Tag: India

  • Is Sri Lanka quietly drifting back into India’s orbit?

    Is Sri Lanka quietly drifting back into India’s orbit?

    Long wary of being seen as a satellite of India, Sri Lanka has spent decades navigating its foreign alignments—at times courting the West, and more recently, leaning heavily toward China. That pivot, especially during the Rajapaksa era, brought a surge of Chinese investment but also coincided with one of the most severe economic crises in the island’s post-independence history. Now, under the weight of that collapse, Sri Lanka appears to be rebalancing. The island nation is quietly edging back toward New Delhi—not through grand gestures, but via a deliberate flow of strategic agreements and behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

    For Colombo, this shift marks a pragmatic recalibration. What was once seen as a one-sided relationship with India is increasingly viewed as a possible path out of economic despair. For New Delhi, the moment offers both a strategic opening and a pressing imperative. By providing critical aid, essential supplies, and infrastructure investment, India is not only helping to stabilize its southern neighbor but also reinforcing its presence in a region where Beijing’s influence has grown markedly.

    Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka

    Narendra Modi, the Indian Prime Minister who has skillfully crafted diplomatic relationships across the region, recently made a significant visit to Colombo. The trip—his first to Sri Lanka since President Anura Kumara Dissanayake took office in September last year—served as a symbol of the changing dynamics in South Asian geopolitics.

    During the visit, India and Sri Lanka signed seven key agreements spanning defense, energy, digital infrastructure, health, and trade. The move signaled a recalibration in regional alliances, as both nations work to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean.

    Initially, concerns in New Delhi centered around Dissanayake’s leftist background and potential leanings toward Beijing. However, those apprehensions have since softened. Instead of drifting closer to China, Colombo appears to be re-engaging with New Delhi in a more pragmatic and strategic manner.

    Dissanayake reassured Modi that Sri Lanka would not permit its territory to be used in any way that might threaten India’s security. Modi, in turn, welcomed the gesture, emphasizing the deeply interconnected nature of security interests between the two nations.

    India Backs Sri Lanka’s Core Needs

    Amid an economic collapse and mounting debt to China, India provided vital supplies and assistance when Sri Lankans needed them most. While China invested heavily in large-scale infrastructure projects—many of which offered limited benefits to ordinary citizens—India’s approach focused on immediate relief and practical support. This made a lasting impact on the public and nudged the Sri Lankan government toward rebuilding trust and strengthening ties with New Delhi.

    That relationship is now evolving. Expanding beyond emergency aid, India is investing across multiple sectors. As a symbol of this growing partnership, the two leaders recently inaugurated—virtually—the construction of a 120-megawatt solar power plant, a joint venture funded by India and aimed at advancing Sri Lanka’s energy future.

    Sri Lanka needs to balance

    While Sri Lanka is working to repair its relationship with India, cutting ties with China is far from simple. China remains Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral creditor, accounting for over half of the island’s $14 billion in bilateral debt at the time of its sovereign default in 2022. The economic collapse, however, forced Colombo to rethink its heavy dependence on China—a reliance that had contributed to the crisis—and created space for India to step in with substantial financial and material assistance.

    Nonetheless, China’s role in restructuring Sri Lanka’s infrastructure loans remains vital. President Dissanayake’s first official overseas visit to New Delhi in December signaled a renewed diplomatic warmth, but his subsequent trip to Beijing in January underscored the balancing act Colombo must maintain. That same month, Sri Lanka signed a $3.7 billion investment deal with a Chinese state-owned company to build an oil refinery in the country’s south, reaffirming Beijing’s enduring economic footprint.

    It’s evident that Sri Lanka still looks to China for large-scale funding—support that India, thus far, has been cautious to extend. As such, it would be premature to declare a pro-India tilt in Colombo’s foreign policy. Instead, Sri Lanka appears to be navigating a delicate path, seeking to balance both powers in pursuit of its own national interests.

    What happens next?

    It’s clear that Trump’s trade policies have shaken the global order. China is no longer the China the world once knew; it is now seeking broader relationships rather than maintaining a confrontational posture. This shift will inevitably influence dynamics in South Asia as well. The region, with its massive population, represents a significant market that China cannot afford to ignore. Yet among South Asian nations, India stands out with the strongest purchasing power—making a stable relationship with New Delhi increasingly important for Beijing.

    India, for its part, remains deeply concerned about China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka, which it considers part of its traditional sphere of interest. As China recalibrates its global strategy, it may seek to ease regional tensions with India, potentially stepping back from past hostilities. In this evolving landscape, the groundwork is being laid for improved relations between India and Sri Lanka—an alignment that could help India reclaim its influence in the region. At the same time, it offers Sri Lanka a valuable escape from the strategic and economic trap it has been struggling to navigate.

  • India’s Linguistic Battle: A Threat to Unity?

    India’s Linguistic Battle: A Threat to Unity?

    The Narendra Modi government’s National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 has reignited India’s long-standing language tensions. The policy enforces a three-language formula in schools, widely seen as an attempt to expand Hindi’s influence—aligning with the BJP’s ideological vision.

    Approved by the Union Cabinet on July 29, 2020, NEP 2020 aims to reform India’s education system, replacing the 1986 National Policy on Education. With decades passing since the last major policy change, reforms were inevitable. However, the three-language formula has met strong resistance, especially from southern states, which take great pride in their linguistic heritage and have long opposed Hindi imposition. The controversy has deepened as the central government prioritizes funding for states that implement the policy.

    Tamil Nadu, known for its strong linguistic identity and opposition to Hindi imposition, has led the resistance. The state government’s formal rejection of the policy has escalated the debate. Online protests and social media campaigns continue to amplify tensions, occasionally sparking concerns about national unity.

    The Land of Linguistic Diversity

    India, a nation of extraordinary linguistic diversity, ranks second only to Papua New Guinea in the number of languages spoken within its borders—780, according to the People’s Linguistic Survey of India. This multiplicity of tongues has long been both a source of cultural richness and a point of contention. Unlike many nations, including its erstwhile twin, Pakistan, India did not designate a single national language. Instead, its framers took a characteristically intricate approach: they recognized Hindi—the country’s most widely spoken language—and English for official purposes but refrained from declaring any language as the national language. This decision was not merely an effort to avoid conflict but a conscious attempt to hold together a vast and diverse republic, fostering a sense of inclusivity.

    Article 343 of the Indian Constitution declares Hindi in the Devanagari script as the official language of the Union, with English permitted for official use for 15 years after independence. The inclusion of English as an official language was met with strong opposition, as many viewed it as a colonial vestige. However, the Official Languages Act of 1963 extended the use of English indefinitely, unless modified by future legislation. The original 15-year timeframe was intended to allow Hindi to gradually replace English as the sole official language, but this vision never materialized due to staunch resistance, particularly from the southern states.

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has ramped up efforts to make Hindi the country’s primary link language. The BJP has placed the National Education Policy (NEP) at the center of this linguistic push, presenting it as a vehicle for national cohesion. By introducing Hindi instruction in non-Hindi-speaking states, the NEP’s three-language formula has revived old tensions, drawing fierce resistance from regions that see the policy as yet another attempt to impose linguistic uniformity on a country that has long resisted it.

    Why Hindi?

    With an estimated 600 million speakers, Hindi dominates northern India and ranks as the world’s third most spoken language. Yet, it remains a minority within India, where non-Hindi speakers outnumber those who speak it. The 2011 Census shows that only 43.63% of Indians identify Hindi as their first language. Despite this, Hindi’s numerical strength gives it a significant advantage. Even without including its dialects and closely related languages, no other Indian language comes close in terms of speakers. The political influence of Hindi-speaking regions is particularly strong in the Indian capital, Delhi, and in populous states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which send a large number of assembly members to the legislature.

    The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), rooted in Hindu nationalist ideology, has consistently pushed for Hindi as a pillar of its vision for national unification. For centuries, Hindi,  a Sanskritized version of Hindustani, has dominated northern India, and the BJP sees its promotion as a way to reinforce national identity. By advancing Hindi, the party aligns with its broader cultural and political objectives.

    Tamil Nadu’s Resistance to Hindi

    Tamil Nadu, one of India’s most economically and culturally vibrant states, has expressed the strongest opposition to the new education policy, reigniting a fresh political dispute. For the people of Tamil Nadu, their language is deeply intertwined with their identity, and their politics often diverge sharply from the rest of the country, sometimes even challenging national unity in the name of Tamil nationalism.

    The ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), known for its strong Tamil identity politics, has seized this issue to counter the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has been trying to establish a foothold in the state’s political landscape. Tamil, with its centuries-old literary heritage and one of the world’s richest linguistic traditions, is neither endangered nor under threat. However, many in Tamil Nadu fear that mandating Hindi education will gradually detach future generations from their Tamil roots—similar to how several northern Indian languages lost prominence after adopting Hindi-centric education policies.

    Beyond the cultural debate, the DMK also sees a political challenge: it fears that the promotion of Hindi could pave the way for national parties like the BJP to gain influence in Tamil Nadu, posing an existential threat to the state’s distinct political landscape.

    Future of the Language Rift?

    The National Education Policy (NEP) has sparked strong opposition, particularly in Tamil Nadu, while other major states, despite some resistance, have largely accepted it. However, if the central government pursues a more assertive language policy, linguistic tensions could spread beyond Tamil Nadu to other regions. Many in the South fiercely oppose any imposition of Hindi on their linguistic identity. At the same time, the aggressive enforcement of regional languages in southern states has, at times, fueled resentment toward Hindi speakers, further straining national unity.

    Political analysts argue that India’s constitutional commitment to multilingualism has been essential in preventing fragmentation. They warn that imposing a single language could have far-reaching consequences—not only for the country’s political landscape but for its very unity. India is not a monolithic nation bound by a single language, ethnicity, or religion; rather, it is a diverse federation held together by the principles enshrined in its Constitution.

  • Can India Steer Clear of Trump’s Tariff Fury?

    Can India Steer Clear of Trump’s Tariff Fury?

    Donald Trump and Narendra Modi have been carefully cultivating a political kinship that extends beyond diplomacy into mutual admiration. They showcased their relationship through grand public displays, from campaign-style rallies to meticulously choreographed photo-ops, projecting the ease of old friends. In a distinction typically reserved for America’s closest allies, Modi became only the fourth world leader to visit Trump early in his term—a visit that underscored not just strategic ties but a personal affinity.

    Yet, despite the warmth of their exchanges, India remains vulnerable to Trump’s economic nationalism. As he upended trade relations with U.S. allies, India found itself in a particularly precarious position. Its sizable trade surplus and rigid barriers to foreign businesses made it an obvious target for Trump’s protectionist agenda. He did not see India as an indispensable partner but as a market resisting American goods—a problem to fix, a prize to claim.

    At their joint press conference in Washington on Thursday evening, Trump and Modi once again projected a united front, their camaraderie intact despite the growing complexities of their relationship. The two staunch nationalists exchanged pleasantries, reinforcing a sense of mutual understanding even as unresolved tensions loomed—from tariff disputes to the deportation of undocumented migrants and the broader uncertainties of global trade.

    Speculation about the future of their partnership ran high, yet their personal chemistry remained undeniable—a dynamic that had long shaped their public engagements. Still, Modi understands that personal rapport has its limits. America First was never designed to align seamlessly with India’s interests—and never will.

    Just hours before Modi’s meeting with Trump at the White House, the U.S. president signed an executive order on reciprocal tariffs, aiming to match the duties imposed on American exports with equivalent levies on foreign imports. A fact sheet released by the White House singled out India, highlighting the disparity: while the U.S. applies an average Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff of 5% on agricultural goods, India’s stands at 39%. The document also noted that India imposes a 100% tariff on American motorcycles, whereas the U.S. levies only 2.4% on Indian bikes.

    India, taking the concern seriously, had already begun making concessions. Just a week prior, it reduced import tariffs on heavyweight motorcycles from 50% to 30%, with further tax cuts following. But the Trump administration remained unsatisfied. The announcement of reciprocal tariffs, timed to coincide with Modi’s visit, underscored the pressure on India to strike a delicate balance—protecting domestic industries while preserving its crucial access to the American market.

    For Modi, this balancing act carries political risks, especially as India grapples with an economic slowdown. The U.S. push for greater market access primarily targets consumer goods, a sector where entrenched protections have long shielded Indian small and medium enterprises. These businesses form a significant part of Modi’s voter base, making any concessions a potential political liability.

    India is banking on large-scale purchases of American oil, gas, and defense equipment—including the coveted F-35 stealth jets—to soften Trump’s frustration over their trade relationship. Rather than challenging U.S. tariffs directly, Modi’s government has chosen a different approach: addressing Trump’s fixation on trade deficits. By ramping up imports from the U.S., India signals its willingness to spend, allowing Trump to claim victory in narrowing the $45.6 billion trade gap while boosting American exports.

    But trade was not the only pressing issue. Trump’s aggressive crackdown on undocumented migration has also affected Indians, making it another focal point of Modi’s visit. An estimated 725,000 undocumented Indian immigrants live in the U.S., making them the third-largest group of unauthorized migrants after Mexicans and Salvadorans, according to Pew Research. Just days before Modi’s arrival, the U.S. deported 104 Indians on a military flight, a move that ignited outrage in India after footage showed deportees shackled and handcuffed. Many in India demanded that Modi push back against Trump’s hardline policies.

    Instead, Modi aligned himself with Trump, stating unequivocally that anyone entering another country illegally has absolutely no right  to stay—a stance that underscored his preference for pragmatism over confrontation.

    Trump’s tariff war shows no signs of slowing, sparing neither allies nor adversaries. India stands among the most vulnerable, making Modi’s visit all the more critical. His government has already shown signs of bending to U.S. demands—accepting deported undocumented migrants on American military planes and negotiating energy, defense, and broader trade deals. With limited support from Russia or China, India faces a harsh reality: if Trump imposes tariffs on Indian goods, the consequences will be severe. More high-level meetings are inevitable as Modi works to defuse tensions and avoid an escalating trade war. But in these early days of Trump’s second term, the tone is already set.

  • Decoding the Flourishing India-France Affair

    Decoding the Flourishing India-France Affair

    France once sailed in step with Britain, Spain, and Portugal, its ambitions stretching as far as the winds would carry its ships. It fought on distant shores, its banners raised in the great imperial struggle that shaped the modern world. From the Americas to Asia—including in India, where it vied with Britain for influence—France played its part in the violent theater of empire, but history had other plans. In the end, it yielded to Britain, its colonial reach eclipsed as the English secured their grip on global power.

    The British Empire, in time, grew old, its influence fraying at the edges, and from its shadow emerged a new master of the world—the United States. France, ever watchful, remained an ally of the West but never quite relinquished its longing for distinction. In partnership with Germany, it imagined a Europe unshackled from Anglo-American dominance, a world where Paris and Berlin, not Washington and London, set the terms. But as the English-speaking nations tightened their bonds, France found itself seeking new avenues for influence.

    Now, with nationalist fervor stirring on both sides of the Atlantic, France is once again in search of a role, a place in the shifting global order. It needs a partner—one formidable enough to shape the world alongside it, yet not so powerful as to cast it into the shadows. And so, France is turning to India. India-France relations are  evolving into a great partnership rooted in shared interests. As India grows wary of the deepening China-Russia partnership and faces limitations in its ties with the U.S., it, too, seeks a reliable ally. With defense, trade, and technological cooperation at the forefront, the India-France relationship is emerging as a key pillar of global diplomacy. 

    While India and France have long shared a strategic partnership, their ties are now reaching new heights. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to France underscored this deepening relationship, culminating in a stop at the Mediterranean port city of Marseille—an entry point that French President Emmanuel Macron envisions as Europe’s gateway to a future shaped by the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

    Announced at the 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi, IMEC is a planned railway and maritime corridor designed to strengthen trade between India and Europe via Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The initiative has been framed as a potential alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and was championed by the U.S. under former President Joe Biden. France, Italy, and Germany joined India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as co-signatories, marking a significant step in Europe’s engagement with this new connectivity project.

    But for France, IMEC is more than just a trade corridor—it is an opportunity to revive its long-standing ambitions of expanding France-India trade. Historically, France saw India as a vital market and resource hub, but its aspirations were overshadowed by Britain, which secured dominance during the colonial era. Now, as France seeks to reassert its global relevance, its engagement with India has taken on a new strategic urgency, positioning India-France relations at the heart of its economic and geopolitical agenda.

    Macron emphasized that Marseille could serve as the main entry point for the European market, describing IMEC as a significant catalyst for concrete projects and investment. During his visit to Marseille, Prime Minister Modi attended a presentation by the CMA CGM Group, a French shipping and logistics giant eager to play a key role in making IMEC a reality. Modi stated on social media that as India expands its maritime and trade networks, collaborations with industry leaders will be essential in strengthening connectivity, supply chains, and economic growth. Recognizing the project’s significance, Macron had already appointed a special IMEC envoy last year to shape France’s role in the initiative.

    For India, Russia remains its most trusted partner, with deep ties spanning trade and defense. However, India’s concerns are growing as Russia strengthens its relationship with China. There is a fear that as Russia becomes more dependent on Beijing, China could dominate the partnership, potentially sidelining India. Given the already strained India-China relationship, such a shift could disrupt India’s access to critical Russian defense supplies and other essential imports.

    To mitigate this risk, India is actively diversifying its strategic partnerships and looking westward. France has emerged as a natural choice, offering advanced military technology and ammunition without the geopolitical constraints often imposed by the U.S. and Britain. Additionally, India sees France as a key partner in strengthening supply chains and securing greater access to European markets.

    India is set to acquire 26 French-made Rafale fighter jets, adding to the 33 already in service, while talks are underway for the purchase of three more Scorpene submarines, complementing the six previously acquired by the Indian Navy. These defense deals, worth approximately €10.6 billion, underscore the growing strategic alignment between the two nations. But France’s ambitions extend beyond defense—it sees India as a vital partner in shaping a world increasingly defined by the China-Russia axis and the U.S.-led order. For India, forging closer ties with France provides a powerful counterbalance, offering an ally beyond the dominant geopolitical blocs. With shared interests and mutual gains at play, this partnership is transforming into something deeper—a strategic alliance with the allure of a grand geopolitical romance.

  • Narendra Modi Finally Got India’s Capital Territory

    Narendra Modi Finally Got India’s Capital Territory

    Delhi, the national capital territory of India, serves as the country’s administrative center, housing Parliament, ministries, the Supreme Court, and other key government institutions and tribunals. Unlike Indian states, it functions as a special administrative zone with limited governing authority, akin to Washington, D.C., in the United States. Despite its small size, Delhi wields significant political influence. Often called “Mini Hindustan” due to the diverse migration from across India, it remains a crucial battleground for political parties, with gaining power in Delhi considered a point of pride.

    For Narendra Modi and the BJP, securing power in Delhi has been a long-standing goal. Though the party briefly controlled the capital in the 1990s, it struggled to regain influence after Modi became prime minister in 2014. Despite its widespread electoral success across India, the BJP consistently lost Delhi’s assembly elections to the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), led by Arvind Kejriwal. Originating from an anti-corruption movement, AAP positioned itself as a grassroots alternative to traditional politics, operating more as an activist-driven group than a conventional party. While some experts saw AAP’s rise as a potential third force in Indian politics, the party lost its important ground in this latest election.

    After years of setbacks, the BJP’s hard work finally paid off in the latest Delhi Assembly elections, which concluded on February 5th. This victory—Modi’s fourth attempt at capturing the capital—marks a significant political shift. For the first time in over a quarter-century, Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has taken control of Delhi’s government. In the 2025 assembly elections, the BJP won 47 of the 70 seats, ousting the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), which had governed the capital since 2015. AAP secured just 22 seats. In a stunning upset, its leader and founder, Arvind Kejriwal, along with his deputy, Manish Sisodia, lost their seats despite the party’s strong appeal through welfare programs and its anti-corruption agenda. The Indian National Congress, which failed to win a single seat for the third consecutive election, faces serious questions about its future. Once a dominant force in the region, Congress ruled Delhi for nearly 15 years before Kejriwal’s rise. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), another former powerhouse, also suffered a crushing defeat.

    Waving party flags and holding up posters of Narendra Modi, BJP supporters chanted slogans and danced outside the party headquarters in the capital as the vote results started to come in, with most exit polls predicting a decisive win for the party. Addressing the crowd, Modi criticized the Aam Aadmi Party and Arvind Kejriwal for their actions, but reserved his sharpest words for the Indian National Congress, delivering a scathing critique of the opposition. Amit Shah, India’s influential home minister and senior BJP leader, emphasized that the victory represented the people’s rejection of deceit. He noted that the public could no longer be misled by falsehoods. Shah also stressed that under Modi’s leadership, the BJP would transform New Delhi into the world’s leading capital by fulfilling all its promises. He hailed the victory as a testament to the people’s faith in Prime Minister Modi’s vision for progress.

    The election result was a major boost for the BJP, especially after the party failed to secure a majority in last year’s national elections and had to rely on coalition partners to form the government. The BJP regained momentum by winning key state elections in Haryana and Maharashtra. In the lead-up to the election, Modi’s government implemented tax cuts for the salaried middle class, a vital voting bloc. Throughout the campaign, both Modi and Kejriwal promised reforms, such as overhauling government schools, providing free healthcare and electricity, and offering a monthly stipend of over 2,000 rupees ($25) to impoverished women—proposals that have become standard in Indian elections.

    The Delhi election signals important political shifts in India. Narendra Modi and the BJP are reaching new heights, extending their influence into states and territories once beyond their grasp. Modi is also attracting support from Muslim and Sikh communities, groups that were traditionally outside his base. Meanwhile, the opposition bloc, known as I.N.D.I.A., which includes the Indian National Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), is unraveling. Both parties failed to coordinate and strike agreements ahead of the Delhi election, leading to disappointing outcomes. AAP may distance itself from the alliance, as many parties within the bloc face similar struggles due to a lack of cohesion. Modi’s success is well-deserved, and the BJP is clearly flourishing. However, the opposition must reassess its strategy if it hopes to challenge Modi’s expanding dominance.

  • Why Doesn’t India Have a Strong Third National Party?

    Why Doesn’t India Have a Strong Third National Party?

    India, the largest democracy in the world with more than 900 million voters, has over 1,000 political parties. These parties can be categorized under various criteria—politics-based, caste-based, interest-based, or even fan groups of cinema actors, who also participate in Indian elections as registered political parties. This diverse landscape makes Indian politics fascinating, with elections often described as the biggest festivals in the country.

    However, the most significant criterion for classifying political parties is their registration status with the Election Commission of India. According to the latest publication dated March 23, 2024, by the Election Commission, there are six national parties, 58 state parties, and 2,763 unrecognized or local parties. Each category has specific criteria for recognition. For instance, a national party must meet one of the following conditions: win 11 Lok Sabha seats from at least three different states, poll 6% of votes in four or more states and win four Lok Sabha seats, or gain recognition as a state party in four states.

    Under these criteria, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Indian National Congress (INC), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), Communist Party of India (Marxist), and National People’s Party (NPP) qualify as national parties.

    Despite these classifications, only the BJP and the INC can truly be considered national parties in terms of nationwide presence and organizational reach. No other party has a pan-India support base or the ability to consistently win more than 10 seats out of the 543 in the Lok Sabha. This trend, visible long before the 2014 general election, became more pronounced when Narendra Modi’s leadership framed Indian politics as a contest between Hindutva and anti-Hindutva narratives. Today, India’s 1.4 billion people largely choose between these two parties and their ideologies, rather than benefiting from a truly functional multi-party system.

    There are several reasons behind this phenomenon. One is the way Indian politics operates, with a strong attachment to socialism or center-right ideologies. This creates a narrow spectrum where major parties compete, leaving little room for diverse offerings. Another factor is the worship-like style of Indian politics, making it difficult for new parties to break through. Additionally, agenda-setting plays a crucial role. Indian politics often divides into two dominant camps, each setting the political narrative in a way that leaves little room for other parties to gain traction.

    Communication barriers further exacerbate the issue. Beyond word-of-mouth channels, many leaders or organizations struggle to connect with the populace, as a significant number of people lack access to print or television media. Established parties already dominate these communication channels, leaving little opportunity for emerging parties to reach a broader audience. These, along with several other factors, make it challenging for new political entities to establish themselves in India’s political landscape.

    When we examine the history of Indian elections, it is unsurprising that the country’s vast political landscape has predominantly been dominated by two major parties, representing two broad political ideologies. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, India occasionally witnessed contests involving three or even four significant parties. For example, in the elections of 1989, 1991, and 1996, in addition to the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), parties like the Janata Dal and the Communist Party held considerable sway and fiercely contested for control of New Delhi.

    Outside of these exceptions, most general elections have been two-way contests, evolving into what can be described as a “two-tent” system. Despite the diversity among India’s political parties, alliances often form during elections, consolidating around two dominant factions. This trend has become a recurring pattern in Indian electoral politics, especially following the period of INC’s dominance after independence.

    It is noteworthy that no third political force in India today has the widespread appeal or organizational reach to secure significant representation across multiple states. Janata Dal, once a powerful player, fragmented into numerous smaller factions and has since lost its national relevance. Similarly, the Communist Party, once a robust third force, now faces an existential crisis. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which emerged as a champion of Dalit politics with a genuinely national agenda and representation from diverse states, has also faded into relative obscurity due to a lack of direction.

    The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), which burst onto the political scene with significant momentum and the promise of becoming India’s third major national party, appears to have stalled, increasingly resembling a regional entity. Meanwhile, the National People’s Party (NPP), a Northeastern-based national party, seems uninterested in expanding its influence beyond its home region.

    A strong third political party can reinvigorate democracy, offering voters a genuine alternative and enriching the national dialogue. In India, however, no such party has emerged with the ability to secure even 10 percent of the seats in the Lok Sabha. In the 2024 elections, the Samajwadi Party (SP)—a regional force with deep roots in Uttar Pradesh—managed to carve out a notable, yet modest, position as the third-largest party, winning 37 seats. The All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) were the only other parties to cross the 20-seat mark. However, all three remain state-centric. DMK’s politics is rooted in Tamil Nadu, showing little interest or involvement in national issues. While the Samajwadi Party and AITC have shown stronger potential, significant hurdles remain.

    The SP’s 37 seats mark one of the strongest performances by a third party in recent Indian elections, rivaling the AIADMK’s 37 seats in 2014. However, unlike AIADMK, which is confined to Tamil Nadu with its 39 Lok Sabha seats, the SP hails from Uttar Pradesh, which offers 80 seats. Additionally, the SP has previously established a presence in other states like Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The party’s vote base includes OBCs and Muslims, groups that often feel politically marginalized and disconnected from the Indian National Congress. With Akhilesh Yadav as its young, charismatic leader, the SP has the potential to expand into the Hindi belt and other states with significant Muslim populations. However, its dynastic politics raises concerns that it may follow the path of its predecessor, Janata Dal, which eventually disintegrated.

    There is a visible political vacuum, as voters seeking an alternative to the BJP often avoid the Indian National Congress. This opens a window of opportunity for the SP. However, for this to materialize, Akhilesh Yadav must strategize effectively, particularly given reports of friction between the Congress and the SP within the opposition alliance, INDIA. A divergence could prompt the SP to strengthen its independent ambitions.

    Similarly, the AITC holds potential. While the party’s current focus remains on West Bengal, where it is dominant, its influence could extend into northeastern states. The Congress’s decline presents an opportunity for the AITC, as both parties share a similar voter base. Being a Congress offshoot, the AITC is well-positioned to attract disillusioned Congress leaders and supporters unhappy with its leadership. With 42 seats in West Bengal and 25 in the northeastern states, the AITC has room to grow in regions previously held by the Congress.

    Both the SP and the AITC represent possible contenders for becoming India’s third political force, but success will require strategic planning and expansion beyond their traditional strongholds. The path is fraught with challenges, yet the shifting political landscape offers unique opportunities for growth and influence.

    Many experts believe that, aside from the two dominant parties, the emergence of a third party in India would likely stem from a spin-off. However, this seems less likely in the current political climate. The BJP, which has built its strength through a solid ideological foundation, systematic organization, and leadership, is not at risk of a major split, as it has consolidated its influence around its charismatic leadership. Similarly, the Indian National Congress has already undergone multiple splits and cannot afford more without risking a complete loss of influence. In recent times, no significant divisions have been visible in either party.

    Another possibility could be the merger of smaller parties to form a larger political force, but this is unlikely to succeed, as ambitious leaders often prioritize their own interests rather than working together for the greater good. Political consolidation among smaller parties faces significant challenges, especially with leaders who are reluctant to cede control.

    In a multiparty state with such a large population, it is a disgrace that the political agenda is set by just two dominant parties. Sadly, this is the reality of India.  However, unless state parties like the SP and AITC decide to grow, or the BSP and AAP refine their strategies, or new spin-offs and mergers take place, the status quo will persist. This will lead Indian politics in the direction of the United States, offering voters only two viable options—and that is detrimental to the health of democracy.

  • Uneasy Allies: The Quiet Growth of India’s Ties with Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan

    Uneasy Allies: The Quiet Growth of India’s Ties with Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan

    Afghanistan has always been immensely important to Indian rulers, serving as a gateway to the Persian-Turkic world. After gaining independence in 1947, India recognized Afghanistan’s strategic value as a counterweight to Pakistan’s hostility. India invested heavily in Afghanistan’s development and actively participated in its social, economic, and cultural spheres. During Afghanistan’s short-lived democratic period, following the United States overthrow of the first Taliban emirate, India and Afghanistan forged their strongest ties, with Indian investments and relations reaching unprecedented heights.

    However, the Taliban, an Islamic extremist organization, has consistently opposed India and its involvement in Afghanistan. When the Taliban first seized control in 1996 and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with support from Pakistan and the United States, they pushed India to the margins. Their rigid Islamic ideology, including calls for the Islamization of India, directly threatened Indian interests too. The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 raised immediate concerns about India’s diminishing influence in Afghanistan, jeopardizing its strategic presence in the region.

    Though In recent years, a significant shift has unfolded. The current Taliban leadership has grown increasingly at odds with its longtime ally, Pakistan, leading to escalating tensions that risk boiling over into open conflict. This rift presents an unexpected opportunity for India, under a Hindu nationalist government, to pursue strategic engagement with the Taliban despite the stark ideological differences. What once seemed an improbable partnership has begun to take shape, with recent developments pointing to a surprising and growing rapprochement between India and the Taliban.

    As much of the international community maintains its distance from the Taliban’s repressive rule, India has quietly intensified its outreach. On Wednesday, in Dubai, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri sat down with Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, marking the highest-level official meeting between India and the Taliban since the latter’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021.

    The discussions, as outlined by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, touched upon a range of pressing issues: the evolving security situation within Afghanistan, India’s role in supporting humanitarian efforts and development initiatives, and the use of Iran’s Chabahar Port to open trade routes to the beleaguered nation. The Taliban’s statement, framed within the context of what it termed a “Balanced” foreign policy focused on economic priorities, pointed to its aim of deepening political and economic ties with India—an acknowledgment of India’s growing importance as both a regional and economic player in this complicated geopolitical landscape.

    India has also expressed its support for the burgeoning relationship. After the meeting, India’s Foreign Office stated that in response to a request from the Afghan side, India would provide additional material assistance, initially focusing on the health sector and refugee rehabilitation. The two sides also discussed strengthening cooperation in sports, particularly in cricket.

    The Taliban, for its part, is in desperate need of financial support. The United States has fully disengaged from Afghanistan, the Gulf countries have limited capacity without U.S. backing, and Russia is now weak, leaving China and India as the primary players. Afghanistan, rich in minerals and strategically located, makes it a target for both countries. India, driven by its desire to not only challenge Pakistan but also compete with China, seeks to reassert itself in a key regional theater.

    The recent meeting between India’s Foreign Secretary and Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister is part of a series of ongoing talks between the two countries. In November, senior Indian Foreign Ministry official JP Singh held multiple meetings with Taliban representatives, including a notable discussion with Acting Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob. Earlier, in June 2022, India sent a “Technical Team” to Kabul to oversee the delivery of humanitarian aid and assess how New Delhi could further assist the Afghan people. Since the opening of the technical mission, the Taliban has repeatedly sought to station its own representative in Delhi. In response, India has allowed a Taliban representative, Ikramuddin Kamil, to work at the Afghan consulate in Mumbai.

    No nation has yet reached the point of formally recognizing the Taliban regime, especially given its ongoing brutal suppression of women. This meeting, however, will likely be seen as highly favorable by the Taliban, which is currently facing military pressure and additional stress from Pakistan. As an old Indian proverb goes, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Despite the stark ideological differences between the two countries, Afghanistan has effectively become a de facto ally for India.

  • Manmohan Singh: A Legacy of Quiet Courage and Economic Reform

    Manmohan Singh: A Legacy of Quiet Courage and Economic Reform

    Manmohan Singh did not possess the fiery charisma many consider essential for a successful Indian politician. He refrained from delivering biting insults, stirring animosity, or crafting electrifying slogans that sparked frenzied devotion among the masses. Instead, he embodied a quieter virtue—a man of action who quietly transformed policy into progress. India mourns and bids farewell to one of its most transformative leaders, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who passed away at the age of 92 in New Delhi due to age-related health issues. The economist-turned-politician is regarded as one of the most impactful figures in modern India, having saved the Indian Union from economic collapse and helped shape the country into a globally competitive economic powerhouse.

    Singh entered politics in 1991 when India was facing one of its most severe economic crises, teetering on the brink of default. Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao appointed Singh, a renowned economist, as Finance Minister. Amid the chaos, Singh stood at the precipice, tasked with averting disaster. With the nation on the edge of collapse, his bold reforms dismantled the remnants of a Soviet-style command economy and introduced a liberalized system that revitalized India’s prospects. Singh drew from Victor Hugo’s words, stating that when the time is right, no power on earth can stop an idea. He believed that India’s emergence as a major economic power in the world was one such idea whose time had come. He dismantled the restrictive “license raj,” which controlled factory production and limited the types of products available. He devalued the rupee to stimulate exports, opened key industrial sectors to private and foreign investment, and slashed taxes. These transformative steps sparked rapid economic growth and earned Singh the title of India’s economic “liberator.” His actions did more than save the nation—they reoriented India’s future, protecting it from the economic unraveling experienced by the Soviet Union.

    The same deft economic leadership defined his first term as Prime Minister. Under his stewardship, India emerged as a rising economic powerhouse, with the economy growing at more than 8%. Singh championed initiatives like the Food Security Act to combat hunger on a national scale and institutionalized the Right to Information Act. He introduced transformative initiatives like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), designed to uplift the country’s most disadvantaged citizens. Additionally, he negotiated vital nuclear energy agreements and played an instrumental role in the landmark Indo-US civil nuclear deal, which not only ended India’s nuclear isolation but also secured the nation’s energy future for generations.

    Despite his considerable achievements, Singh Often portrayed as the “Remote-controlled” Prime Minister of the Gandhi dynasty, he faced intense media criticism, accused of being a passive leader in a highly charged political landscape. His reserved demeanor and reluctance to step into the spotlight only fueled these perceptions, earning him the label of an “Accidental Prime Minister.” His second term was overshadowed by a series of massive corruption scandals that undermined public trust in his administration. Though personally incorruptible, Singh was criticized for failing to assert control over his coalition partners. His former adviser, Sanjaya Baru, in his memoir, observed that while Singh upheld the highest standards of integrity, he did not enforce these standards on others. Singh’s perceived deference to Sonia Gandhi further led to allegations that he was merely her “Puppet.”

    The debates surrounding Manmohan Singh’s legacy underscore both his remarkable achievements and the perceived limitations of his leadership. While many in today’s middle class, burdened by the weight of taxes, look back with nostalgia at his tenure, it is impossible to ignore the fact that his second term paved the way for the rise of the BJP and Narendra Modi, ushering in an era marked by Hindu nationalism. In the process, his leadership precipitated the near-collapse of the Congress Party. Though Singh himself did not directly contribute to this downfall, his tenure marked the beginning of a slow but irreversible decline for the party. Once a dominant force in Indian politics, Congress has since withered into a shell of its former self, its relevance in both the electoral arena and in political discourse shrinking ever smaller.

    Even though Singh distanced himself from politics after his time as Prime Minister, the weight of his legacy lingers—compelling and contradictory. On one side of history’s ledger, he saved India from an economic abyss and oversaw a profound transition in the country’s economy and global standing. Yet, his era also witnessed the decline of Nehruvian socialism and the Congress Party’s weakening grip on power. Ultimately, history may well be kinder to him than many of his contemporaries, remembering him as a figure who, without fanfare or spectacle, steered India through turbulent waters—a hero not of blaring headlines, but of quiet determination.

  • India’s Khalistan Paradox: Divisions That Endure

    India’s Khalistan Paradox: Divisions That Endure

    Sikhs, one of the many religious communities in India, have long pursued political ambitions and established their own territories in the northern part of the Indian subcontinent over the centuries. The religion, a blend of Hinduism and Islam, was once the state religion of the Khalsa Raj, which existed on the map from 1799 to 1849 and stretched over a large area during its period. Sikhs fought against the rulers of India, the Mughals and the British, but ultimately, their kingdom fell under British rule and became part of British India. After the British split the kingdom’s territory between India and Pakistan, Punjab, the heart of the Sikh kingdom, was divided into Western Punjab, which went to Pakistan, and Eastern Punjab, which remained part of India. While most of the Sikh population moved to Eastern Punjab after facing persecution from Islamist forces in Pakistan, India warmly welcomed them and appointed Sikhs to key positions in the government. The initial harmony between Sikhs and Hindus was strong, as Sikhs did not share the same rivalry with Hindus as they did with Muslims. However, the demand for an independent Sikh state, under the name of Khalistan, soon began to trouble the relationship.

    Besides India and Pakistan, a large Sikh diaspora existed in English-speaking countries due to prolonged British rule. As Sikhs gained wealth and influence, they amplified the demand for a separate state by carving it out of India. Khalistan, the proposed land for the Sikh state, was supported by overseas Sikhs and Western governments, who feared India’s growing alignment with the Soviet Union. The demand for Sikh statehood received heavy funding from the West and Pakistan, which, after losing East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) due to India’s intervention, saw this as an opportunity to support Sikh youth. This eventually led to the Sikh insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the region of Punjab experienced a wave of terrorist acts, prompting the Indian government to respond with a strong stance. This led to the assassination of India’s then-Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, by her Sikh bodyguards. The assassination caused widespread anger and riots against Sikhs, with propaganda spreading in India that equated Sikhs with Muslims—suggesting both prioritize religion over their motherland. Anti-Sikh campaigns were carried out across India. Once a beloved community, Sikhs became increasingly viewed with suspicion. Overseas Sikhs exploited these tensions to rally youth, recruit them, and spread their propaganda both abroad and in India. They used both peaceful and violent means to keep the issue alive among the Sikh diaspora and in India.

    As India’s domestic politics shifted toward Hindu nationalism, with the BJP holding a strong majority and Narendra Modi emerging as a powerful figure, overseas Sikhs feared that India would assimilate the Sikh population through nationalism. Sikh leaders, who are highly influential in Canadian politics, and community leaders in the UK, USA, and other countries, began attacking Modi and the BJP, pressuring their respective governments to take a tougher stance against him. In response, Modi targeted Khalistan supporters fiercely. The clashes became more frequent, and Sikhs supporting Khalistan attempted a coup under the guise of the farmers’ protests. As Modi tightened his grip on India, the Khalistan movement shifted its focus to foreign countries, particularly Canada, the USA, the UK, and Australia, where Khalistan supporting Sikhs launched large campaigns against India, attacking Hindus, delivering hate speeches, and desecrating the Indian flag.

    By the 2020s, Sikh leaders, long recognized for their provocative rhetoric against India and Hindus, began to face an alarming wave of anonymous attacks. On June 18, 2023, one of the most prominent voices in this movement, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, was fatally shot in the parking lot of a Sikh temple in Surrey, British Columbia This triggered a huge outcry in the Sikh diaspora against India, with some accusing Indian diplomats and the Indian spy agency RAW of orchestrating the attack. A few weeks later, Khalistani supporters set fire to the Indian consulate in San Francisco, and Indian diplomats were subsequently targeted by Khalistanis. Canada used this attack to criticize India. Justin Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister and a staunch supporter of Sikhs, directly entered the conflict, turning it into an India-Canada dispute. In 2023, the United States also came out against India by alleging a plot by the Indian government to assassinate New York–based Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a spokesperson for the pro-Khalistan group Sikhs for Justice, who openly threatened to bomb Indian planes, among other actions.

    India will not allow any further secession, as it now has a Hindu nationalist government working toward an Akhand Bharat, a union of all Indian subcontinent countries. However, Sikhs are receiving significant support from Canada, which has a large Sikh voter base and influential leaders like Jagmeet Singh. As a result, the demand for Khalistan will likely continue to grow. If India does not make serious efforts to improve the living conditions of Sikhs within the country, the diaspora can easily utilize them. Moreover, regardless of whether China is involved, the West does not want a superpower to emerge in Asia and may sponsor attempts at secessionism in India to destabilize it. As a result, Khalistan will likely receive continued support from the West. This will push India closer to Russia and China, creating turbulence in its relations with the West. Therefore, Khalistan will continue to act as a barrier between India and the West.

  • How the BJP’s ‘One Nation, One Election’ Is Redefining Indian Democracy

    How the BJP’s ‘One Nation, One Election’ Is Redefining Indian Democracy

    From the United States to Japan, democracies everywhere contend with a common predicament: the staggering financial burden of elections. Governments allocate vast budgets to organize them, while political parties and candidates pour in even greater sums to secure victory. This flood of money—both aboveboard and concealed—not only fuels corruption but often forges troubling alliances between business tycoons and politicians, bound by the relentless demand for funds. Fair elections remain the cornerstone of democracy, but their escalating costs can feel like a silent affliction, gradually undermining the very principles they are designed to protect.

    In India, the world’s largest democracy, elections scale up into grand spectacles of participation and spending. With over a billion people involved, the process transcends politics, transforming into a sprawling festival of flags, rallies, sweets, and freebies. Spanning months, election seasons unfold in staggered phases, covering parliamentary, state, and local polls across 28 states and multiple union territories. The financial strain on the nation is immense, fueled not only by government and political party expenditures but also by the pervasive corruption and money laundering that frequently accompany the process.

    The relentless cycle of political campaigns, rife with financial and ethical challenges, undeniably hampers India’s economic momentum. Yet democracy, by its very nature, cannot exist without elections. To address this dilemma, the Indian government has put forth the contentious “One Nation, One Election” proposal—a bold attempt to streamline the electoral process and curb costs and corruption. But the question persists: will this sweeping reform resolve India’s electoral quandary, or will it usher in a host of new complications?

    An India Today report predicts that the cost of the 2024 elections could soar to a staggering 1.35 trillion rupees. While official figures remain unverified, experts believe the final cost will likely surpass this estimate. The Centre for Media Studies, a Delhi-based non-profit, revealed that India spent over 600 billion rupees on the 2019 general elections, making it the world’s most expensive at the time. Added to this are the billions spent on various state elections. Confronted with these enormous costs, the government has proposed a solution aimed at reducing financial strain: the merger of national and state elections, to be held once every five years. This forms the backbone of the “One Nation, One Election” initiative. The Indian government is considering the synchronization of all elections, whether within a single month or a set time frame, to ease the financial burden of repeated electoral cycles.

    Beyond financial savings, the government argues that the proposal would bring other benefits: by avoiding the disruptions caused by ongoing election seasons, governance could become more efficient, and politicians could focus on national issues rather than just campaigning. Additionally, the government believes it would also boost voter participation and encourage greater political engagement.

    For years, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been a staunch advocate for the concept of “One Nation, One Election.” The party has long supported a vision of a strong central government over a decentralized federal system. But this idea has sparked fierce opposition, particularly from India’s regional parties and the Congress Party, the country’s historic political powerhouse.

    The Congress Party now opposes the “One Nation, One Election” proposal, despite having conducted unified elections from 1951 to 1967. In stark contrast to Modi’s vision of a centralized system, Congress seems fragmented and hesitant to endorse the initiative. Party leaders fear the proposal could bolster Modi’s position, using his national popularity to secure synchronized state and parliamentary elections, potentially weakening Congress’s foothold in state politics. Many regional parties share this concern, believing the plan would further undermine India’s federal structure. They worry that national issues would dominate in a unified election cycle, sidelining state-specific concerns and diminishing the influence of regional governments in the national conversation.

    With a five-year parliamentary term and the possibility of no elections in between, critics argue that such a system would free the ruling party from the democratic “Test” of frequent elections. This, they warn, could empower the government to push through unpopular policies—like fuel price hikes—without fear of electoral consequence.

    Though the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) still enjoys a commanding position, even with a two-thirds majority necessary to amend the constitution, its path to implementing “One Nation, One Election” faces obstacles. On Tuesday, India’s law minister, Arjun Ram Meghwal, introduced a bill in Parliament to establish the system, only for it to fail in a vote. In a notable twist, even BJP members—including a prominent union minister—abstained from voting. However, the government remains undeterred, planning to move the issue to a parliamentary committee for further deliberation. The committee will review a report from former President Ram Nath Kovind, who chaired a nine-member panel recommending simultaneous elections. Kovind described the proposal as a “Game Changer,” citing economists who believe the change could bolster India’s GDP by up to 1.5%.

    India, the world’s largest democracy, is perpetually in election season. With 28 states, eight union territories, and nearly a billion eligible voters, elections are an ever-present feature of the nation’s political landscape. Unifying all elections into one season may reduce the spectacle and vibrancy of the process, but it could ultimately strengthen India’s democracy by streamlining elections and curbing excessive spending. However, this shift risks eroding the federal nature of India’s constitution, potentially creating tension at the local level. The impact of the “One Nation, One Election” proposal could fundamentally alter Indian democracy, diminishing the role of federalism and state-level politics, leaving national parties and their agendas with dominant influence.