Tag: India

A Calculated Calm: India, Pakistan, and the Specter of War

It was a brutal attack. In the town of Pahalgam, in Indian Kashmir, Islamist militants opened fire on a group of tourists, killing 26 men—many of them civilians visiting from other parts of India—apparently because they were not Muslim.

The massacre has reignited tensions between India and Pakistan, long-time adversaries whose rivalry dates back to the partition of British India in 1947. The violence in Kashmir, a region both countries claim, has once again drawn global concern, particularly given the nuclear capabilities and dense populations of both nations.

Signs of escalation have already begun to surface. Cross-border firing has resumed, and both India and Pakistan have traded sharp accusations. In response to the attacks, New Delhi and Islamabad have initiated diplomatic reprisals, including the cancellation of visas, the suspension of bilateral agreements, and formal statements of condemnation. Military drills and a surge in nationalistic rhetoric have further heightened tensions.

Despite growing pressure from segments of the media urging a forceful response—often invoking comparisons to Israel’s approach in similar situations—there is still no clarity on whether the crisis will spiral into open conflict. For now, India appears to be responding with restraint, signaling a degree of strategic maturity aimed at avoiding a war that would bring only greater hardship to the state.

The pressure is real

The Hindu nationalist government, led by the hardline figure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is now under intense pressure from all sides. The Hindu factions that support him are calling for full-scale war—urging India to act like Israel and punish Pakistan. Meanwhile, the main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, is seizing the moment to criticize Modi, and the media is offering little sympathy.

More than reporting on the attacks themselves, many outlets seem to focus on how the attack was carried out in an explicitly Islamist manner—something that, disturbingly, has become a selling point in parts of India. The attack has also undermined Modi’s previous claims that scrapping Article 370 had made Kashmir safer and that India’s defense sector was now foolproof. In a way, Modi is now bearing the weight of his own narrative.

There is little doubt in New Delhi that the attacks were carried out by Kashmiri Islamists, with support from across the border in Pakistan. India has long presented evidence that Pakistan-occupied Kashmir has become a breeding ground for Islamist terrorism. In response, India initiated immediate retaliatory steps. Most notably, it suspended the long-standing Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan—a move not taken even during previous wars.

Another front has emerged in the battle over narrative. Indian intelligence asserts that the Pahalgam attack was unmistakably an act of terrorism, contradicting earlier reports from international media outlets—including the BBC and The New York Times—that failed to establish a clear terrorist link. Even former U.S. President Donald Trump criticized the ambiguity. In response, the Modi government has intensified efforts to label the attackers as terrorists and to highlight Pakistan’s alleged role.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs recently wrote to major international media organizations—including the BBC, Associated Press, and Reuters—objecting to their use of the term “Militants” instead of “Terrorists” in coverage. Additionally, the government has blocked 16 Pakistani YouTube channels and restricted access to social media pages of prominent Pakistani news outlets like Dawn News, ARY News, and Geo News across India.

Still, critics of Modi and the media demand swift action. They are calling for war, and every movement from India’s military or strategic command is being watched closely, even celebrated. At the same time, opposition leaders and Islamist voices are using these moments to further criticize the government—adding more pressure to an already volatile situation.

Pakistan sees an opportunity

The tension is becoming an advantage for Pakistan. A country that is deeply divided politically, economically, and demographically has always found unity when it comes to India. Despite internal divisions, most Pakistanis share a collective animosity toward India. While the government may not have full control over its military or the terrorists operating within its borders, politicians are skillfully using the current situation to stir anti-India sentiment. Anyone who opposes the government, including Balochs and Pathans, is branded a traitor.

Amid escalating tensions, Pakistan has repositioned air defense systems and deployed troops closer to the Line of Control—the border dividing India- and Pakistan-administered Kashmir—as well as to Sialkot in the country’s east. Pakistani media coverage has zeroed in on these military maneuvers, official government statements, and the humanitarian toll of the latest flashpoint in the long-standing Kashmir conflict.

Additionally, there is growing concern over the Indus River Treaty’s implications for Pakistan. If India diverts water from the rivers, Pakistan’s agrarian economy would suffer immensely. The only fertile land in Pakistan depends on the Indus river and its tributaries, and a lack of water would lead to major troubles. Pakistani media is portraying the Indian government as inhumane, fueling the longstanding Islamic rivalry with India. it’s clear that the rising tensions are consolidating Pakistan’s position as a state.

What happens next?

While the media in both countries, as well as international outlets, are speculating that war is imminent, in reality, it appears that India will refrain from full-scale conflict. The chances of India engaging in an all-out war seem low. Although some reports suggest that Prime Minister Modi has given the military authorization to strike at the right time and with appropriate measures, it is more likely that India will resort to surgical strikes or targeted attacks on terrorist breeding grounds in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

The logic is straightforward: India has much to lose, while Pakistan does not. Modi’s biggest ambition is to make India a $5 trillion economy and a global superpower. If war breaks out, even feeding 1.5 billion people could become a serious challenge. Therefore, India seems to be planning a strategy focused on targeted strikes and economic pressure. Actions like freezing the Indus Water Treaty and imposing economic restrictions are signs of this approach.

Pakistan’s economy is already in crisis and may not withstand further pressure. India is betting that continued stress could lead to Pakistan’s internal collapse and possible fragmentation, which could serve India’s interests more effectively than a conventional war or nuclear escalation.

This scenario may be India’s most favorable outcome, while Pakistan appears to be pushing for escalation, possibly to rally its population behind the government and military and to blame India for its failures. Pakistan will likely continue to provoke, while India will respond with calculated restraint.

May 3, 2025
With Trade Talks in Motion, Modi and J.D. Vance Strike a Hopeful Note

The U.S. Vice President’s highly celebrated visit to India concluded amid chaotic days, as rising India-Pakistan tensions flared after a terrorist attack in Kashmir. Yet both India and the United States are portraying the trip as a diplomatic success in strengthening their ties. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Vice President J.D. Vance praised what they called significant progress toward a bilateral trade agreement — one aimed at helping India avoid steep tariff hikes announced by President Donald Trump, modestly opening India’s vast market to American goods, and encouraging greater Indian purchases from the United States.

An important visit

Accompanied by the Second Lady, Usha Vance — who has Indian roots — and their children, Ewan, Vivek, and Mirabel, Vice President Vance arrived in New Delhi on Monday for a four-day visit blending high-level negotiations with family sightseeing. Indian media warmly covered the family’s arrival, highlighting the children’s traditional Indian attire and their visits to prominent Hindu temples as a symbol of deepening ties between the two nations. They were welcomed at the airport by Railways Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw.

At the airport, Vance stood beneath a red canopy shielding him from the blazing sun, while soldiers saluted and a military band played the U.S. national anthem. Optimism about a potential trade deal followed a series of one-on-one and delegation-level meetings between Modi and Vance at the prime minister’s official residence, culminating in a dinner hosted by Modi for the Vance family.

With President Trump’s 90-day pause on tariff hikes nearing its expiration, negotiators on both sides are working urgently to finalize a limited trade deal by July, with hopes for a broader agreement by autumn. Without a deal, tariffs on Indian exports are set to rise sharply, from 10% to 26%.

Although no formal agreements are expected during this visit, Vance’s engagement lends fresh political momentum to the negotiations and signals Washington’s commitment to securing an accord. Meanwhile, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, currently in Washington, is pressing India’s case for a swift resolution.

Mega Partnership

Modi’s close relationship with Trump is widely credited with securing India’s exemption from certain tariff rates. JD Vance’s diplomatic mission is viewed as a step toward transforming the personal bond between Trump and Modi into a more comprehensive US-India partnership. Amid an escalating tariff dispute, the US finds itself in a vulnerable position, grappling with growing recession fears and minimal progress in easing tensions with China. In this environment, gaining access to India’s vast market has become a crucial priority for the US, not only to address trade imbalances but also to fulfill Trump’s goal of revitalizing domestic production. However, the US cannot compromise on India’s higher tariff rates, as such concessions could spark negative perceptions, even among its European allies.

The Prime Minister’s office issued a statement applauding the significant strides made in negotiations for a mutually beneficial India-US Bilateral Trade Agreement, which emphasizes the well-being of both nations’ citizens. India has already lowered tariffs on certain US goods, with further reductions expected. The agreement could also involve Indian purchases of US-made Javelin missiles and Stryker vehicles, along with tariff reductions on more than half of India’s $41.8 billion in imports from the US. The US remains India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $190 billion.

During a goodwill visit to Washington in February, following Trump’s return to the White House, Modi and Trump pledged to more than double trade to $500 billion, which Modi described as a “Mega Partnership.” Behind the scenes, discussions have progressed under a framework established during Modi’s Washington visit. The two leaders also welcomed initiatives to expand cooperation in energy, defense, and strategic technologies. Additionally, India is eager to secure fresh investments from Elon Musk, who recently spoke with Modi and indicated he may visit India later this year to explore Tesla’s long-awaited entry into the market of 1.45 billion people.

Is it all smooth sailing?

While things seem to be moving in a positive direction, opening up the Indian market will not be easy for Modi, as it has traditionally been highly restricted. Easing these restrictions could spark massive protests against him and his government. The socialist, communist, and Islamist parties, along with affiliated trade and farmers’ unions, have consistently adopted a hostile stance toward both the United States and India’s market liberalization efforts. They will undoubtedly oppose these moves. The All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS), a prominent left-wing farmers’ organization, has warned that trade liberalization could severely impact farm incomes, particularly in the dairy sector. The AIKS, linked with India’s Communist Party and claiming over 16 million members, has accused US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick of “Coercion” for pushing to include India’s heavily subsidized agricultural sector in the deal. Clearly, Modi faces a significant challenge.

What happens next?

While Modi may not be making sweeping tariff concessions, he is expected to increase India’s purchases from the US and expand agreements across various sectors. In exchange, Trump may delay tariff decisions and provide greater support for India’s foreign policy challenges, particularly concerning Pakistan and China. Notably, neither the US president nor vice president have adopted the same aggressive stance toward India in imposing tariffs as they have with other countries, even those within their circle of allies.

Modi also extended “Warm Greetings” to Trump, expressing his anticipation for the president’s visit to India later this year, according to a statement. Modi had previously invited Trump to attend the Quad Leadership Summit during his Washington trip. The Quad, consisting of the US, India, Japan, and Australia, is viewed as a key counterbalance to China’s growing influence in the region. It appears that India and the US are building a stronger relationship, with the potential to become even closer allies.

April 27, 2025
In Kashmir, Acts of Terror Reopen Wounds Between Nations

Two of Asia’s most powerful and contentious neighbors—nuclear-armed and densely populated—are once again on the brink of confrontation following a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir. The assault, reportedly carried out by Islamist extremists, targeted Hindu civilians, sparking widespread outrage across India.

The targeted killings of Hindu civilians have placed immense pressure on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist government to respond forcefully. Public sentiment, especially on social media, is overwhelmingly in favor of military retaliation. Pakistan, frequently accused by New Delhi of harboring or supporting cross-border terrorist groups, has come under renewed scrutiny and is reportedly preparing for a potential escalation.

As tensions rise rapidly on both sides, fears are growing of yet another dangerous standoff between these long-standing adversaries—one that could lead to a catastrophic human toll.

What happened in Kashmir?

The brutal terrorist attack that claimed 26 lives in one of Kashmir’s most scenic regions shattered a period of relative calm, transforming a popular tourist destination into a scene of horror. It’s reported that some gunmen emerged from dense pine forests, asked tourists about their religion, and selectively killed Hindu men. A little-known group, calling itself the Resistance Front, claimed responsibility, but Indian authorities suspect it is a proxy for Lashkar-e-Taiba or another Pakistan-based faction. While Pakistan denies supporting terrorists, clear signs emerged in recent weeks that Islamabad had been preparing for a possible Indian response.

India and Pakistan, having fought three wars over the disputed territory, remain deeply divided. The integration of Kashmir into India has been a core objective for Narendra Modi’s government, which revoked the region’s special status five years ago. This move brought Kashmir in line with other Indian territories, granting New Delhi direct control and ushering in a period of relative calm.

At the same time, Kashmir remains a crucial unifying issue for Pakistan, which often uses the dispute to rally domestic support, particularly when the government faces internal challenges. This latest terrorist attack occurred just a week after Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, referred to Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular” and vowed not to “abandon our Kashmiri brothers in their heroic struggle.

Escalating tit-for-tat moves

After canceling his visit to Saudi Arabia and returning to New Delhi, the Indian Prime Minister convened high-level meetings to formulate a response to the attack, with Pakistan as the primary focus. The initial steps were diplomatic: India canceled visas, shut down diplomatic channels, downgraded bilateral relations, and suspended the Indus Waters Treaty—a crucial water-sharing agreement on which Pakistan heavily depends. The Prime Minister has since vowed that retaliation will follow in a form that delivers lasting consequences for Pakistan.

In response, Pakistan has begun implementing countermeasures. Islamabad has closed its airspace to Indian aircraft, canceled diplomatic engagements, suspended visa issuance, and halted trade with India. Its strongest reaction has come against the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty—one of the world’s most enduring and vital water-sharing agreements, essential to Pakistan’s agricultural sector. Pakistani officials warn that this move could prove more damaging than a military strike, as agriculture remains a cornerstone of an economy already strained by poverty, inflation, and domestic terrorism. Any disruption to water supplies could plunge the country into deeper instability.

As part of its retaliation, Pakistan has also suspended the Shimla Accord—the 1972 treaty that served as the bedrock of diplomatic engagement between the two nations.

Did terrorists succeed in reigniting Kashmir?

Pakistan and allied Islamist groups have long sought to bring Kashmir back into the international spotlight—and the recent attack appears to have achieved just that. It was timed during U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s visit to India, where he emphasized deepening defense ties and praised New Delhi as a key strategic partner. The attack gained significant global media attention as a result. Simultaneously, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was on a widely covered visit to Saudi Arabia—an Islamic nation traditionally close to Pakistan but now warming to India. In that sense, Pakistan also succeeded in reminding the Islamic world of Kashmir.

Domestically, it’s also a short-term win for Pakistan. Confronted with deep political divisions and growing separatist unrest in Balochistan, Islamabad seized the moment to rally unity by inflaming anti-India sentiment. Yet whether this renewed spotlight on Kashmir will actually find support among Kashmiris remains highly uncertain.

Since Modi’s government revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status in 2019, the region has experienced relative calm. Terrorist incidents declined, and tourism soared—reaching 3.5 million visitors in 2024. Modi has used this to present Kashmir’s “normalization” as a political and economic success, despite lingering resentment over the region’s heavy militarization.

The latest attack has disrupted this fragile peace and placed local livelihoods at risk. In protest, more than a dozen Kashmiri organizations closed businesses and held marches, with demonstrators chanting, “Tourists are our lifeline.”

While Pakistan may have succeeded in turning the world’s gaze back to Kashmir, the response from within the valley suggests the move may backfire.

What happens next?

Modi’s swift return from an official visit to Saudi Arabia highlights the government’s determination to respond decisively. The pressure is mounting for a strong retaliation following the brazen attack in one of the world’s most militarized zones. Analysts speculate that India may consider cross-border strikes, similar to those launched after the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing, which killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel. However, unlike Pulwama, the recent victims were civilians, raising the political stakes even higher.

Modi, a Hindu nationalist leader, is expected to seek revenge, though predicting his next move is challenging. While open war seems unlikely—given that India has much more to lose, and the economy remains a primary concern—Modi’s political agenda may not allow him to back down without some form of retaliation. Pakistan may have succeeded in bringing Kashmir back into the global spotlight, but India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty has introduced an unexpected consequence. While this move is a blow to Pakistan, it allows the government to rally domestic support by blaming India for its mounting problems and fueling anti-India rhetoric.

April 25, 2025
Faith, Land, and Votes: The Waqf Act and the Tightrope Walk of India’s Opposition

Religion has long been one of the most sensitive and polarizing forces in India. This is hardly surprising in a country that is not only the birthplace of several major religions but also home to a population that has, for centuries, defended its faiths with fervor. Religion is deeply woven into the nation’s social and political life, continuing to shape both public discourse and electoral outcomes. Unsurprisingly, any legislation that touches on religious matters tends to ignite fierce debate.

A recent example is the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, which has now been enacted into law. The Act introduces a host of new complexities in the functioning of the Waqf Board, the institution responsible for managing properties endowed for religious and charitable use within the Muslim community. Historically, particularly during the era of Muslim rule, large swathes of land—including those with pre-Islamic temples and long-established non-Muslim settlements—were brought under Waqf ownership. The current Hindu nationalist government, asserting a reformist agenda, has framed the new law as a measure to enhance transparency, secure property rights, and promote gender equality.

Given the government’s commanding parliamentary majority, the passage of the amendment was all but assured. The more precarious political challenge, however, has landed on the shoulders of the opposition. Parties like the Indian National Congress—long proponents of secular modernism in contrast to the religious nationalism espoused by Prime Minister Modi and the BJP—now find themselves compelled to oppose the amendment in order to retain the support of their Muslim base. Yet doing so places them in direct conflict with their own stated ideals of progressivism and modernity.

This is not the first time such a dilemma has emerged. Much like the controversy surrounding the triple talaq legislation, the Waqf amendment forces secular parties into an impossible balancing act: resisting the law may alienate liberal and secular-minded constituents, while endorsing it could be seen as abandoning a key electoral bloc. The BJP, meanwhile, has seized the opportunity to cast its rivals as beholden to Islamist interests—a narrative that not only undermines the opposition’s credibility but also complicates their path back to political relevance.

What’s the Waqf Act?

Waqf, an Islamic tradition, entails the permanent dedication of property for religious or charitable purposes. Though its roots in India trace back to the period of Muslim rule, the institution of Waqf expanded significantly under British colonial administration and continued to grow well after independence. Today, the Waqf Board manages an estimated 870,000 properties across 940,000 acres, with a cumulative value exceeding ₹1 lakh crore (approximately $12 billion). This makes it the third-largest landowner in the country, after the Indian Railways and the Armed Forces. Much of this expansion—particularly in the post-independence era—has been shaped by political patronage and legal ambiguities, prompting persistent calls for reform. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has made addressing these issues a recurring theme in its electoral platforms.

Mounting public pressure culminated in the passage of the Waqf (Amendment) Bill in 2024, which became law the following year. The legislation introduced sweeping changes to the governance of Waqf properties. Under traditional Islamic jurisprudence, such endowments can be established in three ways: by formal declaration, by long-standing public use (waqf by user), and through familial endowments (waqf-alal-aulad). The amended Act abolished the waqf by user provision and now permits only individuals who have practiced Islam for at least five years and who hold legal ownership of the property to declare it as Waqf. It also safeguards inheritance rights—particularly for women—by ensuring that familial endowments cannot override lawful claims by heirs.

The amendment also redistributed key administrative responsibilities. The task of surveying Waqf properties was transferred from the Survey Commissioner to district-level authorities such as District Collectors. It mandated the inclusion of Muslim women and members of non-Muslim communities on both the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards. Additionally, the Act called for the establishment of separate Auqaf Boards for the Bohra and Agakhani communities, thereby expanding representation beyond the traditional Sunni-Shia divide and amplifying the voices of historically marginalized Muslim sects.

To improve transparency, the Act mandated the creation of a centralized online registry for Waqf properties and streamlined procedures for property mutation to align with existing revenue laws. It introduced a requirement for prior notice to all stakeholders before any property is designated as Waqf. The amendment also overhauled the tribunal system: Waqf Tribunal decisions are now subject to appeal in High Courts within a 90-day window. Outdated provisions, including Section 107, were repealed, bringing Waqf disputes under the purview of the Limitation Act of 1963.

Experts have largely welcomed the Waqf (Amendment) Act of 2025 as a timely and necessary reform. It advances gender equity by mandating female representation in governance, protects inheritance rights, and fosters greater sectarian inclusion. It also grants the Central Government expanded authority over registration, auditing, and financial oversight, aiming to bring more accountability to a system long criticized for opacity.

The politics of Act

Indian politics today is largely shaped by the assertive direction of the Narendra Modi government, while the opposition remains disoriented, struggling to define its own priorities. The Waqf Amendment Bill has become emblematic of this divide. For the BJP, the bill represents a legal instrument to address longstanding land disputes involving the Waqf Board—an effort framed as reclaiming public and historical land holdings for broader civic use.

In contrast, opposition parties, heavily reliant on Muslim electoral support, have consistently resisted legislation related to Muslim affairs—often regardless of its merit or potential benefit. Their opposition to the triple talaq ban, despite the practice being abolished in many Muslim-majority countries, was widely criticized as political appeasement. Such positions have increasingly alienated secular and liberal voters, many of whom now find themselves more aligned with the BJP’s reformist narrative.

The government has also capitalized on public dissatisfaction with the Waqf Board, particularly its claims over properties predating Islam, including ancient temples and heritage structures. In many cases, even local Muslim residents are unaware that the land they occupy is registered as Waqf—based on historical claims dating back to the medieval period. These issues have stirred broader debates over the legitimacy of religious land endowments rooted in conquest and the relevance of vast religious land holdings in a secular republic decades after partition.

By opposing the Waqf Amendment Bill and labeling it anti-Muslim, the opposition has inadvertently strengthened the BJP’s political positioning. Instead of recalibrating their stance, opposition leaders and Muslim political parties have turned to the Supreme Court—further reinforcing the BJP’s portrayal of them as obstructionist and disconnected from contemporary reformist sentiment.

What happens next?

The Waqf Act 2025 has triggered widespread protests among Muslim communities across India, highlighting the deep religious importance of the issue. In several areas, these protests turned violent, with some taking on openly anti-Hindu tones. In West Bengal—especially in regions with large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants—the unrest escalated into full-blown riots, resulting in deaths, injuries, looting, and widespread chaos.

These incidents have deepened existing communal tensions. At the same time, the violence in West Bengal has helped rally Hindu nationalist sentiment across the state. BJP supporters quickly closed ranks, using the unrest to argue that the opposition’s policy of communal appeasement has gone too far. This growing polarization is working in the ruling party’s favor, strengthening its political position ahead of the next round of elections.

April 21, 2025
Is Sri Lanka quietly drifting back into India’s orbit?

Long wary of being seen as a satellite of India, Sri Lanka has spent decades navigating its foreign alignments—at times courting the West, and more recently, leaning heavily toward China. That pivot, especially during the Rajapaksa era, brought a surge of Chinese investment but also coincided with one of the most severe economic crises in the island’s post-independence history. Now, under the weight of that collapse, Sri Lanka appears to be rebalancing. The island nation is quietly edging back toward New Delhi—not through grand gestures, but via a deliberate flow of strategic agreements and behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

For Colombo, this shift marks a pragmatic recalibration. What was once seen as a one-sided relationship with India is increasingly viewed as a possible path out of economic despair. For New Delhi, the moment offers both a strategic opening and a pressing imperative. By providing critical aid, essential supplies, and infrastructure investment, India is not only helping to stabilize its southern neighbor but also reinforcing its presence in a region where Beijing’s influence has grown markedly.

Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka

Narendra Modi, the Indian Prime Minister who has skillfully crafted diplomatic relationships across the region, recently made a significant visit to Colombo. The trip—his first to Sri Lanka since President Anura Kumara Dissanayake took office in September last year—served as a symbol of the changing dynamics in South Asian geopolitics.

During the visit, India and Sri Lanka signed seven key agreements spanning defense, energy, digital infrastructure, health, and trade. The move signaled a recalibration in regional alliances, as both nations work to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean.

Initially, concerns in New Delhi centered around Dissanayake’s leftist background and potential leanings toward Beijing. However, those apprehensions have since softened. Instead of drifting closer to China, Colombo appears to be re-engaging with New Delhi in a more pragmatic and strategic manner.

Dissanayake reassured Modi that Sri Lanka would not permit its territory to be used in any way that might threaten India’s security. Modi, in turn, welcomed the gesture, emphasizing the deeply interconnected nature of security interests between the two nations.

India Backs Sri Lanka’s Core Needs

Amid an economic collapse and mounting debt to China, India provided vital supplies and assistance when Sri Lankans needed them most. While China invested heavily in large-scale infrastructure projects—many of which offered limited benefits to ordinary citizens—India’s approach focused on immediate relief and practical support. This made a lasting impact on the public and nudged the Sri Lankan government toward rebuilding trust and strengthening ties with New Delhi.

That relationship is now evolving. Expanding beyond emergency aid, India is investing across multiple sectors. As a symbol of this growing partnership, the two leaders recently inaugurated—virtually—the construction of a 120-megawatt solar power plant, a joint venture funded by India and aimed at advancing Sri Lanka’s energy future.

Sri Lanka needs to balance

While Sri Lanka is working to repair its relationship with India, cutting ties with China is far from simple. China remains Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral creditor, accounting for over half of the island’s $14 billion in bilateral debt at the time of its sovereign default in 2022. The economic collapse, however, forced Colombo to rethink its heavy dependence on China—a reliance that had contributed to the crisis—and created space for India to step in with substantial financial and material assistance.

Nonetheless, China’s role in restructuring Sri Lanka’s infrastructure loans remains vital. President Dissanayake’s first official overseas visit to New Delhi in December signaled a renewed diplomatic warmth, but his subsequent trip to Beijing in January underscored the balancing act Colombo must maintain. That same month, Sri Lanka signed a $3.7 billion investment deal with a Chinese state-owned company to build an oil refinery in the country’s south, reaffirming Beijing’s enduring economic footprint.

It’s evident that Sri Lanka still looks to China for large-scale funding—support that India, thus far, has been cautious to extend. As such, it would be premature to declare a pro-India tilt in Colombo’s foreign policy. Instead, Sri Lanka appears to be navigating a delicate path, seeking to balance both powers in pursuit of its own national interests.

What happens next?

It’s clear that Trump’s trade policies have shaken the global order. China is no longer the China the world once knew; it is now seeking broader relationships rather than maintaining a confrontational posture. This shift will inevitably influence dynamics in South Asia as well. The region, with its massive population, represents a significant market that China cannot afford to ignore. Yet among South Asian nations, India stands out with the strongest purchasing power—making a stable relationship with New Delhi increasingly important for Beijing.

India, for its part, remains deeply concerned about China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka, which it considers part of its traditional sphere of interest. As China recalibrates its global strategy, it may seek to ease regional tensions with India, potentially stepping back from past hostilities. In this evolving landscape, the groundwork is being laid for improved relations between India and Sri Lanka—an alignment that could help India reclaim its influence in the region. At the same time, it offers Sri Lanka a valuable escape from the strategic and economic trap it has been struggling to navigate.

April 9, 2025
India’s Linguistic Battle: A Threat to Unity?

The Narendra Modi government’s National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 has reignited India’s long-standing language tensions. The policy enforces a three-language formula in schools, widely seen as an attempt to expand Hindi’s influence—aligning with the BJP’s ideological vision.

Approved by the Union Cabinet on July 29, 2020, NEP 2020 aims to reform India’s education system, replacing the 1986 National Policy on Education. With decades passing since the last major policy change, reforms were inevitable. However, the three-language formula has met strong resistance, especially from southern states, which take great pride in their linguistic heritage and have long opposed Hindi imposition. The controversy has deepened as the central government prioritizes funding for states that implement the policy.

Tamil Nadu, known for its strong linguistic identity and opposition to Hindi imposition, has led the resistance. The state government’s formal rejection of the policy has escalated the debate. Online protests and social media campaigns continue to amplify tensions, occasionally sparking concerns about national unity.

The Land of Linguistic Diversity

India, a nation of extraordinary linguistic diversity, ranks second only to Papua New Guinea in the number of languages spoken within its borders—780, according to the People’s Linguistic Survey of India. This multiplicity of tongues has long been both a source of cultural richness and a point of contention. Unlike many nations, including its erstwhile twin, Pakistan, India did not designate a single national language. Instead, its framers took a characteristically intricate approach: they recognized Hindi—the country’s most widely spoken language—and English for official purposes but refrained from declaring any language as the national language. This decision was not merely an effort to avoid conflict but a conscious attempt to hold together a vast and diverse republic, fostering a sense of inclusivity.

Article 343 of the Indian Constitution declares Hindi in the Devanagari script as the official language of the Union, with English permitted for official use for 15 years after independence. The inclusion of English as an official language was met with strong opposition, as many viewed it as a colonial vestige. However, the Official Languages Act of 1963 extended the use of English indefinitely, unless modified by future legislation. The original 15-year timeframe was intended to allow Hindi to gradually replace English as the sole official language, but this vision never materialized due to staunch resistance, particularly from the southern states.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has ramped up efforts to make Hindi the country’s primary link language. The BJP has placed the National Education Policy (NEP) at the center of this linguistic push, presenting it as a vehicle for national cohesion. By introducing Hindi instruction in non-Hindi-speaking states, the NEP’s three-language formula has revived old tensions, drawing fierce resistance from regions that see the policy as yet another attempt to impose linguistic uniformity on a country that has long resisted it.

Why Hindi?

With an estimated 600 million speakers, Hindi dominates northern India and ranks as the world’s third most spoken language. Yet, it remains a minority within India, where non-Hindi speakers outnumber those who speak it. The 2011 Census shows that only 43.63% of Indians identify Hindi as their first language. Despite this, Hindi’s numerical strength gives it a significant advantage. Even without including its dialects and closely related languages, no other Indian language comes close in terms of speakers. The political influence of Hindi-speaking regions is particularly strong in the Indian capital, Delhi, and in populous states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which send a large number of assembly members to the legislature.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), rooted in Hindu nationalist ideology, has consistently pushed for Hindi as a pillar of its vision for national unification. For centuries, Hindi, a Sanskritized version of Hindustani, has dominated northern India, and the BJP sees its promotion as a way to reinforce national identity. By advancing Hindi, the party aligns with its broader cultural and political objectives.

Tamil Nadu’s Resistance to Hindi

Tamil Nadu, one of India’s most economically and culturally vibrant states, has expressed the strongest opposition to the new education policy, reigniting a fresh political dispute. For the people of Tamil Nadu, their language is deeply intertwined with their identity, and their politics often diverge sharply from the rest of the country, sometimes even challenging national unity in the name of Tamil nationalism.

The ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), known for its strong Tamil identity politics, has seized this issue to counter the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has been trying to establish a foothold in the state’s political landscape. Tamil, with its centuries-old literary heritage and one of the world’s richest linguistic traditions, is neither endangered nor under threat. However, many in Tamil Nadu fear that mandating Hindi education will gradually detach future generations from their Tamil roots—similar to how several northern Indian languages lost prominence after adopting Hindi-centric education policies.

Beyond the cultural debate, the DMK also sees a political challenge: it fears that the promotion of Hindi could pave the way for national parties like the BJP to gain influence in Tamil Nadu, posing an existential threat to the state’s distinct political landscape.

Future of the Language Rift?

The National Education Policy (NEP) has sparked strong opposition, particularly in Tamil Nadu, while other major states, despite some resistance, have largely accepted it. However, if the central government pursues a more assertive language policy, linguistic tensions could spread beyond Tamil Nadu to other regions. Many in the South fiercely oppose any imposition of Hindi on their linguistic identity. At the same time, the aggressive enforcement of regional languages in southern states has, at times, fueled resentment toward Hindi speakers, further straining national unity.

Political analysts argue that India’s constitutional commitment to multilingualism has been essential in preventing fragmentation. They warn that imposing a single language could have far-reaching consequences—not only for the country’s political landscape but for its very unity. India is not a monolithic nation bound by a single language, ethnicity, or religion; rather, it is a diverse federation held together by the principles enshrined in its Constitution.

March 4, 2025
Can India Steer Clear of Trump’s Tariff Fury?

Donald Trump and Narendra Modi have been carefully cultivating a political kinship that extends beyond diplomacy into mutual admiration. They showcased their relationship through grand public displays, from campaign-style rallies to meticulously choreographed photo-ops, projecting the ease of old friends. In a distinction typically reserved for America’s closest allies, Modi became only the fourth world leader to visit Trump early in his term—a visit that underscored not just strategic ties but a personal affinity.

Yet, despite the warmth of their exchanges, India remains vulnerable to Trump’s economic nationalism. As he upended trade relations with U.S. allies, India found itself in a particularly precarious position. Its sizable trade surplus and rigid barriers to foreign businesses made it an obvious target for Trump’s protectionist agenda. He did not see India as an indispensable partner but as a market resisting American goods—a problem to fix, a prize to claim.

At their joint press conference in Washington on Thursday evening, Trump and Modi once again projected a united front, their camaraderie intact despite the growing complexities of their relationship. The two staunch nationalists exchanged pleasantries, reinforcing a sense of mutual understanding even as unresolved tensions loomed—from tariff disputes to the deportation of undocumented migrants and the broader uncertainties of global trade.

Speculation about the future of their partnership ran high, yet their personal chemistry remained undeniable—a dynamic that had long shaped their public engagements. Still, Modi understands that personal rapport has its limits. America First was never designed to align seamlessly with India’s interests—and never will.

Just hours before Modi’s meeting with Trump at the White House, the U.S. president signed an executive order on reciprocal tariffs, aiming to match the duties imposed on American exports with equivalent levies on foreign imports. A fact sheet released by the White House singled out India, highlighting the disparity: while the U.S. applies an average Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff of 5% on agricultural goods, India’s stands at 39%. The document also noted that India imposes a 100% tariff on American motorcycles, whereas the U.S. levies only 2.4% on Indian bikes.

India, taking the concern seriously, had already begun making concessions. Just a week prior, it reduced import tariffs on heavyweight motorcycles from 50% to 30%, with further tax cuts following. But the Trump administration remained unsatisfied. The announcement of reciprocal tariffs, timed to coincide with Modi’s visit, underscored the pressure on India to strike a delicate balance—protecting domestic industries while preserving its crucial access to the American market.

For Modi, this balancing act carries political risks, especially as India grapples with an economic slowdown. The U.S. push for greater market access primarily targets consumer goods, a sector where entrenched protections have long shielded Indian small and medium enterprises. These businesses form a significant part of Modi’s voter base, making any concessions a potential political liability.

India is banking on large-scale purchases of American oil, gas, and defense equipment—including the coveted F-35 stealth jets—to soften Trump’s frustration over their trade relationship. Rather than challenging U.S. tariffs directly, Modi’s government has chosen a different approach: addressing Trump’s fixation on trade deficits. By ramping up imports from the U.S., India signals its willingness to spend, allowing Trump to claim victory in narrowing the $45.6 billion trade gap while boosting American exports.

But trade was not the only pressing issue. Trump’s aggressive crackdown on undocumented migration has also affected Indians, making it another focal point of Modi’s visit. An estimated 725,000 undocumented Indian immigrants live in the U.S., making them the third-largest group of unauthorized migrants after Mexicans and Salvadorans, according to Pew Research. Just days before Modi’s arrival, the U.S. deported 104 Indians on a military flight, a move that ignited outrage in India after footage showed deportees shackled and handcuffed. Many in India demanded that Modi push back against Trump’s hardline policies.

Instead, Modi aligned himself with Trump, stating unequivocally that anyone entering another country illegally has absolutely no right to stay—a stance that underscored his preference for pragmatism over confrontation.

Trump’s tariff war shows no signs of slowing, sparing neither allies nor adversaries. India stands among the most vulnerable, making Modi’s visit all the more critical. His government has already shown signs of bending to U.S. demands—accepting deported undocumented migrants on American military planes and negotiating energy, defense, and broader trade deals. With limited support from Russia or China, India faces a harsh reality: if Trump imposes tariffs on Indian goods, the consequences will be severe. More high-level meetings are inevitable as Modi works to defuse tensions and avoid an escalating trade war. But in these early days of Trump’s second term, the tone is already set.

February 16, 2025
Decoding the Flourishing India-France Affair

France once sailed in step with Britain, Spain, and Portugal, its ambitions stretching as far as the winds would carry its ships. It fought on distant shores, its banners raised in the great imperial struggle that shaped the modern world. From the Americas to Asia—including in India, where it vied with Britain for influence—France played its part in the violent theater of empire, but history had other plans. In the end, it yielded to Britain, its colonial reach eclipsed as the English secured their grip on global power.

The British Empire, in time, grew old, its influence fraying at the edges, and from its shadow emerged a new master of the world—the United States. France, ever watchful, remained an ally of the West but never quite relinquished its longing for distinction. In partnership with Germany, it imagined a Europe unshackled from Anglo-American dominance, a world where Paris and Berlin, not Washington and London, set the terms. But as the English-speaking nations tightened their bonds, France found itself seeking new avenues for influence.

Now, with nationalist fervor stirring on both sides of the Atlantic, France is once again in search of a role, a place in the shifting global order. It needs a partner—one formidable enough to shape the world alongside it, yet not so powerful as to cast it into the shadows. And so, France is turning to India. India-France relations are evolving into a great partnership rooted in shared interests. As India grows wary of the deepening China-Russia partnership and faces limitations in its ties with the U.S., it, too, seeks a reliable ally. With defense, trade, and technological cooperation at the forefront, the India-France relationship is emerging as a key pillar of global diplomacy.

While India and France have long shared a strategic partnership, their ties are now reaching new heights. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to France underscored this deepening relationship, culminating in a stop at the Mediterranean port city of Marseille—an entry point that French President Emmanuel Macron envisions as Europe’s gateway to a future shaped by the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

Announced at the 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi, IMEC is a planned railway and maritime corridor designed to strengthen trade between India and Europe via Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The initiative has been framed as a potential alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and was championed by the U.S. under former President Joe Biden. France, Italy, and Germany joined India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as co-signatories, marking a significant step in Europe’s engagement with this new connectivity project.

But for France, IMEC is more than just a trade corridor—it is an opportunity to revive its long-standing ambitions of expanding France-India trade. Historically, France saw India as a vital market and resource hub, but its aspirations were overshadowed by Britain, which secured dominance during the colonial era. Now, as France seeks to reassert its global relevance, its engagement with India has taken on a new strategic urgency, positioning India-France relations at the heart of its economic and geopolitical agenda.

Macron emphasized that Marseille could serve as the main entry point for the European market, describing IMEC as a significant catalyst for concrete projects and investment. During his visit to Marseille, Prime Minister Modi attended a presentation by the CMA CGM Group, a French shipping and logistics giant eager to play a key role in making IMEC a reality. Modi stated on social media that as India expands its maritime and trade networks, collaborations with industry leaders will be essential in strengthening connectivity, supply chains, and economic growth. Recognizing the project’s significance, Macron had already appointed a special IMEC envoy last year to shape France’s role in the initiative.

For India, Russia remains its most trusted partner, with deep ties spanning trade and defense. However, India’s concerns are growing as Russia strengthens its relationship with China. There is a fear that as Russia becomes more dependent on Beijing, China could dominate the partnership, potentially sidelining India. Given the already strained India-China relationship, such a shift could disrupt India’s access to critical Russian defense supplies and other essential imports.

To mitigate this risk, India is actively diversifying its strategic partnerships and looking westward. France has emerged as a natural choice, offering advanced military technology and ammunition without the geopolitical constraints often imposed by the U.S. and Britain. Additionally, India sees France as a key partner in strengthening supply chains and securing greater access to European markets.

India is set to acquire 26 French-made Rafale fighter jets, adding to the 33 already in service, while talks are underway for the purchase of three more Scorpene submarines, complementing the six previously acquired by the Indian Navy. These defense deals, worth approximately €10.6 billion, underscore the growing strategic alignment between the two nations. But France’s ambitions extend beyond defense—it sees India as a vital partner in shaping a world increasingly defined by the China-Russia axis and the U.S.-led order. For India, forging closer ties with France provides a powerful counterbalance, offering an ally beyond the dominant geopolitical blocs. With shared interests and mutual gains at play, this partnership is transforming into something deeper—a strategic alliance with the allure of a grand geopolitical romance.

February 15, 2025
Narendra Modi Finally Got India’s Capital Territory

Delhi, the national capital territory of India, serves as the country’s administrative center, housing Parliament, ministries, the Supreme Court, and other key government institutions and tribunals. Unlike Indian states, it functions as a special administrative zone with limited governing authority, akin to Washington, D.C., in the United States. Despite its small size, Delhi wields significant political influence. Often called “Mini Hindustan” due to the diverse migration from across India, it remains a crucial battleground for political parties, with gaining power in Delhi considered a point of pride.

For Narendra Modi and the BJP, securing power in Delhi has been a long-standing goal. Though the party briefly controlled the capital in the 1990s, it struggled to regain influence after Modi became prime minister in 2014. Despite its widespread electoral success across India, the BJP consistently lost Delhi’s assembly elections to the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), led by Arvind Kejriwal. Originating from an anti-corruption movement, AAP positioned itself as a grassroots alternative to traditional politics, operating more as an activist-driven group than a conventional party. While some experts saw AAP’s rise as a potential third force in Indian politics, the party lost its important ground in this latest election.

After years of setbacks, the BJP’s hard work finally paid off in the latest Delhi Assembly elections, which concluded on February 5th. This victory—Modi’s fourth attempt at capturing the capital—marks a significant political shift. For the first time in over a quarter-century, Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has taken control of Delhi’s government. In the 2025 assembly elections, the BJP won 47 of the 70 seats, ousting the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), which had governed the capital since 2015. AAP secured just 22 seats. In a stunning upset, its leader and founder, Arvind Kejriwal, along with his deputy, Manish Sisodia, lost their seats despite the party’s strong appeal through welfare programs and its anti-corruption agenda. The Indian National Congress, which failed to win a single seat for the third consecutive election, faces serious questions about its future. Once a dominant force in the region, Congress ruled Delhi for nearly 15 years before Kejriwal’s rise. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), another former powerhouse, also suffered a crushing defeat.

Waving party flags and holding up posters of Narendra Modi, BJP supporters chanted slogans and danced outside the party headquarters in the capital as the vote results started to come in, with most exit polls predicting a decisive win for the party. Addressing the crowd, Modi criticized the Aam Aadmi Party and Arvind Kejriwal for their actions, but reserved his sharpest words for the Indian National Congress, delivering a scathing critique of the opposition. Amit Shah, India’s influential home minister and senior BJP leader, emphasized that the victory represented the people’s rejection of deceit. He noted that the public could no longer be misled by falsehoods. Shah also stressed that under Modi’s leadership, the BJP would transform New Delhi into the world’s leading capital by fulfilling all its promises. He hailed the victory as a testament to the people’s faith in Prime Minister Modi’s vision for progress.

The election result was a major boost for the BJP, especially after the party faile d to secure a majority in last year’s national elections and had to rely on coalition partners to form the government. The BJP regained momentum by winning key state elections in Haryana and Maharashtra. In the lead-up to the election, Modi’s government implemented tax cuts for the salaried middle class, a vital voting bloc. Throughout the campaign, both Modi and Kejriwal promised reforms, such as overhauling government schools, providing free healthcare and electricity, and offering a monthly stipend of over 2,000 rupees ($25) to impoverished women—proposals that have become standard in Indian elections.

The Delhi election signals important political shifts in India. Narendra Modi and the BJP are reaching new heights, extending their influence into states and territories once beyond their grasp. Modi is also attracting support from Muslim and Sikh communities, groups that were traditionally outside his base. Meanwhile, the opposition bloc, known as I.N.D.I.A., which includes the Indian National Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), is unraveling. Both parties failed to coordinate and strike agreements ahead of the Delhi election, leading to disappointing outcomes. AAP may distance itself from the alliance, as many parties within the bloc face similar struggles due to a lack of cohesion. Modi’s success is well-deserved, and the BJP is clearly flourishing. However, the opposition must reassess its strategy if it hopes to challenge Modi’s expanding dominance.

February 9, 2025
Why Doesn’t India Have a Strong Third National Party?

India, the largest democracy in the world with more than 900 million voters, has over 1,000 political parties. These parties can be categorized under various criteria—politics-based, caste-based, interest-based, or even fan groups of cinema actors, who also participate in Indian elections as registered political parties. This diverse landscape makes Indian politics fascinating, with elections often described as the biggest festivals in the country.

However, the most significant criterion for classifying political parties is their registration status with the Election Commission of India. According to the latest publication dated March 23, 2024, by the Election Commission, there are six national parties, 58 state parties, and 2,763 unrecognized or local parties. Each category has specific criteria for recognition. For instance, a national party must meet one of the following conditions: win 11 Lok Sabha seats from at least three different states, poll 6% of votes in four or more states and win four Lok Sabha seats, or gain recognition as a state party in four states.

Under these criteria, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Indian National Congress (INC), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), Communist Party of India (Marxist), and National People’s Party (NPP) qualify as national parties.

Despite these classifications, only the BJP and the INC can truly be considered national parties in terms of nationwide presence and organizational reach. No other party has a pan-India support base or the ability to consistently win more than 10 seats out of the 543 in the Lok Sabha. This trend, visible long before the 2014 general election, became more pronounced when Narendra Modi’s leadership framed Indian politics as a contest between Hindutva and anti-Hindutva narratives. Today, India’s 1.4 billion people largely choose between these two parties and their ideologies, rather than benefiting from a truly functional multi-party system.

There are several reasons behind this phenomenon. One is the way Indian politics operates, with a strong attachment to socialism or center-right ideologies. This creates a narrow spectrum where major parties compete, leaving little room for diverse offerings. Another factor is the worship-like style of Indian politics, making it difficult for new parties to break through. Additionally, agenda-setting plays a crucial role. Indian politics often divides into two dominant camps, each setting the political narrative in a way that leaves little room for other parties to gain traction.

Communication barriers further exacerbate the issue. Beyond word-of-mouth channels, many leaders or organizations struggle to connect with the populace, as a significant number of people lack access to print or television media. Established parties already dominate these communication channels, leaving little opportunity for emerging parties to reach a broader audience. These, along with several other factors, make it challenging for new political entities to establish themselves in India’s political landscape.

When we examine the history of Indian elections, it is unsurprising that the country’s vast political landscape has predominantly been dominated by two major parties, representing two broad political ideologies. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, India occasionally witnessed contests involving three or even four significant parties. For example, in the elections of 1989, 1991, and 1996, in addition to the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), parties like the Janata Dal and the Communist Party held considerable sway and fiercely contested for control of New Delhi.

Outside of these exceptions, most general elections have been two-way contests, evolving into what can be described as a “two-tent” system. Despite the diversity among India’s political parties, alliances often form during elections, consolidating around two dominant factions. This trend has become a recurring pattern in Indian electoral politics, especially following the period of INC’s dominance after independence.

It is noteworthy that no third political force in India today has the widespread appeal or organizational reach to secure significant representation across multiple states. Janata Dal, once a powerful player, fragmented into numerous smaller factions and has since lost its national relevance. Similarly, the Communist Party, once a robust third force, now faces an existential crisis. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which emerged as a champion of Dalit politics with a genuinely national agenda and representation from diverse states, has also faded into relative obscurity due to a lack of direction.

The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), which burst onto the political scene with significant momentum and the promise of becoming India’s third major national party, appears to have stalled, increasingly resembling a regional entity. Meanwhile, the National People’s Party (NPP), a Northeastern-based national party, seems uninterested in expanding its influence beyond its home region.

A strong third political party can reinvigorate democracy, offering voters a genuine alternative and enriching the national dialogue. In India, however, no such party has emerged with the ability to secure even 10 percent of the seats in the Lok Sabha. In the 2024 elections, the Samajwadi Party (SP)—a regional force with deep roots in Uttar Pradesh—managed to carve out a notable, yet modest, position as the third-largest party, winning 37 seats. The All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) were the only other parties to cross the 20-seat mark. However, all three remain state-centric. DMK’s politics is rooted in Tamil Nadu, showing little interest or involvement in national issues. While the Samajwadi Party and AITC have shown stronger potential, significant hurdles remain.

The SP’s 37 seats mark one of the strongest performances by a third party in recent Indian elections, rivaling the AIADMK’s 37 seats in 2014. However, unlike AIADMK, which is confined to Tamil Nadu with its 39 Lok Sabha seats, the SP hails from Uttar Pradesh, which offers 80 seats. Additionally, the SP has previously established a presence in other states like Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The party’s vote base includes OBCs and Muslims, groups that often feel politically marginalized and disconnected from the Indian National Congress. With Akhilesh Yadav as its young, charismatic leader, the SP has the potential to expand into the Hindi belt and other states with significant Muslim populations. However, its dynastic politics raises concerns that it may follow the path of its predecessor, Janata Dal, which eventually disintegrated.

There is a visible political vacuum, as voters seeking an alternative to the BJP often avoid the Indian National Congress. This opens a window of opportunity for the SP. However, for this to materialize, Akhilesh Yadav must strategize effectively, particularly given reports of friction between the Congress and the SP within the opposition alliance, INDIA. A divergence could prompt the SP to strengthen its independent ambitions.

Similarly, the AITC holds potential. While the party’s current focus remains on West Bengal, where it is dominant, its influence could extend into northeastern states. The Congress’s decline presents an opportunity for the AITC, as both parties share a similar voter base. Being a Congress offshoot, the AITC is well-positioned to attract disillusioned Congress leaders and supporters unhappy with its leadership. With 42 seats in West Bengal and 25 in the northeastern states, the AITC has room to grow in regions previously held by the Congress.

Both the SP and the AITC represent possible contenders for becoming India’s third political force, but success will require strategic planning and expansion beyond their traditional strongholds. The path is fraught with challenges, yet the shifting political landscape offers unique opportunities for growth and influence.

Many experts believe that, aside from the two dominant parties, the emergence of a third party in India would likely stem from a spin-off. However, this seems less likely in the current political climate. The BJP, which has built its strength through a solid ideological foundation, systematic organization, and leadership, is not at risk of a major split, as it has consolidated its influence around its charismatic leadership. Similarly, the Indian National Congress has already undergone multiple splits and cannot afford more without risking a complete loss of influence. In recent times, no significant divisions have been visible in either party.

Another possibility could be the merger of smaller parties to form a larger political force, but this is unlikely to succeed, as ambitious leaders often prioritize their own interests rather than working together for the greater good. Political consolidation among smaller parties faces significant challenges, especially with leaders who are reluctant to cede control.

In a multiparty state with such a large population, it is a disgrace that the political agenda is set by just two dominant parties. Sadly, this is the reality of India. However, unless state parties like the SP and AITC decide to grow, or the BSP and AAP refine their strategies, or new spin-offs and mergers take place, the status quo will persist. This will lead Indian politics in the direction of the United States, offering voters only two viable options—and that is detrimental to the health of democracy.

January 26, 2025