Tag: Iran

  • Israel Aims to End the “Axis of Resistance”

    Israel Aims to End the “Axis of Resistance”

    Hamas lies in ruins, Hezbollah is in disarray, and the Houthis are increasingly under attack. Iran, the chief backer of these groups, has lost both its key strategist and its revered military leader to assassination. The so-called Axis of Resistance – formed as a Shia military coalition in solidarity with the Palestinian cause, with the goal of destroying the Jewish state and asserting Shia Islamic dominance – now faces an existential crisis. Following the unprecedented assault it suffered on October 7, Israel, with precise and methodical force, has embarked on a campaign to eliminate all remaining threats. Its multi-front offensive is not only altering the regional balance but driving this once formidable alliance to the brink of collapse.

    Israel remains resolute in its campaign, despite criticism from international media, political groups, and human rights organizations, as it continues to prioritize its security. The Israeli military presses forward, targeting key Hamas leaders, even those who believe they are safe outside Gaza, showing little regard for the ongoing hostage situation. However, the expansion of operations into Lebanon to target Hezbollah was less anticipated. Hezbollah presents a more geographically and strategically challenging position for Israel, as it operates from Lebanon with access to Iranian support and maintains a robust infrastructure, often blending into civilian populations.

    However, Israel’s intelligence apparatus, including Mossad, has delivered significant blows to Hezbollah, which could shatter the group’s confidence and operational strength. On September 17th and 18th, a coordinated electronic attack using pager bombs killed several Hezbollah operatives. There were also reports following the deaths of several high-ranking leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s longtime commander, along with other key figures. Although Hezbollah denies it, Israel claims to have also killed Abu Ali Rida, Hezbollah’s last remaining senior military commander. Meanwhile, Israel continues to launch precise missile strikes against Hezbollah targets, including second-tier leaders and munitions, in contrast to Hezbollah’s less effective retaliatory fire.

    Beyond military action, Israel is reportedly attempting to strategically exploit divisions within Lebanon’s population, particularly among Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shia Muslims who migrated from the south. Social discourse is filled with reflections on Lebanon’s rich history and its decline, attributed to the influx of this migrated population. Lebanese expatriates lament the country’s downfall, blaming these sectarian divisions, which further weaken Lebanon’s defenses against cross-border actions. This narrative helps to portray Israel’s actions as targeting Hezbollah, not Lebanon itself.

    Unlike in the past, Sunni Arab nations, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, appear unwilling to intervene in Lebanon’s favor. Previously, they had united to fight against Israel in solidarity with Palestine. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia, a Sunni powerhouse, is likely content as Israel begins to target the Houthis in Yemen – another Iranian-backed faction that has fought against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis, who previously launched missiles at key Saudi targets and inflicted significant losses, have also attacked Israeli-linked ships and even launched missiles toward Israel, making them the next likely target of Israeli strikes. Israel has already initiated attacks on the Houthis, and, much like with Hezbollah, its approach appears calculated and deliberate.

    Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq, two collapsed countries due to civil war and foreign interests, are also expected to attack Israel in solidarity with Palestine as part of Iran’s axis of resistance. Although they are trained and supported by Tehran, they currently pose less of a direct threat to Israel. Israel will likely neutralize them with relative ease, as it has done with similar threats in the past.

    The leader of the axis of resistance, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is now facing its greatest setback. They are losing control over other states through their Shia military units due to Israel’s actions. And It is a humiliation for them, as Israel’s reach extends within borders to eliminate key leaders of these militant groups who seek refuge in Iran. No Iranian city is now beyond Israel’s reach, making the country increasingly vulnerable. Some even accuse Israel of orchestrating the killing of former president Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash. Israel is also reportedly working to destabilize the Islamic Republic through information warfare, posing a significant threat to the very existence of the regime.

    The Israel-Hamas conflict, often labeled by the media as the Israel-Palestine conflict, is increasingly being viewed as an Israel-Iran conflict. No Arab countries are showing interest in this situation, not even the official governments of Lebanon and Yemen. Iran and its proxies, known as the axis of resistance, are isolated and now feeling the full wrath of Israel.

  • Israel Expands War to Southern Lebanon

    Israel Expands War to Southern Lebanon

    After a series of missile exchanges and targeted strikes, it is clear that Israel is now at war with Hezbollah. Having nearly completed its campaign in Gaza, Israel is shifting its focus to the next target, following a well-executed plan. However, this conflict will not be as straightforward as Gaza. In Gaza, Israel primarily dealt with media coverage of civilian casualties – images of dead bodies, crying children, and grieving women that fueled international outrage from left-wing and liberal movements. Militarily, Hamas posed little threat. In contrast, Hezbollah operates from Lebanon, an independent country with strategic advantages, such as its mountainous terrain and easy connections to Iran and other regional militant groups. Nevertheless, Israel appears determined, and the war is already in motion. Lebanon, a nation already devastated by economic and political collapse, faces the grim possibility of becoming the next Gaza.

    Lebanon’s health ministry reports that at least 500 people have been killed and 1,645 injured in a series of Israeli airstrikes on alleged Hezbollah targets, marking the highest daily death toll in the country since the end of its civil war in 1990. As Israel intensifies its offensive, thousands of residents are fleeing towns and villages in southern Lebanon. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the military’s actions as shifting the security balance along Israel’s northern border, though his remarks seemed to downplay the severity of the situation. Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, indicated that the military is preparing for the next phases in Lebanon, withholding further details. Israel appears determined to dismantle Hezbollah’s parallel governance in southern Lebanon, which it claims exists solely to target Israel and pursue a religious mandate to kill Jews.

    The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported striking over 1,300 Hezbollah targets in the past day, marking its most extensive assault on the group since the Gaza war began last October, when Hezbollah started attacking in solidarity with Hamas. The success rate of Israel’s missile operations remains high, and more strikes are expected in the coming days, possibly before any ground invasion is considered. Earlier in the day, the IDF issued warnings to Lebanese residents in Beirut and other areas via phone calls, urging them to evacuate and avoid buildings suspected of housing Hezbollah weapons. Israeli media later clarified that these strikes were not indiscriminate missile barrages but were specifically targeting Hezbollah operatives, including Ali Karaki, the group’s third-ranking military commander. Reports suggest the operation was successful. Meanwhile, about 35 rockets were fired from Lebanon toward Israel’s Safed area, with some landing in open fields near the community of Ami’ad, according to the IDF.

    Lebanon is now bracing for the possibility of a ground war, not by mobilizing its military but by focusing on protecting its citizens. A direct confrontation with Israel is beyond the country’s capabilities, and unlike Hezbollah, the Lebanese people do not view martyrdom in battle as a national or religious duty. Families fleeing southern Lebanon are publicly pleading for apartments or rooms to shelter their loved ones. Grassroots housing efforts have quickly emerged, with individuals coordinating calls for available spaces and hostels offering discounted rates to those displaced by the conflict. Meanwhile, international efforts to evacuate foreign nationals from Lebanon are underway, with countries like the U.S. issuing calls for peace, though such interventions often prove ineffective. Hezbollah, for its part, has vowed to continue its strikes in support of Palestinians and Hamas.

    For over four decades, a shadowy and unyielding conflict has simmered between Israel and Hezbollah. Now, with steely determination, and despite the geographic and military risk factors, Israel appears intent on bringing this protracted struggle to a definitive conclusion. Israel’s resolute commitment to pursue this conflict may push Hezbollah into a corner, even though they appear stronger on paper. It is clear that, just as Gazan civilians have borne the brunt of hostilities, Lebanese civilians, too, will face the consequences. While Israel has been forged in the crucible of existential threats and built to withstand aggression, Lebanon, fractured and vulnerable, is far less prepared and could easily collapse. Should a ground war unfold, it would not only devastate Lebanon but also send ripples throughout the region. Such a conflict would signal to militants in Syria, Yemen, and Iran that they need to prepare for what lies ahead.

  • What is happening in Lebanon?

    What is happening in Lebanon?

    Lebanon, the volatile home of Hezbollah, finds itself reeling from a bewildering series of explosions. Just a day after thousands of pagers detonated in unison across the country, a new wave of blasts from seemingly innocuous devices – walkie-talkies, laptops, radios – claimed the lives of 14 people, injuring 450 more. On Tuesday, the shocking detonations of pagers linked to Hezbollah members killed 12 and left nearly 3,000 injured, a grim spectacle that stunned not only Lebanon but the world, both in its method and its sheer scale of destruction. By Wednesday, reports of further explosions spread like wildfire across messaging apps, with disturbing images of shattered devices and smoldering buildings circulating rapidly, 

    As Lebanon teeters on the brink, already frayed by political dysfunction and administrative paralysis, it faces a new and bewildering crisis. The source of these devastating attacks remains shrouded in mystery, and citizens, now fearful of their own electronic devices, find themselves paralyzed in a country unable—or unwilling – to respond. While Israel has yet to officially claim responsibility, many cast accusatory glances in its direction. Civilians are increasingly caught in the crossfire, victims of what appears to be Israel’s widening focus on Hezbollah. Yet within Hezbollah itself, a disquieting confusion has surfaced, even as the group vows retribution. The ominous specter of a Hezbollah-Israel conflict hangs in the air, inching Lebanon ever closer to the precipice of war. Poor Lebanon, once again.

    Information is still emerging, but multiple explosions were reported on Wednesday afternoon in Beirut’s southern suburbs and the southern city of Tyre. Social media images showed vehicles ablaze and smoke billowing from residential areas, as reports of walkie-talkies and even solar cells exploding surfaced. Shockingly, blasts were reported at funerals as well. Chaos gripped the streets, with ambulances rushing to aid the injured and panic spreading as more explosions were reported. 

    There is growing fear among the public about how Israel might have executed such an operation, raising concerns over the involvement of vast global supply chains, stretching from Japan and Taiwan to Europe. Some suspect these supply chains may have been infiltrated, allowing devices to be equipped with small amounts of high-powered explosives – between 1 and 3 grams. Reports suggest that Hezbollah members suspect the blasts are linked to batteries, with several removing and discarding batteries from their radios after one exploded during a funeral in Beirut. While most affected devices appeared to be communication systems, there were also reports of other objects, like solar panels, causing explosions.

    Israel has neither claimed responsibility nor made any official comments regarding the explosions. However, investigations are underway by various parties, and international media has ramped up its coverage, saturating the digital sphere with the unfolding story. Both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government have pointed fingers at Israel for the attacks. Experts believe as Israel’s operations in Gaza approach their final stages, and they are moving to the next stage. Israel’s long-term strategy remains unclear, but these explosions represent a significant escalation against Hezbollah and Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced on Wednesday that the army would redirect resources and forces from its nearly year long campaign in Gaza to the northern front.

    The attacks dealt a heavy blow to Hezbollah, not only operationally but also in terms of psychological warfare, raising questions about the group’s standing within Lebanon. As Israel wraps up its operations in Gaza, it now faces threats primarily from the north, particularly along its borders with Lebanon and Syria. In Syria, Israel holds an advantage due to its control over key strategic areas, but Lebanon presents a more complex risk. The recent explosions seem to signal Israel’s intent to pressure both Lebanese authorities and Hezbollah, demonstrating that no one is beyond its reach.

    Hezbollah has vowed revenge, but it must acknowledge that Israeli intelligence operates with a sophistication that may surpass its own capabilities. Despite this, Hezbollah faces a critical dilemma; the attacks have been a severe blow to its reputation, and failure to retaliate could undermine its very existence. As tensions rise, the Lebanese people should brace themselves for further hardship.

  • Will Balochistan Secede from Pakistan?

    Will Balochistan Secede from Pakistan?

    Independent Balochistan, a demand for ethnic statehood, dates back decades. It is quite similar to the demand for Kurdistan, an ethnic state for Kurds, by seceding Kurdish-majority regions from different countries. In the case of Balochistan, the land of the Baloch tribes, they seek to form a new state by seceding Baloch-dominated territories in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Although the demand for statehood is significant across Baloch territories in these countries, the demand from Pakistan is more intense, as they have acted more forcefully against it than others. This has led to full-scale conflicts between the Pakistani army and Baloch militants in 1948, 1958–59, 1962–63, and 1973–1977, with a new ongoing insurgency at varying levels since 2003.

    Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons

    Although the Baloch are now Sunni Muslims, they have historically opposed the creation of Pakistan, and some even opposed the partition of India. In response, Pakistan has consistently treated the Baloch harshly. It is clear that Pakistan will never agree to secede its largest province, which is roughly the size of France and one of the largest provinces by area within any country. However, despite Balochistan being rich in natural resources such as gold, diamonds, silver, and copper, it is sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped, and one of the poorest regions in Pakistan.

    Pakistan has attempted several measures to assimilate Balochistan with the rest of the country, such as promoting the national language Urdu while suppressing native languages like Balochi and Brahui, and arresting local leaders by branding statehood advocates as terrorists and Indian supporters. Additionally, Pakistan has encouraged migration to Balochistan to alter the demographics, but the people have resisted, with Baloch organizations resorting to extreme measures like suicide bombings and targeted killings. This has allowed Pakistan to label Baloch organizations as terrorist groups.

    The region has always attracted the interest of Pakistani politicians due to its valuable mineral resources and strategic location. When China initiated the Gwadar port project in Balochistan – a natural deep-sea port at the mouth of a critical trade route – Pakistani politicians tried to use the situation to benefit from the migration of workers from the rest of Pakistan. However, this move was met with significant opposition. As Pakistan’s political and economic situation worsens day by day, the secessionist movement in Balochistan is rising to an unprecedented level.

    The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), an ethno-nationalist militant group operating out of Afghanistan, regularly targets the Pakistan Armed Forces, civilians, and foreign nationals. Recognized as a terrorist organization in multiple countries, the BLA recently launched Operation Herof, striking Pakistani army checkpoints and camps along key highways in Balochistan. This operation reportedly claimed the lives of nearly 102 people, including civilians, and led to the capture of significant parts of the Bela army camp. The BLA has also set up checkpoints across the province to ambush military convoys, indicating a broader effort to achieve secession from Pakistan.

    The BLA claimed that over 40 soldiers were killed in the attack on the main army camp in Bela. According to the group, its Fidayeen unit maintained control over a substantial portion of the camp for six hours as part of Operation Herof, with the Majeed Brigade spearheading the assault on the occupying forces in Bela, resulting in the deaths of more than 40 military personnel.

    Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif condemned the violence, asserting that the separatists aim to disrupt China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) development projects, which seek to expand Beijing’s influence in Pakistan and across Central and South Asia. This is viewed as a counter to the influence of the United States and India in the region. Sharif vowed retaliation, noting that the violence coincided with a visit from a top Chinese general to Islamabad.

    Pakistan will definitely retaliate, as it has a history of doing so. According to Amnesty International, over 10,000 Baloch have disappeared in Pakistan since 2011. This challenge presents opportunities for both the Pakistani army and the government. The Pakistani army, which holds control over the state, will likely use the situation to act more aggressively in Balochistan, gaining control over more areas and justifying actions in other problematic regions. The Pakistani government, which is not well-liked due to issues like banning opposition, corruption, nepotism, and poor governance, sees this as an opportunity to strengthen its grip on the state.

    There was opposition to the government over Chinese-run projects that have led to significant debt for Pakistan and offered little benefit to local communities. Now, the government has a reason to suppress this dissent and push its anti-India agenda, which could unify the nation and seek warmer relations with Iran and Afghanistan – both of which are also dealing with secessionist movements from their Baloch populations.

    How Pakistan handles this situation will be crucial in determining the country’s future. Pakistan already faces significant challenges in its northwestern territories, and if it fails in Balochistan, India will most likely intervene, leading to the loss of occupied Kashmir. Furthermore, Pakistan could face mass protests in Sindh and Punjab that could weaken the union’s control, similar to what happened in former East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Therefore, the management of the Balochistan issue will play a key role in shaping the future of the world’s first Islamic republic.

  • Why Doesn’t the Islamic World Have a Superpower to Challenge Israel?

    Why Doesn’t the Islamic World Have a Superpower to Challenge Israel?

    The conflict between Muslims and Jews has historical roots extending over centuries, primarily driven by religious differences rather than just territorial disputes. This is why the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict attracts worldwide attention and involves Muslims and Jews globally. Social media is abuzz with propaganda from both sides. However, on the ground, Israel has a significant advantage as a sovereign state with advanced project management, while Hamas, which governs Gaza and initiated the fresh wave of conflict with terrorist attacks in Israel, finds itself on the defensive with only weakened support from Iran. The conflict appears to be heavily skewed in favor of one side, with the Hamas side suffering greatly.

    In terms of international politics, Israel receives support from superpowers like the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, while countries like Russia, China, and India maintain a more neutral stance. This support provides Israel with a substantial advantage. On the other hand, Hamas and Gaza mainly receive backing from Iran, whose capabilities are in question. This raises the question: why are there no superpowers in the Arab or Muslim world capable of challenging Israel?

    The answer lies in U.S. supremacy in a unipolar world. Although there is widespread anger and calls for solidarity with Hamas across the Islamic world, which stretches from Morocco to Indonesia, these are largely limited to public statements. This situation represents a clear victory for U.S. diplomacy, which has either aligned powerful countries with U.S. interests or severely weakened others. A powerful or superpower country typically has strong leadership, economic influence, political influence, strong international alliances, and a strong military, but few countries in the Islamic world possess all these features combined. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey are considered powerful countries within the Islamic world today, but they are all aligned with the United States. Turkey is a NATO member with tight ties to the U.S., while Saudi Arabia and the UAE are highly reliant on business with the U.S., and their leadership maintains strong connections with U.S. diplomats. They also have military defense pacts with the U.S. Qatar, one of the wealthiest Islamic countries, also maintains a close relationship with the U.S. Despite their connections with Islamist leaders and organizations, and their roles in mediating with groups like Hamas and the Taliban.

    All the countries that previously challenged Israel are now weakened and humbled by U.S. strategies and diplomacy. Egypt, home to the largest army in the Middle East and the leader of last century’s Arab movements against Israel, along with Libya, Iraq, and Syria – countries that once challenged Israel—have lost the leadership capable of making such decisions. They are experiencing severe economic decline and face significant domestic challenges. Now, it seems that the Islamic Republic of Iran is currently the only major power from the Muslim world still challenging Israel. However, Iran has also been economically weakened by strong U.S. sanctions and faces serious domestic issues. Iran has been stunned and humbled by Israel through severe attacks. While Iran has vowed revenge, it has not taken any significant actions that are visibly effective. Nonetheless, Iran has not completely withdrawn from its ideological commitment to opposing Israel, unlike other states. Iran continues to fund organizations fighting against Israel, and Qatar is also reported to be providing support. Despite these efforts, no one is currently able to effectively challenge Israel, highlighting the weakness of the Islamic world outside of its elaborate organizations.

    As Israel is not ready for a truce, it seems likely that Gaza will be systematically annexed by Israel. This outcome appears inevitable. The stance of Islamic countries, which avoids a regional war, may bring peace, but it is clear that the position of Muslim governments does not reflect the sentiment of their populations. This could lead to a revival of terrorist organizations like ISIS in the Islamic world, which would bring more challenges in the region.

  • Iran Is Forced, But Are They Capable?

    Iran Is Forced, But Are They Capable?

    Iran is deeply humiliated by Israel’s killing of the Hamas chief in Tehran. Although it was anticipated that Israel might target him, the attack did not occur while he was in Gaza or Qatar. Instead, Israel chose to act when he arrived in Iran for the new president’s inauguration. As a major player in the Islamic world and the only country actively opposing Israel, Iran views this as a significant humiliation. This incident is not unprecedented; Israel has previously targeted several high-ranking Iranian officials, and some experts even speculate that Ebrahim Raisi might be a target. Iran’s regime feels compelled to retaliate to maintain its strong image domestically and its status as a defender of Islam globally. While previous responses have involved ceremonial missile launches, such a response may no longer suffice. But are they capable?

    Iran is undeniably a superpower in the Middle East, boasting a formidable military force. As of 2024, the Iranian Armed Forces are the second-largest in the region, surpassed only by the Egyptian Armed Forces in terms of active troops. Iran’s military consists of approximately 425,000 active-duty personnel and an additional 100,000 reserves and trained personnel available when needed. These numbers do not include the Law Enforcement Command or the Basij. Despite its numerical advantage over Israel, Iran faces more challenges than opportunities. 

    Most of Iran’s imported weapons are American systems acquired during the shah’s regime before the Islamic Revolution. Following international sanctions, Iran initiated a strong domestic rearmament program, resulting in an increasingly indigenous military inventory. By the 2000s, Iran had become an exporter of arms, although the effectiveness of its domestically manufactured items remains. The country has invested significantly in an ambitious ballistic and cruise missile program to enhance its mid-range strike capability, though updates on its progress are scarce. Additionally, Iran produces a variety of arms and munitions, including tanks, armored vehicles, drones, and an array of naval assets and aerial defense systems, which could be crucial in a conflict.

    Iran has purchased some munitions from Russia in addition to its indigenous weapons. However, since Russia is currently at war, it cannot meet Iran’s demand. It is uncertain whether other superpowers in Asia, such as China and India, will supply munitions to Iran. Supplying munitions would likely invite U.S. sanctions, so Islamic countries will probably refrain from doing so.

    The biggest challenge for Iran is that it does not share a border with Israel, so the size of its army does not provide an advantage. War through waterways is possible, but on all the routes through land and sea, U.S. allies are present and will likely stop them. Through the air, missiles are available, and they have been launched at Israel before, but Israel successfully blocked them. The only way that might work for Iran now is a joint attack with its allies in the region. However, there are doubts that these countries will cooperate with Iran now because they would suffer more than Iran if they intervened. However, it is certain that militant groups in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen will fight alongside Iran, and a joint attack with them is the only possibility for Iran. Iran is trying its best to partner with Islamic countries.

    Iran has called in foreign ambassadors to Tehran to assert its moral duty to hold Israel accountable for what it views as provocations and violations of international law following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh. Tehran has also requested an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on Wednesday to seek backing from Arab states for potential retaliatory measures against Israel. Many Gulf leaders have expressed their condemnation of Israel’s actions but are advising Iran to show restraint.

    Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s Security Council Secretary, arrived in Tehran on Monday for talks with Iranian leaders, including President Masoud Pezeshkian. While discussions are advancing quickly, it remains uncertain how many countries will support Iran in its war against Israel.

    Experts suggest that Iran is striving to maintain its image. To potentially promote peace, the U.S. might indirectly assist Iran by allowing a token attack, enabling Iran to claim retaliation. Iran could then shift blame to other Gulf states. At this stage, a full-scale war seems unlikely, as Iran recognizes the significant challenges and potential internal problems that such a conflict would create. Although missile strikes or proxy attacks might continue, the likelihood of a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel remains low. 

  • What’s next for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Republic?

    What’s next for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Republic?

    It was a significant week for Israel; they humiliated Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Republic all in the same week. They killed Hamas’s political chief, Ismail Haniyeh, at a safe house during his visit to the Iranian capital, Tehran, just hours after killing Hamas’s military commander, Mohammed Deif, at a safe house in the Lebanese capital, Beirut. The Qatar-based official’s death is likely to affect progress in talks for a ceasefire and hostage release deal, which were already faltering. It appears that Israel is gaining the upper hand, with Arab countries uninterested in regional escalation, and the UN is a big humor.

    Hamas, which began the conflict with a brutal attack on October 7th by crossing into Israeli territory, is now facing severe repercussions. Their leaders are being consistently assassinated, even as they flee to Syria, Iran, or Qatar. Hamas’s plan to negotiate using hostages has already failed, and the people of Gaza, who initially celebrated the attack, are now suffering the most. According to Hamas authorities, the death toll in Gaza has approached 40,000 and the situation seems far from being resolved, as indicated by Netanyahu’s address to the U.S. Congress.

    Ismail Haniyeh, who lost all his family members in Israel’s retaliatory actions, was an important figure in the Hamas movement. While Hamas will likely regroup and survive, this war has left them with a leadership vacuum. Salah al-Arouri, considered one of Haniyeh’s deputies, was killed in a strike in Lebanon in January, and Marwan Issa, Hamas’s deputy military chief, was reportedly killed in Nuseirat in March. On Thursday, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that an airstrike in Khan Younis last month successfully targeted Hamas’s military chief, Mohammed Deif.

    In the past, Hamas used a secret ballot in Gaza, the West Bank, Israeli prisons, and abroad to choose their political chief, but that is currently impossible. Instead, Khaled Meshaal, who is currently the head of the Hamas office in the Palestinian diaspora and was Haniyeh’s predecessor, is likely to step back into the role, at least as the acting politburo leader. Khalil al-Hayya, a Qatar-based deputy who has led Hamas’s ceasefire negotiation team, is from Gaza and is reportedly well-regarded by officials in Tehran, which positions him well to succeed Haniyeh.

    Even if a peace-seeking leader were to emerge within Hamas, peace in Gaza remains elusive. Prime Minister Netanyahu has consistently affirmed that the military operation will continue until all Hamas militants are eliminated. Israel claims to have eliminated half of the leadership of Hamas’s military wing, including six senior brigade commanders and more than 20 battalion commanders, and to have killed or wounded 14,000 militants. With the collapse of the hostage deals Hamas was relying on, it is becoming evident that this is the endgame for Hamas.

    Hezbollah, engaged in conflict with Israel alongside Hamas, is facing significant setbacks despite their control over certain territories. They have suffered major losses from Israel’s targeted strikes, with the most recent incident involving the death of a key militant leader who was believed to be secure in a residential area of Beirut. This event is a humiliation not only for Hezbollah but also for Lebanon. Last week, Hezbollah reportedly sent a warning through U.S. mediators that any strikes on Beirut would cross a red line and lead to retaliation against Tel Aviv. Despite this warning, Israel seems to have disregarded it and continues its hunt of Hezbollah leaders, exacerbating the group’s troubles.

    The Guardian of Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, led the prayers over the coffins of Haniyeh and his bodyguard, who were draped in traditional black and white Palestinian scarves. Iran is also facing turmoil due to escalating tensions with Israel. Many believe that the death of former Islamic Republic President Ebrahim Raisi was planned and executed by Israel, along with other reported deaths from targeted killings. Despite attempts at retaliation, Iran has been unable to take effective action against Israel. However, Iran appears to be increasingly enraged. Speakers at Haniyeh’s funeral, which was attended by Khamenei, Iran’s new president Masoud Pezeshkian, Revolutionary Guards chief Gen. Hossein Salami, and senior members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, vowed to avenge his death. While Israel has already launched a new wave of attacks in Lebanon, Iran’s response is of significant interest. It remains to be seen whether Iran will continue its proxy warfare using militants in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, or if it will escalate to a direct conflict with Israel or engage in combined warfare similar to the 1960s.

    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu doesn’t have any worries on escalating situations and they announced on Thursday that his  country is fully prepared to respond to any aggression from any party. Although international officials have limited influence over Israel and Iran, they are working to de-escalate the cycle of retaliation and prevent a broader conflict.

  • Will there be any reforms when Iran gets a reformist President?

    Will there be any reforms when Iran gets a reformist President?

    The reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, an independent candidate, has achieved a stunning victory in the Iranian presidential runoff, reflecting deep dissatisfaction with the country’s direction in recent years. Pezeshkian, a heart surgeon and former health minister, garnered 16,384,403 votes, defeating the ultra-conservative Saeed Jalili, who received 13,538,179 votes, with a final turnout of 49.8%, a significant increase from the record low turnout of 39% in the first round, the lowest in the history of the Islamic Republic founded after the 1979 revolution. In the first round, Pezeshkian emerged as the frontrunner, surpassing three conservative rivals. Although no candidate secured the required percentage of votes, in the second round conducted on July 4th, concerns arose about late-stage rigging and a high number of invalid votes. However, these issues did not sway the outcome in favor of Pezeshkian, highlighting a significant public desire for change.

    The path ahead is difficult for Pezeshkian, who has advocated for allowing women to choose whether to wear the hijab in a country with one of the toughest records on human rights and poor women’s rights under a highly Islamist regime. He has stated, “Girls and women belong to us, not to foreign powers. We have no right to enforce citizenship rights on them. We cannot cover women’s heads through coercion”. Iran witnessed a huge wave of protests after the death of Mahsa Amini, who was killed in connection with the hijab issue, which caused significant discontent in the country.

    Under the slogan “For Iran”, Pezeshkian promised to be a voice for the voiceless and said that democratic protests should not be met with police batons. The regime’s police treated protests very cruelly under Raisi’s tenure, and deaths were often reported. There were immediate calls from Pezeshkian’s supporters to release political prisoners, symbolizing the pent-up demands he may struggle to satisfy. He also advocated for ending internet restrictions that force the population to use VPN connections to bypass government censorship.

    Pezeshkian is also notable for his support of multi-ethnicity. He frequently reflects on his Azeri heritage despite being from a predominantly Kurdish city, emphasizing his view of Iran as a unitary state. He advocates for ethnic rights as a means of maintaining national unity. Though The biggest hurdle for Pezeshkian will be the country’s struggling economy. During the campaign, he argued that Iran had become economically trapped due to its foreign policy and needed to adopt a more cooperative stance to explore the lifting of sanctions.

    Despite these variations from the regime’s conventional presidents, how much he can move with it is in doubt. Previously, when Iran had reformist presidents, they seemed to continue with the regime’s direction and did not question the conventional decisions that restricted human rights and women’s rights. The system of Iran works like this. Pezeshkian will also likely lead in this direction. However, as the regime understands the anti-regime mindset in the country, there are some reports that the regime will loosen up and present Pezeshkian as the changing face of the regime to the people. 

    The West now faces a decision: whether to support Pezeshkian or continue with the blanket of sanctions in response to the ongoing escalation of Iran’s nuclear program and its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Yemen’s Houthi rebels. Reports indicate that Iran is enriching uranium to near weapons-grade levels and has a stockpile sufficient to build several nuclear weapons, though it lacks the warheads or missile technology. Additionally, Iran is providing Russia with drones for use in Ukraine and reportedly assisting Armenia in the conflict with Azerbaijan. Both actions are against the interests of the West. The U.S. State Department has stated that Pezeshkian’s election will not alter the U.S. approach to Iran. U.S. officials highlighted the election boycott by a significant portion of Iranian voters and remarked, “The elections in Iran were not free and fair. As a result, a significant number of Iranians chose not to participate at all.” However, in the case of Europe, there is a chance of deviation. We are awaiting moves from Germany and Hungary, who might potentially establish a relationship with Iran. It is certain that Pezeshkian will continue fostering warm relationships with Russia, India, and China.

    According to the Islamic Republic constitution, which aligns closely with Sharia law and maintains the Supreme Leader as the final authority, the president has limited room for maneuver. There is no expectation that these elections will lead to a fundamental change in Iran’s trajectory or an increase in respect for citizens’ human rights. As the candidates themselves have acknowledged, Iran’s policies are dictated by the Supreme Leader. Therefore, any reforms initiated by a reformist president are likely to encounter significant obstacles. He faces an uphill task in uniting the country, as his conservative opponents strongly objected to being compared to the Taliban by the reformists and viewed him as a Western agent, along with his supporters who are seen as individuals who have succumbed to Western influences, particularly in breaking internet filters. Additionally, he will need to decide whether and how to reconcile with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. However, even small improvements in people’s lives and rights could benefit the populace.

  • Iran Election Faces Humiliation with Record Low Turnout, Heads for Runoff

    Iran Election Faces Humiliation with Record Low Turnout, Heads for Runoff

    Due to widespread discontent with the Islamic Republic and its highly scrutinized presidential candidates, around 60% of eligible voters in Iran chose not to participate in the important presidential election. Following the unexpected death of Ebrahim Raisi, the election was conducted last Friday to meet the constitutional requirement to fill the presidential vacancy within 50 days. This tight controlled Iran election featured only candidates approved through tight monitoring, and the campaigns did not address the people’s real problems, resulting in low voter participation. None of the six candidates secured 50% of the total votes needed, leading to a runoff election in a week. In the first round, reformist lawmaker Masoud Pezeshkian secured a narrow lead over the hardline former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Parliamentary speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, initially considered the likeliest victor by Western media, finished third and was eliminated before the second round.

    Turnout ended up at 39.93%, a record low for an Iranian election since the revolution in 1979. The last time in 2021, it was 48.48%. The scale of the boycott from various sectors is a rebuff for the regime, which had repeatedly urged Iranians to show their commitment to the Islamic regime by voting. Reluctance to vote in regime-controlled elections has been visible in previous times too, but this marks the lowest. Before this, the lowest turnout was in the 2001 presidential election, which was officially recorded at 48.8% with 24.9 million voting.

    Six candidates, including five conservatives, two of whom withdrew on the eve of the poll, were approved to stand by the Guardian Council, an unelected constitutional watchdog whose members are appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, both directly and indirectly. The initial results of the first round of the Iran election showed Masoud Pezeshkian, 69, a reformist independent and former Minister of Health and Medical Education, receiving 10.45 million votes, which is 44.36% of the total votes cast. Saeed Jalili, 58, a principlist, Member of the Expediency Discernment Council, and Chief Nuclear Negotiator, contested as an independent and garnered 9.47 million votes, which is 40.35% of the total. Another conservative, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the current Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, contested under the label of the prominent Progress and Justice Population of Islamic Iran party and garnered only 3.38 million votes. A fourth candidate, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, a conservative and former Justice Minister who ran a wildcard campaign under the label of the Combatant Clergy Association, won only 206,000 votes. Out of a total of 24,735,185 votes cast, 1,056,159 ballots were deemed spoiled. A runoff on Friday seems inevitable and will offer a clear ideological choice between Pezeshkian and Jalili.

    Pezeshkian has utilized video town hall meetings to engage with students and pledged not to crack down on those who refuse to wear the hijab. However, at the core of his campaign is the belief that Iran’s economic challenges will persist unless it engages with Western economies, including through renegotiating the Iranian nuclear deal. With active support from former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, Pezeshkian has criticized hardliners for leading Iran into an ideological, cultural, and economic dead end. Unless Pezeshkian can mobilize more voters in the runoff by demonstrating a viable path to victory and promising real change for Iran, the reformist is likely to lose. Most, but not all, of Ghalibaf’s votes are expected to shift to Jalili. The rivalry between Ghalibaf and Jalili, both personal and ideological, was sufficient to prevent them from forming a pre-election alliance. Other conservative votes scattered among different candidates will also bolster Jalili’s position. Many believe that even though the second round will directly pit reformists against conservatives, it is uncertain whether those opposed to the regime will turn out to vote, potentially closing the door on Pezeshkian’s hopes.

    While about 60% of voters boycotted the Iran election, the message is clear: people don’t like these kinds of gimmick elections. The decision to allow a reformist to stand in the ongoing Iran election was seen as a concession by the regime, which needed a more competitive election to try to lure voters to the polls. The second round between Pezeshkian and Jalili will be interesting to watch, not only to see who will win but also to observe if the voter turnout will increase. A democracy or republic only succeeds if the people participate in it, and Iran cannot continue to conduct these kinds of elections without the participation of the majority. And it will be interesting to see if people in deep conflict with the regime will come to the polling booth to vote for the reformist.

  • Iran to Hold Election Ensuring No Changes

    Iran to Hold Election Ensuring No Changes

    The Islamic Republic of Iran is set to conduct the first round of its presidential election on June 28th. This swift election follows the unexpected death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. According to the Islamic Republic’s constitution, a new election must be held within fifty days to fill the vacant presidential post. No one expects Ebrahim Raisi’s successor to bring significant political change, and Iran’s unpopular elections, characterized by highly vetted candidates and low voter turnout, are intended to maintain the regime’s priorities of continuity and stability.

    As the regime is well aware of the public mood against them, politicians with views divergent from the Islamic Republic are banned from public politics, so they cannot even think about participating in elections. In the last race, in 2021, the Guardian Council, an elite body appointed by Khamenei that vets candidates, banned all reformists, although they do not oppose the Islamic Republic. This time, however, one has made the cut. More options have been provided by the authorities. Masoud Pezeshkian, a doctor, MP, and former health minister whose father was Azeri and mother was Kurdish, is an interesting candidate. Cynics assume he has been picked precisely because he is unlikely to win, viewing the parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, as the likeliest victor among the six men running. Saeed Jalili, a former national security adviser known for his hardline religious views, is another contender. However, the ceremonial election winner is likely to be predetermined by the authorities.

    Mr. Qalibaf, widely predicted to win, has repeatedly faced corruption allegations, though he is favored by the regime. He helped oversee violent crackdowns on students both as a general and as a police chief, making him indispensable to the regime in suppressing protests against it. Iran’s most powerful entities, the supreme leader’s office and the country’s military Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, with whom he has served and maintains strong connections, are expected to support him for the presidential role. Analysts suggest he might steer Iran towards what they regard as its inevitable future: increasingly dominated by the military rather than the clerical establishment. Qalibaf is also a former mayor of Tehran with a reputation as a technocrat, raising hopes that he might improve living conditions, despite the challenges posed by the mounting sanctions. 

    Even though the Islamic Republic has numerous issues to address in an election,such as women’s rights, human rights, and economic misconditions, the selection of candidates who lack the courage or obedience to the regime is the primary reason for candidate approval. This may lead to neglecting the issues facing Iran. Since most participants in the election are conservative, the candidate chosen is often the most conservative Islamist leader or the leader with the closest connection to the regime. Although candidates’ behavior towards the public and their public image also matter, the outcome of the last election, which resulted in the selection of the last president, Ebrahim Raisi, known as the butcher of Tehran due to his tough stance for the republic.

    But of course, tough times are waiting for the new president. The possible hostility of a second Trump administration and the regime facing widespread discontent at home, following the suppression of the massive Women’s, Life, Freedom protests, are all factors to consider. Actions towards the people who celebrated the death of the butcher will also be interesting to watch. The evidence of recent years suggests that the regime is more concerned about conservative consolidation at the top than about legitimacy from below.

    The last presidential election, held in 2021, recorded the lowest turnout ever, with only 48% of electors bothering to cast their votes. Therefore, the regime needs to appear credible and re-engage at least parts of the public. Reformists had warned of an election boycott if their candidates were barred from running. Some also speculate that the supreme leader may hope to curb factionalism and infighting within conservative ranks. However, the widespread assumption is that Mr. Pezeshkian is permitted to participate because Iran’s powerbrokers are confident he will not win. In the past, Hassan Rouhani ascended to the presidency with the backing of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; Mr. Pezeshkian does not have a similarly influential supporter. Ali Larijani, a moderate conservative who was barred from running, might have been a more formidable threat as a heavyweight figure. However, whoever wins, those in power remain confident that he will not pose a problem. Thus, the Islamic Republic will be preserved.