Tag: Israel

  • Is Trump Pushing for a Gaza Ceasefire?

    Is Trump Pushing for a Gaza Ceasefire?

    The Gaza war, specifically Israel’s military action against Hamas, has evolved, as expected, from a regional conflict into a global issue. People have rallied around religious solidarities across countries, deepening divisions in many societies. In retaliation for the brutal killing of 1,200 Israelis, Israel has now killed over 45,000 people in Gaza and continues its operations with the aim of preventing future terrorist attacks from the region. Though a ceasefire is essential to help those suffering in this punishing war, the Gaza ceasefire remains nothing more than a plea. Despite ongoing discussions over the past 15 months of conflict, no agreement has been reached.

    As Donald Trump prepares to begin his second term as U.S. president on January 20, there is a sense of optimism surrounding his strong relationships with Middle Eastern leaders and his bold, hero-like persona. He is positioned to prioritize the Gaza ceasefire, focusing on securing it as soon as possible. His administration is likely to build on the efforts of outgoing President Joe Biden, whose peace initiatives were thwarted by the competing demands of various stakeholders. Known for his deal-making prowess, Trump now has a significant opportunity to act swiftly in his presidency. Successfully mediating peace could satisfy global calls for resolution and cement his reputation as a decisive and effective leader.

    Steve Witkoff, the U.S. Middle East envoy appointed by President-elect Donald Trump, is leading efforts to broker a Gaza ceasefire. He met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Saturday to push forward with negotiations for a hostage deal and a ceasefire, according to an Israeli official cited by The Guardian. Before meeting Netanyahu, Witkoff met Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani on Friday to discuss recent developments and the push for a Gaza ceasefire, as outlined by the Qatari foreign ministry. Qatar plays a pivotal role as a mediator, maintaining connections with various Islamist groups, including those linked to Iran. After his visit to Qatar, Witkoff, who reassured that the U.S. remains committed to a swift resolution, flew to Israel to meet with Netanyahu and accelerate the talks. Trump’s administration aims to engage all its allies to advance peace and strengthen regional ties.

    The main obstacle now lies in the status of the hostages taken by Hamas during the October 7th raid on Israel and their release. Israel has previously stated that it would only engage in peace talks after the release of all hostages, but Hamas has shown no willingness to comply. Following the discussions with Witkoff, Netanyahu’s office announced that the prime minister would send Mossad chief David Barnea to Qatar’s capital to continue pushing for a deal to release the hostages. It remains unclear when Barnea will travel to Doha, but the U.S. is pressing for an agreement before Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20. Barnea’s involvement indicates that high-level Israeli officials, who must approve any deal, are now directly involved in the process.

    Several rounds of negotiations, mediated by the U.S., Egypt, and Qatar, have failed to yield a lasting ceasefire. Despite officials’ repeated optimism that a breakthrough was imminent, talks have consistently stalled. Over the course of 15 months of war, only one brief ceasefire was achieved during the early stages of fighting, with no substantial agreement since. However, political dynamics have shifted. The initial fury over Hamas’ terrorist actions in Israel has lessened, and the focus has now shifted to the hostages. In recent weeks, the hostage issue and a potential ceasefire have dominated discussions in Israeli media. There are growing doubts that Netanyahu is using the war to prolong his political tenure while also leveraging Trump’s influence. On Hamas’ side, while initial celebrations of their actions in Gaza were widespread, the consequences are now clear, and many have grown disillusioned with the group. The Islamists and their media may still support Hamas, but the wider public recognizes its failed strategy. Hezbollah, and Iran—Hamas’ major supporter—are all reeling from significant setbacks. 

    The call for an end to the war is intensifying, with Trump positioning himself to play a crucial role in negotiations. While any ceasefire agreement he brokers is likely to favor Israel, all parties now need an end. During his previous term, the historic Abraham Accords happened, and his efforts to strengthen relations with Israel and other Middle Eastern nations are viewed as positive moves toward peace. While some of his supporters advocate for a Nobel Prize for him. If Trump succeeds in brokering a Gaza ceasefire, he will further solidify his reputation as a key peace broker, and it truly deserves the Nobel Prize.

  • Can Yemen’s Crisis Find a Resolution, Like Syria’s?

    Can Yemen’s Crisis Find a Resolution, Like Syria’s?

    The Arab Spring, fueled by Islamist populist movements advocating for Islamic rule and opposing dictatorial regimes, plunged many nations into chaos. This upheaval fractured several countries, leaving them embroiled in civil wars that have lasted over 13 years. Despite numerous peace talks over this period, most efforts ended in stalemates. Meanwhile, several global powers exploited these conflicts, strengthening their influence. Iran, in particular, expanded its regional power by funding and directing proxy groups involved in civil wars across various nations.

    However, The ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran is helping various factions in war to break long-standing deadlocks. Syria offers a key example. Despite significant risks, Israel-backed forces successfully challenged Iran-aligned factions, collaborating with allies like Turkey to oust the Iran-backed regime and ultimately reach a resolution. A similar shift appears to be unfolding in Yemen, where Israel’s growing focus on the region has sparked renewed optimism that a resolution to the prolonged conflict may finally be within sight.

    Yemen, with its strategic geopolitical location, once served as a vital trade hub between the East and West. For much of its history, Yemeni cities were among the wealthiest in the Arabian Peninsula, flourishing along key trade routes. However, its strategic importance made Yemen vulnerable to superpowers, and it eventually fell under the control of Islamic kingdoms and European powers. The modern state of Yemen, as we know it today, was established in 1990 following the unification of the previously divided South and North. Yet, foreign influence and interests did not diminish. Saudi Arabia and the United States continued to pursue their agendas in Yemen—Saudi Arabia aiming to create a Shia-free region, while the U.S. sought to maintain control over this vital geopolitical location.

    Ali Abdullah Saleh, the leader who unified Yemen, soon began treating the country as his personal fiefdom. However, his failure to build strong state institutions hampered Yemen’s development into a stable nation. Instead, Yemen’s political landscape became defined by a fragile form of collaborative governance, where competing tribal, regional, religious, and political interests coexisted through an unspoken arrangement. This informal structure was underpinned by a power-sharing agreement among three key figures: President Saleh, who controlled the state; Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who commanded the majority of Yemen’s armed forces; and Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar, the leader of the Islamist al-Islah party, who served as a Saudi-appointed broker overseeing transnational patronage payments to various political factions, including influential tribal leaders.

    Misgovernance, internal divisions, and deteriorating living conditions in Yemen created a fertile environment for terrorism, turning the country into a recruitment hub for various Islamic organizations. Despite the worsening situation, Saleh managed to hold on to power through fraudulent elections. During the Arab Spring, multiple groups united in opposition to him, sparking a new wave of civil war. However, the opposition quickly fragmented, and as various factions seized control of different regions, each pursuing its own agenda, Yemen was pushed further into crisis, edging closer to collapse.

    Like in Syria, Iran plays a significant role in Yemen by backing the Houthis, a group of militants advocating for the implementation of Shia Islamic law. The Houthis are notorious for their attacks on maritime shipping routes, as well as for their strikes on Saudi oil refineries and their solidarity with Hamas and Iran in their opposition to Israel. They control a large portion of Yemen, primarily in the former northern part of the country. For years, international watchdogs and superpowers largely avoided engaging with the Houthis or seeking resolutions in Yemen. However, as the Houthis continue their attacks on Israel, it’s increasingly likely that Israel will retaliate. Israel may follow a strategy similar to the one it used in Syria, which could bring hope for Yemen. In Syria, Israel successfully targeted Hezbollah fighters, aligned with Iran, forcing them to collapse and paving the way for forces backed by the United States ally Turkey to topple the Iran-supported regime, ultimately bringing an end to the civil war.

    In Yemen, Israel may target the Houthis with the support of its intelligence agencies, while Saudi-backed troops, potentially bolstered by U.S. assistance, could attempt to seize control of Sanaa. However, Yemen presents a unique challenge for Israel due to its geographical distance and the significant cultural and social differences from Syria.

    Yemen is now fragmented into at least six parts, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States playing key roles within the country. While Iran and its Houthi allies remain entrenched, other factions could unite in the conflict. If Israel were to target the Houthis, opposing groups or their coalition partners could likely execute a relatively straightforward mission. This would involve a surgical strike strategy and targeted attacks similar to those that severely weakened Hezbollah by eliminating key leaders. If successful, the Houthis would be significantly diminished, reducing their threat. Although the timeline for such an outcome remains uncertain, if the Houthis persist in their missile attacks against Israel, a resolution will eventually emerge. This could provide an opportunity for opposition groups in Yemen to retake the capital and reunify the nation.

  • Does Israel Want To Expand?

    Does Israel Want To Expand?

    Israel is often seen as having no expansion plans beyond the territories of the former British Mandate. Its actions following the Six-Day War support this perception, as it briefly held Gaza and returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, both gained during the conflict. Similarly, Israel reclaimed areas under the British Mandate from Jordan, specifically the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which were previously under Jordanian control. After regaining these territories, Israel negotiated agreements with neighboring countries, promoting mutual respect for borders and significantly reducing regional tensions.

    The territories reclaimed from Egypt and Jordan are now recognized by international authorities as part of the Palestinian state. However, Israel expanded its Jewish population in these areas through planned settlement growth, transforming arid deserts into fertile land, and relocating more people to these regions. Numerous reports, even before the renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas on October 7, 2022, point to Israel’s de facto annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In contrast, Israel has made fewer efforts to establish settlements in Gaza, and the situation has largely remained stable since the withdrawal of settlements in 2005. However, following the October 7 attacks, it is now clear that Israel will likely follow the strategies it used in the West Bank, leading to further encroachment on what some view as the future state of an independent Palestine.

    Israel’s recent actions have raised further doubts, as its expansion plans now appear to extend beyond the former British Mandate. In addition to these territories, Israel continues to control the Golan Heights, which was not part of the British Mandate and which the international community still recognizes as part of Syria, and which it has not returned through peace negotiations. As Israel shifts its military operations toward its borders with Lebanon and Syria, and with Gaza no longer posing an immediate threat from the south, the country seems to be intensifying its focus on the Golan Heights. Israel is following the same strategies used in the West Bank. The Israeli government has approved a plan to invest over $11 million in the occupied Golan Heights, aiming to double the region’s population. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the initiative an important response to the evolving “New Front” with Syria, emphasizing that strengthening the Golan Heights is essential for strengthening Israel at this time. Netanyahu reiterated the government’s intent to retain the area, promote its development, and expand settlements there. 

    Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Israel established a buffer zone by stationing troops on the Syrian side of the border, arguing that previous ceasefire agreements had collapsed due to changes in Damascus. Reports suggest that Israeli troops have extended their presence beyond this buffer zone in several areas. The Golan Heights is home to over 50,000 people, including Jewish Israelis and members of the Druze and Alawite religious minorities. As the Jewish population grows and Syria maintains stable governance, the Muslim population may move towards Syria, which will likely lead to undisputed Israeli control of the Golan Heights. There are now more than 30 Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights, housing around 20,000 people. Netanyahu stated that Israel would continue to hold onto the territory, make it flourish, and expand settlements there. This announcement followed a day after Syria’s new de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, criticized Israel for its ongoing strikes on military targets in Syria, reportedly targeting military facilities.

    As Netanyahu maintains a cruise mode, he is likely to adopt a more aggressive approach. The Golan Heights, surrounding areas, Lebanon, and even Yemen hold historical significance for the Jewish people, with a once-thriving Jewish population that was displaced by Arabs. Given this, Netanyahu may plan to re-establish settlements in these regions to serve Jewish interests. It may seem like an exaggeration, but by observing these trends, it is clear that Israel seeks expansion, citing security as the justification. This pattern is evident in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, Lebanon, and potentially Aden. The Jewish people have a deep connection to their history.

  • Will Singapore Ever Recognize Palestine?

    Will Singapore Ever Recognize Palestine?

    As the Israel-Hamas conflict slipped into yet another charged chapter, Singapore retained its measured commitment to a two-state solution, its calls for Palestinian sovereignty growing steadily louder. Yet, despite these increasingly public declarations of support, the city-state continues to withhold formal recognition of Palestine. By contrast, its Muslim-majority neighbors have embraced a more unequivocal stance, championing Palestinian statehood while categorically refusing to recognize Israel. Their position is tethered to the broader contours of the “From the River to the Sea” ideology, a vision that entertains the erasure of the Jewish state altogether.

    If not to dismantle Israel, the question might reasonably arise: why not recognize both? Intriguingly, Singapore sets itself apart not just from its regional peers but also from nations that recognize both Israel and Palestine. Instead, it aligns with countries like Japan and South Korea, which extend official recognition solely to Israel. But unlike these countries, who remain muted on the question of Palestine, Singapore strikes a markedly different tone. Through consistent, though noncommittal, expressions of support, it fosters a posture that is at once active and ambiguous—a calculated ambiguity that renders its stance an exercise in balancing rhetoric and restraint.

    There were fleeting moments when Singapore seemed poised to join the growing list of nations recognizing Palestine, as Spain and Armenia had done in recent years, spurred by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Each time, however, Singapore stepped back. In May, a proposed resolution to recognize Palestine sparked cautious optimism across the Islamic world, which saw the potential shift as a significant gesture from a prominent Asian nation. The optimism, though, proved premature. By July, in a parliamentary address, Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan announced that Singapore would recognize Palestine—only for the resolution to be quietly shelved.

    Come September, Singapore once again appeared to take a bold step, supporting a United Nations General Assembly resolution demanding that Israel end its unlawful presence in the occupied Palestinian territories within a year. Whispers swirled of Singapore leaning favorably toward Palestine, yet the momentum faltered once more.

    Singapore’s delicate balancing act took center stage in a recent podcast episode featuring Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. Reflecting on the Gaza war and its global repercussions, Wong affirmed Singapore’s commitment to collaborating with international partners to help secure a homeland for the Palestinian people while aiding their preparation for eventual statehood. He stressed the necessity of a deliberate and nuanced approach, positioning Singapore as neither beholden to the views of its neighbors nor inclined to alienate the United States. Technical assistance, Wong argued, represents a meaningful and uniquely Singaporean contribution to global affairs—a strategy deeply rooted in the city-state’s diplomatic ethos. Drawing comparisons to Singapore’s well-established support initiatives across Southeast Asia, he suggested that similar efforts could play a critical role in equipping Palestine for the responsibilities of statehood. Over the course of the 46-minute podcast, Wong’s remarks revealed a careful and calibrated strategy—one that seeks to balance principle with pragmatism, charting a course that maintains Singapore’s reputation as a constructive, if cautious, participant in the global dialogue on Palestine.

    In the interview organized by Plan B, Prime Minister Wong reiterated Singapore’s steadfast support for a two-state solution, while emphasizing the nation’s recent initiatives to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Since the war erupted in October 2023, Singapore has dispatched five consignments of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Both government-led and citizen-driven contributions have amassed over US$13 million in donations to support relief efforts. Earlier this month, Dr. Maliki Osman, Singapore’s Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, met with Dr. Mohammad Mustafa, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Palestine, during a conference in Cairo. There, Dr. Maliki reaffirmed Singapore’s commitment to assisting Palestine in its capacity-building endeavors. Moreover, Singapore has expanded the number of scholarships offered under its Enhanced Technical Assistance Package for Palestinians, increasing the annual intake from three to ten. 

    While Singapore’s public stance appears to align with Gaza, its domestic policies exhibit a more restrictive approach, particularly when it comes to managing any form of public protest that could tarnish its image. In October of the previous year, authorities prohibited public events tied to the Gaza conflict, even in the country’s sole designated free speech zone, citing concerns about public safety and security. They also issued a warning against displaying symbols associated with the war. Three women were charged for attempting to organize a group of 70 individuals to deliver pro-Palestinian letters to the president’s office and official residence without a permit. Despite such efforts being stifled, there has been ongoing pressure from Palestinian supporters in the city-state for Singapore to sever its defense ties with Israel and officially recognize Palestinian statehood. This has been accompanied by a surge in public mobilization. A petition demanding the government recognize Palestine as a state has collected over 10,000 signatures since its launch in October.

    The Singaporean government’s sympathy for Palestine is evident, yet its actions reveal the deep constraints of what it is willing—or able—to offer. While there is a notable push for practical support, the more contentious issue of formal recognition remains elusive. This tension speaks to the complex diplomatic landscape that Singapore must traverse. The city-state, often characterized as conservative in practice but progressive in appearance, exemplifies this paradox. On closer inspection, it is apparent in nearly every facet of its policies.

    With 15 percent of its population Muslim and deep business ties to neighboring Muslim-majority countries, Singapore can no longer ignore the Palestinian cause. However, any move to formally recognize Palestine seems untenable without risking its strategic relationships elsewhere. Chief among these is its long-standing military alliance with Israel, which dates back to Singapore’s split from Malaysia in 1965. At that time, Israel played a key role in helping build Singapore’s military—an offer other regional powers, like India, had refused. Caught in this diplomatic web, the city-state finds itself in a precarious position, unable to fully align with either side without facing significant consequences. Though Singapore will likely delay its recognition of Palestine “Until the Right Time.”

  • Is Syria Entering a New Era of Peace?

    Is Syria Entering a New Era of Peace?

    After thirteen years of devastating civil war—claiming around 600,000 lives and displacing six million—rebels have seized Damascus, ending Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime. Once a symbol of unshakable power, Assad has fled, leaving behind a nation scarred by his rule and the violence that defined it. The Islamist coalition Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is now administrating Damascus. Their triumphant march through Syrian cities is marked by the hoisting of a new flag—a poignant echo of the 1930s nationalist movement against French colonial rule. This banner, now embraced by crowds and draped along Damascus’s streets, signifies more than a regime’s collapse; it is a declaration of an era’s end.

    For decades, the Syrian Arab Republic operated less as a democratic state and more as a personal fiefdom under the Assad dynasty. Yet, as the dust settles, the flag’s promise of renewal carries an unspoken question: will this new chapter fulfill the dreams of a fractured nation, or will it lead to yet another uncharted and precarious path?

    A fragile yet palpable sense of hope has begun to spread across Syria in the wake of Assad’s official ouster from the war—a moment that feels almost surreal to a population accustomed to despair. For those who once fled the carnage, enduring the indignities of life as migrants, the news signals the faintest possibility of a return, however uncertain, to a land they scarcely recognize. In liberated cities, the crackle of celebratory gunfire fills the air, and once-omnipresent statues of Assad are toppled with theatrical fervor. Rebels parade captured allies of the former regime through the streets, as the nation’s official flag—its somber hues now synonymous with repression—is replaced with the green-bannered emblem of the opposition. It is a victory both symbolic and intoxicating.

    This moment is being hailed as another hard-won victory for the Arab Spring’s enduring mission to unseat entrenched dictatorships across the Arab world. Yet the cost of this triumph is staggering: thirteen years of relentless conflict, nearly half a million lives lost, and the displacement of more than half of the population—a scale of human suffering that defies comprehension. The rebels’ lightning-fast march from their stronghold in Idlib to Damascus, achieved in a mere two weeks, has drawn inevitable comparisons to the Taliban’s startlingly swift seizure of Kabul. In Syria’s case, the speed of the advance lays bare the hollowed-out power of Assad’s government and the waning influence of its embattled backers, Russia and Iran

    Syria’s descent into chaos was never simply a civil war; it was a stage upon which global powers enacted their rivalries. The United States, Israel, and a constellation of Sunni states found themselves embroiled in a proxy confrontation against Russia and Iran, each seeking to reshape the region’s political contours to their advantage. Now, with reports suggesting that President Bashar al-Assad has fled to Russia alongside his family, the once formidable Russia-Iran axis seems on the brink of relinquishing its tenuous hold over Syria’s fractured state.

    Amid the shifting alliances and fractured ambitions of Syria’s long war, Turkey has emerged as the unequivocal victor in a geopolitical chess that drew in superpowers and regional actors alike. What began as a conflict shaped by American support for liberal factions and the staunch backing of Bashar al-Assad’s regime by Russia and Iran—complicated further by the shadowy maneuvers of Israel and the Sunni bloc—soon morphed into a theater where Ankara played a decisive hand. Faced with the dual pressures of a staggering migrant crisis and an emboldened Kurdish presence along its southern border, Turkey deftly repositioned itself from a peripheral participant to a central player, reshaping the war’s trajectory in ways that no other power could.

    Under Turkey’s strategic direction, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—a Sunni Islamist organization deemed a terrorist group by the United States—cemented alliances with Turkish-backed factions, forging a cohesive and well-supported coalition. Operating from its stronghold in Idlib, HTS received Turkish logistical and tactical support, including training that bolstered its capacity to wage a coordinated campaign. As these forces advanced with astonishing speed, ultimately seizing control in Damascus, Turkey’s influence in Syria became unmistakable. This ascendancy not only underscores Ankara’s newfound leverage but also signals a revival of Turkey’s long-diminished prominence in the complex power dynamics of the Middle East.

    Will the rebels’ triumph herald a lasting peace in Syria? The answer, steeped in the country’s deep-seated divisions, remains elusive. Even as the official government signals a willingness to cooperate with the rebel coalition and promises elections, skepticism pervades. A significant segment of the population—primarily Alawites and Shias—continues to rally behind Assad, their allegiance rooted in sectarian solidarity. Adding to the complexity is the Christian minority’s apprehension toward the Sunni Islamist factions that now dominate the coalition. Distrust runs deep, and it is far from certain that a religiously aligned organization can effectively navigate the intricacies of Syria’s fractured social fabric.

    For the Sunni rebels, forging alliances with these wary communities poses a daunting challenge. Within their own coalition, cracks are already visible, with the specter of internal discord looming and threatening to unravel their fragile unity. Adding to the precariousness is the broader geopolitical chessboard. The risk of another civil war hangs heavy over this uneasy settlement. For now, the promise of peace remains as tenuous as ever, a fragile hope in a nation scarred by relentless conflict and irreconcilable divisions.

    The fall of the Assad regime and the rise of a new administration in Damascus have been met with widespread approval across the globe. The United States and France, two of the West’s most prominent actors in Syria, have openly expressed support for the shift in power. Turkey, meanwhile, has welcomed the outcome, as has Saudi Arabia, which now champions the Sunni-led takeover. Israel, too, seems content, having played a role in Assad’s decline through its strikes on Hezbollah, and now looks favorably upon the prospect of a Sunni populist government in Damascus.

    Despite the optimistic global response, a pressing question lingers: can Syria’s deeply divided population come together under the new administration? Should the proposed government adopt a Sunni Islamist constitution, could this herald yet another chapter of turmoil, akin to the upheavals that followed other Arab Spring uprisings? The answer remains uncertain, as the country’s fractures, both sectarian and political, threaten to undo even the most well-intentioned reforms.

  • Resurgence of Syria’s Rebel Islamists: Trouble Brewing Again?

    Resurgence of Syria’s Rebel Islamists: Trouble Brewing Again?

    The Syrian civil war is once again drawing global attention as Islamist groups in northwest Syria conquer Aleppo by defeating the official Syrian army. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist militant group leading the Syrian Salvage Government from Idlib, has announced its victory and shared images from Aleppo, Syria’s historic and second-largest city. Although HTS is not directly affiliated with the former Islamic State, its victory in Aleppo has raised global concerns about Syria potentially falling under renewed Islamist rule, reviving the horrific memories of the Islamic State.

    The Sunni Islamist faction HTS views this advancement as a major victory over the Shia-dominated Assad regime and his sponsors, Iran and Russia. Taking Aleppo is not only a strategic victory for the rebels but also an emotional one. The city has been a focal point in Syria’s civil war for over a decade. The 2016 battle for Aleppo, in which Assad’s forces recaptured the city, turned the civil war in his favor. Now, Aleppo is once again under the control of Islamists. Many people are fleeing Aleppo, fearing that Islamist factions could revive the horrors of ISIS’s reign. They consider Assad’s oppressive rule a lesser evil compared to the horror that Islamist control would bring.

    Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a major offensive earlier this week. Within three days, they reached Aleppo, exposing the weakness of the official army’s defense. This marked the first time in four years that insurgents captured territory around the city’s outskirts. On Friday afternoon, Turkish media reported that jihadists and allied factions had seized significant portions of Aleppo. In response, Syrian government forces based in Damascus launched at least 125 airstrikes and shelled rebel-controlled areas in Idlib and western Aleppo. However, there has been no significant progress in their favor.

    Damascus expects more Russian military equipment to help it navigate the current situation. However, doubts persist due to Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine, where it faces shortages of ammunition and personnel. While  Russia itself is relying on North Korean soldiers to reinforce its forces in Ukraine, questions arise about how much assistance it can offer Syria. Iran and Hezbollah, Assad’s key allies, have also suffered significant setbacks in their conflict with Israel, which has caused heavy losses. Although they recently brokered a ceasefire, the lull allowed Syria’s Salvation Government to seize the opportunity to act. Meanwhile, Palestine supporters on social media are accusing Israel, the United States, Turkey, and HTS of forming a possible alliance. 

    HTS’s capture of Aleppo has escalated the civil war, which began in 2011 and continues to tear Syria apart. The war is likely to see further developments, possibly becoming a battleground for world powers. Currently, the rebels cannot unite with other groups against Damascus due to ideological differences. HTS may team up with Turkey and its groups within Syria to confront the Kurds, who control significant territory. This shift could overshadow the ongoing struggle between the rebels and the Assad regime.

    The future of Syria likely involves a divided nation with shifting borders. HTS, the militants in Idlib, have tried to demonstrate their ability to govern but face accusations of suppressing dissent and relying heavily on dwindling international aid to meet civilians’ needs. For now, the militants are more focused on expanding the battlefield than on addressing the people’s needs and The people of Syria find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place.

  • Israel-Hezbollah Ceasefire: A Path to Peace or a Temporary Pause?

    Israel-Hezbollah Ceasefire: A Path to Peace or a Temporary Pause?

    Israel and Hezbollah reached a ceasefire, bringing an end to their latest wave of conflict. The truce went into effect at 4 a.m. Wednesday in Lebanon, drawing praise from peace advocates and world leaders. However, Israeli airstrikes on Beirut, including several in the city center, occurred just before the ceasefire began, further contributing to the chaos on the ground. The Israeli military issued warnings to residents in southern Lebanon to avoid IDF positions and evacuated villages. Despite the warnings and ongoing uncertainty, residents filled the roads from Beirut to southern Lebanon, determined to return to their homes. Hezbollah and the Amal political movement provided guidance for those returning to villages south of the Litani River. Meanwhile, the Lebanese government remained silent, revealing its inability to assert authority or manage the unfolding situation.

    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu endorsed the deal after his full cabinet approved it, despite opposition from his far-right allies. In televised remarks following the Israeli security cabinet’s vote on the 60-day ceasefire proposal, Netanyahu confirmed his readiness to implement the deal but stressed that Israel would retain full military freedom to act if Hezbollah violated the ceasefire.

    The 60-day agreement, spanning two months, is grounded in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which brought an end to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah but remains only partially enforced. Under its terms, Israel must withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah is required to move its heavy weaponry north of the Litani River, about 25 kilometers from the border. During the transition, the Western-backed Lebanese army is expected to take up positions in the south.

    Although Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government, its forces are not included in the official military. A copy of the ceasefire deal, reviewed by Reuters, specifies that only official military and security forces in Lebanon may carry weapons. While Hezbollah is unlikely to fully disarm, it may reduce its visible armed presence. Israel has consistently criticized Hezbollah for stationing weapons near its border.

    Both parties repeatedly cycle through conflicts and ceasefires, demonstrating that neither truly seeks lasting peace. This time, they paused strategically and agreed to a truce because both required time. Their deep-rooted hatred persists without any signs of diminishing. Hezbollah considers expelling Jews a religious obligation, while Israel, fueled by the memory of the October 7th attack, remains driven by a desire for vengeance. Hezbollah uses the truce to rebuild its infrastructure, which Israel’s attacks and the loss of its top leader have severely damaged. At the same time, Israel works to strengthen ties with the incoming Trump administration and avoid escalating the conflict further, as doing so could harm its business relationships with Gulf states. And the truce gives Israel an opportunity to shift its focus toward Gaza.

    Will this ceasefire pave the way for one in Gaza? That remains unclear. Israel has not shifted its focus toward securing a truce in Gaza. The current agreement does not address the ongoing conflict there, where U.S.-led efforts to mediate a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas have so far failed. Negotiators deliberately excluded Gaza from the discussions. When asked about the possibility of a Gaza ceasefire, Biden expressed cautious optimism, stating that he believed it was possible and hoped for it. However, Israel may delay addressing the Gaza conflict until Trump takes office, when he could bring a plan for Gaza that heavily favors Israel’s interests.

  • Assessing the Impact of the ICC’s Arrest Warrant on Netanyahu

    Assessing the Impact of the ICC’s Arrest Warrant on Netanyahu

    International news outlets and social media are celebrating the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu is leading a war against Iran’s Axis of Resistance, which has vowed to dismantle the state of Israel. However, the ICC has decided to act during the war. Netanyahu has become the first leader of a modern Western-style democracy to face an arrest warrant issued by the ICC in its 22-year history. He now stands alongside his former defense secretary, Yoav Gallant, and Hamas military leader Mohammed Deif, although doubts remain about Deif’s current status.

    The ICC’s three-judge panel stated that reasonable grounds exist to believe Netanyahu and Gallant are criminally responsible for war crimes, including using starvation as a method of warfare, as well as crimes against humanity such as murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts. The panel also found reasonable grounds to hold them accountable as civilian superiors for directing attacks against civilian populations.

    While anti-war advocates, leftists, and Islamic groups anticipate that Netanyahu will be forced to avoid international travel, the ICC arrest warrant actually benefits the prime minister in several ways. The warrant significantly bolsters Netanyahu’s narrative that international bodies are against Israel and have no support in fostering peace for the country. With the warrant, Netanyahu can now position himself as a leader in a battle against those seeking Israel’s destruction, a role that aligns seamlessly with his political strategy. 

    The ICC depends on its 124 member states, signatories of the Rome Statute that established the court, to enforce arrest warrants. These countries are obligated to arrest individuals wanted by the ICC if they enter their territory. However, neither Israel nor its closest ally, the United States, are members of the ICC, nor are Qatar and Egypt—potential venues for ceasefire talks.  Netanyahu remains free to visit Russia, China, India, and other influential nations as they all are not member states. On the other hand, Germany, a strong ally of Israel, is an ICC member, as are all European Union nations, Switzerland, Japan, Australia, and most Latin American countries, with the exceptions of Cuba and Haiti. Still, it is uncertain whether these countries will act against Israel and the United States in favor of the ICC’s warrant. Last year, Vladimir Putin avoided visiting South Africa amid speculation that authorities might detain him under an ICC warrant for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet, he was warmly welcomed in Mongolia, an ICC member state, exposing the persistent weaknesses in the court’s enforcement mechanism.

    The US strongly criticized the ICC’s decision, with President Joe Biden calling the arrest warrants outrageous in a Thursday night statement. The US National Security Council also issued a statement rejecting the court’s decision, reiterating that the ICC lacks jurisdiction over the matter. This position contrasts with the US’s earlier support for the ICC’s warrant against Vladimir Putin for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. Netanyahu’s office condemned the ICC’s decision, labeling it antisemitic and describing the court as a biased and discriminatory political body.

    The ICC’s verdict has united Israeli politicians, with Benny Gantz, a retired general and political rival of Netanyahu, condemning the decision as moral blindness and a shameful stain of historic proportions that will never be forgotten. Israel is clearly using the ICC arrest warrant as an opportunity to attack the international body, which has previously recognized Palestine. Palestine joined the Rome Statute in 2015, and in 2021, the ICC recognized it as a state, extending its jurisdiction to territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. However, this recognition has had little practical impact. Many parts of Palestine lack functioning governance or administrative systems, and Hamas has no means to arrest Netanyahu. So, The ICC’s rulings, while symbolically significant, remain largely ineffective in practice.

  • Has Qatar Failed as a Mediator?

    Has Qatar Failed as a Mediator?

    In the Middle East, there are a lot of Islamic militant groups working in almost every country. To be free from the risk they offer, you need to be rich and an ally of the US. Qatar is one of them; it is rich and a US ally. But This Gulf country is more strict on Islamic laws, a demand of many militant groups in the region. They even follow Islamic way of labor practices that some critics liken to a form of slavery. Qatar’s fondness for Islamic rule has allowed various terrorist organizations to establish offices within its territory, including Hamas, the group that caused the ongoing war of Israel in Gaza. While most Western and Arab countries have shown little interest in supporting the Iran-backed militia, Qatar has often provided a haven for Hamas.

    While Hamas conducted a brutal terrorist attack in Israel and captured many hostages, Many political analysts believed that Qatar could help Hamas negotiate with Israel with the lives of hostages. However, as Israel prioritized war over negotiations, Qatar’s role in brokering a resolution favoring Hamas has diminished. Qatar tried for over a year to save Hamas. And now, after a year, it looks like they are getting out from the side of Hamas. This shift, coupled with Qatar’s realization that its controversial support for Hamas, has threatened its international image, which it built through massive investments, including bribes for securing the World Cup.

    Qatar has decided to step back from its mediation efforts and allow other parties to take over. The Qatari government informed the U.S., Israel, Hamas officials, and Egypt that it would no longer facilitate negotiations to halt the Gaza conflict, citing a lack of good faith among the parties involved. According to The Guardian, This decision followed a recent visit by a U.S. delegation, including CIA Director Bill Burns, for meetings in Doha that ended without progress.

    Qatar concluded that both sides seemed more focused on political optics than on achieving genuine security solutions. This decision is a significant setback to mediation efforts, which had produced minimal results since a temporary ceasefire and limited hostage release deal nearly a year ago.

    Many believe Qatar is engaging in a strategic power play to raise its regional profile and bolster its importance in the eyes of the United States. With upcoming president Donald Trump expected to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia, Qatar seems uneasy with Saudi dominance in the region, despite the official reconciliation between the two countries.

    Though Israel shows little interest in ending the war,  Trump may eventually pursue negotiations, which could necessitate indirect talks with Hamas. Given Iran’s support for Hamas, it cannot serve as an impartial mediator, and it’s uncertain whether Turkey or Egypt would step into that role. In this context, Qatar could reemerge as the “Rescuer,” promoting itself as a responsible mediator. Al Jazeera, Qatar’s influential media outlet, could showcase Qatar’s efforts, reinforcing its image as a “Good Muslim Ally.”

    With a new U.S. administration set to take office in a couple of months, Qatar has indicated to American contacts that it would be open to resuming mediation if both sides demonstrate genuine interest in reaching a deal. Qatar tried a similar approach months ago, though it fell short of producing any results. This marks the second time Qatar has publicly warned it will not support stalled talks indefinitely.

    The Hamas office in Doha, established in 2012, has served as a critical communication channel  for over a decade, including during last year’s negotiations for a Gaza ceasefire and the release of more than 100 hostages. However, the October 7th attack by Hamas has severely damaged its reputation, and Qatar has faced growing criticism from Israel and segments of the U.S. political establishment for hosting the group.

    As a close U.S. ally that hosts a major American military base, Qatar has previously maintained a positive diplomatic relationship with Donald Trump during his first term. However, its perceived “double game” on terrorism and concerns over its human rights record have made Qatar increasingly unpopular among U.S. senators. Last Friday, a group of Republican senators urged Washington to seek the extradition of Hamas officials from Qatar and freeze their assets.

    These criticisms, especially regarding an initiative that Qatar launched at the U.S.’s request, have caused friction in Doha and influenced Qatar’s decision to distance itself from Hamas and mediation efforts. U.S. officials have reportedly briefed American media that Washington requested the closure of the Hamas office, although the Biden administration has not yet commented publicly on the matter.

    However, some Western and regional diplomats argue for keeping the Hamas office in Qatar, warning that pushing Hamas out would limit engagement with figures potentially open to compromise. Yet, Qatar’s continued support arguably empowers Hamas rather than encourages moderation. For Hamas, there is hope that Qatar might broker a deal with Israel, leveraging hostages, including women and children, to meet its demands. But Qatar has struggled to engage Israel effectively or include other mediators in negotiations, and it now appears uncertain about risking its international reputation for an organization closely tied to Iran.

    Meanwhile, with many key Hamas leaders lost, Hamas itself may be reconsidering its reliance on Qatar and is reportedly more inclined to look to long-standing allies like Turkey, who could be more effective in brokering a truce. Qatar’s wealth may have helped to uplift them in football, but they failed in the game of geopolitics in the Middle East they craved to win.

  • How Would Trump’s Second Term Affect Asia?

    How Would Trump’s Second Term Affect Asia?

    Donald Trump has been confirmed as the next U.S. president, defeating incumbent Vice President Kamala Harris. As the 47th president, he will take office next year, though his return to the post after a defeat is already resonating worldwide. The U.S. president’s role extends beyond national borders, shaping global direction and policy. Asia, the world’s focal point this century, is preparing for Trump’s return, and he is likely to focus more on the region in his second term compared to his predecessors, who primarily concentrated on Europe and Latin America.

    In his last term, which ended four years ago, Trump clearly demonstrated his approach as a businessman-turned-politician. While the Biden administration has since reshaped the global landscape, Trump is expected to resume his previous style, promoting closer ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, taming Russia and Iran, shifting U.S. alliances from Pakistan toward India, challenging China, and reinforcing U.S. relations with East Asia.

    The war-ridden Middle East anticipates Trump’s immediate attention. Many Arab Americans expressed anger over the Democratic Party’s failure to address regional issues, which contributed to their loss. Trump is expected to be more reactive in the region than Biden. He has been a staunch supporter of Israel and has built strong ties with Israel and its Prime Minister Netanyahu, while Democrats, especially Kamala Harris, have advocated for a two-state solution and support for Palestine. Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moved the U.S. embassy there, and encouraged allies to follow suit. During his previous tenure, he also proposed a peace plan that, while heavily favoring Israel, was still somewhat workable.

    Trump’s pro-Israel approach led many to fear it would deteriorate relations with Muslim states. However, while openly supporting Israel, he also established a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince, despite heavy criticism from human rights watchdogs and significant opposition both within the U.S. and abroad. His efforts resulted in closer ties between several Muslim nations and Israel, with Saudi Arabia nearly formalizing relations. Some Republicans even nominated Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize for these actions, and many believe Saudi Arabia would have formalized relations with Israel had Trump won a second term four years before instead of Biden.

    During Biden’s term, Saudi Arabia became increasingly distant and pursued other alliances, including with Russia. Many believe Trump can fix this and could persuade Netanyahu to negotiate a ceasefire. However, regarding Iran, Trump is expected to maintain a hardline stance against the regime, and a closer U.S.-Israel alignment could further pressure Iran, potentially fueling internal unrest. Conflicts in Syria and Iraq will likely persist, with additional U.S. support expected for the Kurds. Turkey, under Erdogan’s vision of Ottoman revival, may continue a balanced approach rather than adopting a more assertive role.

    Central Asia and Russia are also likely to remain in Trump’s focus. Given his alleged close ties with Putin, many believe he may work to resolve the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. As a seasoned negotiator, Trump might aim to broker an agreement between both sides. During his campaign, Trump acknowledged American frustration over spending on Ukraine, suggesting a resolution may be near. In exchange for potential cooperation with Russia, Trump might reduce U.S. involvement in Russia’s sphere of influence in Central Asia, an area where Biden sought to weaken Moscow’s control.

    In South Asia, Trump’s interest in the Indian market was evident during his previous term. He cultivated a strong relationship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and both view each other as close allies. However, as nationalists, they often balance competing interests. Nonetheless, the mutual reliance between the U.S. and India—both in terms of American production needs and the Indian market, and vice versa—suggests that major deals may soon follow. Despite her Indian heritage, Kamala Harris is often seen by Indian media as opposing Modi due to her stance on certain policies. It was also clear that Indian media endorsed Trump during the campaigns. This alignment creates room for more significant developments between the U.S. and India, while Islamic nations in the region, like Pakistan and Bangladesh, may face challenges due to Trump’s pro-India and pro-Hindu stance.

    In East Asia, Trump’s relationship with China is likely to worsen as he opposes any economic growth in China that might threaten U.S. market dominance. Trump initiated the ongoing trade wars, and further actions against Chinese products are expected. His push to revitalize American manufacturing will likely intensify pressure on China. By framing China as an adversary, Trump’s strategy may drive more countries away from China’s business, which could significantly impact China and escalate tensions between the U.S. and China. This economic friction may heighten tensions in the South China Sea, especially if China loses market influence.

    Trump’s search for alternatives to China could benefit Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam, Indonesia, and possibly Malaysia. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan will likely draw closer to the U.S., as Trump seeks to strengthen alliances to counter China. His previous engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un also showcased his diplomatic flexibility.

    Asia is sure to see more eventful days during Trump’s second term. Israel and Russia, both seeking an end to ongoing conflicts, appear uncertain about how to resolve them and may be hoping for an intervention. Donald Trump is likely to step in, aiming to position himself as a hero. Optimists believe a resolution could happen within months, as he has discussed these issues multiple times and has strong relationships with key parties, along with a desire to save American money.

    However, while Trump may strengthen some alliances, many believe his approach could strain relationships with other regional actors, such as Iran, China and  nuclear-armed Pakistan. As tensions between the U.S. and China continue, there is a risk of increased instability in the eastern region. Yet, with Trump’s focus on economic growth and business, it’s expected that global attention will shift back to economic matters, setting aside other issues currently in the spotlight.