Tag: India

  • India to Grant Citizenship for Non-Muslim Refugees from  Islamic Neighbors: Humanity or Election Agenda?

    India to Grant Citizenship for Non-Muslim Refugees from  Islamic Neighbors: Humanity or Election Agenda?

    Millions of individuals have sought refuge in India, escaping the stringent Islamic regimes of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Among them are Muslims in search of a better life and freedom from strict Islamic rule, as well as Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Christians facing denial of religious freedom and enduring threats such as rapes, massacres, forced conversions, and the forced marriage of young girls by Islamic groups and militias.

    The significant inflow of these migrants poses a considerable challenge for the Indian government, already dealing with overpopulation. And Granting citizenship to these individuals has evolved into a major political crisis too. The migration, predominantly of Muslims, has transformed the political and demographic dynamics of states, as these newcomers now outnumber the local population. This significant demographic shift has resulted in substantial disruptions, marked by numerous riots, intensifying tensions between the migrant and local communities.

    The migration issue has grown to be a major concern in at least five states since the 1970s. The initial welcome extended to the Bengali population from Bangladesh resulted in them becoming the majority in various districts of the state of Assam, predominantly inhabited by Hindu tribals who speak Assamese. Cultural difficulties arising from this population transition led to serious problems, affecting rule of law. .

    As a political matter influencing elections, the Indian National Congress, traditionally relying on Muslim votes, opted for a neutral stance on the issue. In contrast, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party, actively advocated for addressing the matter, emphasizing the potential threat to the Hindu identity of these states. The BJP employed a strategic political approach, proposing the granting of citizenship to Hindus and other minorities from these nations while excluding Muslims. This move sparked discussions in Indian politics, with concerns arising about the implications for Muslim population growth becoming a notable consideration.

    Upon securing a majority in the central government, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) introduced The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, which gained parliamentary approval on December 11, 2019. This amendment to the Citizenship Act of 1955 established an accelerated pathway to Indian citizenship for persecuted religious minorities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan who had arrived in India by 2014. The specified eligible minorities encompass Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, or Christians. Notably, Muslims from these countries are not afforded similar eligibility. This marked a significant departure in Indian law as religion became an explicit criterion for citizenship, resulting in widespread global criticism and sparking anti-India campaigns from Islamic countries.

    Nevertheless, the amendment has faced criticism for perceived religious discrimination, particularly due to its exclusion of Muslims. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) labeled it as “Fundamentally Discriminatory,” recognizing India’s intent to safeguard marginalized communities while emphasizing the necessity for an impartial and robust national asylum system. In response to the criticism, the Indian government contended that Muslims were unlikely to experience religious persecution in Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Bangladesh, citing Islam as the official religion in those countries. However, historical evidence suggests the persecution of various Muslim sects, including Ahmadis and Hazaras (mainly Shias), in these nations.

    Widespread protests erupted across India in response to the law. Notably, strong opposition materialized in Assam and other northeastern states, driven by concerns that granting Indian citizenship to immigrants and refugees could jeopardize the “Political Rights, Culture, and Land Rights” of the locals and potentially intensify migration from Bangladesh. Protesters in various regions of the country argued that the law exhibited bias against Muslims and advocated for the inclusion of Muslim immigrants and refugees in the citizenship provisions.

    Numerous Indian universities experienced significant protests, with students from institutions such as Jamia Millia Institute and Aligarh Muslim University playing a prominent role. The repercussions of these demonstrations included hundreds of detentions, casualties, injuries to both protestors and law enforcement personnel, as well as damage to private and public property. Some regions also witnessed disruptions to local internet and cell phone services due to the unrest.

    Several states governed by opposition political parties declared their intention not to enforce the Act. However, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) asserted that states lacked the legal authority to prevent the implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). Union Home Minister Amit Shah committed to enacting the CAA legislation before the 2024 national elections. The MHA publicly released the guidelines on March 11, 2024, anticipating a surge in protests and legal battles as a result.

    Widespread misinformation has sparked anxiety among India’s Muslim community. Some individuals, influenced by certain international media reports, mistakenly believe that the new law aims to strip Indian Muslims of their citizenship, despite the law explicitly excluding them. Additionally, unfounded rumors circulate about the establishment of concentration camps for Muslim migrants in India who cannot apply for citizenship. These misconceptions particularly erupt the concerns in a country with a significant number of illiterate individuals.

    Opposition parties have raised concerns about the timing of the law’s implementation, coinciding with the imminent announcement of upcoming elections in India. Critics argue that the law may exacerbate divisions within the country, potentially creating a rift between Muslims and non-Muslims and attracting non-Muslim votes in favor of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Anticipation of significant protests by Muslims during their holy month is on the rise, with the possibility of these demonstrations turning violent, ultimately playing into the hands of the BJP’s Hindu nationalism. Nevertheless, the law is poised to give the BJP a considerable advantage in the upcoming elections, while the Indian National Congress (INC) remains uncertain in its stance.

  • Russia’s Presidential Election: Putin is Ready for his “First Term”

    Russia’s Presidential Election: Putin is Ready for his “First Term”

    While influential opposition leaders are either being murdered, jailed, or barred, Russia is preparing for its upcoming presidential election in the coming weeks. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has carefully crafted constitutional modifications to prolong his term in office, looks set to win his fifth election. As for the 2020 constitutional amendment, which essentially “Nullified” his prior tenure, he is officially running for another term, but the March 15–17 election will be his first under the new structure. Thanks to this clever political maneuvering, Putin is able to seize several openings, leaving his opponents with no choice but to surrender or risk certain death. The most recent victim was Alexei Navalny, who was barred from future participation in democratic elections in Russia. 

    In December, during a staged event in an opulently furnished Kremlin ballroom, Putin declared his candidacy while speaking with a separatist “Colonel” from the Donbas region of southeast Ukraine. He has four terms under his belt. In 2000, he won the presidency, and he was reelected in 2004, 2012, and 2018. Due to the constitution, he was not elected president during a brief tenure in between; instead, he served as prime minister and also “Super President”. As anticipated, he will serve a further six years if he prevails, as the term has been extended by constitutional revisions. His fifth term would begin with this. After that, he is eligible for a sixth term  in 2030. 

    Since Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader, the 71-year-old former KGB spy has already led Russia for the longest period of time. Putin’s increasingly harsh handling of opponents, critics, and antiwar demonstrators has drawn comparisons to Stalin’s “Big Terror” operations. To those who support the Kremlin, however, Putin is seen as a political “Genius” who stopped Russia from collapsing, brought billionaire oligarchs under control, and defeated Chechen insurgents. In addition, Putin’s admirers refer to him as a “Gatherer of Russian Lands,” a dignified moniker bestowed upon Russian princes and czars, for his actions in the 2008 war against Georgia, the recognition of two breakaway Georgian statelets, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and his intentions to annexe full of Ukraine. 

    Putin’s most vocal political rival, Alexey Navalny, passed away in an Arctic prison on February 16 in what his family, followers, and a large portion of the international community considered to be political murder. In the 2018 presidential election, which Putin won with about 78% of the vote, Navalny was not allowed to register. Further opposition activists, Ilya Yashin and Vladimir Kaza-Murza, have been sentenced to eight and a half years and twenty-five years in prison, respectively, for their criticism of Putin’s war in Ukraine. Numerous opposition activists, critics, and normal Russian citizens who shared or liked antiwar comments on the internet have also been charged with crimes in thousands of cases. Tens of thousands have been detained, fined, or expelled from the nation. Russian Democracy is defined here. 

    This is the first three-day voting in Russian history as opposed to the usual one-day one. Additionally, this marks the debut of internet voting for voters in 29 locations. In Russia, 112 million people who are at least 18 years old are able to cast votes. Voting will also take place in occupied Crimea and other parts of Ukraine, a move that Kiev and its Western supporters have denounced as illegal. Millions of Russian citizens residing overseas, from California in the United States to the southern Kazakhstan spaceport of Baikonur, which Russia leases, are also able to cast ballots via mail, consulates, or embassies.  The initial results are anticipated to be made public on March 19 and the final result on March 29. According to official estimates, the officially-expected turnout is almost as high as it was during the 2018 election, when about 68 percent of Russians cast ballots. 

    There’s hardly much optimism for a free and fair vote among those who follow Russian politics. Due to the widespread perception of the current United Russia party as corrupt and ineffective, Putin is contesting as an independent. It was referred to as the “Party of Crooks and Thieves” by late opposition leader Navalny. Other contenders are viewed as symbolic figures whose involvement serves mainly to demonstrate Putin’s “Popularity.” The Communist Party’s Nikolay Kharitonov is one among them. 

    Boris Borisovich Nadezhdin is an opposition politician who has openly condemned the war in Ukraine, said he will designate unbiased observers to supervise elections, and promised to keep appealing the rulings of the Supreme Court against him. But he’s not going to be able to run at all. Sometimes he will also in his final time.

    Nobody is expecting a different result from this election; Putin is viewed as a strong leader, and he is successful in portraying this image. Additionally, his admirers claim that the Russian Federation would fall apart and pandemonium will envelop the country in his absence. The Russian nationalists are therefore standing firm beside him. His drives for “Slavic Unity” and “Russia First”. However, many disbelieve the percentage of vote he gained in elections. The unnatural death of opponents increased screening of opposing candidates, videos of election employees making dubious actions in the booth, a lot of suspicious activity raised doubts in his win. Putin, however, will still receive more than 60% of the vote in the current scenario, and all of the leaders hail him as Russia’s savior. And he will continue to be the ruler. Russia presents new conceptions of democracy that any rulers craving power can embrace.

  • How the Narendra Modi Era Changed Kashmir?

    How the Narendra Modi Era Changed Kashmir?

    Three influential religions assert control over specific territories, avoiding overlap and vying for dominance over the entire region, reminiscent of the situation in Jerusalem. However, this scenario unfolds in Kashmir, a breathtaking location fiercely contested by three nuclear powers. Situated at the intersection of the Islamic world, India, and China, Kashmir is divided among these three nations, with India, Pakistan, and China each holding authority over distinct parts.

    Due to limited access to news from China and Pakistan, and a surplus of information from India, the international media tends to focus more on the Indian-administered Kashmir. Unfortunately, a majority of reports seem inclined to cover negative news against India. Nevertheless, despite obstacles like security threats from military forces and militant groups, the Indian-controlled area of Kashmir is actually undergoing a major transformation under the direction of the Modi government.

    Following the annulment of autonomous status in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir in 2019 and the subsequent withdrawal of its statehood, the territory unequivocally came under the complete authority of the Indian union. This transformative era has initiated a multitude of large-scale projects encompassing roads, railways, tourism, and education.

    Last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced more projects for Kashmir during his visit to Kashmir. This visit carried significance as it marked Modi’s inaugural presence in Kashmir since the repeal of Article 370. This article had acted as a dividing line between the Indian government and Jammu and Kashmir, allowing for a distinct constitution primarily based on Islamic laws—an arrangement that faced notable resistance from the Hindu and Buddhist populations.

    Media reports, showcasing discontent from religious and regional leaders and emphasizing internet bans and the control of separatist figures in the Islamist region, are contributing to obfuscating the true situation in the area. Kashmiri politicians voice dissatisfaction, pushing for the reinstatement of statehood and asserting control from Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, rather than New Delhi. Multiple incidents of violence against Hindus in the Islam majority region have been documented, leading BJP leaders, including Modi, to abstain from visiting without a military presence.

    While democracy exists in Kashmir, political power has long been concentrated within two family led parties – the Abdulla family’s National Conference (NC) and the Mufti family’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Governance under these two parties has faced considerable challenges, impacting essential services for the people. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and increased hostility towards minorities has heightened tensions, creating a volatile environment. The presence of the Indian military in the region is met with formidable challenges from Islamist groups, leading to significant incidents such as bombings, mass killings, and population displacement.

    Upon assuming office in 2014, Modi’s government confronted heightened tensions in the region. Islamist groups strongly oppose the Hindu nationalist leader as the Prime Minister of India, while Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs warmly embrace Modi. This division has contributed to an uptick in attacks against the military and increased communal distrust. The failure of local governments to address these issues has further intensified the volatile situation, resulting in a surge of violence in Kashmir.

    In response to a series of incidents posing threats to the Indian Union while favoring China and Pakistan, the Indian government took decisive action on August 5, 2019. The rights granted to Jammu and Kashmir under the Indian constitution, initially established by the 1954 decree, were revoked through a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers of the Indian parliament. Subsequently, on August 6, a supplementary order nullified everything in Article 370 except clause 1. Following the enactment of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019, on October 31, 2019, the state underwent a transformation into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. This restructuring granted the Indian government complete administrative control over Kashmir.

    Despite initial challenges, substantial financial investments from the rest of India into Kashmir have led to a noteworthy increase in job opportunities, and the region’s infrastructure has experienced significant development despite obstacles posed by terrorists and the challenging Himalayan terrain.

    In spite of the numerous meetings held, project inaugurations for Kashmir took place between 2019 and the present. Modi frequently participated virtually from Delhi, as safety concerns prevented his physical presence in Srinagar. As a prominent figure opposed by Islamists in the Indian subcontinent, Modi was restricted from moving to Srinagar for security reasons. However, in the past week, under the transformed era of Kashmir, he addressed a crowd in Kashmir.

    Dismissing allegations of repression, Modi asserted that Kashmir is now experiencing newfound freedom. In his address to the gathered crowds, he heralded the dawn of a new era marked by peace and development in the region, declaring it to be the long-awaited Jammu and Kashmir. Modi justified the revocation of Article 370, citing security concerns and the desire to align the region with the rest of India. His recent visit to Srinagar is viewed as a strategic move ahead of upcoming elections, as he vies for a third term in power. The BJP, aiming to bolster its political influence in the Himalayan region, particularly in the Srinagar seat it has never previously won.

    However, reports from British and Pakistani media suggest that a majority of Kashmiris view these developments as encroachments on their rights and freedoms by the Hindu nationalist government. Following the revocation, concerns have arisen about new regulations permitting outsiders to buy land in the state, leading to apprehensions of dispossession among the local populace and potential alterations in the Muslim demography of the region. Preserving the Muslim demography is perceived by some as a plea for an independent country or alignment with Pakistan, which could gradually diminish the demand for a separate state in Kashmir.

    In the past three years, the central government has invested over 1 lakh crore Indian rupees in Kashmir, aiming to reshape the mindset of the Islamic population towards the Indian union, as reported by Indian media. On Thursday in his latest visit to Kashmir As part of the “Viksit Bharat, Viksit Jammu Kashmir” initiative, Modi announced a number of development projects in Srinagar that together have a value exceeding Rs 6,400 crore. Pakistan and Indian Muslim leaders, however, assert that the Indian government is using infrastructure projects to divert attention from the real issues in Kashmir and accuse it of attempting to erase the Muslim identity of the region. Despite these allegations, tangible changes are evident, including the development of significant infrastructure like bridges, buildings, railways, airports, and roads, creating a favorable environment for tourism. Jobs and investments from businesspeople are improving the lives of the people, fostering peace in the region.

    Amidst these transformations, it is clear that China and Pakistan are closely monitoring the region, seeking to assert their influence. The Indian government remains steadfast in its commitment to reclaim control over territories held by Pakistan and China. However, achieving a peaceful resolution in the Kashmir case remains challenging, as Pakistan is likely to fuel extremism and separatism in the region, and China subtly encroaches towards Indian borders. The tranquility of the Indian-administered part of Kashmir depends on addressing these issues, and the government’s initiatives to provide jobs and infrastructure to foster a connection with the people will face scrutiny in the upcoming elections.

  • Maldives Deepens Strategic Relationship with China, Evidencing a Shift from India

    Maldives Deepens Strategic Relationship with China, Evidencing a Shift from India

    China and the Maldives have solidified a robust military partnership. On Tuesday, Maldivian officials publicly expressed their desire for the withdrawal of Indian troops from the archipelago while simultaneously finalizing a “military assistance” pact with China. The agreement, characterized as China’s provision of cost-free military aid to the Republic of Maldives, was formally endorsed by the Maldivian Minister of Defense and a senior Chinese military official, aiming to enhance bilateral ties. As per a statement from the Ministry of Defense on X, formerly Twitter, the Maldivian Defense Ministry underscored the agreement’s significance in fostering “stronger bilateral ties,” specifying that the military aid is offered without charge, although specific details were not disclosed.

    Since assuming office in November, President Muizzu has actively sought to strengthen his ties with China. This shift in policy aligns with his “India Out” platform from the election campaign, aimed at reclaiming what is perceived as “lost” sovereignty. President Muizzu underscored Maldives’ Islamic identity over its Indian identity by opting for a ceremonial trip to Turkey, eschewing the traditional visit to India after taking the oath. Subsequently, he solidified his political ties with China. In line with his electoral commitments, Muizzu set a deadline of March 15 for the complete withdrawal of Indian military personnel from the Maldives. Negotiations resulted in a phased pullout, with the initial forces departing before March 10 and the remaining troops scheduled to leave by May 10.

    President Muizzu’s triumphant state visit to Beijing in January resulted in the signing of twenty agreements encompassing infrastructure, trade, economy, green development, grants, and various initiatives. Notably, around $127 million has been allocated for the construction of 30,000 social housing units and the enhancement of Male’s road infrastructure. These commitments underscore the president’s unwavering commitment to fostering a robust alliance with China across multiple critical domains.

    During the visit, Muizzu underscored China’s position as one of the Maldives’ closest allies and key developmental partners. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, affirmed Beijing’s dedication to establishing a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership with the Maldives. Mao emphasized that their collaboration is not directed at any third party and remains impervious to external influences.

    Following the visit to China, President Muizzu, in a presidential address on February 5, underscored the critical need for the Maldives to bolster its military capabilities. He revealed that the defense force was on the verge of attaining round-the-clock surveillance capabilities over the nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone, covering an extensive 900,000 square kilometers. Additionally, the government decided against renewing an agreement that permitted foreign countries to measure and map the oceans and coasts of the Maldives.

    India has expressed serious concerns over these recent developments, with the Maldives facing accusations of betrayal in the Indian media. Historically considered a traditional ally of India, the small archipelago in the Indian Ocean, situated close to the Indian mainland, has been heavily dependent on India for support, particularly in terms of military aid, since gaining independence. The alliance’s significance was underscored in 1980 when Indian military forces were dispatched to the Maldives to prevent Sri Lankan rebels from taking control of the islands, solidifying India’s influence in the region.

    However, as the Maldives’ economy underwent expansion and tourism exploration, the nation’s focus pivoted towards China. China emerged as a prominent player, seeking to assert itself in the Indian Ocean and challenge India’s regional dominance. This shift proved highly advantageous for the Maldives, fueled by China’s substantial investments in the region, notably through projects like the $200 million China-Maldives Friendship Bridge and various other initiatives under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

    The completion of this transition was marked by the victory of the president and the party backed by China in the recent Maldivian election, resulting in the ousting of established political parties. The Maldives’ altered geopolitical objectives solidified by the invitation extended to the Chinese Military and the  removal of the Indian military from the islands.

    Presently, there are 77 Indian soldiers and 12 medical personnel from the Indian armed forces stationed in the Maldives. India has provided two helicopters and a Dornier aircraft, primarily employed for marine surveillance, search and rescue operations, and medical evacuations. In light of safety concerns, India has initiated the withdrawal of its military presence, acknowledging the associated risks.

    With the Maldives heavily indebted to China, their reliance on the country is substantial, encompassing the use of airports, ports, and territories. Any escalation of tensions between India and China could position the Maldives as a focal point. Male is in close proximity to the critical Kochi naval base and Thiruvananthapuram, a significant city in India. The Thiruvananthapuram airport is merely a few kilometers from the Maldives. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and all neighboring nations are aligned with China, heightening the risk for India.

    In response, the Indian government has initiated projects to fortify Lakshadweep, an archipelago near the Maldives and a geographical extension of the island chain. Major Indian billionaires are planning substantial investments in Lakshadweep. Moreover, Minicoy Island, the closest to the Maldives, is preparing to establish a naval base, airstrips, and cantonments. India is also strengthening ties with Mauritius, located to the southern side of the Maldives. Given these circumstances, India is not anticipating a reversal from the Maldives and is preparing for potential new threats.

    Despite its image as a well-liked vacation spot for visitors from the US, Europe, the Middle East, and China, the Maldives lost its largest market, Which is India.  Boycott calls and anti-Maldives protests spiked in India, causing a large loss for Male.  Tourism is the backbone of Maldives. And the loss will hit the economy hard. The Maldives government is striving to fill the void left by the Indian market by attracting tourists from China and the Middle East. But India is creating competition in the tourism sector of the region by promoting travels to Mauritius, Seychelles and its own archipelago, Lakshadweep. The heightened competition presents a significant challenge to the Maldives, and it is evident that the country will play a substantial role in any potential tensions between India and China.

  • Nepal Citizens Recruitment to Wagner Army: How is it Happening?

    Nepal Citizens Recruitment to Wagner Army: How is it Happening?

    In a prevalent trend, individuals from South Asian nations, grappling with overpopulation and high unemployment, often find themselves opting for high-risk employment opportunities. From Saudi Arabia to the UK, there is a noticeable presence of South Asian workers undertaking perilous jobs, driven by the need to support their big families despite the associated dangers. Notably, certain individuals in Nepal are particularly sought after for roles in security services, exemplified by the renowned Gurkhas, considered the elite members of security forces. These warriors, once serving in the armed forces of the British, German, and Soviet nations, are now being recruited into the Wagner Army, actively involved in the conflict on behalf of Russia against Ukraine.

    Over the past year, there have been reports of Nepalese individuals actively engaging in the conflict in Ukraine. The gravity of the situation became apparent on December 4 when it was revealed that six Nepali citizens had lost their lives while participating in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Subsequently, Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal disclosed that over 200 Nepali citizens had enlisted in the Russian military since the full-scale invasion commenced in February 2022. PM Dahal also highlighted the presence of Nepalis in the Ukrainian army. And these figures are official counts, and the actual numbers may be higher.

    Responding to the unfolding scenario, Dipendra Bahadur Singh, an official at the National Human Rights Commission Nepal, stressed the importance of diplomatic dialogues between Nepal and both Russia and Ukraine. He underscored the illegality and associated risks of Nepali citizens joining foreign armies without the explicit consent of the state.

    Prime Minister Dahal acknowledged that while Nepal voted in favor of a UN resolution condemning Russia’s attempted annexation of four Ukrainian territories, some Nepalis fighting for Russia have been captured by the Ukrainian army. Furthermore, there is credible information about Nepali nationals serving in the Ukrainian army, adding complexity to the situation.

    Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement cautioning citizens against joining foreign armies in conflict-ridden nations. The emphasis was placed on the fact that Nepali citizens are enlisted only in the national armies of friendly countries under established traditional agreements. And Russia is not in the list.

    As apprehensions escalated, the ministry urged Moscow to bring back Nepali citizens from the conflict zone and to refrain from involving them in the ongoing conflict. Presently, the government is engaged in diplomatic efforts to rescue citizens captured in the war, and local authorities are actively investigating how Nepalis are navigating their way into the Russian army.

    Nepal has implemented a decisive measure by prohibiting its citizens from seeking employment in Russia or Ukraine. This decision aligns with a recent directive from Russian President Vladimir Putin, streamlining the naturalization process for foreigners who choose to join the Russian army. This directive extends the same privilege to immediate family members, creating an added incentive for recruitment.

    Human traffickers operating in Nepal and India have played a central role in orchestrating the transportation of young Nepali men into the conflict in Ukraine. These traffickers exploit the vulnerabilities of individuals by presenting alluring prospects, such as fast-tracked citizenship or significantly higher salaries than what is available in their home countries. A notable crackdown in Nepal resulted in the arrest of twelve individuals in December, charged with trafficking approximately 150-200 men to Russia. These traffickers demanded substantial sums, around $9,000, masquerading as fees for tourist visas to Russia, only to later coerce the victims into joining the Russian military.

    In grappling with the complexity of the situation, the Nepali government had previously appealed to Russia to repatriate the bodies of soldiers who lost their lives in the war against Ukraine, coupled with a demand for just compensation for the grieving families. Moreover, there are reports indicating that additional Nepali soldiers have been taken captive by Ukraine.

    Outside of Nepal, other South Asian nations find themselves entangled in a comparable quandary. Frequently, males embark on illicit migration, often under the guise of tourist visas, taking advantage of countries with lenient visa programs. Those lacking proficiency in the Russian language come under scrutiny, finding themselves ensnared in military engagements, sometimes affiliating with groups like the Wagner military. The predicament extends to India, where reports unveil that certain individuals, under deceptive pretexts, have been dispatched to partake in the conflict in Ukraine. Families of these individuals are now urging the government for aid in repatriation.

    Furthermore, apprehensions persist about potential recruits from Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, acquiring precise figures remains a formidable task due to the absence of robust citizen tracking systems and limited information flow from these countries.

    Similar instances have surfaced involving individuals from diverse nations, including Cuba, Serbia, and several African countries, enlisting in the Russian military. Occasionally, agencies deceive individuals seeking employment in Russia and neighboring countries, redirecting them towards military service without proper informed consent.

    People who are in need of food, those who are jobless and have nowhere else to turn, and even in the event of a conflict, these people will join. It follows that human migration to the conflict zone makes sense. However, it shows how the country has fallen short of ensuring job opportunities and population control. The situation is comparable to that of medieval Europe, when individuals served in other countries’ armies only in order to benefit financially. Sometimes people would sooner die than go hungry. 

  • Will the Surge of Farmers Protests Impact Modi’s Hopes for a Third Term?

    Will the Surge of Farmers Protests Impact Modi’s Hopes for a Third Term?

    Over the past decade, only one protest against the Modi government has managed to both astonish and successfully secure the protesters’ demands. The farmers’ protests, a notable demonstration, resulted in the retraction of proposed reforms aimed at significantly altering India’s agricultural landscape. The BJP-led administration found itself caught off guard by the intensity of this protest, which included several months of blockades in the capital, New Delhi.

    In addition to the impactful 2020–21 farmers’ protest, there were various other demonstrations opposing issues such as the triple talaq prohibition bill and the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which grants citizenship to Hindu refugees from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Wrestlers in India also expressed their dissent, particularly objecting to the BJP leader’s lack of charges in connection with allegations of rape and harassment of women wrestlers. But, they all failed.

    Even though Modi was able to overcome the farmers’ disapproval, some farmers are starting a new wave of protest against the central government with fresh demands. Is Modi’s political trajectory in India at risk from a group’s protest that mimics the 20–21 protests? 

    At the core of India’s economic structure lies the agricultural sector, serving as the linchpin that sustains not only the country’s 1.5 billion inhabitants but also reverberates globally. Ranging from expansive agricultural holdings owned by influential landholders to the smaller-scale operations of modest farmers, the spectrum is diverse. Despite this disparity, the Indian government is intricately entwined with the fate of its farmers and the agricultural industry. Long held in high esteem alongside the military in the Indian political landscape, farmers witnessed a shift in their standing with the advent of Modi, who redirected focus from agriculture to prioritize the business and service sectors. 

    The introduction of the farmers’ bill, intended to commercialize agriculture, faced vehement opposition from various quarters, including farmers, landlords, communists, and anti-Indian union groups. This collective resistance had a profound impact on Indian politics, compelling the government to backtrack on the proposed legislation.

    The protests that unfolded in 2020–21 were a concerted response to three proposed legislations aimed at relaxing regulations surrounding the pricing, storage, and sale of agricultural produce—regulations that had long served as a protective shield for farmers against the uncertainties of the free market. Farm unions vociferously warned that these measures could have disastrous consequences for the livelihoods of farmers, rendering them vulnerable to the influence of large corporations. Despite months of staunch insistence from the Modi administration that the reforms were in the farmers’ best interest, on November 19, 2021, Mr. Modi announced the repeal of the controversial legislation. Subsequently, the parliament swiftly approved the repealing bill.

    This turn of events was widely hailed as a victory for farmers, showcasing the potent impact of large-scale demonstrations in influencing governmental decisions. However, the triumph was short-lived, as the BJP strategically dismantled the farmer alliance by garnering support from various castes and creating divisions among the farmers along Hindu and Sikh lines. Political parties representing farmers in Punjab, Rajasthan, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh also played a role in this fragmentation. The BJP effectively neutralized the possibility of a united mass demonstration akin to those witnessed in 2020–21 by abandoning legal reforms and opting for collaboration with the farming community instead.

    As we approach the 2024 general election, certain factions are resurfacing, yet their attempts to reach Delhi have been thwarted. In neighboring states, heavily armed troops have been deployed, even providing grenades and shells to prevent their advance. This development has cast a shadow of uncertainty over established political analyses. Observers recognize that politically motivated protests could emerge as a potent tool to impede Modi’s bid for a third term, especially given his recent electoral victories, a weakened opposition, and the inauguration of the Ayodhya Temple. With elections looming, protesters assert that they are applying pressure on the government to promptly address their concerns.

    While the government and BJP argue that their actions aim to sway public opinion, accusing certain factions of harboring separatist motives, such as the demand for a Sikh nation in Punjab, the protesters reject this narrative. Some BJP leaders have gone to the extent of labeling the demonstrators as terrorists. In this charged political climate, it’s noteworthy that Congress and every opposition party align themselves in support of the farmers.

    Allegations have surfaced that certain BJP members have joined forces to threaten or assault the protesters. Farmers contend that promises made by the government during the 2020–21 protests remain unfulfilled. Additionally, they have called for the government to forgive their debts and provide pensions. Farmers argue for consequences against counterfeit fertilizers, herbicides, and seeds, and urge the government to increase the maximum number of workdays under the rural job guarantee program to 200.

    Furthermore, the demonstrators demand that India renounce all free trade agreements and withdraw from the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is widely acknowledged that these demands may not be met during the period of the current government. Consequently, the BJP claims that this is a political theater orchestrated to discredit Modi.

    Until now, new waves of farmer’s protest have had minimal impact on the Indian public, especially when compared to previous instances. The diminished coverage of protests by the Indian media has contributed to this subdued response. Farmer’s groups and Political parties that represent Farmers like Rashtriya Lok Dal, despite expressing readiness to collaborate with the Modi-led alliance. Several parties had withdrawn their support for the administration in 2020–21 upon recognizing the pulse of ground in that time. However, the current political landscape appears different now. Modi has solidified support from farmer’s groups, successfully redirecting to other issues like Hindutva to captivate the Indian public’s focus. And doubts about the political motivations of these protesting farmer’s groups are now surfacing among the public.

    While Modi’s position may be secure, the methods employed to quell protesters, involving the use of shells, grenades, and drones, raise concerns about the state of democracy within the nation.

  • Shrinking Russosphere: How Central Asia’s Cultural Uplift Will Affect Russia’s Interests?

    Shrinking Russosphere: How Central Asia’s Cultural Uplift Will Affect Russia’s Interests?

    Throughout history, language has consistently proven to be a crucial instrument in the delicate process of shaping national identities. The Russian language, in particular, stands out as one of the Soviet Union’s most powerful tools, adeptly molding diverse ethnic groups into a cohesive whole and forging a robust national identity. This linguistic force played a pivotal role in facilitating the dissemination of ideas, fostering the development of unions, and acting as a conduit for news to permeate society. Over time, it evolved into a unifying force, seamlessly binding together the disparate regions under Soviet rule.

    The Russian language has had a lasting impact on the global landscape even after the Soviet Union disintegrated. Despite changes in political landscapes, Russia, which is currently the successor to a “Russosphere,” observes the enduring effect of its language history. Russian continues to be the most widely spoken language in several republics, including the current Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

    As Russia, under Putin’s leadership, pursues ambitions of imperial resurgence through conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine, a counter-trend is quietly emerging in some nations seeking to rebuild their national identity by distancing themselves from the Russian language. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Central Asia.

    Originating in Eastern Europe, a movement has gained traction, aiming to dismantle Russian influence and foster distinct identities, particularly notable in the Baltic countries. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, motivated by a yearning to reclaim their cultural heritage, strategically pivoted towards their ethnic languages—Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian. Simultaneously, English emerged as a Lingua Franca, supplanting Russian, enabling national radios, television, and cultural programs to successfully resonate with both domestic and international audiences. These Baltic nations adeptly navigated the transition, reclaiming their identities during the shift from the Soviet Union to Putin’s Russia.

    However, the pace and assertiveness in this linguistic and cultural transition varied across different Eastern European countries. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia were comparatively slow and less assertive, leading to a different outcome. These nations continued to embrace Russian programs and news, and paid a price for not fostering a distinct cultural identity. Ukraine, in particular, faced internal divisions, as the lack of assertive Ukrainian language contributed to a large population of Russian influenced people..

    Georgia lost territories, while Moldova too grappled with internal divisions. Belarus, facing a crisis of identity, is now closely aligned with Russia. The contrast in outcomes highlights the crucial role of linguistic and cultural choices in shaping a nation’s destiny, as Eastern European countries navigate the complex interplay between identity, politics, and external influences.

    Central Asia also embarked on a journey of self-discovery, slowly and amicably fostering their language and identity. However, the pace and approach differ markedly, as Central Asian nations lack the robust support enjoyed by their Eastern European counterparts from Europe and the United States. With a continued reliance on Russia for resources, financial support, and tourism, their journey has been shaped by a different set of challenges.

    While still dependent on Russia for essentials like gas and financial aid, the region is increasingly becoming a multi-player on the global stage. With a myriad of options, including support from Turkey, Qatar, Iran, India, China, and even Eastern Europe itself, Central Asian nations are strategically positioning themselves to diversify their alliances and reduce dependence on any single power.

    This shift opens avenues for Central Asia to make bold and swift moves in establishing and strengthening their languages and cultural identities. The geopolitical realignment not only offers opportunities but also poses challenges as these nations navigate a delicate balance between maintaining historical ties and forging new partnerships in their quest for identity.

    As the largest country in Central Asia, Kazakhstan grapples with intricate language dynamics, notably the coexistence of Russian and Kazakh. While Russian is not designated as a state language, Article 7 of Kazakhstan’s Constitution accords it equal status with Kazakh in state and local administration, despite Russian being the more commonly spoken language. The 2009 census sheds light on the linguistic landscape, revealing that a significant 84.8% of the population aged 15 and above in Kazakhstan can proficiently read, write, and understand Russian. 

    However, recent developments indicate a deliberate push towards elevating the use of the Kazakh language over Russian. In October 2023, Kazakhstan introduced a media law aimed at increasing the prominence of Kazakh. The law mandates a gradual rise in the share of the state language on television and radio, moving from 50% to 70% at a 5% annual increment, beginning in 2025.

    The matter of language in Kazakhstan stands as one of the most contentious issues today, marked by periodic language-related scandals. Language has evolved into a significant aspect of political rhetoric, particularly for politicians espousing a national-patriotic agenda. Arguments advocating for the strengthening of Kazakh’s position are gaining momentum, showcasing the complex interplay between linguistic identity, political discourse, and societal tensions in the country.

    Kyrgyzstan navigates a nuanced linguistic landscape, as Russian holds co-official status per Article 5 of the Constitution. According to the 2009 census, 8.99% of the population, approximately 482,200 individuals, speak Russian as a native language. Moreover, a significant 49.6% of Kyrgyzstan’s population aged 15 and above, or 1,854,700 residents, fluently speak Russian as a second language.

    At the close of 2023, Kyrgyzstan implemented a law on the state language, compelling civil servants, MPs, teachers, and healthcare workers to communicate in Kyrgyz. However, this move has sparked controversy, with Russian officials and propaganda outlets criticizing it as “undemocratic” and oppressive to the Russian language. Despite objections, language tests over three years reveal gaps in officials’ Kyrgyz proficiency, highlighting the need for improvement.

    The head of the National Commission for the State Language and Language Policy, Kanybek Osmonaliyev, is an advocate for allowing officials time to improve their Kyrgyz language proficiency. The new law stipulates that noncompliance with linguistic proficiency requirements will result in instant termination. Around 4.4 million people in Kyrgyzstan speak Kyrgyz, according to the census taken in 2022, and there is a rising desire among them to learn the language. 

    In Tajikistan, Russian serves as the language of inter-ethnic communication, permitted in official documentation under the country’s constitution. Despite being spoken by 28% of the population in 2006, and with 7% using it as their primary language in various settings, Russian remains integral in government and business. In Tajikistan, proficiency in Russian is often seen as essential for career success, granting access to modern literature and technology. While English holds promise, learning Russian is more affordable, and many families anticipate their children studying at Russian universities or working in Russia. However, Tajik language courses are scarce and expensive, with limited availability after school. The teaching system primarily focuses on literary Tajik, differing significantly from the modern spoken language.

    Contrastingly, in Turkmenistan, Russian lost its status as the official lingua franca in 1996. Approximately 12% of the population, those who grew up in the Soviet era, can speak Russian. Primary and secondary education in Russian is minimal for subsequent generations. Turkmen state press and the newspaper Neytralny Turkmenistan continue to publish material in Russian, and there are schools like the Joint Turkmen-Russian Secondary School. The country has made strides in revitalizing the national language, with only 18% of residents proficient in Russian in 2020. A radical language policy, notably the shift from Cyrillic to the Latin script, led to a significant outflow of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations. The reform also impacted education, eliminating Russian-language schools and university curricula despite the declared policy of trilingual education (Turkmen, Russian, English).These linguistic landscapes underscore the delicate balance between cultural preservation, economic considerations, and the evolving educational paradigms in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

    Russian is the official language of documentation, the lingua franca and language of the elite in Uzbekistan, and it plays an important role in interethnic communication. An estimate from the World Factbook that is not current states that 14.2% of people speak Russian. Russian is nevertheless widely used even though it is not an official language, especially in big cities, business, and science. Its persistence in society is partly due to the belief that education in Russian is better than in Uzbek. 

    Uzbekistan, among Central Asian countries planning to transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet since 1993, has faced multiple delays in implementing the change, with the latest deadline set for 2023. While some school textbooks have been published in the Latin alphabet, the shift has resulted in a nuance: young people not proficient in the Cyrillic version of Uzbek find themselves disconnected from the world’s literary heritage, as limited fiction, including classical works by Uzbek authors, has been adapted into Latin.

    The Russosphere stands at a crossroads, its existence intricately tied to the Russian language. Contrary to the belief that language merely spreads culture, it wields power. Former Soviet nations, once deeply connected to Russia, are now charting their own paths, fostering distinct identities and pivoting from Russian towards English. These countries aspire to align with prosperous Western standards, a departure that is transforming the geopolitical landscape. The Russosphere, once synonymous with Russian dominance, is undergoing a deterioration, signaling a new chapter in the histories of these nations.

  • What Will the New Government in Pakistan Mean for the Neighbors?

    What Will the New Government in Pakistan Mean for the Neighbors?

    After the widely rigged recent national election, Pakistan is set to form a new government. Caretaker prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif is well-positioned to return to the prime minister’s office by the partnership developed between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). They underscored having secured the requisite majority to establish a coalition government. The inaugural session of the National Assembly, expected at the end of February or in early March, is poised to witness the taking of Shehbaz Sharif as the new prime minister, representing the cohesive front of the PML-N. The inception of this new government is accompanied by a myriad of internal and external challenges. Anticipated public anger over mandate rigging may intensify and extend. The state is currently confronting economic challenges, with citizens contending with poverty and a deepening hunger crisis. In the midst of these hardships, public confidence in the system is diminishing.

    Will this transition affect any change in Pakistan’s volatile relationship with neighbors? Sadly No. More than the Pakistan Government, Pakistan Military is crafting foreign policy. As some political experts said before, for every state there will be an army. But in the case of Pakistan, the army owns that state. Yes, the Pakistan Military is still a powerful authority in that country. And they need peace? Never!!

    Whenever Pakistan grapples with internal obstacles, a recurrent pattern appears: a highly powerful military seizes power and pushes out any remaining democratic elements. The historical precedent of this occurred last time in 1999 when Pervez Musharraf orchestrated a military coup to overthrow the government led by Nawaz Sharif. This move was spurred by tensions with India, culminating in a war that Pakistan lost in the same year. Notably, this conflict, which was not necessarily desired by either the Pakistani or Indian government, was perceived as aligning with the preferences of the powerful Pakistan military.

    The dominance of the Pakistan military is visible even it democratic governments, they drive Pakistan’s external affairs. The Pakistan army is considered as one of the fiercest,  and they hold a large arsenal including nuclear weapons. So countries are often connecting with the Pakistan military instead of governments. The United States, intricately linked with the Pakistani army, has consistently endorsed the military’s expanding autonomy, often diverting authority from elected governments. Despite the state being officially an “Islamic republic,” the Pakistan Military’s proximity to both the USA and the UK suggests a closer alignment with Western interests. This alignment gains particular significance in light of the substantial debt owed to China. Faced with an overwhelming debt burden, Pakistan is compelled to open its markets and economy to China while simultaneously maintaining the military in alignment with U.S. interests. This dynamic played a role in Imran Khan’s removal from office as he leaned towards China over the U.S. 

    India, Pakistan’s largest neighbor, is viewed as a dangerous enemy.  The existence of Pakistan and the people’s loyalty to the military often hinge on the animosity towards India. During periods of internal turmoil, conflicts with India are used to rally the nation. The Kashmir issue is still fuming. And India’s current leadership under Modi has a strong stance in the case of Kashmir and they continuously cite the annexation of Pak occupied Kashmir to their side of Kashmir. And Pakistan uses separatism, Muslim extremist in India, to counter the growth of India. And the Military need to continue their strategy that will lead to further tensions. And in any case Pakistan military wants to topple Sharif government, they will choose a conflict with India.

    Iran, another neighbor of Pakistan who is ready to fight with the United States, engaged in air strikes within Pakistan’s borders last year. Although Pakistan retaliated, bringing an end to the immediate violence, the relationship remains strained. The longstanding issue of Balochistan, akin to the Kashmir problem with India, adds complexity. India and Iran appear to be close allies, making it imperative for the new government in Pakistan to prioritize peace with Iran while maintaining popular anti-India sentiments.

    The historical connections between the Taliban’s emirate in Afghanistan are facing a decline. The Taliban maintains strong affiliations with Islamic groups in Pakistan, particularly within the ethnic Pashtun community. Recently, this association has evolved into a potential threat to Pakistan’s stability. Certain factions within Pakistan advocate for the autonomy of Pashtun-majority regions, urging immediate intervention from the Pakistani military. In the years ahead, this particular region of Pakistan is poised to become the most precarious. Given historical precedents, there is a likelihood that various militia groups may challenge Pakistan’s authority in the area, even if a Taliban-led Afghanistan refrains from overt opposition due to their official ties.

    In Pakistan’s political arena, the military’s hegemony frequently obscures democracy. And this is the ongoing story. It’s clear, The Pakistan military operates as a distinct entity from the government and they shape foreign policies. Consequently, there is expected to be minimal change in Pakistan’s foreign policies in the coming years.  Nonetheless, enduring geopolitical hurdles pose challenges in fostering constructive relationships with neighboring nations. Issues such as radical Islam, the increasing influence of India, and the deterioration of Iran and the US relationships, may necessitate a shift in foreign policy. It is evident that Pakistan is navigating through turbulent times, raising concerns for the broader region.

  • India’s New Megacity in the Mouth of Malacca Strait: A Geopolitical Study

    India’s New Megacity in the Mouth of Malacca Strait: A Geopolitical Study

    India is setting up a pioneering initiative by allocating a substantial investment of $9 billion (£7 billion) to establish a dynamic port city on Great Nicobar Island. Positioned at the entrance of the narrow Malacca Strait, serving as a gateway to the Indian Ocean, this ambitious project represents a transformative effort aimed at reshaping the regional dynamics. The comprehensive plan envisions the evolution of the Indian Ocean island, home to 8,000 inhabitants, into what has been termed the ‘Hong Kong of India.’ Which involves the creation of an international shipping terminal, airport, power plant, military base, and industrial park, strategically aligned with considerations for tourism development.

    India’s New Megacity in the Mouth of Malacca Strait: A Geopolitical Study
    Location of Nicobar Islands

    At the heart of this venture lies India’s dream for dominance over the Malacca trade route, adding layers of geopolitical significance. Predictably, environmentalists, often vocal opponents of infrastructure projects in developing nations, are already raising concerns about one of India’s most ambitious undertakings. Scholars from diverse global perspectives are collectively urging India to reassess its mega-construction plans for the island. Their cautionary message emphasizes that proceeding with the project could potentially deliver a ‘death sentence’ to the indigenous Shompen hunter-gatherer community residing there.

    India’s Ambitious Plan

    India’s New Megacity in the Mouth of Malacca Strait: A Geopolitical Study
    Great Nicobar Islands in Nicobar Islands Map

    Nestled within the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago in India, Great Nicobar Island stands as a haven predominantly inhabited by tribes. As the largest and southernmost among the Nicobar Islands, its strategic positioning serves as a gateway to the vast Indian Ocean via the narrow Malacca Strait. Notably closer to Indonesia than the Indian Mainland, this island is located just 93 miles northwest of Aceh on the Indonesian island of Sumatra and approximately 800 miles east of Chennai on the Indian mainland.

    Great Nicobar accommodates a population of Shompen people estimated to be between 100 and 400. Encompassing 921 km2 (356 sq mi), this sparsely inhabited island is characterized by lush rainforests, earning renown for its rich and diverse wildlife. Presently, the only signs of development on this often-neglected island are an airstrip of 915m at Campbell Bay/Ten Lua on the East coast and at least one small shipping dock.

    The island’s history is marked by a significant event – the 2004 earthquake and tsunami – which brought dire consequences, including a day-long isolation from external interactions. Despite its strategic importance and ecological richness, Great Nicobar remains a largely undeveloped landscape, waiting to unfold its potential.

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has unveiled an ambitious investment plan of $9 billion (€8.38 billion) to revolutionize Great Nicobar, envisioning it as a pivotal military and trade hub. The proposed developments encompass an international container terminal, deep-water port, dual-use airport, power plant, and a greenfield township, with the potential to elevate the population to the hundreds of thousands. Positioned strategically near the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s most bustling shipping lanes, the envisioned port in Galathea Bay adds a critical dimension to the plan.

    There is a hopeful anticipation for the implementation of free trade policies, distinct laws, and a separate entity, similar to the Hong Kong model. Experts posit that the success of such island endeavors often hinges on exemptions from the mainland’s stringent regulations.

    This visionary proposal, brought forth on January 18, 2021, by India’s policy development team NITI Aayog and informed by a comprehensive feasibility report from AECOM India Private Limited, projects a flourishing population of 650,000 inhabitants on the island by 2050. Currently, the island is home to a modest 8,500 residents, while the entire archipelago, comprising over 500 islands, with only about 40 inhabited, accommodates a total population of approximately 380,000. The anticipated population surge raises valid concerns about the substantial ecological pressure it may exert on the island and its environs.

    A Stalemate For China

    The enduring and contentious border dispute between China and India, Which is unrecognized by either side, has led to significant confrontations on multiple occasions. As India strengthens its alliances with key players like Japan and the U.S., China watches with heightened concern. Part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative strategically invests in India’s neighbors grappling with political and economic instability, including Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. This financial leverage not only provides China with a considerable advantage but also allows it to shape political alliances and influence media narratives against India.

    India’s foremost geopolitical challenge with China extends beyond the harsh geography and climate of the land border. It encompasses critical port leases, where vital transport hubs have fallen into Chinese hands due to the inability of recipient countries to repay substantial loans. Notably, Hamabanthotta, a key port leased to China, poses a significant threat to Indian navies, with reports of Chinese naval and spy ships utilizing these strategic locations. If tensions escalate, there is a potential for all Indian ports to be targeted from these Chinese-controlled ports, pushing these nations into a proxy war, given their high dependency on China.

    The economic repercussions are twofold: these Chinese ports not only divert trade routes between China and Europe away from traditional Indian ports like Mumbai, Kolkata, and Kochi but also contribute to an economic setback for India. Amidst this complex scenario, India’s newly proposed port city emerges as a potential game-changer. Positioned strategically at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, a critical juncture in the China-Europe trade route, it becomes a focal point in one of the world’s most vital economic conduits in terms of goods’ value and shipping volume. The Indian navy’s presence in these waters creates a strategic stalemate, compelling Chinese ships to navigate through this crucial point, providing India with both economic and military advantages. Despite China exploring alternative land routes through Russia and Pakistan, the conventional route through the Malacca Strait remains irreplaceable. Any Indian blockade in the Malacca Strait could significantly impact the Chinese economy.

    The West Bloc’s Opposition

    The Western powers, notably the USA and UK, exerting their influence in the Indian Ocean, harbor reservations about India akin to their concerns about China. Despite their inclination to counterbalance China, they are cautious about empowering India too much. Western nations, alongside China, are wary of India gaining an upper hand in the trade route that facilitates 60 percent of global maritime trade. In contrast to the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait region doesn’t currently pose many problems.  because there are no unilateral claims.   It includes the territorial waters of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and India, which is a major player in the area. Even if no one country wants to rule the route by itself, India’s bold actions on Great Nicobar, which were previously disregarded, indicate a change in its strategic priorities. With this action, India’s influence in the Malacca Strait is expected to grow. 

    As the initial stages of discontent, the US and UK media expressed numerous reservations about the Nicobar project. Concerns have been prominently raised, particularly in relation to the Great Nicobar actions, with a focus on potential impacts on the Shompen community, deforestation, and seismic activity in the region. This scrutiny has been extensively covered by sources such as The Guardian, BBC, and Deutsche Welle. Evidently, Western nations, disapproving of India’s approach in Great Nicobar, are adhering to their established method of critiquing infrastructure projects in developing countries.. The alignment of India’s trajectory with China’s stirs expectations among Western powers that India will assertively seek a more substantial share in the region. This, in turn, is foreseen to directly impact the trade flowing through this pivotal route.

    In Summary

    A significant geopolitical shift looms on the horizon if India proceeds with its Great Nicobar plan. This strategic move promises an unprecedented advantage for India in the Malacca Strait. China, finding itself potentially blocked from the Indian Ocean, faces a challenge in advancing its cooperation with India unless its trade route is jeopardized in an unprecedented manner. The impact could be substantial for smaller nations heavily dependent on the trade route. Therefore, the persisting rivalry for influence between China and India in these smaller countries is expected to endure.

    It is evident that India is strategically deploying its trump card against China, presenting a formidable challenge. Interestingly, this shift is not welcomed by Western nations, adding an intriguing layer to the evolving geopolitical landscape

  • The Downfall of the Indian Opposition Alliance

    The Downfall of the Indian Opposition Alliance

    Narendra Modi and the BJP is in a cruise mode.  With the impending Lok Sabha (House of Commons) elections on the horizon, a multitude of factors fortify their confidence in an enduring dominance. Modi’s magnetic leadership, forward-looking developmental initiatives, resonance with Hindu sentiment, and substantial financial backing collectively underpin what appears to be an unimpeded march toward electoral success.

    Yet, at the heart of Modi’s seemingly seamless trajectory lies a conspicuous vacuum— the absence of a formidable opposition in the Lok Sabha. The official recognition of an opposition, necessitating at least 10% representation, is notably vacant in India’s current political landscape. This void amplifies the BJP’s influence, leaving the opposition space remarkably unfilled.

    The primary opposition force, the venerable Congress party, grapples with substantial weaknesses that have diminished its efficacy. Despite these challenges, the Congress seeks to mount a credible challenge to the BJP by forging alliances with various state parties under the umbrella of the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance. 

    In its initial phases, the alliance displayed commendable performance. The Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance, commonly known as I.N.D.I.A., has emerged as a united front announced by leaders representing 28 political parties, gearing up for the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. The acronym I.N.D.I.A. was proposed during a pivotal meeting in Bengaluru, where leaders from all 28 participating parties unanimously embraced this symbolic title.

    The inaugural meeting of opposition parties, a momentous gathering in Patna, Bihar, was chaired by Chief Minister Nitish Kumar on June 23, 2023. Attended by 16 opposition parties, this assembly marked the introduction of the proposal for a new alliance. Following this milestone, the second meeting unfolded in Bengaluru, Karnataka, on July 17 and 18, 2023, under the chairmanship of UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi. During this session, the formal acceptance of the alliance’s formation took place, with an additional ten parties joining the coalition. The Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance was officially christened, and plans were set for the third meeting, scheduled to occur in Mumbai.

    The third assembly took place in Mumbai between August 31, 2023, and September 1, 2023. Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi, and chief ministers from five different states were among the notable attendees. After two days of intense discussion, the coalition reviewed key electoral issues related to the approaching general elections in great detail. During these talks, the details of the coordination committee were carefully outlined, and a complete three-point resolution was eventually adopted. This resolution is a significant step forward for the cooperative projects carried out by various political organizations uniting under the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance. It unequivocally declares the alliance’s commitment to working together to address the many issues that the general elections in India in 2024 are expected to present. 

    The fourth assembly, convened in New Delhi on December 19, 2023, honed in on pivotal elements encompassing seat-sharing, joint rallies, and the selection of a prime ministerial face and/or convenor for the alliance. A noteworthy resolution was embraced, underscoring the imperative to maximize the use of VVPATs in the imminent elections. The emphasis lay on self-verification by voters and the separate storage of VVPAT slips. Setting deadlines for seat-sharing arrangements, the alliance declared nationwide protests against the suspensions of opposition MPs in the Indian Parliament on December 22. While plans for a grand joint rally in Patna on January 30, the death anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, were alluded to, they remained unconfirmed.

    However, the trajectory took an unexpected turn with the advent of the fifth meeting, conducted virtually, with some leaders unable to participate. Post-meeting, Mallikarjun Kharge, the president of the Indian National Congress, assumed the mantle of alliance chairperson. Seat-sharing discussions took center stage, with the Chief Minister of Bihar, Nitish Kumar, declining the role of national convenor.

    As the electoral momentum initially surged, the later days unveiled the burgeoning vulnerabilities of the alliance. The dearth of robust leadership, the failure to establish a cohesive minimum program, and internal avarice within participating parties are now precipitating the coalition’s collapse. At the national level, the Indian National Congress stands as the sole representative within the alliance. However, the party grapples with internal weaknesses, marked by the absence of a prominent leader and the dominance of the Gandhi family, reluctant to relinquish control to outsiders. Regrettably, this familial stronghold has yet to recognize the urgency of the situation, failing to formulate effective policies to counter the formidable presence of Modi, despite being a national-level party. The intricate dynamics of this political landscape underscore the critical need for a resilient and strategic opposition to navigate the challenges presented by the current political climate.

    While on paper, other collaborators such as the Aam Aadmi Party, Communist Party of India (Marxist), and former national parties like the All India Trinamool Congress and Nationalist Congress Party carry or carried a nationalist label, their influence remains largely confined to their regional strongholds. Exploiting the weakened state of the Congress, these parties seek to contest and expand their influence beyond their traditional territories, a move restricted by the Congress itself.

    The complications intensify as regional parties with conflicting national interests undermine the broader image and objectives of the Congress. The alliance with the DMK, with its anti-Hindu stance and leaders making divisive statements, casts a negative shadow on the national-level standing of the Congress. Personal agendas, exemplified by JD(U)’s Nitish Kumar, further contribute to leaders withdrawing from the alliance. Modi’s strategic overtures, including awards for local parties and their leaders, have enticed collaboration with the BJP-led NDA alliance, leading parties like RLD and the National Conference to consider exiting and join NDA. A growing number of parties are preparing to contest the elections independently rather than aligning with the BJP.

    Genuine democracy necessitates the presence of an opposition. India, proudly hailed as the world’s largest democracy with a populace exceeding 100 billion, fails to meet the criteria of a commendable democratic model in the eyes of Western think tanks. The absence of a robust opposition in India poses the risk of transforming the nation into a de facto single-party state, as the BJP champions the notion of Ramarajya, departing from the modern state concept embraced by Western counterparts.

    The ideological architects behind the BJP seem to dismiss the strength of a diverse and vibrant opposition, opting instead to emphasize a narrative that weakens the West and underscores perceived conflicts with Islam. To safeguard the essence of Indian democracy, it is imperative for the opposition to awaken to the current scenario. However, the very parties constituting the opposition, driven by personal interests and avarice, appear poised to precipitate the collapse of the INDIA alliance. This potential disintegration could inadvertently pave the way for a third term for Narendra Modi, if not counteracted promptly. The intricate interplay among political forces in India emphasizes the vital significance of a robust opposition to safeguard the democratic values that characterize the nation’s democracy.