force. However, deep-seated rivalries, competing strategic interests, and the ambitions of some leaders to establish an “Asian NATO” pose significant challenges, making full economic integration uncertain.

  • Is China Taking Over Uzbekistan?

    Is China Taking Over Uzbekistan?

    China, a major investor in global infrastructure, is often accused of using its financial power to bind countries to its influence, exploit resources, and bribe local politicians. Many nations have fallen into debt traps, ultimately ceding control of critical infrastructure to China—a form of economic colonization without territorial rule.

    This strategy is becoming increasingly visible in mineral-rich Central Asia. As Russia’s dominance in the region wanes, China is rapidly expanding its investments, securing access to natural resources, and integrating local economies into its business networks. In these poorly managed economies, Chinese influence is growing, raising concerns among citizens. However, with limited political opposition—reminiscent of Russia’s model—public frustration is largely channeled through social media.

    A Deep Relationship

    Although Uzbekistan and China do not share a border, their historical and economic ties run deep. The land and cities that now make up Uzbekistan were once integral to China’s ancient Silk Road, serving as key hubs of trade and cultural exchange. Today, this connection endures through modern diplomatic and economic frameworks between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

    China is Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, though this relationship has created a significant trade imbalance. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $13.8 billion, with Uzbekistan exporting only $2 billion worth of goods while importing $11.8 billion from China. Additionally, China is the country’s largest creditor—President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s administration, which has been borrowing heavily to fund economic modernization, now owes Beijing at least $3.8 billion.

    Beyond trade, cultural ties between the two nations have deepened through official agreements. Since 2017, China and Uzbekistan have engaged in cultural exchanges, including seminars, exhibitions, and performances. China has also contributed to the restoration of Uzbekistan’s cultural heritage sites, while Chinese and Uzbek state media collaborate on joint productions.

    Intensifying Anti-China Sentiment

    While the Uzbek government maintains strong ties with China at the official level, public sentiment tells a different story. Anti-Chinese sentiment is rising in Uzbekistan, driven by influential social media channels. In February, reports surfaced alleging that Chinese entities and individuals were purchasing and securing long-term leases on properties in major Uzbek cities, including Tashkent, as well as acquiring prime land for mining and agricultural ventures.

    Many online discussions have framed China’s growing economic footprint as a direct threat to Uzbekistan’s sovereignty. A widely shared video on the Demokrat UZ YouTube channel garnered over a million views, amplifying concerns over Chinese influence. Similarly, Fazliddin Shahobiddin, an influential YouTuber who analyzes current affairs from an Islamic perspective, claimed that Uzbekistan is being bought up by China. His post attracted more than 1.8 million views, with a majority of the 12,000 comments echoing anti-Beijing sentiment, some even urging Uzbeks to recognize what they see as an encroaching Chinese presence in the country.

    How will it evolve?

    Uzbekistan depends on China. While the United States, Europe, and their Asian allies—such as Turkey, South Korea, and Japan—are seeking closer ties with the resource-rich nation, Uzbekistan’s leadership remains firmly aligned with Russia. Without Moscow’s backing, the country risks political instability, including potential unrest and challenges to the current government. Given Uzbekistan’s consistently low rankings on global democracy indices, meaningful cooperation with the West remains difficult.

    In this context, China emerges as Uzbekistan’s most viable partner—economically dominant, technologically advanced, and closely linked to Russia. Beijing is taking full advantage of this dynamic, even working to curb the influence of other Russian allies like India, which lacks both the financial muscle and, perhaps, the political will to compete in Uzbekistan through large-scale investments or transactional diplomacy as China does.

    Amid growing public resentment toward China, the Uzbek government is actively working to suppress negative sentiment. Officials are eager to avoid a scenario like that in Pakistan, where anti-Chinese backlash led to targeted violence against Chinese nationals. To counter the rising hostility, authorities have launched a media campaign emphasizing the benefits of deeper economic cooperation. Yet initial efforts to reassure the public have failed to stem the tide of online criticism, forcing the government to intensify its PR strategy. 

    Given the government’s reliance on China, its efforts will likely go beyond media campaigns to include suppressing dissent, particularly on social media. Like many other authoritarian regimes in Asia, Uzbek authorities understand that their political survival is increasingly intertwined with their ties to Beijing. While not a direct takeover, China’s expanding influence is gradually steering Uzbekistan’s political landscape in its favor.

  • Are New Rail Routes Enhancing Kazakhstan’s Strategic Role?

    Are New Rail Routes Enhancing Kazakhstan’s Strategic Role?

    Kazakhstan, the world’s ninth-largest country, is often overlooked despite its rich history, vibrant culture, and vast natural resources. For much of its modern existence, it remained a satellite of Russia, never fully stepping into its own spotlight. Its landlocked geography and strategic vulnerabilities kept it tethered to Moscow’s influence, even after gaining independence in 1991 following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Russia continued to shape its political trajectory, limiting its ability to assert true sovereignty.

    However, more than three decades after independence, Kazakhstan is now finally charting its own course. While maintaining political ties with Russia, it has strengthened its partnership with China, expanded relations with India and the Gulf states, and deepened engagement with Europe and the United States. No longer solely reliant on Moscow, Kazakhstan is leveraging its growing ties with Beijing to bolster its economic and strategic standing.

    At the heart of this transformation is the Middle Corridor—a trade route linking China to Europe through Kazakhstan while bypassing Russia. This corridor has strengthened Kazakhstan’s geopolitical standing and opened new economic opportunities, firmly establishing the country as a vital hub in global trade.

    The Middle Corridor

    The Middle Corridor, a high-stakes trade route, provides the shortest overland link between China and Europe, sidestepping war-ravaged Russia and the increasingly congested Suez Canal. More than a mere alternative, it reflects shifting geopolitical tides and economic realignments, emerging as a transformative force in global trade. Kazakhstan’s national railway company emphasizes that the corridor not only expands regional transport capacity but also improves the speed, flexibility, and reliability of international logistics.

    Beijing, driven by strategic economic ambitions, is actively expanding its access to European markets while bypassing Russia and strengthening its foothold in Central Asia by leading this project. This shift not only deprives the Kremlin of crucial transit revenue but also weakens its geopolitical leverage. As the Ukrainian news outlet Dialog notes, Chinese goods that once flowed through Russia are now shifting to these new routes—an unmistakable sign of Moscow’s declining influence over Eurasian trade. Meanwhile, rising regional powers like Kazakhstan and Turkey are positioning themselves as key players in this evolving economic landscape.

    The Corridor is Filling Out

    Despite Russia’s extensive transit network, a legacy of the Soviet era, the Middle Corridor still demands substantial infrastructure upgrades and investment. Yet, as its strategic importance becomes undeniable, countries along the route are accelerating efforts and channeling funds into its development.

    China and Kazakhstan have officially launched a new freight rail transit line to transport Chinese goods to Europe while bypassing Russia. Additionally, China is developing two more westbound freight corridors through Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea, further diminishing Moscow’s role as a key transit hub.

    According to Kazakhstan’s State Railway company, the first container train on this route departed from Chengdu in central China on March 4, bound for the Polish city of Łódź. Carrying televisions and other electronic components, the train is expected to complete its 40-day journey through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey before reaching the European Union’s border. Its success is expected to pave the way for more trains along the route.

    Kazakhstan at the Center

    Kazakhstan has strengthened its global standing by rapidly developing its infrastructure and managing its resources more effectively. Its growing geopolitical importance has allowed it to stand more confidently before Moscow and negotiate with Russia on equal footing. Analysts point to several key moments that highlight this shift, including Kazakhstan’s neutral stance during the Azerbaijan-Russia tensions following the downing of an Azerbaijani civilian plane.

    Moscow has lost its grip over land logistics between China and Europe, as Kazakhstan, China, and Turkey now control this crucial transit route. With its geopolitical influence expanding, Kazakhstan is increasingly seen as a rising power. More nations recognize its strategic importance, making it an indispensable player in regional trade and diplomacy.

    Reflecting this growing influence, Uzbekistan’s state railway agency recently launched a new freight transit route connecting India to Kazakhstan. Workers loaded twelve containers onto a freighter at India’s Mundra port, sending them to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port. From there, the shipment will travel by rail through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan before reaching its final destination near Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital. Expected to take 25 to 30 days, the new route could significantly reduce transport costs while creating more opportunities for exporters and importers.

    Russia’s war in Ukraine, far from merely redrawing battle lines, has inadvertently accelerated Kazakhstan’s ascent, hastening the emergence of a more self-assured and strategically independent Central Asia.

  • As Chipmaking Shifts, Is Taiwan Losing Its Leverage?

    As Chipmaking Shifts, Is Taiwan Losing Its Leverage?

    For Donald Trump, everything has a price. He saw Ukraine’s value in its rare earth minerals, while Taiwan’s significance lies in its semiconductor industry. Setting politics, geopolitics, and strategic importance aside—for Trump, every deal is a business deal. Ukraine has held its ground, but Taiwan has either conceded or been forced to.

    As China reaffirms its claim over Taiwan, most recently in its Two Sessions meetings, Taipei finds itself unable to push back against U.S. demands. More purchases, more contracts, and in return, more security—that defines the current U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Yet, the push to shift semiconductor production to the U.S. has unsettled Taiwan’s opposition. They fear that if chip manufacturing moves, Taiwan’s significance to Washington will fade. And will its “Silicon Shield,” which protects it from China, break if the U.S. no longer sees it as essential?

    TSMC Deal

    For decades, Taiwan’s chip industry has remained anchored on the island, with government regulations limiting companies from moving production overseas. Then came the Trump effect.

    TSMC, Taiwan’s leading semiconductor manufacturer, is departing from tradition by relocating part of its production to the U.S. under American pressure, committing to a substantial investment. However, the deal still hinges on approval from the Taiwanese government—a barrier that has stalled similar efforts in the past. Yet, with Trump’s influence, there is optimism that this time will be different.

    On Monday, TSMC’s chief executive, C.C. Wei, stood alongside Donald Trump at the White House, proudly announcing what he called the largest foreign direct investment on U.S. soil in history. The company, which manufactures the world’s most advanced semiconductors, plans to expand its existing $65 billion U.S. operations with an additional $100 billion investment.

    For TSMC, the deal offers a way to bypass the heavy tariffs Trump has threatened on the global chip industry. For the U.S., it promises tens of thousands of construction jobs and ensures that crucial semiconductor technology is developed domestically—shielded from Chinese control should Beijing attempt to annex Taiwan.

    Taiwanese law requires government approval for any foreign investment exceeding $1.5 billion—a mere fraction of this deal’s scale. President Lai Ching-te has stated that the government will review the agreement with Taiwan’s “national interests” in mind, though approval is expected to be a mere formality.

    Loss of the Infinity Stone

    For Taiwan, losing its semiconductor industry is akin to surrendering an Infinity Stone. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry—anchored by TSMC, its largest and most advanced firm—contributes up to 15% of the nation’s GDP. Often referred to as Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield,” it serves as a strategic asset, ensuring that global stakeholders remain invested in keeping both Taiwan and the world’s chip supply beyond China’s grasp. With Donald Trump signaling a waning personal commitment to Taiwan’s defense, this leverage has only become more critical.

    Opposition figures from the Kuomintang (KMT) argue that shifting semiconductor production to the U.S. could weaken Taiwan’s geo political standing. They caution that as TSMC increases its U.S. operations, Taiwan’s importance to Washington may decline, reducing America’s incentive to support the island in the future.

    What the Government Says 

    Lai’s office has assured that TSMC will keep its most advanced manufacturing processes in Taiwan. However, this statement appears to contradict remarks made by TSMC CEO C.C. Wei and Donald Trump at the White House. Wei stated that the deal would enable the production of the most advanced chips on U.S. soil, while Trump emphasized that the world’s most powerful AI chips would be manufactured in America.

    Despite these concerns, the Ministry of Economic Affairs remains confident, highlighting Taiwan’s semiconductor workforce as its greatest strength. The ministry pointed to the country’s well-established STEM training-to-employment pipeline as a key factor in sustaining its chip industry’s success. According to officials, Taiwan’s semiconductor sector depends on its highly skilled workforce—an advantage that other nations would struggle to replicate.

    However, public concerns over the potential weakening of Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” continue to grow, putting pressure on the Lai administration to provide clearer answers. In response, President Lai and Wei held a press conference on Thursday. Reflecting on a tense few days of meetings with two presidents, Wei suggested that Lai had urged him to address the media, recognizing their responsibility to explain the situation to the public.

    Will the Deal Strengthen Relations?

    The TSMC-U.S. deal is a strategic move to strengthen Taiwan-U.S. relations. Lai hailed it as a historic milestone, while he and Wei reassured the public that the investment would not undermine TSMC’s domestic operations. Both leaders emphasized that the decision was driven by increasing U.S. customer demand rather than political pressure from Washington.

    This shift can be seen as an effort to curb China’s influence in the global semiconductor supply chain by expanding Taiwan’s production, particularly in the U.S. However, without Taiwan’s highly skilled workforce, the U.S. may find it difficult to surpass China’s chip industry. Even if manufacturing relocates, Taiwan’s expertise will remain critical, making a complete transfer of semiconductor dominance to the U.S. unlikely. Taiwan will continue to be important to the U.S.

  • Beijing’s Bid to Be the Grown-Up in the Room

    Beijing’s Bid to Be the Grown-Up in the Room

    As the long-standing alliance between the United States and Europe shows signs of strain in the turbulent Trump era, uncertainty grips the global order. Smaller nations, caught in the confusion, struggle to determine their stance. However, this upheaval in international relations has created an opportunity for one power to adopt a steadier, more authoritative presence on the global stage—China. For China, this is the moment it has long anticipated—a chance to establish itself as the world’s stabilizing force.

    As Beijing’s annual Two Sessions unfolds, the country is setting its priorities—strengthening the economy, advancing technology, and managing its prolonged trade dispute with Donald Trump. While the meetings continue, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi addressed the global press on Friday with a clear message: in an increasingly uncertain world, China positions itself as a steady force, ready to uphold global peace.

    What Wang Yi Says

    At his assertive, “Wolf Warrior”–style press conference, Wang Yi outlined China’s vision for the global order with calculated precision. While he made only a few direct references to the United States, the contrast he drew between Beijing and Washington was unmistakable—casting the U.S. as a destabilizing force and China as the steadfast champion of the developing world.

    Wang framed the present moment as one of profound transformation and uncertainty, where stability is increasingly elusive. He stressed that the choices made by the world’s major powers will not only shape the course of history but also determine the future of global governance. Positioning China as a pillar of stability, he asserted that the country’s diplomacy would remain firmly aligned with progress and the “right side of history,” offering a steady hand in a world adrift.

    Trump: The Bad Guy

    China attributes much of this uncertainty to Washington, as Donald Trump’s return to the White House signals a sharp departure from previous administrations. His “America First” agenda, defined by protectionist policies and the looming threat of tariffs, has raised fears of a broader trade war and potential damage to the rules-based global system.

    When asked about Trump’s withdrawal from international organizations and his prioritization of American dominance, Wang Yi warned that an obsession with strength would lead the world back to the law of the jungle. He cautioned that smaller and weaker nations would bear the brunt of such a shift, while international norms and order would suffer a severe blow.

    Wang emphasized that major powers must uphold their international obligations and act responsibly, rather than placing self-interest above fundamental principles.

    China: The Good Guy

    China’s top diplomat vowed that Beijing would stand as a force for global peace and stability, championing fairness and justice on the world stage. He emphasized China’s commitment to upholding true multilateralism, pledging to build consensus for a more balanced and orderly multipolar world. Beijing, he said, would serve as a constructive force for global development, safeguard the multilateral free-trade system, and promote an open, inclusive, and non-discriminatory environment for international cooperation.

    Wang underscored China’s belief in lasting friendships built on shared interests, pointing to the Belt and Road Initiative, which he noted has been embraced by over three-quarters of the world’s nations. History, he argued, would prove that true leadership lies in prioritizing the common good and fostering a global community with a shared future. 

    China’s World Order

    We can’t say, based on Wang Yi’s remarks, that China intends to replace the United States outright. But Beijing is certainly making its case: the U.S. is unreliable, a disruptor of the global order, and a habitual rule-breaker. In contrast, China presents itself as the more stable, trustworthy, and mature alternative. The message is clear: Europe and other nations would be better off relying on China to preserve the current world order.

    Unlike Washington, Beijing insists that it seeks to uphold international institutions like the United Nations and ensure that all nations, regardless of size, are treated as equal members of the global community. If the U.S. is unwilling or unable to maintain global stability, China is signaling that it stands ready to step in—not as a direct replacement, but as a leader among partners in Europe, Asia, and beyond.

  • As the U.S. Withdraws, Can China Take the Helm?

    As the U.S. Withdraws, Can China Take the Helm?

    Donald Trump’s policies—cutting aid, imposing tough tariffs, downsizing alliances, and publicly humiliating leaders—have significantly damaged the United States’ global reputation. The humiliation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was a shock to the Western world and marked a major setback in U.S. foreign relations. Many now believe that by the end of Trump’s second term, America’s international standing could erode even further.

    While the U.S. economy and the dollar remain dominant, even its closest allies are questioning whether promoting a second global power is inevitable. But if not the United States, then who?

    The traditional European powers—Britain, France, and others—once led the world but are now weakened. Even if the European Union consolidated its economic strength, reaching a GDP of $18 trillion, it would still trail the U.S. Moreover, Europe remains a fragmented bloc, deeply divided by political conflicts between the left and right, making a unified challenge to U.S. dominance unlikely. Militarily and technologically, Europe also lags far behind.

    Russia, once the United States’ great rival under the Soviet Union, has proven itself a diminished force. Its war in Ukraine has exposed deep military and economic weaknesses, making it clear that Moscow is no longer a serious contender for global leadership.

    That leaves China as the only nation truly positioned to rival the U.S. With a $19 trillion economy—just $10 trillion behind America’s—an increasingly sophisticated military under centralized command, and technological advancements that have even caught Washington off guard, China has both the ambition and the capacity to assert itself on the world stage. The question is: Can it seize the moment?

    U.S. Step-Back

    To safeguard its interests, the United States is increasingly withdrawing from international institutions. It has already pulled out of the World Health Organization, and under Trump, there is even the possibility of an exit from the United Nations or NATO—the very alliance that anchors Western Europe to the U.S. Cuts to security funding and demands for increased financial contributions from NATO allies have been viewed as humiliating by many member-state politicians.

    Trump is also shifting away from traditional alliances with strategically located partners. In 2024, he suggested that Taiwan should pay the U.S. for its defense, despite the self-governing island already spending billions on American arms. This year alone, Taiwan is reportedly considering an additional $7–10 billion in military purchases to maintain favor with the Trump administration—a strategy that other nations may attempt but cannot all afford.

    At the same time, cuts to U.S. foreign aid could weaken ties with many countries that rely heavily on American financial support. Numerous political parties and organizations worldwide operate with U.S. funding, and if those resources dry up, they may easily shift their allegiances to new backers.

    Ambitious China 

    China’s ambition for global dominance extends far beyond Communist Party meetings and nationalist action films. As the United States retreats from international commitments, it creates a power vacuum that China is eager to fill. Despite its authoritarian governance and poor human rights record, global institutions have done little to challenge Beijing. By funding these organizations, China can subtly influence international agendas in its favor.

    The rise of trade wars and economic protectionism may further push nations to decouple from the U.S., creating opportunities for Chinese products to dominate global markets. Meanwhile, China’s extensive infrastructure investments have already forged deep ties with many countries. As the U.S. cuts foreign aid, China is well-positioned to step in, offering financial lifelines and strengthening its influence.

    Many nations seek investment but fear U.S. retaliation. However, if Washington intensifies economic punishments, these countries may increasingly turn to China as an alternative partner. Additionally, the U.S.’s handling of Taiwan presents another potential opening for Beijing. Should Washington waver in its commitment to defend the island, China could swiftly assert control over Taiwan and expand its dominance across the South China Sea. Such a move would significantly advance China’s strategic influence, further positioning it as a central force in global politics.

    Is China Capable?

    Over the past decade, many news outlets predicted that China would overtake the United States, citing its rapid GDP growth, technological advancements, and large-scale infrastructure projects. However, the COVID-19 pandemic, strict lockdown measures, trade restrictions, and a real estate crisis—coupled with a declining population—slowed China’s momentum. While the West anticipated a complete economic collapse, China managed to withstand these challenges and is now showing signs of renewed growth, expanding its influence in Central Asia and other regions. China is asserting itself in global affairs.

    However, China’s ascent to global leadership still hinges on its relationship with the West. While Trump’s policies have strained U.S.-China ties, many liberal democracies maintain economic partnerships with Beijing. A key uncertainty remains China’s military preparedness—unlike the U.S., its forces lack combat experience, casting doubt on their operational effectiveness. Nevertheless, Beijing continues to strengthen its position, steadily advancing toward its long-held ambition of global dominance.

    What Happens Next?

    Political experts strongly believe that despite disruptions and diplomatic humiliations, the West will remain firmly aligned with the United States. Without breaking Western unity or expanding its influence in the Middle East, China cannot achieve true global dominance.

    Although Ursula von der Leyen envisions a stronger and more independent Europe, the continent remains deeply tied to Washington—willing to endure tariffs and occasional setbacks rather than sever ties. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern leaders, driven by economic interests, are likely to maintain their alignment with the U.S., as will India. This leaves Russia as China’s only major strategic ally.

    Analysts suggest that Washington is now seeking an  opportunity to weaken the Russia-China partnership. If Moscow were to distance itself from Beijing, China could find itself increasingly isolated on the global stage.

    However, if Russia remains firmly aligned with China and Europe drifts away from its close relationship with the U.S., the balance of power could shift significantly. If China also manages to strengthen ties with India, its global influence would be further solidified.

    For years, Beijing has aspired to global leadership but has struggled to fully realize that ambition. Ironically, the evolving geopolitical landscape—largely shaped by U.S. actions—may become the very force that propels China to the forefront.

  • Turkmenistan Eyes a Future in the Middle Corridor

    Turkmenistan Eyes a Future in the Middle Corridor

    For decades, Turkmenistan has stood apart—an authoritarian state wrapped in bureaucracy and wary of foreign influence. Visas are notoriously difficult to obtain, and for many Turkmen citizens, the prospect of traveling abroad remains out of reach. Since breaking from Moscow, its leadership has upheld a policy of strict isolation, maintaining a state-controlled economy and a political system defined by secrecy.

    But as Central Asia’s geopolitical currents shift, Turkmenistan is beginning to reorient itself. No longer content with isolation, Ashgabat is making calculated moves to integrate into the region’s expanding trade networks. With East-West commerce surging through the Middle Corridor, the government is channeling resources into infrastructure projects that could turn the country from a reclusive state into a key transit hub.

    Path to Integration

    In early February, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Ministry announced that its officials had participated in a virtual meeting with counterparts from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Romania to discuss enhancing East-West trade connectivity. These countries are key partners in the Middle Corridor, which links China and Kazakhstan to Europe while bypassing Russian territory. According to the ministry, Ashgabat is preparing to sign a quadripartite agreement to establish a new trade route through the Middle Corridor, connecting the Caspian and Black Seas. The agreement is expected to play a crucial role in facilitating cargo transport between Central Asia and Europe.

    However, progress on the transit deal may not be swift. Turkmenistan has a history of unpredictable negotiations, as evidenced by its prolonged pricing dispute with Turkey over a gas swap deal originally agreed upon in early 2024. After months of back-and-forth, the gas flow is now set to begin on March 1, with Turkmenistan expected to supply 1.3 billion cubic meters by the end of 2025.

    The government is ramping up infrastructure development with an emphasis on aligning it with key trade routes. According to the government-affiliated Turkmenportal, a new airport near the village of Jebel in western Balkan province is nearing completion. Strategically positioned along the railway linking Ashgabat to the Caspian port city of Turkmenbashy, the airport features a 3,200-meter runway and is primarily intended for air cargo, though it may also accommodate passenger flights. Turkmenportal reports that the facility is expected to boost trade, increase transport capacity, and support the country’s broader economic ambitions.

    The Middle Corridor

    The Middle Corridor, an important international trade route, connects China, a major global production hub, to Europe, one of the world’s largest markets. It passes through Kazakhstan, crosses the Caspian Sea by ship, and continues through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. This route serves as an alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia and the congested maritime passage via the Suez Canal. Despite the Caspian Sea crossing, the Middle Corridor remains the shortest land connection between Western China and Europe. China has invested heavily in its infrastructure, completing the Trans-Kazakhstan railway—which runs east to west across Kazakhstan—in 2014 and inaugurating the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, which links the Caucasus region, three years later.

    After the Ukraine war began, cargo traffic along the Middle Corridor—bypassing Russian and Ukrainian territory—surged, reaching 3.2 million tons in 2022 as trade shifted away from the Northern Corridor. However, the route still faces challenges, including limited port capacity in the Caspian Sea, insufficient railway infrastructure, and persistent geopolitical tensions along the transit countries. While Russia plays a minimal role in this corridor, Turkey has positioned itself as a key player through the Organization of Turkic States, driving a six-fold increase in cargo transport over the past decade.

    Despite its strategic location, Turkmenistan remains outside the Middle Corridor, which primarily runs through Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Decades of neglect, compounded by the country’s insular and ultra-conservative politics, left its transportation infrastructure underdeveloped, limiting regional trade integration. However, Ashgabat is now ramping up infrastructure projects, positioning itself for potential connectivity with key trade routes. Strengthened transport links could not only facilitate energy exports to China but also provide a more efficient route for delivering Turkmenistan’s vast natural gas reserves to energy-hungry Western markets.

    What Will It Deliver?

    Turkmenistan’s economy is still recovering from the 2014 collapse in hydrocarbon prices, a downturn further exacerbated by prolonged low gas prices, the suspension of gas exports to Russia between 2016 and 2019, and poor agricultural yields. The country remains heavily reliant on natural gas, oil, and petrochemicals—sectors in which Russia is also a dominant player with limited demand for Turkmen exports. As Russia’s regional influence declines, Turkmenistan is exploring alternative economic partnerships. Despite possessing the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, its investment climate remains high risk, particularly for U.S. foreign direct investment. Strengthening ties with the Middle Corridor could boost investment in Turkmenistan, improve its connectivity, and create broader economic opportunities.