Tag: Indonesia

  • Indonesia Expands Military’s Role, Raising Fears of Democratic Erosion

    Indonesia Expands Military’s Role, Raising Fears of Democratic Erosion

    In a nation that has endured military brutality and struggled to reclaim democracy, fears of a return to military-dominated governance are once again resurfacing. Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy, stands at a critical juncture. President Prabowo Subianto—an ex-special forces general and former son-in-law of Suharto, the country’s longtime autocrat—has ratified contentious amendments to military law, expanding the role of armed forces personnel in civilian governance. This shift raises concerns that Indonesia could be inching back toward military dominance, reminiscent of the New Order era, when the armed forces wielded sweeping political power under Suharto’s rule.

    The controversial revision

    Indonesia’s parliament has passed sweeping revisions to the country’s military law, expanding the presence of active-duty military personnel in civilian government roles. The new legislation increases the number of agencies where military members can serve from 10 to 14, adding institutions such as disaster mitigation and the attorney general’s office. Previously, officers seeking civilian posts outside a select group—including the defense ministry and state intelligence agency—were required to resign or retire from military service.

    The revisions further extend these privileges to key government bodies, including the state secretariat, the counterterrorism agency, and the narcotics agency. Additionally, the law raises the retirement age for officers, a change critics argue deepens military influence in governance.

    The amendments were approved on Thursday in a plenary session led by a parliament dominated by President Prabowo Subianto’s ruling coalition. Speaker Puan Maharani presided over the unanimous vote, asserting that the revisions uphold democratic principles and human rights—claims that activists and political analysts have met with deep skepticism.

    What the government says

    Indonesia’s law minister, Supratman Andi Agtas, has rejected concerns that the revised law signals a return to the military dominance of the Suharto era, insisting that the changes are necessary to address domestic and geopolitical challenges. Defending the amendments, Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin told parliament that shifting geopolitical dynamics and advancements in global military technology require the armed forces to adapt to both conventional and unconventional threats.

    Despite initially opposing the revisions, the main opposition party ultimately endorsed them—a decision critics argue undermines democracy and reflects the growing political alignment in favor of Prabowo since his election last year.

    What Critics Say

    Critics contend that President Prabowo is intent on reinstating the military’s influence in civilian affairs, arguing that the swift passage of these amendments undermines the government’s stated commitment to human rights and accountability. The bill was approved in under two months after the president formally requested the amendment, raising concerns over the hasty legislative process and lack of transparency.

    The creeping militarization of government has been apparent for some time, reinforcing fears within civil society. However, some argue that warnings of a full-scale return to the New Order era may be overstated.

    Student organizations have vowed to protest outside parliament in Jakarta, with one group condemning the law as a threat to democracy. By Thursday evening, nearly a thousand protesters had gathered, holding banners as police officers and military personnel maintained a heavy presence around them.

    Undermining Democracy

    Despite 25 years of efforts to curb military influence in politics and governance, local human rights watchdog Imparsial found that nearly 2,600 active-duty officers were already serving in civilian roles even before the latest legal revisions. The recent changes further entrench military presence in government under Prabowo.

    During Suharto’s rule, the armed forces exercised a dual function, controlling both security and administrative affairs—a structure many see mirrored in Prabowo’s legislative amendments. Critics warn that his presidency could erode Indonesia’s hard-won but fragile democracy. Since taking office last October, he has already expanded the military’s role in public affairs. His flagship $4 billion free-meal program for children and pregnant women, for instance, relies on logistical support from the armed forces. Given these developments, concerns over growing military influence appear well-founded.

  • Public Outcry Leads to Withdrawal of Indonesia’s Pro-Dynasty Law

    Public Outcry Leads to Withdrawal of Indonesia’s Pro-Dynasty Law

    Indonesia, a country with a long history of dynastic politics, saw massive protests outside the parliament building as citizens rallied to defend democracy from the influence of powerful political families. In response to these widespread demonstrations, Indonesian legislators were compelled to abandon their plans to ratify revisions to election laws. With thousands of protesters gathered outside, lawmakers postponed an emergency session. The demonstrators set tires on fire, ignited firecrackers, and chanted slogans against President Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi. The unrest soon spread to other cities as well.

    On Thursday, the Indonesian Parliament was poised to overturn a Constitutional Court order regarding age requirements for candidates in the upcoming regional elections. This reversal would counter a ruling that had disqualified President Joko Widodo’s 29-year-old son, Kaesang Pangarep, from running. The Constitutional Court had recently dismissed a challenge to the age limit, which prevents those under 30 from running for regional governorships and would have barred Kaesang from participating in a key contest in Central Java. If implemented, the proposed changes could further amplify the outgoing president’s political influence, drawing criticism that the move aims to establish a political dynasty. The incoming president, Prabowo Subianto, who is set to take office in October, also hails from a prominent political dynasty, leading to concerns and protests over the concentration of power between these two dynasties. In response to the escalating unrest following news of the new law that could overturn the court’s verdict, Widodo’s office has sought to ease tensions.

    This development is seen as a setback for Joko Widodo’s efforts to place his son and several relatives in key positions of power. Last year, a similar ruling allowed his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, 36, to become Indonesia’s youngest vice president, which sparked allegations of nepotism. At that time, the court was headed by Widodo’s brother-in-law, Anwar Usman. Now, Widodo’s younger son, Kaesang Pangarep, is expected to seek a prominent role in November’s regional elections. To bypass the minimum age requirement of 30 for candidates, the president’s allies had proposed applying the age criterion at the time of inauguration, as Kaesang will turn 30 in December. However, this strategy has been blocked, thwarting Widodo’s plans. Additionally, Widodo faces criticism for allegedly supporting his successor, defense chief Prabowo Subianto, who is set to assume office in October, to maintain his family’s political influence. Furthermore, Joko’s son-in-law, Bobby Nasution, is running for governor of North Sumatra after his tenure as mayor of Medan. Experts observe that Indonesians are growing disillusioned with Widodo and his efforts to retain political influence as he prepares to step down after two five-year terms as president.

    People are deeply frustrated with the frequent and rapid manipulation of democratic system, driven by a clear desire to extend power. Protests have erupted in Yogyakarta, Makassar, Bandung, and Semarang, reflecting the so-called Generation Z revolution in Bangladesh. The government may act quickly on this issue, recognizing the parallels between the situations in Bangladesh and Indonesia, both of which grapple with political Islam. The Indonesian government is unlikely to retreat from its efforts to consolidate control and bolster its influence through political dynasties, and is expected to continue reinforcing its grip on power.

  • Can the U.S. Bring Indonesia onto Its Team?

    Can the U.S. Bring Indonesia onto Its Team?

    Indonesia, an archipelago state situated at the intersection of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, holds significant geopolitical importance. Although the United States is building a military bloc against China in the region, including major countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Singapore, Indonesia does not appear interested in joining. Whichever side Indonesia decides to align with will gain a substantial strategic advantage, but Indonesia is advocating for non-alignment, as it did during the Cold War. But Many expect escalating tensions might force it to choose a side, especially given China’s proximity. In this situation, the United States certainly does not want Indonesia to align with China, but its relationship with Indonesia is not as strong as it is with Malaysia and Singapore. The United States has not put as much effort into engaging Indonesia as it has with Malaysia or Singapore. Given Indonesia’s strong demand for investment and its growing reluctance to accept additional Chinese funding, this could be an opportune moment for the United States to strengthen its relationship with Indonesia.

    Indonesia’s rapid population growth and significant infrastructure developments have heightened the country’s investment needs. Recently, President Joko Widodo began working from the presidential palace in Indonesia’s ambitious new administrative capital. This modern city, being developed amidst rainforests, is set to be one of the largest investment ventures in the nation’s history. Despite being a centerpiece of Widodo’s two terms, the project has encountered delays. Announced in 2019 with a $33 billion budget, it is currently behind schedule and facing investment challenges.

    The project has been marred by confusion, as expected investments have failed to materialize. Indonesian Maritime Affairs and Investment Coordinating Minister Luhut Panjaitan had estimated the total investment needed to be between $30 and $40 billion, which is a lot of money for Indonesia. In 2022, the Japanese SoftBank Group withdrew due to concerns about returns. But the President Jokowi has assured investors that the project will advance regardless of the outcome of the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, stressing that Nusantara represents a valuable investment opportunity. As of August 2023, the government had allocated only 20% of the needed funds, while investors were reluctant to cover the remaining amount due to political uncertainty and Indonesia’s track record of underinvestment in infrastructure. By November, Jokowi acknowledged that no foreign investors had yet committed funds to Nusantara.


    The lack of investors in the megaproject poses a significant challenge for Prabowo once he assumes the presidency. Having promised continuity as part of his campaign platform, Prabowo has pledged to continue Widodo’s landmark projects, including Nusantara. However, the relocation project has already placed considerable strain on the economy. The need for foreign investors is urgent, and there are three potential sources to consider. One option is investment from Gulf countries. Indonesia has strengthened its ties with Islamic nations, and countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have previously made significant investments. However, as these nations are now focusing on policies to protect their own economies, the likelihood of substantial investment in Indonesia is low.

    Another option is the People’s Republic of China, a major trading partner for Indonesia. Despite the ongoing South China Sea disputes, China has made significant investments in Indonesian infrastructure, including the newly inaugurated bullet train. However, with China grappling with economic challenges and growing concerns about its influence, Indonesia has responded by imposing tariffs of up to 200 percent on various Chinese goods in 2024. Additionally, Indonesia is working to restrict Chinese investment in new nickel mining and processing projects, aligning with U.S. efforts to limit Beijing’s influence on the electric vehicle supply chain.

    This situation presents an opportunity for the United States. By increasing investments in Indonesia, similar to their approach in Malaysia, the U.S. could foster development and potentially integrate Indonesia into a regional bloc that includes Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Such alignment could boost investments from these countries and relief from reliance on Chinese goods, promoting growth and stability in the region.

    There are still a lot of issues to resolve between Indonesia and the U.S. Public sentiment may be unfavorable due to the ongoing Gaza issue. it is certain that China will closely monitor the situation and attempt to align Indonesia with its interests, which could challenge  the U.S.. But now,  For Indonesia, cooperation with the U.S. seems to be a great option for advancing its infrastructure projects and boosting the economy.

  • Rise of Political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia: An Analysis

    Rise of Political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia: An Analysis

    Malaysia and Indonesia, both predominantly Muslim nations with secular governance, have charted unique paths in history, differing from many other Islamic countries. Their divergence traces back to colonial eras, with British and Dutch rule shaping them differently from Ottoman-controlled territories. Even after achieving independence, while they instituted specific Islamic frameworks – Indonesia even embracing Islamic Sharia in certain areas – they generally maintained a more liberal outlook compared to Arab nations. However, in recent years, there has been a noticeable rise in the influence of Islamic parties in both countries, signaling a shift from the waning of anti-colonial nationalist movements. This trend emerged prominently in Indonesia from the early 2000s and has more recently gained traction in Malaysia. Although these parties may not hold unilateral authority, they wield significant sway over the public.

    The intertwining of religion and politics is becoming more pronounced in the region. Islamist politics is gaining significant traction in Malaysia, with PAS’s influence transcending its traditional support base. Especially in rural Malay areas, PAS has emerged as the favored choice for many Muslims. Strengthening its hold in the northern states and the east coast, PAS is also gaining ground in other parts of Peninsular Malaysia. This shift towards Islamist parties like PAS can be attributed, in part, to internal turmoil within UMNO, Malaysia’s oldest political party, including scandals such as the 1MDB controversy involving former Prime Minister Najib Razak. For the Malay Bumiputera community, race and religion stand as core values that have long guided PAS since its inception. There is a growing sense of concern that Malay voters are increasingly leaning towards conservatism, embracing PAS’s agenda of Islamization and advocacy for Shariah laws.

    After Malaysia’s 2022 General Election, PAS emerged as arguably the most potent individual party at the federal level. It now commands 43 out of 222 seats in parliament, surpassing the influence of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), the multiracial-centric Democratic Action Party (DAP), and even UMNO. Historically, UMNO, a Malay nationalist party, held sway over Malaysian politics from 1957 to 2018. On the federal stage, PAS spearheads the opposition coalition PN alongside the Malay nationalist party Bersatu. In the six state elections of 2023, PAS achieved significant victories, securing 105 out of 127 contested seats. It orchestrated a clean sweep of all 32 state seats in Terengganu under the PN banner, clinching 27, while the remaining five went to Bersatu. Presently, PAS governs four states—Terengganu, Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis – in the north, known as the Malay heartland.

    Fueled by its recent political successes, the conservative party is setting its sights on forming the government in the upcoming General Election. Divisive Malaysian politics have exacerbated societal fractures. In the Malaysian context, the majority comprises the Malay Bumiputera, who are predominantly Muslim. This reality underscores PAS’s unwavering stance that leaders in Malaysian politics must be Malay-Muslims, as they represent the dominant demographic in the country. PAS remains resolute in this position.

    In Indonesia, a nation more diverse than Malaysia, the mission of Islamic parties focuses heavily on fostering Islamic identity within the state. The National Awakening Party and the Progressive National Mandate Party are prominent Islamic parties in Indonesia, advocating for political Islam. And there are many small parties, They have a limited regional presence, particularly in Aceh, where Sharia law is implemented. These parties have achieved varying levels of success in terms of seats won and membership.

    The prominent party, The National Awakening Party (PKB) was established in 1999 by the traditionalist Muslim community in Indonesia, with significant overlap with the membership of Nahdlatul Ulama. Described as a nationalist Muslim party, PKB promotes inclusive and nationalist principles while upholding the Pancasila doctrine. In the legislative assembly, the party holds 68 out of 580 seats, with a vote percentage of 10%.

    Indonesia boasts larger Islamic territories and population, dissenting voices foresee an impending demand for Sharia law in additional regions. They perceive the recent electoral defeat of figures like Anies and Muhaimin Isakander in the presidential election as part of the ongoing Jokowi wave. These proponents argue that the current 10% representation could burgeon in the future, leading to the proliferation of Islamic politics across more regions.

    In the region, Muslims are devout yet also seek prosperity. Political Islam has often relied on instilling fear, anxiety, and the perception of Islam being threatened. While fear may resonate with some of the younger generation, hope tends to be more appealing. Malaysia and Indonesia, with their unique identities among Islamic nations, have pursued more modern and secular political approaches. In contrast, Islamic Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are gradually relaxing strict Islamic rules. Meanwhile, Islamic factions are gaining influence in the democracies of Malaysia and Indonesia. It’s clear that if these factions were to govern independently, it would likely result in a significant loss or alteration of the national identity of these states.

  • Indonesia Election: Opponents Of Prabowo Are Moving To Court

    Indonesia Election: Opponents Of Prabowo Are Moving To Court

    After a month-long process of tallying votes, Prabowo Subianto was officially declared the upcoming president of Indonesia. Prabowo, alongside his vice presidential candidate Gibran Rakabuming Raka, clinched a majority of votes on February 14th. According to the official results announced by General Elections Commission Chair Hasyim Asy’ari, Prabowo, a former special forces commander who garnered implicit support from the immensely popular incumbent President Joko Widodo, secured nearly 60% of the vote. Anies followed with 25%, trailed by former Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo with 16%. Prabowo Subianto was already in celebratory spirits over his apparent victory, particularly after unofficial tallies indicated his lead in the presidential race.

    The election outcome was widely perceived as favoring Prabowo due to his ties to the influential ruling dynasty of Suharto, as well as his running mate, the son of the current president, Joko Widodo. The populist appeal of Widodo and the highly effective campaign of Prabowo were cited as justifications for the election result, leading international observers to refrain from criticisms of the election process.

    However, Anies Baswedan, the defeated presidential candidate and second-place finisher in the election, who garnered significant support from Islamist groups and a majority from Aceh and West Sumatra, has lodged a legal challenge at the constitutional court to dispute the election outcome. Anies, a former Jakarta governor and Minister of Education and Culture in the Joko Widodo administration, asserted that the aim of the case is to bolster democracy and address numerous flaws in the election process that necessitate correction.

    Anies emphasized the significance of both the electoral process and its results, stating, “Where there is a flawed process, there will be flawed results”. He drew attention to various issues in the election, advocating for their resolution to prevent future occurrences.

    Anies’s team raised concerns about the widespread distribution of social assistance, such as rice, fertilizer, and cash, in strategic electoral regions, which they alleged influenced voting patterns. However, Indonesia’s current administration dismissed these claims. Moreover, they criticized the constitutional court’s last-minute decision the previous year to amend election regulations, allowing the president’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, to become Prabowo’s running mate. Notably, the chief justice of the court at that time was Widodo’s brother-in-law.

    The decision of the Constitutional Court previously ignited considerable controversy, especially given that the court’s chief justice at the time, Anwar Usman, had a marital relationship with Jokowi, the incumbent president. Usman was subsequently removed from his position as chief justice after an ethics council determined  that he had unlawfully altered election candidacy criteria, allegedly to benefit Widodo’s son. Despite allegations, Jokowi’s supporters have denied any involvement on his part in influencing the court’s verdict.

    In Indonesia, where political dynasties wield considerable influence, such occurrences are not uncommon. The legal team representing Anies Baswedan  urged the Constitutional Court to mandate a re-run of the election, excluding President Joko Widodo’s son from the vice presidential candidacy. They argued that his late inclusion unfairly influenced the outcome.

    Both losing factions, including Ganjar Pranowo’s third-place team, alleged widespread irregularities in the electoral process, with Ganjar’s team expected to initiate a legal challenge as well. Mahfud MD, Ganjar’s running mate, described the February 14 vote as the “Most Brutal” since Indonesia began conducting direct presidential elections two decades ago, attributing this to interference by state officials. Ganjar emphasized the necessity of the challenge to “Restore the credibility of our democracy”. According to regulations, legal challenges must be filed within three days of the announcement of results.

    While Prabowo remains confident and has chosen not to pursue legal action against the opposition, he expressed gratitude to his supporters, including Jokowi, following the announcement of results on Wednesday. He assured the nation of his commitment to lead all Indonesians. Prabowo’s team asserted their readiness to confront any legal challenges with a team of over 30 lawyers. The international community, including world leaders, accepted the outcome and extended congratulations to Prabowo. Chinese President Xi Jinping conveyed his congratulations on Thursday, as reported by Beijing’s state news agency Xinhua. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also offered congratulations, commending the Indonesian people for their robust participation in the democratic process and their commitment to democracy and the rule of law.

  • Indonesia’s Islamic State: The Story of Aceh

    Indonesia’s Islamic State: The Story of Aceh

    Islamists around the globe  are vehemently criticizing Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for current deviation from Islamic rulings and traditions. As the birthplace and home to sacred sites such as Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia was traditionally regarded as the leader of global Islam, especially after the Ottoman Empire. However, a noticeable shift has occurred as these nations, driven by economic prosperity and a desire to adopt modern European standards, have chosen to dilute Sharia laws. This includes an increased emphasis on women’s rights and limiting the application of laws exclusively to Muslim followers. These countries now actively host events such as music festivals, cinema, and participate in global fashion festivals, leading to widespread criticism within the Islamic world. 

    At the same time, some nations, which adopted secularism before are witnessing a resurgence of interest in fundamentalism, with Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, notably among them. Remarkably, Indonesia has a province that operates entirely under the Islamic Sharia system, a legal code often deemed tribal, anti-feminine, and contrary to human rights by modern societies. 

    Aceh, situated as the westernmost province of Indonesia, holds a unique position on the northern tip of Sumatra island, with its capital and largest city being Banda Aceh. Bounded by the Indian Ocean to the west and the Strait of Malacca to the northeast, Aceh shares land borders with North Sumatra to the east, while its maritime boundaries extend to Malaysia and Thailand in the east and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India to the north. Distinguished by a special autonomous status, Aceh stands out as a region adhering to a conservative religious ideology, being the sole Indonesian province to officially implement Sharia law.

    The roots of Islam in Indonesia trace back to Aceh, marking its significance as the birthplace of the spread of Islam in the archipelago. Around 1250 AD, Islam reached Aceh through the Kingdoms of Fansur and Lamuri, playing a pivotal role in the propagation of Islam across Southeast Asia. By the early 17th century, the Sultanate of Aceh had emerged as the most affluent, influential, and cultured state in the Malacca Straits region. The province boasts a historical narrative of political independence and a persistent resistance against external dominance, be it from Dutch colonizers in the past or, more recently, the Indonesian government.

    Aceh holds the distinction of being the solitary part of Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, to enforce Sharia law in its criminal justice system. Initially confined to matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, the jurisdiction of Islamic courts expanded to encompass criminal cases after the passage of special autonomy legislation in 2001. Canings serve as a punitive measure for offenses such as being alone with an unrelated member of the opposite gender and engaging in gambling. Notably, in 2014, the provincial government extended the reach of Sharia law to non-Muslims involved in offenses with a Muslim party. Non-Muslims, found in violation of the secular criminal code, can now opt for punishment under either the national criminal code (KUHP) or Aceh provincial Sharia Law. This unique legal landscape reflects the intricate interplay between religious principles and the broader legal framework in Aceh.

    Amidst stringent Islamic laws, a recent report from the Jakarta-based think tank SETARA Institute sheds light on the concerning state of tolerance in Aceh province. The Tolerant City Index 2023, an annual assessment of 94 Indonesian cities, reveals that Lhokseumawe, Sabang, and the provincial capital Banda Aceh are among the least tolerant places in the nation. The evaluation takes into account various factors, including local laws, social regulations, government actions, and socio-religious demographics.

    Halili Hasan, the Executive Director of SETARA Institute, attributes the cities’ low tolerance ranking to what he perceives as a lack of commitment from the government to promote tolerance. This deficiency, according to Hasan, results in discrimination against minority groups based on factors such as religion, gender, and race, presenting a deeply rooted issue that poses a significant challenge to the region.

    SETARA’s report sheds light on governmental and social regulations in Aceh that allegedly favor Muslims while discriminating against religious minorities. The increasing strictness on religious attire in schools and government offices, heightened obligations for religious services, and hindrances to economic activities during Ramadan are cited as examples. The report concludes that these conditions do not support the creation of a tolerant ecosystem in the region.

    The recurring placement of Aceh at the bottom of tolerance rankings underscores the ongoing challenges faced by the province in fostering inclusivity and religious harmony. The report serves as a call to action for increased government commitment to address these issues and build a more tolerant society in Aceh.

    The closure of churches in Aceh has sparked controversy, with the official justification citing the lack of appropriate permits. Governor Zaini Abdullah and Indonesian Home Affairs Minister Gamawan Fauzi, both in support of this action, maintained that the closures were legally warranted. Similar incidents had occurred in April 2012 in the Singkil regency, prompting concerns among Christians. In 2015, an escalation resulted in a church being burned down and another attacked, leading President Joko Widodo to appeal for calm.

    Historically, Aceh has been a gateway for various religions including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. The current trajectory of increased Sharia law implementation and Islamization in Aceh may shape the future of Indonesia. This shift has broader implications, potentially influencing other Indonesian provinces with significant minority populations. Jakarta and other states are already witnessing signs of fundamentalism, raising concerns about internal conflicts within Indonesia.

    Interestingly, while countries like Saudi Arabia regulate Sharia to accommodate tourism and hospitality, secular nations in the tourism and hospitality industry, such as Indonesia, are adopting Sharia to establish distinct boundaries from external influences. This complex interplay of religion, governance, and cultural identity adds a layer of intricacy to the evolving landscape of Aceh and its potential impact on the broader Indonesian context.

  • Prabowo’s Indonesia Will be a Key Ally for China: A Strategic Outlook

    Prabowo’s Indonesia Will be a Key Ally for China: A Strategic Outlook

    In the current trend of prematurely asserted election victories, Indonesia follows the trend, as Prabowo Subianto, endearingly dubbed the “cute grandpa” by Indonesian youth, and a seasoned statesman with a nuanced military background, boldly proclaims his victory in the recent presidential election. At 72 years old, Prabowo Subianto will be the heir to the immensely popular incumbent, President Joko Widodo, harboring aspirations to become the eighth president of the world’s third-largest democracy. Noteworthy is the inclusion of President Widodo’s son as Subianto’s running mate for the vice president position.

    Amid the absence of official declarations from election authorities and the conspicuous lack of agreements from the two other former provincial governors in the race, Subianto, leaning on unofficial results, confidently announces his victory to a gathered crowd in Jakarta. His proclamation characterizes the win as “the victory of all Indonesians,” illustrating a strategic move to unite the populace under his leadership.

    Subianto is a  figure marked by a tumultuous past, faced a ban on entry into the United States for a lengthy two-decade period, a consequence of allegations related to human rights violations. His military trajectory unfolded against the backdrop of the Suharto dictatorship, a chapter that concluded just over 25 years ago in the Indonesian archipelago. Holding a prominent position in the military hierarchy, Subianto served as an army general, notably assuming the role of a special forces commander in a unit implicated in allegations of torture and disappearances—an assertion vehemently disputed by Subianto.

    Current unofficial tallies from Indonesian polling agencies indicate Subianto securing 57% to 59% of the votes, drawing on data from over 80% of the sampled polling locations. Although the official tally may extend over a month, historical precedent suggests the reliability of quick counts based on a sampling of polling stations across Indonesia. This method has consistently provided accurate reflections of results in the nation’s previous four presidential elections since the inception of direct voting in 2004.

    Despite his hasty declaration of triumph, Subianto struck a calm tone in a broadcast speech from a sports stadium. He issued a warning against conceit, stressing the need of humility in the face of uncertainty. Declaring that this victory should go beyond individual successes, he recognized the difficult journey that Indonesia travels as a country caught between a difficult historical story with democracy. 

    Indonesia is on the trajectory to become the world’s fourth-largest economy in the next decade, and in a need to strategically shape its foreign policies, with a particular emphasis on asserting uphand in south east Asia. However, inherent disparities, including ideological opposition to the West, a foundation rooted in communism and Islam, perceived imperfections in democracy, leadership marked by corruption or crime allegations, and the sensitive issue of Western Papua, have the potential to strain relations between Indonesia and Western nations. Paradoxically, these very differences also position Indonesia as a natural ally for China, further fortified by the nation’s possession of the world’s largest nickel reserves. Probably the duo will be best friends with benefits.

    In a decisive move in 2020, Indonesia imposed a prohibition on the export of nickel ore, aiming to establish a competitive electric vehicle and battery supply chain. Recognizing the strategic importance of this decision, China has made substantial investments, injecting a notable US$3.6 billion into Indonesia’s nickel sector in the first half of 2022. This financial commitment aligns seamlessly with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and complements Indonesia’s ongoing infrastructure initiatives, led by Incumbent President Widodo. These initiatives include notable projects such as the inception of Southeast Asia’s first high-speed rail.

    The apparent stagnation in Indonesia’s ambitious new capital project needs a significant increase in investment, a void that seems poised to be filled by China. President Widodo’s stance with foreign investment underscores the nation’s need, and China stands ready to fulfill it, fostering deeper connections with both Chinese companies and the government.

    It is certain that Prabowo, poised to assume office after Widodo, is unlikely to disrupt the established economic cooperation with China, a trend notably evident in his past actions. Similar to its Southeast Asian counterparts, Indonesia contends with China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. Despite facing challenges, including the tragic explosion at a Chinese-financed nickel processing plant last year, which sparked concerns about the perceived reliability of the Chinese relationship, China maintains its position as Indonesia’s primary trade and investment partner.

    Previously, apprehensions arose regarding the prospect of Indonesia adopting an assertive stance in response to China’s escalating tensions in the South China Sea. There was speculation that Indonesia might have explored solidarity with other ASEAN countries facing similar sovereignty disputes against China, potentially forming a united front against Beijing’s actions. However, in the present scenario, Indonesia’s inclination toward China seems increasingly probable. This alignment holds the potential to cultivate a coalition involving Russia, China, Indonesia, and possibly India, shaping a resilient trade bloc with a substantial market encompassing 300 billion people. Such an alliance could exert considerable political influence, countering regional interests pursued by the United States.

  • In the Hands of Tomorrow: The Significance of Young Voters in Indonesia

    In the Hands of Tomorrow: The Significance of Young Voters in Indonesia

    Indonesia emerges as a pivotal testing ground, given the prevalent presence of millennials and Generation Z within its population. The growing influence of the internet-savvy generation within the voting booths plays a pivotal role in determining the election’s outcome.

    The Indonesian General Elections Commission highlights a significant demographic shift, revealing that out of the anticipated 205 million voters, a notable 106 million fall below the age of 40, constituting 52% of the expected electorate. This shift underscores the captivating nature of Indonesia’s elections, emphasizing the escalating impact of the younger generations on shaping the political landscape.

    With presidential elections occurring every five years, the 2024 polls on February 14th signify a noteworthy departure. This marks the first instance in a decade for the selection of a new leader due to the term constraints of the incumbent president, Joko Widodo. The 2019 election, with an 82% voter turnout, showcased the lowest abstention rate since the initiation of the presidential electoral process in 2004. Ongoing election campaigns vividly spotlight the candidates’ focused outreach to a specific audience.

    Campaign strategies encompass a diverse range, from TikTok initiatives and the rebranding of established political figures to resonate with the preferences of the new generation, to mobile phone-centric campaigns and musical festivals. Banners line roads, pavements, and homes, transforming social media feeds into a bustling battleground of election fervor, adorned with campaign videos, fan art celebrating candidates, and a torrent of opinions.

    Parties and candidates employ various strategies, such as distributing tickets to K-pop concerts and crafting social media feeds filled with cats and viral dancing, in a deliberate effort to capture attention. Even candidates with Islamic backing strategically tailor their efforts to address the concerns and inclinations of the youth demographic. This diverse array of campaign methodologies reflects a deliberate endeavor to connect with and appeal to various segments of the electorate, underscoring the evolving landscape of political outreach in Indonesia.

    Against the backdrop of a significant youth demographic, a discernible pattern emerges as all three contenders for political office in Indonesia surpass the age of 50. Notably, the leading aspirant, 72-year-old Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, strategically selects a vice-presidential candidate under 40, specifically Gibran Rakabuming Raka, aged 36 and incidentally, the offspring of the incumbent president. Subianto’s campaign tactics entail a deliberate effort to reshape public perception, steering away from the image of a military general accused of instigating unrest in the nation. Presently, he cultivates a contrasting persona – that of a genial grandparent, engaging in TikTok dances and even crafting a personalized avatar tailored to resonate with the TikTok generation. This calculated rebranding strategy, reminiscent of Jokowi’s past initiatives, underscores the candidates’ recognition of the influential role of social media and the effectiveness of well-funded campaigns in shaping public sentiment.

    Prabowo Subianto, a former special forces commander, carries a controversial legacy marred by allegations of past human rights abuses. These encompass claims of involvement in the abduction and enforced disappearance of student activists in 1997 and 1998. Despite being discharged from the army over these accusations, he has not faced criminal prosecution and vehemently denies any wrongdoing.

    Accusations of rights abuses in Papua and East Timor further stain Prabowo’s record, with allegations including targeted killings of East Timorese civilians, such as the notorious 1983 Kraras massacre where hundreds lost their lives. Despite labeling these claims as “unproven allegations, innuendoes, and third-hand reports,” Prabowo, renowned for his fiery temper, undergoes a substantial rebranding effort to secure voter favor. His campaign depicts him as a grandfatherly figure, adopting a softer tone in speeches and even showcasing jovial dance performances on stage.

    The primary concerns resonating among young Indonesians encompass the quality of life, corruption, institutional integrity, and environmental issues, particularly air pollution. Economic challenges, notably in social welfare and unemployment, add to the critical concerns, with 14% of Indonesians aged 15 to 24 grappling with joblessness in 2022. The youth, increasingly alarmed by climate change, particularly in Jakarta, the world’s most polluted city, assertively call for a government possessing both “good character” and a “certain level of competency” to address these pressing issues.

    Despite these urgent concerns, the youth engagement in social media appears more motivated by entertainment than the substantive problems they face. Some experts argue that the election’s social media space is often utilized to divert attention from real issues, providing entertainment through platforms like TikTok that create a screen-blanketing effect. Social media takes on a pivotal role in connecting with young voters, considering that nearly 60% of the nation’s workforce operates in informal sectors. TikTok and Instagram have transformed into crucial battlegrounds for political campaigns, featuring tactics such as TikTok live streams and targeted engagement to resonate with the younger demographic.

    As the election results approach on Wednesday, they not only hold the key to determining the nation’s new leader but also offer insights into the efficacy of social media campaigns in addressing the concerns of young voters. However, a growing concern arises, questioning whether political campaigns might excessively rely on superficial strategies, potentially trapping young voters in gimmicks rather than addressing substantive issues. The outcome not only shapes the nation’s future but also sets a global precedent on the role of screens in political campaigns and the behavior of the internet generation during elections.

  • Indonesia Elections 2024: Jokowi Era to Continue through Prabowo

    Indonesia Elections 2024: Jokowi Era to Continue through Prabowo

    On February 14th, Indonesia, the third-largest democracy globally, will decide on their next president. Jokowi, the current president and a prominent populist leader, continues to shine on the political landscape. However, constitutional constraints prevent the incumbent President Joko Widodo, affectionately known as Jokowi, from seeking a third term. Nevertheless, Jokowi wields substantial influence in the election by offering unprecedented support to the leading candidate, Prabowo Subianto, challenging entrenched norms in Indonesian politics.

    Although Mr. Widodo has not officially endorsed a specific candidate, his clear indications of support for Prabowo—whose running mate, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is Jokowi’s eldest son—have sparked discussions. Jokowi, serving as Indonesia’s second two-term president since the introduction of direct presidential elections in 2004, stands in stark contrast to his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono adhered to the societal tradition of official neutrality during polls, refraining from political involvement. In contrast, Jokowi is affiliated with the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and actively participates in political events. Adding to the complexity, candidate Jokowi is endorsing Prabowo, who is not a member of PDI-P. Instead, Prabowo belongs to another party called the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) party.

    Furthermore, the incumbent president’s frequent visits to the crucial battleground of Central Java in the weeks leading up to the election, described as work trips by his office but perceived by some analysts as open campaigning for Prabowo, the leader of the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) party, have raised eyebrows. Ganjar Ponomwo, presidential candidate from Jokowi’s Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), strongly advises Mr. Widodo to make a clear endorsement statement, emphasizing the vital need for state officials to remain impartial while navigating this complex political environment.

    During his campaign, Mr. Prabowo has pledged to continue programs initiated by Mr. Widodo, reciprocating the incumbent’s involvement in populist initiatives like providing cash aid and a pay raise for civil servants. This participation is viewed as a mobilization of state apparatus to bolster support for his chosen successor. Prabowo currently leads the polls, with supporters seeing him as a robust leader capable of ensuring stability, committed to maintaining the continuity of Jokowi’s development plans.

    If none of the contenders receives more than 50% of the vote on February 14, a runoff between the top two candidates is set for June 14. But according to experts, as of right now, most cases might not require a second round. As to the most recent survey by  the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI), it appears that Prabowo is above the 50% threshold that is required to win in the first round. In the survey that took place between January 16 and 26, 50.7 percent of the 1,200 participants agreed with the former military person who is the favorite of Jokowi. Twenty-two percent of respondents said they supported former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan. Mr. Ganjar Pranowo, a member of Jokowi’s party, supported by 19 percent of those surveyed . The percentage of people who were unsure was close to 7%.

    The unfolding dynamics of this election occur within the context of a significant and diverse electorate. Ongoing debates revolve around the role of political dynasties and their implications for the strength of the country’s democracy. Civil society groups express unease, suggesting that Jokowi is seeking to retain influence even after leaving office. Concerns are raised about the potential ramifications of this alliance, impacting how the public perceives the presidency as an institution and the electoral process as a whole. If Prabowo is chosen in the upcoming election, it is likely to cast more doubts on Indonesian politics, solidifying the continuation of the Jokowi era and further spreading dynasty politics in the so-called third-largest democracy in the world.

  • How will the Huge Amount for the Election Affect Indonesia?

    How will the Huge Amount for the Election Affect Indonesia?

    The most important aspect of democracy is elections. A strong democratic nation is created by transparent democratic elections. Fair elections are thus a basic obligation of every democratic nation. However, elections are no longer an easy procedure in modern times. In countries like Indonesia, which has 200 million voters, elections are costly and often detrimental to a country’s booming economy. 

    The Indonesian Government earmarked Rp 25 trillion (approximately USD 1.7 billion) for election preparations in the fiscal period of 2022–2023. More than half of this budget was allocated to the General Elections Commission, while the majority of the remaining funds were directed to the General Election Supervisory Agency. Hasyim Asyari, Chairman of the General Election Commission (KPU), highlighted the substantial cost involved in printing legislative ballots, amounting to over Rp 800 billion. With additional funding anticipated for the upcoming fiscal year. Among the realized expenditures, Rp 20 trillion has been deployed for election logistics and preparatory tasks managed by the General Election Commission (KPU) and the Election Oversight Body (Bawaslu). Additionally, an allocation of Rp 3.4 trillion has been designated for election security, dissemination efforts, and publications, involving various ministries and state agencies.

    Globally, democracies are grappling with concerns over the escalating costs of elections. Efforts are being made worldwide to alleviate the economic burden associated with these processes. For instance, Malaysia has initiated movements like mandatory tenure completion to address these concerns. Despite the global discourse on cost reduction, Indonesia faces the challenge of balancing the financial demands of a crucial election with the imperative of upholding democratic principles.

    Though Important Indonesian officials have confidence in the spending. The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs’ Secretary, Susiwijono Moegiarso, is expecting the cost can be balanced by the country’s economic growth in the duration. He expressed hope that Indonesia’s economic growth would be positively impacted by the general elections in 2024. He cited the strong economic growth of 2023 and predicted an even stronger performance in 2024, attributing it to the approaching elections on February 14, 2024, when speaking at the Investor Trust Economic Outlook 2024 event. 

    Moegiarso pointed out that Indonesia had sustained growth of over five percent for eight consecutive quarters until the third quarter of 2023. Emphasizing the historical trend, he explained that election periods traditionally stimulate domestic economic activity through increased government spending and consumption, particularly by non-profit institutions serving households. The activities during the election period are expected to contribute to a rise in the real gross domestic product (GDP) and expedite money circulation.

    In addition to the election-driven optimism, Moegiarso outlined the government’s development agendas for 2024, supported by state budget (APBD) policy. The government has also devised fiscal policies to accelerate national development targets and priorities. The ongoing economic transformation agenda includes down streaming natural resources, mining, and food products.

    Furthermore, Moegiarso noted that national economic solidarity is bolstered by positive growth in consumption and investment in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). As Indonesia looks ahead, the combination of election-driven economic momentum and strategic policies positions the country for continued economic strength.

    It’s true that democracies lose money when holding elections, but this money will go toward boosting economic activity, which is beneficial for the economy. Furthermore, the policies that the democratically elected government is dedicated to implementing benefit the economy more broadly. Hence, in the long run, democratic elections are mandatory, election expenses are a reality, and policies by democratic governments lead to prosperity.