Tag: Myanmar

  • Myanmar’s Junta Moves Toward Elections, but Fears of a Farce Persist

    Myanmar’s Junta Moves Toward Elections, but Fears of a Farce Persist

    Despite Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, the junta is pressing ahead with plans for an election. Rather than seeking peace or addressing the country’s deepening crisis, it is focused on tightening its grip on key cities through political maneuvering and the familiar tactics of sham elections used by other authoritarian regimes.

    On the surface, this move appears to be an attempt to pacify critics and draw advancing rebel groups into the political process. Yet, with the junta widely despised across the country, its promise of elections in December 2025 or January 2026 is seen as little more than political theater. A genuinely fair vote would almost certainly result in the military’s defeat—an outcome it is unlikely to accept. So, instead of bringing stability, the election is expected to escalate violence, fuel repression, and serve as yet another means for the junta to cling to power.

    The Call for an Election

    Myanmar’s military junta announced on Saturday, through state media, that it would hold a long-promised election—its first time specifying a timeline since seizing power in a 2021 coup. The announcement follows junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s recent visit to Moscow, where Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly endorsed the plan.

    China, a key military ally with significant economic interests in Myanmar, has also expressed support for the elections. Meanwhile, Belarus, another close partner of the junta, has signaled its willingness to assist in the process. However, most Western governments and election watchdogs are expected to dismiss the vote as a sham, lacking both credibility and legitimacy.

    A challenging election

    An election—if conducted under genuine democratic principles—would be fraught with challenges, as opposition parties are either banned or have chosen to boycott the process. Nearly 22,000 political prisoners remain behind bars, according to a local monitoring group, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, whose government was overthrown in 2021. Her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), was dissolved after failing to re-register under an electoral law imposed by the junta following the coup.

    Beyond political repression, the feasibility of holding nationwide elections remains highly questionable. The military has lost control of vast swathes of the country to a patchwork of opposition groups actively resisting its rule. The junta’s territorial losses have been so severe that it managed to conduct a full census—intended to prepare voter lists—in fewer than half (145) of the country’s 330 townships. A BBC-commissioned study estimates that the military now controls only 21% of Myanmar’s territory, though it still dominates key, densely populated cities.

    So, the prospect of holding nationwide elections that genuinely represent the entire country and all its people is not only a formidable challenge but an almost impossible task.

    Path to more bloodshed

    Rather than bringing peace or stability, the election is expected to escalate violence. For ordinary people in Myanmar, it represents a source of fear and uncertainty. When the military conducted its census last year, many were too afraid to respond, while those tasked with carrying it out feared being targeted by opposition forces. A similar scenario could unfold during the election.

    Analysts warn that the junta, which has brutally suppressed dissent since the coup, will likely resort to even greater force to ensure polling takes place in the areas it still controls, leading to intensified confrontations. It is almost certain that opposition groups, currently in an aggressive stance, will resist, increasing the risk of prolonged conflict.

    How will it unfold?

    Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has long pledged to hold elections but has repeatedly extended the state of emergency, delaying the process. During a visit to Belarus, he stated that the election would be held in December 2025 or by January 2026. He also claimed that 53 political parties had registered to participate.

    Min Aung Hlaing further announced that the military would invite Belarusian teams to observe the election. His statement came during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who has held power for more than three decades and recently secured a seventh five-year term in an election widely dismissed as a sham.

    The junta’s decision to align itself with regimes well-versed in orchestrating controlled elections raises serious concerns. Given past patterns across the region, the vote is likely to be carefully engineered to guarantee victory for junta-backed parties, ensuring the military’s continued grip on power.

  • Four Years In: Where Myanmar’s Civil War Stands Now

    Four Years In: Where Myanmar’s Civil War Stands Now

    While the world’s attention remains fixed on the Russia-Ukraine war—largely due to Europe’s involvement—and the Israel-Hamas conflict, which has deepened religious divisions, another war continues to unfold largely unnoticed. As global headlines focus on Gaza and Ukraine, Myanmar’s civil war rages on, drawing little international concern. For many, the country is little more than the backdrop of a viral meme featuring a dancing instructor oblivious to military tanks rolling past her during the 2021 coup. That coup dismantled Myanmar’s democratic government, plunging the nation into a relentless conflict between the military junta and various ethnic armed groups. Now in its fourth year, the war has inflicted widespread devastation, forcing mass displacement and causing staggering human losses. With no immediate resolution in sight, many believe the junta’s hold on power is weakening, raising the prospect of Myanmar fracturing along ethnic lines.

    Four years into the conflict, resistance to Myanmar’s military junta has only intensified. A BBC study estimates that the regime now controls just 21% of the country’s territory, as it battles the People’s Defence Force—formed by the opposition National Unity Government, comprised of remnants of the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won Myanmar’s last democratic election—alongside long-standing ethnic armed groups resisting Naypyidaw’s rule.

    Despite losing 95 towns, key trade routes, hundreds of military bases, and two regional commands, the junta still holds Myanmar’s major cities and central regions, making its removal far from imminent. Yet internal fractures are deepening, with growing calls for its leader, Min Aung Hlaing, to step down. In its desperation, the military continues to deploy brutal tactics—mass killings, torture, sexual violence, and relentless airstrikes on civilian areas. Any effort to further restrict its access to jet fuel should be pursued. The toll has been catastrophic: more than 4 million people displaced, half the population forced into poverty, and fewer than half with access to electricity. Rakhine State, one of the few places that occasionally draws international attention due to its Muslim population, is reported to have an especially dire crisis. The UN warns of imminent famine, with the Rohingya Muslim community particularly vulnerable—trapped between the military, which has forcibly conscripted men, and the Arakan Army, which accuses them of siding with the junta.

    For many in Myanmar, military rule no longer feels like an inevitability. The junta’s refusal to compromise has convinced its opponents that a negotiated settlement is out of reach. Fears of post-junta chaos—and the potential toll on civilians—are understandable. Opposition groups have committed human rights abuses of their own and remain deeply divided, with often conflicting agendas. There is also concern about how a coalition government could function given these vast differences. However, despite these challenges, the opposition has managed to cooperate in surprising ways over the past four years.

    The dramatic rebel advances of late October 2023 were made possible by China’s quiet backing of an alliance of ethnic armed groups, frustrated by the junta’s failure to curb cross-border criminal networks. But Beijing has since cut off arms supplies and key imports, now viewing the regime’s survival as its best chance to secure resources, maintain stability, and keep U.S. influence at bay. Notably, China has emerged as the strongest advocate for elections this year—an exercise that would be both a sham, given the 21,000 political prisoners in detention, and a logistical impossibility, as opposition forces have vowed to disrupt them.

    Meanwhile, U.S. policy shifts are already having dire consequences. The Trump administration’s attacks on the National Endowment for Democracy threaten civic groups providing critical support to Myanmar’s population and would be essential in rebuilding the country. The freeze on USAID operations has already led to the withdrawal of medical care for 100,000 refugees in Thailand. 

    Beyond China and the US, other regional and global powers have a vested interest in Myanmar’s future. India, Thailand, and Europe are involved in varying degrees, with the West supporting the National Unity Government (NUG). However, the cooperation of ethnic armed groups in any future government remains uncertain. A federal union might be the best possible solution for Myanmar, but these groups, now deeply entrenched in their ethnic identities, govern their own territories like independent entities.

    Take the Arakan Army, for example. It controls nearly all of Rakhine State, except for Sittwe, and operates autonomously, despite its nominal alliance with the NUG. If it were to receive support from other nations, it would likely push for full independence. The same applies to other ethnic groups, which, while currently united against the junta, could ultimately seek their own sovereignty.

    As Myanmar marks the fourth anniversary of its civil war, it’s clear that a unified Myanmar, whether under military or civilian rule, is increasingly unrealistic. The coup and subsequent civil war have fractured the country. What remains is a power struggle among multiple factions, each vying for control.

  • Myanmar’s Junta and Rebels Strike a Truce: How Long Can It Hold?

    Myanmar’s Junta and Rebels Strike a Truce: How Long Can It Hold?

    While the world’s attention fixated on the dramatic and much-publicized ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, a quieter but no less significant peace agreement took shape in Southeast Asia—largely unnoticed by the global media. Myanmar’s junta, which overthrew a democratically elected government in 2021 and plunged the country into an increasingly brutal civil war, reached a ceasefire with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic rebel group from the country’s northeastern territories. China, with its strategic interests in maintaining ties to both parties, acted as mediator, and on January 18, the two sides finalized the agreement. This truce, forged in Kunming, a border city in southwestern China, represents a clear diplomatic victory for both Beijing and Myanmar’s military government. This is the second such truce mediated in Kunming within the past year, underscoring China’s growing role as a power broker in Myanmar’s tumultuous civil war.

    The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a rebel group composed of the ethnic Chinese Kokang minority, is a key player within Myanmar’s “Three Brotherhood Alliance” coalition. Founded in 1989, it was the first such group to enter into a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government. This truce, which endured for nearly two decades, allowed the central government to formally recognize the Kokang region as “Shan State Special Region 1,” and ushered in a period of economic prosperity driven by illicit ventures. Opium cultivation and heroin production fueled both the MNDAA’s coffers and those of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), as the region, strategically positioned near the Chinese border, became a nexus for illegal trade.

    But in 2009, this fragile peace collapsed. Relations between the Kokang forces and the central government turned bitter, and the MNDAA was violently ousted, with many members fleeing into China. The region has been embroiled in a vicious cycle of conflict ever since, with the 2021 military coup igniting new waves of violence. As the civil war escalated, the MNDAA, along with various other rebel factions, banded together in a multi-front struggle against the junta, their armed resistance a symbol of defiance in the face of Myanmar’s fractured political landscape.

    In January of last year, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the junta, under the watchful eye of Beijing, signed a ceasefire in Kunming, the capital of China’s southwestern Yunnan province. The pact, however, unraveled within six months, swallowed by the shifting tides of Myanmar’s entrenched conflicts. This year, China has stepped in again to broker another truce, and while skepticism abounds, observers suggest it might last longer. Beijing’s firmer intervention, combined with the junta’s increasingly precarious position, has made breaching the agreement a more onerous prospect. For now, China’s calculated pressure offers a flicker of hope for a temporary calm in a landscape dominated by turmoil.

    China’s 2,000-kilometer border with Myanmar underscores its deep entanglement in the country’s political and military turmoil. Beijing maintains close ties with both the ruling junta and an array of rebel groups, including the Kachin Independence Army, which is advancing south against government forces, and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which has seized military outposts and towns near the Chinese border since 2023. For China, the stakes of Myanmar’s conflict extend well beyond regional instability: the fighting imperils border security, disrupts trade routes, and threatens Beijing’s extensive infrastructure investments in the region.

    Northern Myanmar, with its heavy reliance on China for communication infrastructure, energy initiatives, and financial support, risks severe economic disruption if the China-brokered ceasefire collapses. In a calculated move to reinforce stability, Beijing reopened all border crossings in MNDAA-controlled areas shortly after the truce was finalized. However, Myanmar’s value to China extends far beyond economic interdependence. Its strategic location provides Beijing with a crucial gateway to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, offering an alternative route to the fraught waters of the South China Sea.

    Beijing remains acutely attuned to the evolving dynamics in Myanmar, particularly the deepening ties between India and the Arakan Army, another influential rebel faction, and the growing Western support for the National Unity Government, the opposition to the junta. For China, stability in Myanmar is not a matter of altruism but necessity. A peaceful and fully democratic Myanmar may not align with Beijing’s strategic vision, but a measure of stability is essential to safeguarding its economic interests and geopolitical influence. For Beijing, peace is less about shared ideals and more about securing access, preserving influence, and safeguarding the uninterrupted pursuit of its regional ambitions—a hope it now pins on the success of the current ceasefire.

  • Will Myanmar’s Rebels Trouble Bangladesh’s Borders?

    Will Myanmar’s Rebels Trouble Bangladesh’s Borders?

    Bangladesh shares its land borders with only two nations: India and Myanmar. While political uncertainty prevails under an interim government taking an anti-India stance, much of the focus has been directed towards the India-Bangladesh border. Yet, the more pressing and complex developments are unfolding along Bangladesh’s southeastern frontier with Myanmar. This border region is increasingly dominated by the Arakan Army, an ethno-nationalist militant group rooted in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Known for its violent clashes with Islamist Rohingya factions and its contentious history with Bangladesh, the Arakan Army’s growing influence raises critical concerns. Could these escalating dynamics along the southeastern border exacerbate Bangladesh’s challenges further?

    Bangladesh and Myanmar are both mired in political instability. In Bangladesh, the removal of the democratically elected government has not yet threatened the country’s territorial integrity unlike Myanmar. However, with a new constitution proposed by the interim government. If the constitution manages to unite disparate groups—Islamists, students, and communists—stability could be maintained. If it fails, Bangladesh risks sliding into unrest, potentially mirroring Myanmar’s descent into chaos. Myanmar’s turmoil began with the military coup of February 2021, which overthrew the democratically elected government. The coup ignited mass protests that escalated into a widespread uprising, especially in ethnic minority areas. Opposition to the junta has formed alliances between ethnic armed groups and civilian-led defense forces, leaving the country deeply fragmented, with regions under the control of various militias.

    In recent months, opposition forces have gained significant ground against Myanmar’s junta, securing control over extensive territories, particularly in northern Shan State and Rakhine State in the west. Among these groups, the Arakan Army (AA) has made notable advances, seizing dozens of townships and military outposts over the past 15 months. The group’s expanding influence and unrelenting momentum have fueled speculation about its long-term objectives. The AA operates as the armed wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA), a political organization representing the Buddhist population of western Rakhine State. Both the AA and the ULA have expressed a commitment to establishing an autonomous region in Rakhine that includes both the Buddhist Rakhine and the Muslim communities. For now, the AA appears focused on driving the Myanmar military out of Rakhine State. However, regarding the region’s political future, the group remains deliberately ambiguous, leaving open the possibility of pursuing an independent nation.

    The future of tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar may largely depend on the Arakan Army’s evolving alliances and interests. While the group was once linked to China, its current ties with Beijing appear diminished, even though China remains the most influential external actor in Myanmar. Some Islamist factions claim the Arakan Army is now aligned with India, although this is questionable given the group’s previous opposition to India-backed projects in Rakhine and the limited influence India exerts over them. Pakistan, despite its weakened state, could exploit the situation by backing Islamist narratives. Such actions might position the Arakan Army as a threat to Islam, potentially provoking Islamist groups to launch attacks in Myanmar or use Rohingya Muslims as a proxy force—escalating into broader conflict. The United States also has an interest in the region, seeking to counter India’s dominance in the Bay of Bengal.

    Bangladesh’s political trajectory will also play a pivotal role. If it transforms into an Islamic republic, its stance on the Rohingya issue may shift toward open support, potentially exacerbating regional tensions. 

    At the same time, The Arakan Army, as it consolidates control over border areas, appears poised to deepen engagement with both Bangladesh and India, aiming to reduce its reliance on central Myanmar and establish stronger regional footholds.

    It goes without saying that both Bangladesh and Myanmar stand at a pivotal crossroads. These already fragile states, fractured by internal strife, appear poised for even deeper disintegration in the days ahead. As interested players—be they nation-states or other insurgent groups—maneuver to advance their agendas, they will exploit these divisions. The resulting tensions seem destined to escalate into outright conflict, likely sooner rather than later.

  • Myanmar Junta in Trouble as Rebels Seize Strategic Military Base

    Myanmar Junta in Trouble as Rebels Seize Strategic Military Base

    The civil war in Myanmar, involving the military junta and an alliance of ethnic armies, is intensifying. The junta, formed after the 2021 coup d’état, is losing more territory to ethnic tribal armies, which are advocating for democracy despite their previous conflicts with Myanmar’s democratic governments. The coup and subsequent suppression united these ethnic armies, leading to the formation of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which is now waging war against the junta.

    In a recent development, ethnic rebels in Myanmar have captured a key military base, the army’s Northeast Command in Lashio, dealing a significant blow to the military junta. This is seen as the biggest setback for Myanmar’s military government this year. The fall of Lashio’s Northeast Command underscores the growing strength and confidence of opposition forces, putting the military junta in a difficult position.

    Lashio, the largest town in Shan State, Myanmar’s biggest state, lies just 110 km from the Chinese border. As an important trading hub, Lashio will provide political and economic benefits to the opposition. Losing control of this town and state could be the junta’s most significant defeat. The MNDAA has been targeting Lashio since launching its offensive in October, initially facing several setbacks. However, among Myanmar’s 14 regional commands, the Northeast Command in Lashio is the first to fall to armed resistance groups.

    The situation is dire for the junta, as the military had recently reinforced the Lashio base with around 3,000 troops. Yet, within a month, the base fell, leading to the surrender of over 1,000 soldiers. The commander of the Northeast Military Region, along with his two brigadier-general deputies, has been captured, marking them as the highest-ranking prisoners of war to date. This setback raises concerns that the ruling military council might have to abandon its efforts to hold contested territories and concentrate on defending the central heartland. It may also increase discontent with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who seized power by overthrowing the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021. Doubts are growing about whether the Army can continue to function effectively under his leadership.

    On Monday, Myanmar’s military regime acknowledged losing communication with the commanders of a strategically important Army headquarters in the northeast, lending credibility to claims from a militia group that it had captured the base. Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, spokesperson for Myanmar’s ruling military council, said in an audio statement on state-run MRTV television that contact was lost with the Northeastern Command headquarters on Saturday night and that there were unconfirmed reports of some commanders being arrested by the MNDAA. Min also noted that the alliance was receiving weapons, including drones and short-range missiles, from unidentified foreign sources.

    The situation has remained difficult for the military junta since last year. In October, through a campaign called Operation 1027, the MNDAA captured large areas of territory along the border with China, including numerous townships and hundreds of junta-held posts. While the MNDAA had previously taken a regional military headquarters in Laukkaing, a key city on the Chinese border, the capture of the Lashio headquarters is even more significant. Many political analysts believe that the success of recent attacks in Shan State will boost the confidence of other factions in Myanmar, with reports indicating that the Arakan Army in the Rakhine state is increasing its strikes.

    The civil war in Myanmar has claimed the lives of over 5,000 civilians since 2021. Millions have been displaced internally, and the country’s economy is in tatters. The conflict is escalating, especially in Shan State and western Myanmar. According to Myanmar’s National Unity Government, a coalition of ousted democratically elected lawmakers seeking to establish a parallel government, resistance forces controlled over 60% of the nation’s territory prior to the capture of Lashio. There is speculation that the fighting may intensify and spread as opposition groups target towns and cities long regarded as military strongholds, such as Myawaddy and Mandalay. Mandalay, an economic and cultural hub, is located just over 200 kilometers from Lashio. Additionally, Myanmar’s capital, Naypyidaw, faced an unprecedented attack that month when armed groups launched drone strikes and targeted military installations in the city. So, it looks like Junta is in big trouble. 

  • How Thailand is Helping Myanmar’s Junta Hold on to Power

    How Thailand is Helping Myanmar’s Junta Hold on to Power

    It has been three years since Myanmar witnessed a coup d’état that overthrew the democratically elected government. We all remember the viral video of a girl dancing while military vehicles approached the presidential palace to take control of the state. After three years, the military rule is still in power despite many democratic protests and military opposition. Major democracies around the world expressed concern and introduced tough sanctions in solidarity with democracy. Interestingly, despite Western sanctions, Myanmar, unlike resource-rich Russia, has managed to sustain itself. This has raised doubts about neighboring countries helping the junta by staying neutral. These suspicions were cemented by a recent United Nations-sponsored investigation revealing that Thailand has emerged as the leading source of banking services for Myanmar’s military junta and a key financial conduit for procuring arms and other military equipment.

    Tom Andrews, the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, authored a report detailing the military junta’s adaptive strategies amidst sanctions from foreign governments. It describes how the State Administration Council (SAC), Myanmar’s military leadership, has altered financial and military suppliers to sustain arms procurement and its opposition campaign. The report identifies that despite international sanctions, SAC maintains crucial banking ties, with 16 banks across seven countries processing military transactions, and 25 banks providing correspondent services to Myanmar’s state-owned banks since the coup. Andrews highlights a significant shift in arms procurement, noting a decline in formal banking system transactions to $253 million in 2023 from $377 million the previous year, particularly citing decreased Chinese arms transfers from $140 million to $80 million. An interesting part of the report is how Thailand, which remains neutral and has not condemned the military takeover of the regime, has emerged as the major source for military supplies, surpassing Singapore, historically a major partner in trade and finance with Myanmar’s military and associated entities.

    As per the report published by Andrews, last year documented that despite Singaporean government opposition to arms transfers to Myanmar, entities based in Singapore had become the military junta’s third-largest source of weapons materials, following Russia and China. There are many reports that there are companies linked to military junta working in Singapore.  In 2022, the advocacy group Justice for Myanmar identified 38 Singapore-based companies involved in supplying weapons to the military, both pre and post the 2021 coup. Following a subsequent investigation by Singaporean authorities, Andrews reported in the document that the flow of weapons and related materials to Myanmar from Singapore-registered companies plummeted by nearly 90%, from $110 million to just $10 million. Total payments processed by Singaporean banks also declined sharply, from $260 million to approximately $40 million.

    However, the decline in business with Singapore led to an increase in transactions with Thailand, where business shifted due to easier administration and a junta-friendly government. In Thailand, the numbers moved in the opposite direction to Singapore, with transfers of weapons and related materials from companies registered in Thailand doubling from over $60 million in 2022 to nearly $130 million last year. These transfers included the purchase of spare parts for Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters and K-8W light attack aircraft, which were previously sourced via Singapore-based entities and used to conduct airstrikes on civilian targets. Thai banks have been pivotal in facilitating this shift. For example, Siam Commercial Bank facilitated just over $5 million in transactions related to the Myanmar military in the fiscal year ending March 2023, but the figure jumped to more than $100 million the following year.

    While the report demonstrates the junta’s ability to adapt to increasing financial restrictions, it also suggests that the campaign of Western sanctions is beginning to have an impact. Andrews notes that after the U.S. imposed sanctions on two state-owned banks last year, the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and the Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, the junta shifted most of its banking functions to Myanma Economic Bank (MEB), a state-owned bank that remains unsanctioned. Since then, MEB has processed tens of millions in payments for military procurement, receipt of international taxes and fees, and repatriation of foreign revenues from state-owned enterprises. Although Australia and Canada have also imposed sanctions on the first two banks, no foreign government has yet targeted MEB. The report emphasizes the need for the international community to shut down MEB’s international banking access through coordinated sanctions.

    The people of Myanmar are in a dire situation, as the suppression of democracy and pro-democracy movements has led to a civil war. The military regime continues to receive business and arms support from various countries, including Russia, Singapore, and now primarily from Thailand, their neighboring country and biggest supporter. While some rebel groups have connections with Western governments, there are few reports of military aid from the West. With India and China, Myanmar’s large neighbors, showing little interest in intervening in the civil unrest, Thailand’s indirect involvement becomes a significant advantage for the regime, enabling it to prolong the war and maintain its military rule.

  • Can Modi’s Third Term Bring Akhand Bharat Closer?

    Can Modi’s Third Term Bring Akhand Bharat Closer?

    Only one phase of polling remains out of the seven phases of the marathon Indian general election, which has stretched over three months. On July 4th, the election results will be published. Even though predicting the minds of a billion people is challenging, the media are forecasting an edge for the incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is expected to secure a consecutive third term. If a strong leader like Modi and Hindu Nationalist Party  awarded a continuous third term, it is expected that there will be more actions fulfilling the long-held wishes of Hindu organizations, with a priority on the formation of Akhand Bharat, a greater Indosphere, stretching Afghanistan to Myanmar, including all South Asian countries.

    Last year, on the occasion of the inauguration of India’s new parliament building, a mural was unveiled that depicted a map of the Maurya Empire under Ashoka. This map, instead of modern India, sparked controversy and criticism from several of India’s neighboring countries, as almost all of them were part of that ancient empire. Mumtaz Zahra Baloch, then spokesperson for the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, condemned the mural, branding it as an expression of revisionism and expansionism. Similarly, the junior minister for foreign affairs of Bangladesh voiced concerns, noting widespread discontent over the depicted map. Additionally, numerous Nepali politicians voiced their apprehensions about the mural.

    While India appears to be employing a strategy akin to China’s, which asserts claims over neighboring territories using the Qing Dynasty map, it has not assuaged the concerns of its neighbors. Responding to these concerns, Arindam Bagchi, the spokesperson for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, conveyed that the mural embodies the concept of responsible and people-centered governance championed by the ancient king Ashoka and the Maurya empire. However, it is evident that the map aligns with the agenda of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which advocates for a revival of India’s past glory. Politicians in the BJP, including Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Pralhad Joshi, proudly declared it as a symbol of Akhand Bharat, the Pan-Indian country, asserting it as their destiny.

    Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist right wing party, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have often been accused of far-right politics that aim to revive India’s ancient histories and mythologies. He frequently speaks about restoring India to its former glory. Modi also made headlines with his promotion of the ancient name “Bharat” instead of the Western name “India” and by making  a strong objective of reclaiming the Pakistan-held territory of Kashmir.

    Akhand Bharat has been a long-standing demand since the Indian independence movement. The call for the creation of Akhand Bharat has occasionally been raised by various Hindu nationalist organizations, including the BJP’s parent organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS textbook included a map that depicted Pakistan and Bangladesh as part of “Akhand Bharat,” along with post-partition modern India. Additionally, a trade union magazine from the same organization extended this concept to include Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar. Moreover RSS, there are many other organizations advocating for this idea, such as the Hindu Mahasabha, Vishva Hindu Parishad, Shiv Sena, Maharashtra Navnirman Sena, Hindu Sena, and Hindu Janajagruti Samiti. There is even one organization named the Akhand Hindustan Morcha that has this goal in its name. Many Hindu organizations believe that Akhand Bharat, stretching from Afghanistan to Myanmar and from Kashmir to Sri Lanka, is the true country they deserve. They advocate for this region, collectively called Akhand Bharat, as it reflects the ancient Hindu empires that once covered this entire area. They claim evidence for their pan-nation theory exists in the languages and cultures of these regions.

    According to these Hindu organizations, Mughal and Islamic rule, referred to as Ottoman colonization, and British colonization caused the decline of the greater Indosphere, the pan-nation. They believe that when the demand for Indian independence was ignited, Britain, who not wanting a superpower in Asia, conspired with the Indian National Congress under Nehru to fragment India and lose these territories. The subsequent Congress government neglected the idea of Akhand Bharat.

    However, they believe this is the perfect time to achieve this goal. Under Modi’s regime, they think they can reunite these territories with India and restore Akhand Bharat. Modi’s BJP aspires to continue ruling until 2047, the 100th anniversary of the Republic of India, and they believe it will happen during this period. BJP politicians have already expressed a desire to officially rename India to Bharat, its ancient name. Additionally, they have spoken about reclaiming Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which was lost in the early years of independence. BJP supporters frequently use the map of Akhand Bharat in their campaigns to garner public support.

    Many believe that for those who support pan-India, the route to unification will be driven more by the economy than by the military. As India becomes economically richer and is expected to be the third-largest economy in the next decade, with per capita GDP also showing signs of improvement, there is a chance for closer collaboration with neighbors, potentially leading to an economic union or a strong confederation. Other countries in the region, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are all facing deep economic crises and are largely reliant on China’s support. For Afghanistan and Pakistan, their opposition to India is primarily due to rising Islamic identity and funding from the Middle East for Islamic governance. However, it appears that the Middle East is now less interested in Islamic propaganda and these countries are now more connected with Chinese money. But Sri Lanka serves as an example of how a country can suffer from relying on Chinese money, and the Maldives might follow. These small countries reluctance towards India is only because of Chinese financial support. If Chinese financial support diminishes, countries like the Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar may have no other option but to collaborate with India. Bhutan already seems to be a collaborative country. These collaboration is expected to follow the confederation and the Akhand Bharth. 

    It’s certain that India will not attempt to induce unification into a single country through military means in the near future, as the Hindu organizations wish. Such actions would significantly hinder India’s goal of becoming a developed country by 2047. Instead, the BJP is likely to adopt a more tactical approach using economy, market, Media and Movies etc. With the interests of the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia in the region waning, increased financial investment and Indian influence could lead to greater cooperation and potentially a strong union, making Akhand Bharat a possible reality. If Modi continues into his third term, he will likely work towards this goal, as it is not only his vision but also a long-time demand of the BJP’s parent organization. It is certain he cannot move forward while ignoring it. Therefore, the result of the 2024 general election in India is not only important for India but also for the entire region.

  • Myanmar Opposition Forces Launch Drone Attacks on Junta’s Capital

    Myanmar Opposition Forces Launch Drone Attacks on Junta’s Capital

    Myanmar Civil War reaches a pivotal moment as the Opposition expands its assault on Naypyidaw, the Military Junta’s Capital. According to reports from Al Jazeera, the opposition forces, spearheaded by the National Unity Government (NUG), have intensified their assault on Naypyidaw, in their ongoing struggle against the military regime. Utilizing 30 drones, they claim to have successfully targeted the stronghold of the military regime. And as further hit, Since the junta’s seizure of power in June 2021, public resentment towards the government has reached new heights. The junta is encountering resistance from various pro-democracy factions and ethnic groups, which have seized territory along the Indian and Chinese borders, and the continuous loss for the military is turning to more support for the NUG from people. With a growing number of defections from the military ranks, Myanmar appears to be teetering on the brink of a democratic revolution.

    Reports indicate that the Union government has conducted targeted drone attacks on two military installations in the capital, the headquarters of the military, and Alar airbase and on the residence of junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. According to statements from the National Unity Government (NUG), no casualties have been reported. Now, The opposition has increasingly turned to drone attacks, viewing them as cost-effective weapons against the coup regime. While the military government has labeled the opposition forces as terrorists, it has confirmed the attacks and claimed to have shot down seven drones. However, verifying information from both the military government and the NUG remains challenging.

    The military finds itself in a defensive position as the Union government advances southward. With numerous adversaries across the country, the military is weakened and disoriented, suffering significant battlefield defeats in recent months. Reports suggest that soldiers are surrendering and defecting to the Union government, indicating a shift in allegiances. Even pro-military figures are expressing uncertainty and dissatisfaction amidst the prevailing confusion.

    Simultaneously, the National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Which is abbreviated as NUG, emerges as a cohesive force, established by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), comprising elected lawmakers and parliamentarians ousted during the 2021 Myanmar coup d’état. It garners increasing public support and gains recognition as the legitimate government of Myanmar by the European Parliament. And maybe US and more western governments will follow the European Parliament. While powerful neighbors India and China are not participating much here, while some accuse China of having good terms with the Military government.

    Comprising representatives from the Nobel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, ethnic minority insurgent groups, and various minor parties, the NUG operates effectively despite being in exile. Its diplomatic engagements, cooperation with ethnic factions, and governance initiatives reflect commendable efforts towards national unity and stability. And they hope and they are progressing to the removal of the Military Junta in the country and re establish democracy government in the country. It will be the great chapter of democracy in the modern world.

    In Naypyidaw, the capital, the military government faces mounting apprehension over its diminishing strength. With significant losses in soldiers and persistent opposition, the recent announcement of imposing mandatory conscription reflects the military’s desperation in light of recent setbacks, including the surrender of entire battalions. This move for conscription has instilled fear among the younger population, leading many to seek ways to flee the country or seek refuge in resistance (Opposition) controlled areas.

    As of the end of February 2024, the United Nations reports that over 2.4 million people have been internally displaced in Myanmar since the coup, while 59,300 individuals have fled to neighboring countries. The escalating humanitarian crisis underscores the severity of the situation and the urgent need for resolution.

  • A Pause in Myanmar’s Civil War: Examining the Ceasefire Stability

    A Pause in Myanmar’s Civil War: Examining the Ceasefire Stability

    A temporary pause has been introduced in the ongoing Myanmar Civil War, a conflict between the Junta and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which consists of three significant ethnic armies united against Myanmar’s military government. China has taken on a mediating role to broker a truce, aiming to bring an end to months of conflict in northern Myanmar that has displaced approximately half a million people. The announcement of a ceasefire by Myanmar’s military and the alliance of armed ethnic minority groups marks a significant development, posing a substantial challenge to the junta in power since 2021.

    The Three Brotherhood Alliance is composed of ethnic armed groups, including the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Their progress has been noteworthy. On October 27, around 10,000 alliance fighters launched coordinated, large-scale assaults on military, police, and government-allied militia locations across Shan state. Over 100 military posts were captured as the military retreated, leaving behind substantial weaponry and ammunition.

    Major towns on the China border, such as Chin Shwe Haw and Mong Ko, have fallen to the alliance. Additionally, the alliance claims to have taken control of Hpawng Hseng, Pang Hseng, and Hsenwi villages. Rebel attacks have targeted Lashio, the largest town in Shan, while bridges and highways connecting Myanmar to China have been destroyed. The ongoing offensive, known as “Operation 1027,” has injected renewed momentum into the armed campaign to restore democracy in Myanmar.

    In response, the military has forcefully engaged anti-coup forces, utilizing indiscriminate air raids, deploying ground troops, and causing significant casualties among newly formed resistance cells. The military’s actions, guided by the longstanding “four cuts” policy, spared no targets, including schools, hospitals, and displacement camps. This policy aims to deprive resistance groups of essential resources such as food, funds, intelligence, and recruits by targeting their civilian support base.

    Therefore, the ceasefire is an imperative need for both conflicting parties and China. The alliance, which consistently advocates for the restoration of democracy in the state, has successfully seized strategic towns and border hubs in Myanmar’s northern Shan state. These areas are vital for trade with China, a crucial supporter and arms supplier to the military. However, China’s relationship with the Myanmar junta has experienced recent strains, primarily due to the junta’s inability to suppress online scam operations targeting Chinese citizens, as asserted by Beijing.

    Since November, residents have been fleeing Laukkai town, located in a district bordering China, which was under the control of a militia aligned with the Myanmar military. Laukkai had gained notoriety for activities such as gambling, prostitution, and online scams carried out in compounds where thousands, many of whom were trafficked, were employed. Reports of shells falling on the border have raised concerns about potential escalation, possibly drawing India into the conflict. India is already grappling with an increased influx of refugees from Myanmar, with the bordering state of Mizoram seeking assistance from the central government, as the number of Myanmar’s Army personnel entering Mizoram since November 13 has reached 636.

    In spite of a recent ceasefire, conflicts persist in northern Myanmar. Analysts posit that troops on both sides may be unaware of the ceasefire due to communication gaps, heightening the risk of misunderstandings that could lead to the collapse of the ceasefire. If the situation does not escalate with China’s mediation, there could be further disruptions in India’s involvement. Given the strained relations between the two countries in recent years, a political tug of war remains a possibility. Myanmar traditionally has political ties with India, but China possesses significant strategic interests in Myanmar, serving as the most direct route to the Indian Ocean without interference from India. The ceasefire, nevertheless, presents an opportunity for China to take a leading role in fostering peace in the region and positioning itself as a regional leader.

    The Myanmar Ethnic Alliance emphasizes that a ceasefire is the sole factor preventing them from capturing additional towns, while the Junta will use this time to prepare for further battles. The realization of peace in Myanmar seems distant unless democracy is established or comprehensive support is garnered from the international community. While global interest in Myanmar appears limited, the imperative for Myanmar’s stability and prosperity lies in the establishment of peace. Despite the perceived limited impact of the current ceasefire on the conflict-ridden nation, it is now crucial to initiate further dialogues and actively pursue peace.

  • Beyond Chaos: Myanmar’s Political Landscape in 2023

    Beyond Chaos: Myanmar’s Political Landscape in 2023

    Myanmar finds itself in a persistent predicament, entangled in the ongoing turmoil of the Myanmar civil war amidst the nation’s enduring insurgencies. These insurgencies gained momentum as a direct response to the 2021 military coup d’état and the subsequent harsh suppression of anti-coup protests.

    On February 1st, marking the second anniversary of the 2021 military coup d’état, the military chose to extend the country’s state of emergency for an additional six months. Predictably, on July 31st, Acting President Myint Swe announced a further six-month extension, citing the ongoing absence of normalcy in the country’s situation.

    Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Prize laureate and a prominent figure in Myanmar, known for her roles as the State Counsellor of Myanmar and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2016 to 2021, remains incarcerated. And also, the ruling military junta took a drastic step by dissolving the National League for Democracy, the political party led by Aung San Suu Kyi.

    On April 11, the Burmese junta carried out an airstrike in the village of Pazigyi (Kanbalu Township) in Sagaing region, resulting in the tragic loss of at least 100 lives. This marks the third major civilian attack since the junta’s offensive in Sagaing commenced in February and stands as the deadliest assault since the junta seized power in 2021.

    Three ethnic armed organisations—the Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army—launch simultaneous attacks named “Operation 1027” on October 27 on various military bases and towns in northeastern Myanmar. Lashio airport is shut down, a bridge is destroyed, and civilian casualties occur due to the military bombardment. On November 1, the Three Brotherhood Alliance intensified its assaults on junta outposts in northern Shan State as part of “Operation 1027.” By November 6, the Alliance captured Kawlin in Sagaing Region, making it the first district capital to fall to opposition forces, with reports of numerous casualties among soldiers and police officers.

    The volatile situation along the Myanmar border is drawing the attention of powerful neighbors China and India. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs urges Myanmar’s State Administration Council to collaborate with Chinese officials in safeguarding Chinese border villages. Meanwhile, on the Indian side, 39 Myanmar Army soldiers who abandoned their positions and fled into Mizoram are deported. The United Nations expresses concern about the heavy fighting in Shan State, highlighting the displacement of over 30,000 people.

    In a tragic incident, a Myanmar Air Force airplane bombs a school in Chin State, resulting in the heartbreaking loss of at least eight children. On December 13, as part of Operation 1027, Allied rebel forces declared the capture of the town of Maw Luu in Sagaing Region. The situation intensified on December 16 when the Three Brotherhood Alliance asserted the capture of Namhsan in northern Shan State, despite a temporary ceasefire mediated by China against the Myanmar military.

    Myanmar, grappling with the status of a failed state, faces escalating challenges. On December 12, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime revealed that Myanmar has surpassed Afghanistan as the world’s largest producer of opium. The nation’s ethnically diverse population stands on the brink of fragmentation, marked by increased violence, human rights abuses, and a bleak outlook. The struggle appears set to persist into 2024, with rebel groups making significant strides, amplifying the complexities facing Myanmar.