Tag: Opinion

  • Is Support for Hasina on the Rise in Bangladesh?

    Is Support for Hasina on the Rise in Bangladesh?

    Bangladesh has been in deep political turmoil for the past six months, marked by the ousting Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in mass protests led by students and Islamists. These demonstrations escalated into violent attacks on Hasina’s supporters and minorities. Even after Hasina fled the state and her official residence was vandalized and looted—down to her personal belongings—the unrest did not subside. Despite Western-backed Yunus Khan assuming the role of interim leader and promising imminent elections, even at the cost of constitutional changes, the situation remains unstable. After six months of chaos, the country’s deepening economic troubles and worsening living conditions have led many to lose hope and many to shift their support back to Hasina. Her party is witnessing a revival, and pro-Hasina hashtags are resurfacing on social media, fueling fears of further political turmoil in the days ahead.

    The country is now sharply divided into two factions. On one side are the forces that led the mass protests that ousted Sheikh Hasina—students, leftists, Islamists, and anti-India groups—who not only oppose Hasina but also reject the legacy of the nation’s founding leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and the Awami League, along with any historical ties to India.

    On the other side are Awami League supporters and those disillusioned with the interim government’s rule. This group remained largely silent over the past six months due to intense crackdowns, but they are slowly resurfacing. As part of this resurgence, Sheikh Hasina, now in exile in India, addressed her supporters, sparking widespread outrage. In response, violent attacks erupted against symbols of her legacy, including her family home and institutions built during her tenure in Bangladesh.

    Bangladesh police have arrested over 1,500 people since Saturday amid reports of mob violence and a sweeping security crackdown. The interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, called for calm following the attack on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s residence. Hours later, members of the student-led movement that ousted Hasina were attacked in Gazipur, near Dhaka, prompting students to demand action.

    The police crackdown, dubbed Operation Devil Hunt, is a joint effort between the army and police to suppress groups involved in recent violent incidents, targeting both supporters and opponents of the ousted premier. As Islamist factions gain ground, liberals and minorities who were once safeguarded under Hasina’s rule are increasingly becoming targets. On Monday, police placed publisher Shatabdi Bhaba under protective custody after a group of enraged Islamist students surrounded his stall at the Amar Ekushey Book Fair in Dhaka, where works by exiled feminist author Taslima Nasrin were on display.

    The interim government, grappling with instability, fears Sheikh Hasina’s return as the nation’s identity remains closely tied to the Awami League, which still commands a loyal and sizable support base. Alarmed by the party’s potential resurgence, the government is reportedly considering a constitutional ban to curb its influence. On Monday, Bangladesh National Party (BNP) Secretary-General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir met with interim leader Muhammad Yunus to voice concerns over the escalating unrest, according to AFP.

    Global perceptions of the Bangladesh riots that erupted in August have shifted in recent months. India appears to be leaning toward supporting Sheikh Hasina, wary of the prospect of Islamist rule on its eastern border. The viral image of Bangladeshi students desecrating Indian and Israeli flags circulated widely in India and the West, shaping opinions on the interim government.

    Western governments have also voiced serious concerns over the rise in extrajudicial killings in Bangladesh. In early February, Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), a Bangladeshi human rights organization monitoring attacks on minority communities, reported that 17 people had died in law enforcement custody during the interim government’s first five months, including a BNP leader. The report highlights an alarming increase in extrajudicial killings, fueling international criticism of human rights violations.

    Despite this, support for Hasina and the Awami League appears to be growing. Even as party offices and homes of Awami League leaders were targeted—attacks spanning 35 districts, including the residence of A.K.M. Mozammel Haque, Minister for Liberation War Affairs—Hasina’s leadership continues to command significant backing. Both the interim government and Islamist factions remain wary of the Awami League. If constitutional changes are not implemented and elections are further delayed, support for Hasina will likely continue to surge, raising the possibility of yet another political upheaval. Bangladesh has a long history of mass mobilization, and the prospect of a new uprising looms large.

  • Trump, Gaza, and the Politics of Departure: A Policy or a Punchline?

    Trump, Gaza, and the Politics of Departure: A Policy or a Punchline?

    Donald Trump has again urged Palestinians to leave Gaza for Egypt or Jordan. To outsiders, this might seem like a practical solution—why endure relentless Israeli bombardment, militant rule, and a collapsing infrastructure when they could escape? But Gazans and many Muslims see Gaza as more than just land; it embodies global solidarity and a generational struggle against Israel. They view their suffering as a sacrifice that deepens their commitment to the cause. They refuse to leave, whether by personal conviction or pressure from their supporters. Meanwhile, Israel, seeking territorial expansion, particularly in the West Bank, finds a willing ally in the United States, whose leaders take pride in making “great deals.” Some believe a relocation plan could work. With strong Muslim allies in the region, Trump, in theory, could try to broker such an agreement.

    Trump’s comment on Gaza has dominated headlines amid growing uncertainty over the territory’s future. While involved parties insist that any resolution will be tied to a ceasefire agreement, one outcome is certain—Israel will never allow Hamas or any other Islamist group to govern Gaza, even if elected. European and Arab states are pressing for the Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank, to take over. Meanwhile, another plan, long favored by Israel’s right wing, is quietly resurfacing: annexing Gaza and relocating its population to neighboring countries like Egypt and Jordan. Trump’s remarks have added momentum to this idea, and Netanyahu, backed by Israel’s right, might see it as a viable option. Yet for many Gazans, deeply connected to their land, religion, and Palestinian identity, forced relocation remains unthinkable. 

    Aboard Air Force One on Monday night, the U.S. president faced questions about his weekend remarks on “cleaning out” the Gaza Strip, whether temporarily or long-term. Trump reinforced his stance, saying he wanted Palestinians from Gaza to live in an area where they would not face constant disruption, revolution, and violence. He described Gaza as a place that had been in turmoil for many years, emphasizing that various civilizations had occupied the strip over thousands of years, always marked by violence. He suggested that people could be relocated to areas that were safer, possibly better, and more comfortable.

    Trump said he would visit Netanyahu and had spoken with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and Jordan’s King Abdullah on Sunday, insisting that both leaders would support the plan. On Monday, Abdullah also spoke with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, though the State Department’s statement on the call did not mention the issue. Trump expressed confidence that Sisi would accept some Palestinians, emphasizing that the U.S. had provided substantial aid to Egypt and that he considered Sisi a friend. He acknowledged Egypt’s challenging geopolitical position but insisted that both Sisi and King Abdullah would cooperate.

    However, both Amman and Cairo have firmly rejected the idea, making it clear that Trump’s proposal is not an option. Yet, if Trump were to apply pressure through tariffs and tougher measures, and if he acted adamantly, Egypt and Jordan—perhaps even Saudi Arabia—might eventually follow his lead.

    Gaza’s dire conditions further bolster the case for relocation. Fifteen months of war have devastated 70% of its infrastructure, pushing 2.3 million residents into a deep humanitarian crisis. Before a ceasefire took effect earlier this month, more than 47,000 people had been killed, and nearly 90% of the population had been displaced—many multiple times—according to Palestinian support sources. Rebuilding remains an immense challenge, especially as aid organizations like UNRWA face scrutiny from Israel.Even before the war, Gaza relied heavily on aid, and the worsening conditions have led many to consider leaving. This option could become more feasible if the United States and Arab countries provide support.

    Mediators have begun preliminary work on the second phase of ceasefire negotiations, expected to take effect in early March. Under this phase, Israel is supposed to fully withdraw from Gaza, while Hamas is expected to disarm. However, the Israeli government will likely align with Trump’s plan and engage with neighboring Arab countries, potentially paving the way for a broader deal shaped by continued U.S. involvement.

  • A Return to Tradition? Iraq Legalizes Child Marriages

    A Return to Tradition? Iraq Legalizes Child Marriages

    Iraq, a parliamentary republic in the Middle East, has long distinguished itself from theocratic regimes like Iran or Afghanistan, where strict Sharia laws and conservative Islamic customs dominate. Unlike these nations, Iraq’s multi-ethnic society encompasses diverse beliefs and traditions, reflected in its post-2005 constitutional framework that allows political parties and communities a degree of autonomy to interpret and practice their customs, even if not directly restricted by federal laws.

    One of the most contentious issues in the Islamic world—child marriage—has now entered the spotlight in Iraq. While the country’s official legal framework sets the marriage age at 18, adopting principles rooted in modern Egyptian law influenced by French legal traditions, many communities have continued to practice child marriage. These informal practices are now being formally legitimized under the influence of the Sadrist Movement, an Iraqi Shi’a Islamic nationalist political force led by Muqtada al-Sadr.

    With the government’s decision to legalize child marriages, Iraq appears to be moving closer to adopting a model resembling that of Iran’s Islamic Republic, where traditional and religious codes overshadow modern legal frameworks. This shift raises concerns about Iraq’s trajectory, signaling a potential alignment with stricter interpretations of Sharia law and marking a significant transformation in its societal and political fabric.

    Although Iraq has prohibited marriage for those under 18 since the 1950s, with judicial approval required for those aged 15 to 17, a UN survey found that 28% of girls in Iraq are married before adulthood. Many girls are either coerced or pressured into marriage, often dropping out of school to do so.

    Instead of strengthening laws to prevent underage marriage or providing support for girls from disadvantaged backgrounds to finish their education, recent amendments to Iraq’s Personal Status Law could have the opposite effect. The new law, passed by parliament, would allow girls as young as nine to marry and shift authority over family matters—including marriage, divorce, and child custody—to religious bodies. Critics argue that these amendments effectively legalize child marriage, deepening concerns about the protection of girls’ rights in Iraq.

    The amendments have sparked widespread outrage among Iraqi MPs and women’s rights advocates, who argue that the law represents a significant setback. Many warn that it effectively legitimizes child exploitation, with activists condemning it as “Legalizing Child Rape.” This controversial shift has drawn intense criticism, with concerns that it will undermine the rights and futures of young girls in Iraq. Critics—including activists and opposing lawmakers—caution that, if enacted, the changes would likely lead to a rise in underage marriages, further jeopardizing the well-being and opportunities of young girls throughout the country.

    Activists argue that the push to legalize child marriage is a calculated attack on women’s rights and freedoms, driven by the prominent role young women played in Iraq’s 2019 anti-government protests. The mass demonstrations, primarily led by youth, emphasized the growing empowerment of women in Iraqi society. In the aftermath, political and religious factions viewed feminist movements, women’s organizations, and activist networks as direct challenges to their power and authority. As a result, these groups were seen as threats, prompting efforts to suppress and restrict them.

    Proponents of the amendments, largely supported by conservative Shia lawmakers, argue that the changes are necessary to align Iraq’s laws with Islamic principles and to shield the country from perceived Western cultural influence. However, critics see this as an attempt to tether Iraq more closely to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which views the West as an adversary and frames its policies as a defense of Islamic values. As Iran’s influence wanes in Syria and Lebanon, Iraq has become a key battleground for asserting regional dominance. By bolstering the Shia government’s control in Iraq, Iran aims to strengthen its grip on the country and pull it further into the fold of the Islamic Republic.

  • Can the Philippines be found on Trump’s Map of Ambitions?

    Can the Philippines be found on Trump’s Map of Ambitions?

    Donald Trump, the real estate mogul-turned-politician, returned to the U.S. presidency after a four-year break, setting a record as the oldest president ever to hold office. Back in power, his focus has shifted to expanding the nation’s influence by acquiring new territories, beginning with Greenland, which he views as strategically vital due to its location and rich natural resources. He has also proposed the idea of Canada becoming the 51st state, stressing the potential benefits for both nations. Meanwhile, rumors circulating on social media suggest that Trump may target other regions, including Panama, the Gulf of Mexico, and even the Philippines, a former U.S. colony. While some dismiss these ambitions as mere fantasy, Trump remains resolute, driven by his bold vision and relentless pursuit of new opportunities.

    Greenland and Canada have long been strategically important due to their proximity to Russia and their access to the emerging trans-Arctic trade route. However, the war in Ukraine has revealed a shift in global power dynamics, with Russia’s influence waning and China emerging as a more significant threat to the U.S. This prompts a crucial question: Is Trump eyeing territories closer to China? While the U.S. already maintains strong alliances with nations like Japan and South Korea, Trump’s continued interest in Greenland and Canada suggests his ambitions may go beyond just security, seeking broader strategic objectives. Trump’s strategy seems to revolve around securing regions that provide both strategic advantages and increased global influence for the U.S. As part of this broader vision, he may turn his attention to territories closer to China. Enter the Philippines: strategically positioned in the Asia-Pacific and just off China’s shores, it remains one of the most Americanized countries in the region due to its history as a former U.S. colony. The Philippines could play a significant role in Trump’s long-term plans.

    Filipinos hold the distinction of being the oldest Asian ethnic group in the Americas, a legacy shaped by their arrival on North American shores more than four centuries ago. Filipino sailors, who made their way across the vast Pacific, were the first Asians to step onto what is now U.S. territory, reaching Morro Bay, California, as early as 1587. In 1763, a group of Filipinos established the first permanent settlement in Louisiana, giving rise to the Manilamen, a community whose members would later distinguish themselves in one of the most pivotal moments in American history. During the War of 1812, they fought alongside Americans in the Battle of New Orleans, their contributions a quiet but significant part of the nation’s struggle against the British Empire.

    The American state of Texas, once part of Spanish territory, was once christened “New Philippines” by the Spanish themselves. This name was not born of affection but of ambition—a vision of replicating the prosperity they had fostered in the Philippines on this side of the world. In 1898, the Philippine Revolution, inspired by the ideals of the French and American revolutions, reverberated with a demand for independence from Spanish rule. What followed was the United States’ acquisition of the Philippines through the Treaty of Paris, an act that set in motion not just the purchase, but the military invasion that would dismantle the nascent First Philippine Republic. The subsequent Philippine–American War would see the dissolution of Filipino sovereignty, and for all but a brief period of Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945, the archipelago would remain under U.S. governance until 1946.

    Since the Philippines gained independence, the relationship between the country and the United States has remained strong, with deep ties across almost every sector. As one of the U.S.’s oldest partners in Asia and a crucial non-NATO ally, the Philippines holds significant strategic value. Unlike many former colonies, the Philippines has consistently maintained a positive view of the U.S., with surveys showing strong support over the years. This enduring favorability positions the Philippines as both a valuable ally and a potentially appealing candidate for annexation under Trump’s strategy.

    While the two nations share many cultural and historical connections, the idea of merging them would not be easily accepted by all. Though one could argue that such a move could lead to a stronger economy, better infrastructure, and more efficient governance, the political realities make this unlikely. The Philippines has one of the most corrupt political landscapes, dominated by powerful dynasties, where fair democratic processes often struggle. Therefore, Philippine politics would most likely reject any attempt to join the United States.

    A move to annex the Philippines would undoubtedly strengthen the U.S.’s influence in Asia, with a developed Philippines potentially playing a more prominent role in regional affairs. However, unlike Greenland and Canada, the Philippines lacks substantial natural resources, and its much larger population presents distinct challenges. Additionally, such a significant shift could attract accusations of recolonization, making it unpopular globally. While the possibility remains unlikely, it is not entirely out of the question—Donald Trump has a history of pursuing unconventional moves.

  • Can Yemen’s Crisis Find a Resolution, Like Syria’s?

    Can Yemen’s Crisis Find a Resolution, Like Syria’s?

    The Arab Spring, fueled by Islamist populist movements advocating for Islamic rule and opposing dictatorial regimes, plunged many nations into chaos. This upheaval fractured several countries, leaving them embroiled in civil wars that have lasted over 13 years. Despite numerous peace talks over this period, most efforts ended in stalemates. Meanwhile, several global powers exploited these conflicts, strengthening their influence. Iran, in particular, expanded its regional power by funding and directing proxy groups involved in civil wars across various nations.

    However, The ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran is helping various factions in war to break long-standing deadlocks. Syria offers a key example. Despite significant risks, Israel-backed forces successfully challenged Iran-aligned factions, collaborating with allies like Turkey to oust the Iran-backed regime and ultimately reach a resolution. A similar shift appears to be unfolding in Yemen, where Israel’s growing focus on the region has sparked renewed optimism that a resolution to the prolonged conflict may finally be within sight.

    Yemen, with its strategic geopolitical location, once served as a vital trade hub between the East and West. For much of its history, Yemeni cities were among the wealthiest in the Arabian Peninsula, flourishing along key trade routes. However, its strategic importance made Yemen vulnerable to superpowers, and it eventually fell under the control of Islamic kingdoms and European powers. The modern state of Yemen, as we know it today, was established in 1990 following the unification of the previously divided South and North. Yet, foreign influence and interests did not diminish. Saudi Arabia and the United States continued to pursue their agendas in Yemen—Saudi Arabia aiming to create a Shia-free region, while the U.S. sought to maintain control over this vital geopolitical location.

    Ali Abdullah Saleh, the leader who unified Yemen, soon began treating the country as his personal fiefdom. However, his failure to build strong state institutions hampered Yemen’s development into a stable nation. Instead, Yemen’s political landscape became defined by a fragile form of collaborative governance, where competing tribal, regional, religious, and political interests coexisted through an unspoken arrangement. This informal structure was underpinned by a power-sharing agreement among three key figures: President Saleh, who controlled the state; Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who commanded the majority of Yemen’s armed forces; and Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar, the leader of the Islamist al-Islah party, who served as a Saudi-appointed broker overseeing transnational patronage payments to various political factions, including influential tribal leaders.

    Misgovernance, internal divisions, and deteriorating living conditions in Yemen created a fertile environment for terrorism, turning the country into a recruitment hub for various Islamic organizations. Despite the worsening situation, Saleh managed to hold on to power through fraudulent elections. During the Arab Spring, multiple groups united in opposition to him, sparking a new wave of civil war. However, the opposition quickly fragmented, and as various factions seized control of different regions, each pursuing its own agenda, Yemen was pushed further into crisis, edging closer to collapse.

    Like in Syria, Iran plays a significant role in Yemen by backing the Houthis, a group of militants advocating for the implementation of Shia Islamic law. The Houthis are notorious for their attacks on maritime shipping routes, as well as for their strikes on Saudi oil refineries and their solidarity with Hamas and Iran in their opposition to Israel. They control a large portion of Yemen, primarily in the former northern part of the country. For years, international watchdogs and superpowers largely avoided engaging with the Houthis or seeking resolutions in Yemen. However, as the Houthis continue their attacks on Israel, it’s increasingly likely that Israel will retaliate. Israel may follow a strategy similar to the one it used in Syria, which could bring hope for Yemen. In Syria, Israel successfully targeted Hezbollah fighters, aligned with Iran, forcing them to collapse and paving the way for forces backed by the United States ally Turkey to topple the Iran-supported regime, ultimately bringing an end to the civil war.

    In Yemen, Israel may target the Houthis with the support of its intelligence agencies, while Saudi-backed troops, potentially bolstered by U.S. assistance, could attempt to seize control of Sanaa. However, Yemen presents a unique challenge for Israel due to its geographical distance and the significant cultural and social differences from Syria.

    Yemen is now fragmented into at least six parts, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States playing key roles within the country. While Iran and its Houthi allies remain entrenched, other factions could unite in the conflict. If Israel were to target the Houthis, opposing groups or their coalition partners could likely execute a relatively straightforward mission. This would involve a surgical strike strategy and targeted attacks similar to those that severely weakened Hezbollah by eliminating key leaders. If successful, the Houthis would be significantly diminished, reducing their threat. Although the timeline for such an outcome remains uncertain, if the Houthis persist in their missile attacks against Israel, a resolution will eventually emerge. This could provide an opportunity for opposition groups in Yemen to retake the capital and reunify the nation.

  • How Long Can South Korea’s Suspended President Cling On?

    How Long Can South Korea’s Suspended President Cling On?

    Yoon Yuk-Seoul, still clinging to his role as South Korea’s president, defies persistent calls for his resignation despite being impeached by parliament. Massive protests forced him to retract his abrupt declaration of martial law, and his humiliation deepened when members of his own party joined the opposition in voting for his removal. Yet, Yoon refuses to step down, undeterred by parliament’s decision to strip him of all powers and duties. The nation now turns its attention to the Constitutional Court, tasked with deciding Yoon’s political future. The court must determine whether to remove him from office permanently or restore his authority. Deliberations are underway, but concerns about the court’s impartiality persist, as critics question its alleged ties to the disgraced president. A single favorable ruling could allow Yoon to retain his tenuous grip on power. Beyond the legal and political battles, the streets of South Korea are witnessing an extraordinary display of civic resistance, with protesters demanding not only Yoon’s resignation but also his imprisonment.

    On Saturday, thousands of South Koreans poured into central Seoul, amplifying their calls for the removal of suspended President Yoon Suk Yeol. This surge in protest came just one day after parliament’s vote to impeach Han Duck-soo, Yoon’s acting replacement, adding yet another twist to the nation’s spiraling political crisis. Han’s impeachment, driven by his refusal to appoint three judges to the Constitutional Court—the very body tasked with deciding Yoon’s fate—highlighted the chaos engulfing South Korea’s leadership. Neither the people nor the opposition are willing to wait for the Constitutional Court’s decision on Yoon’s impeachment, which must come within its 180-day deadline and looms over the country like a storm cloud. The court’s ruling hinges on critical judicial appointments. If new justices replace the three who stepped down in October at the end of their terms, Yoon’s chances of being found guilty of violating the constitution through his martial law declaration and related actions could rise significantly. However, if the decision is left to the current six judges, the stakes increase dramatically. A unanimous verdict would be required to uphold his impeachment; one dissenting judge would reinstate Yoon

    Undeterred by freezing temperatures, South Koreans continue to flood the streets to save their democracy. The protests, which have steadily grown since Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed declaration of martial law on December 3, have transformed Seoul’s historic Gwanghwamun area into a vibrant display of civic engagement. The rallies, blending youthful energy with political urgency, feature protesters carrying K-pop light sticks and banners from civil society groups. Organizers reported that over 500,000 people participated in the latest demonstration, which unfolded under heavy police presence. Marchers called for Yoon Suk Yeol’s imprisonment as they moved from Gyeongbokgung Palace to the busy Myeongdong shopping district, singing along to K-pop music blasting from speaker trucks. The atmosphere, a mix of celebratory fervor and serious political messaging, drew opposition leader Lee Jae-myung, who joined protesters on the ground in a gesture of solidarity. Despite the enormous crowd, the rally remained peaceful and well-organized.

    The court building itself has been barricaded by police buses and heavily guarded. Hundreds of flower wreaths, sent by Yoon’s supporters, line the barriers, each bearing messages of support for the suspended president. About a kilometer away from the main demonstration, a large counterprotest led by far-right evangelical Christian groups gathered to oppose the impeachment. Comprising mostly elderly individuals, their tone was hostile as they denounced the parliamentary impeachment votes as invalid and called for Yoon’s reinstatement. Despite this, recent polls show that a majority of South Koreans support Yoon’s removal from office following his attempt to impose martial law earlier this month.

    With parliament having done its part, the focus now shifts back to the Constitutional Court. Under normal circumstances, six of the court’s nine justices must approve parliament’s impeachment vote for Yoon to be removed from office, triggering an election to be held within 60 days of their ruling. Han, the impeached acting president who previously served as prime minister under Yoon, steps aside to make way for a temporary successor, finance minister Choi Sang-mok, as parliament moves further down the pecking order to fill the country’s leadership vacuum. Choi, the new acting president, announced on Friday that the government had ordered the military to heighten vigilance and prepare to prevent North Korea from miscalculating the situation and launching provocations.

    While the ruling party believes it can extend Yoon’s time in office until the Constitutional Court delivers its verdict, the evolving political landscape has become increasingly unfavorable to both the party and President Yoon. Though they hope to delay the process as public sentiment lightens, the reality is that the situation worsens day by day, with rising anger toward the president and his party, sparking more protests and increasing pressure on Yoon. Nonetheless, he clings to power at any cost, desperately holding onto the presidency. It is clear that the opposition will not allow any further time, with a parliamentary majority ready to oust him. The political crisis will persist until a new presidential election is held, and Yoon is likely to hold on, struggling to maintain his position until then.

  • Does Israel Want To Expand?

    Does Israel Want To Expand?

    Israel is often seen as having no expansion plans beyond the territories of the former British Mandate. Its actions following the Six-Day War support this perception, as it briefly held Gaza and returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, both gained during the conflict. Similarly, Israel reclaimed areas under the British Mandate from Jordan, specifically the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which were previously under Jordanian control. After regaining these territories, Israel negotiated agreements with neighboring countries, promoting mutual respect for borders and significantly reducing regional tensions.

    The territories reclaimed from Egypt and Jordan are now recognized by international authorities as part of the Palestinian state. However, Israel expanded its Jewish population in these areas through planned settlement growth, transforming arid deserts into fertile land, and relocating more people to these regions. Numerous reports, even before the renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas on October 7, 2022, point to Israel’s de facto annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In contrast, Israel has made fewer efforts to establish settlements in Gaza, and the situation has largely remained stable since the withdrawal of settlements in 2005. However, following the October 7 attacks, it is now clear that Israel will likely follow the strategies it used in the West Bank, leading to further encroachment on what some view as the future state of an independent Palestine.

    Israel’s recent actions have raised further doubts, as its expansion plans now appear to extend beyond the former British Mandate. In addition to these territories, Israel continues to control the Golan Heights, which was not part of the British Mandate and which the international community still recognizes as part of Syria, and which it has not returned through peace negotiations. As Israel shifts its military operations toward its borders with Lebanon and Syria, and with Gaza no longer posing an immediate threat from the south, the country seems to be intensifying its focus on the Golan Heights. Israel is following the same strategies used in the West Bank. The Israeli government has approved a plan to invest over $11 million in the occupied Golan Heights, aiming to double the region’s population. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the initiative an important response to the evolving “New Front” with Syria, emphasizing that strengthening the Golan Heights is essential for strengthening Israel at this time. Netanyahu reiterated the government’s intent to retain the area, promote its development, and expand settlements there. 

    Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Israel established a buffer zone by stationing troops on the Syrian side of the border, arguing that previous ceasefire agreements had collapsed due to changes in Damascus. Reports suggest that Israeli troops have extended their presence beyond this buffer zone in several areas. The Golan Heights is home to over 50,000 people, including Jewish Israelis and members of the Druze and Alawite religious minorities. As the Jewish population grows and Syria maintains stable governance, the Muslim population may move towards Syria, which will likely lead to undisputed Israeli control of the Golan Heights. There are now more than 30 Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights, housing around 20,000 people. Netanyahu stated that Israel would continue to hold onto the territory, make it flourish, and expand settlements there. This announcement followed a day after Syria’s new de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, criticized Israel for its ongoing strikes on military targets in Syria, reportedly targeting military facilities.

    As Netanyahu maintains a cruise mode, he is likely to adopt a more aggressive approach. The Golan Heights, surrounding areas, Lebanon, and even Yemen hold historical significance for the Jewish people, with a once-thriving Jewish population that was displaced by Arabs. Given this, Netanyahu may plan to re-establish settlements in these regions to serve Jewish interests. It may seem like an exaggeration, but by observing these trends, it is clear that Israel seeks expansion, citing security as the justification. This pattern is evident in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, Lebanon, and potentially Aden. The Jewish people have a deep connection to their history.

  • Why North Korea Isn’t Weighing In on the South’s Turmoil?

    Why North Korea Isn’t Weighing In on the South’s Turmoil?

    They thrive on mocking and humiliating each other, with their rivalry defining their existence. North Korea and South Korea—one people divided by contrasting ideologies and governments have long competed to showcase which system best serves its people. The two Koreas—South and North—function like estranged brothers, each leveraging hatred for the other to bolster faith in their respective administrations. Without the enmity and stark administrative differences, they are fundamentally the same people—potentially capable of uniting. To prevent this, politicians on both sides benefit from perpetuating hostility.

    Yet, when South Korea plunges into political turmoil, dividing both politicians and citizens, North Korea remains unusually silent and calm—a stark contrast to the typical animosity between the two countries. President Yoon, the central figure in South Korea’s political drama, harbors deep animosity toward the North, skillfully leveraging this hatred to his advantage. He even links opposition forces to North Korea to justify his controversial martial law declaration, a move that has further inflamed an already charged political climate and put him under threat—a perfect situation for North Korea to act.

    Strangely, despite numerous opportunities to exploit South Korea’s vulnerability or launch a powerful propaganda attack, North Korea has chosen restraint. It remains inactive, refraining from using the chaos to fuel domestic narratives. Why has this traditionally aggressive neighbor, so known for its hostility, suddenly embraced such uncharacteristic restraint and maturity?

    North Korean state media typically exploit any signs of public dissent in the South, using them to depict South Korea’s democratic system and its leaders as corrupt and inept. Yet, for over a week, North Korea chose not to capitalize on the opportunity, refraining from mocking its ideological adversary and missing a chance to showcase the supposed superiority of its socialist communist model.

    North Korea has used the situation to argue that the South unfairly blames it for all its domestic troubles, sowing doubt even within South Korea itself. President Yoon’s martial law declaration, for instance, claimed that “anti-state” and “North Korean communist forces” had infiltrated his domestic political opposition—a claim that holds little substantive merit. There has also been a gradual reduction in the coverage the North provides its people about the South in state media, because they no longer want to emphasize the South. Instead, they aim to position it as “Just another” country.

    Some analysts suggest that Pyongyang refrained from broadcasting images of mass protests in South Korea to avoid inspiring similar uprisings among its own citizens. Others believe the North fears that turmoil in the South might compel its government, under pressure, to divert public attention by provoking a security incident with Pyongyang. Another theory points to Pyongyang’s decision in late 2023 to amend its constitution, officially designating South Korea as a “Belligerent state” and reframing their relationship as one between “Two hostile states”. This shift marks a departure from the North’s previous rhetoric of the two Koreas as a single, homogenous people destined for reunification.

    Some believe North Korea withheld reports on South Korea’s unrest, fearing it might inspire its own citizens to resist their leadership. However, for others, Pyongyang’s approach seems more strategic, as it aims to navigate this period of South Korean vulnerability with its long-term objectives in mind.

    The North did not stay silent. On Wednesday, KCNA covered the events in South Korea with its trademark inflammatory tone, describing the declaration of martial law by President Yoon Suk Yeol as a shocking move. The report condemned his actions as those of a fascist regime, claiming that the South Korean military was a “Gangster organization” and describing Yoon’s declaration as “A disaster.” It also claimed that the South Korean public was demanding his immediate impeachment and punishment. The report included about 20 photos, but none showed South Korean civilians resisting the military outside the parliament. The tone of the coverage suggests that the North sees the South’s political struggles as an opportunity to further distance itself, reinforcing its identity as fundamentally separate. It seems intent on severing ties with its “Brother” to pursue its own path.

  • Will Pakistan’s Shias Meet the Same Fate as Its Other Minorities?

    Will Pakistan’s Shias Meet the Same Fate as Its Other Minorities?

    Pakistan, the first Islamic Republic, has gained notoriety for its treatment of minorities, who endure forced conversions, abductions of their daughters, killings, or imprisonment under harsh blasphemy laws. The country’s troubled history with minorities spans decades and has become institutionalized over time. Although divisions among communities were visible from its inception, the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq, who ruled from 1977 to 1988, entrenched these divisions further. Under his rule, Pakistan’s laws became deeply rooted in Islamic principles. Zia’s Islamization policies enforced a strict Sunni interpretation of Islam, marginalizing other communities. These policies, combined with Islamic politics, deepened societal divisions and escalated violence against minorities.

    Persecution under Islamic laws initially targeted non-Muslims, such as Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians, who chose to remain in Pakistan despite warnings of potential dangers. However, discrimination soon extended to sects within Islam. The Ahmadiyya community faced brutal suppression, and in 1974, a constitutional amendment officially declared them “Non-Muslim,” effectively giving extremists a license to attack them.

    Shias, the largest religious minority group in Pakistan, have also been frequent targets of sectarian violence. The historical feud between Shias and Sunnis, rooted in centuries-old differences in religious practices, continues to fuel such violence. Extremists often view acts like killing each other as religious duties. In Pakistan’s Sunni-majority republic, Shias have faced systemic oppression and exclusion from the mainstream. Mosques are frequently bombed during religious festivals and other significant occasions, while Shia followers are pressured to conform to Sunni practices and teachings.

    Shias actively resisted movements that threatened their religious practices, including Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization campaign, which they viewed as “Sunnification.” In July 1980, 25,000 Shias staged a famous protest in Islamabad against these laws. However, such protests only deepened hostilities. Despite their resistance, sectarian violence continued unabated, and deaths became a grim norm. Between 2001 and 2018, approximately 4,800 Shias were killed in sectarian violence

    After a brief period of increased political clashes taking center stage, the Sunni-Shia conflict is once again escalating in the Islamic Republic, particularly since the last parliamentary elections. In the latest development, around 300 families have fled sectarian violence in northwest Pakistan, as fresh clashes killed 32 people last Saturday. Sporadic fighting between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the mountainous Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which borders Afghanistan, has claimed the lives of about 150 people in recent months.  The independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that 79 people died between July and October due to sectarian violence. The death toll is expected to rise as fighting between Shia and Sunni communities continues in multiple locations. The recent clashes, which left 32 dead—14 Sunnis and 18 Shias—occurred just two days after gunmen opened fire on two separate convoys of Shia Muslims traveling with a police escort in Kurram, killing 43 people and leaving 11 in critical condition, according to officials. On Friday evening, in Kurram, a once semi-autonomous region, Shia Muslims attacked several Sunni locations in retaliation. 

    The conflict is set to intensify in the coming days, with Shias likely to endure even greater suffering. Pakistan’s ineffective administration is ill-equipped to address the situation, and the increasing Sunnification of its politics, combined with the Taliban’s growing influence in the region, will exacerbate the persecution of Shias. The weakening Islamic Republic of Iran will further contribute to this crisis. 

    Pakistan, as an ally of the United States, has effectively masked these atrocities from global scrutiny by fabricating data and manipulating narratives to downplay the extent of persecution. As a result, the international community remains largely unaware of the true scale of injustices faced by minorities and marginalized sects in the country. However, Pakistan cannot advance or survive while promoting deeply entrenched sectarian divisions. Emphasizing Islamic fervor and anti-India rhetoric might briefly unite factions, but it does not provide a sustainable path forward.

  • Why Should India Consider Changing Its Capital?

    Why Should India Consider Changing Its Capital?

    Delhi is now a living nightmare. Apologies to the 1.4 billion people of India, but it must be said. As the capital territory of India, the world’s most populous country, and home to nearly 20 million residents, Delhi is one of the largest urban agglomerations on the planet. However, it has become an increasingly difficult place to live. The air pollution has reached a level where living there poses severe health risks, and the government has proven unable—or perhaps unwilling—to address the crisis effectively. 

    Delhi’s struggle with pollution is not a recent phenomenon; it has been grappling with this problem for years. Poor urban planning, combined with a rapidly expanding population, has only exacerbated the situation. Moreover, deep-rooted cultural practices and resistance to change have hindered the implementation of necessary pollution-control measures.

    Despite these challenges, Delhi remains the nerve center of India. It houses the military headquarters, judiciary, ministries, and numerous other vital institutions. People traveling from distant regions to work or seek services here must endure the city’s harsh conditions.

    This dire situation has prompted some political experts to propose a controversial idea: should India consider relocating the capital? Building a new, planned capital city—alongside other new towns—could be a step toward alleviating the pressure on Delhi and fostering sustainable development.

    The suggestion has not gained public traction or widespread endorsement, remaining largely confined to discussions among think tanks. It is expected to trigger significant backlash, as people fear it could negatively impact Delhi’s real estate market, businesses, and the overall importance of the national capital territory. This is one reason political parties have been reluctant to initiate such proposals.

    Delhi was chosen as India’s capital centuries ago due to its strategic location for Indian emperors. At that time, India stretched from Afghanistan in the west to Assam in the east, and Delhi’s central position made it an ideal seat of power. In the modern era, while Delhi is no longer geographically central, the threats from northern enemy states and the financial constraints of relocating the capital prevented any change.

    However, today, pollution has emerged as the greatest challenge for Delhi. It has drawn criticism not only from foreign diplomats working in India’s capital but also from Indian judiciary members, bureaucrats, and think tanks, who struggle with the deteriorating living conditions in the city.

    As of Wednesday morning, Delhi’s air quality remained in the “Severe” category, with an average Air Quality Index (AQI) of 427, making it the most polluted city in India. Of the 38 air quality monitoring stations in the city, 12 reported AQI levels of 450 or higher.

    Compounding the situation, Delhi experienced its first below-normal minimum temperature of the season, dropping to 11.2 degrees Celsius on Wednesday. This followed a period of above-average temperatures since mid-October. The maximum temperature on Tuesday was recorded at 25.4 degrees Celsius, two degrees below normal. Cold westerly winds and clear skies have contributed to this drop in mercury levels.

    As winter approaches, the prospect of worsening pollution levels becomes increasingly likely, further exacerbating the already difficult living conditions in the city.

    The government has introduced various measures, such as banning crop burning—a practice tied to cultural rituals—restricting the use of firecrackers during festive seasons, and controlling motor vehicle emissions. However, these efforts have largely been in vain. Without a long-term strategy and widespread cooperation, meaningful change seems unlikely. In a bureaucratic country like India, such efforts are even harder to implement effectively.

    The difficulty in curbing pollution has fueled the idea of relocating the capital. While some suggest seasonal shifts, this is impractical for a nation with such a large bureaucracy and extensive ministries. Instead, a permanent change—or at least relocating certain ministries to other cities—has gained attention. Others propose creating a new, purpose-built capital, similar to Indonesia’s plan for its new administrative center.

    The idea comes with both positives and negatives. On the positive side, relocating the capital could significantly improve quality of life, and a new city could be planned efficiently from the ground up. For a country like India, the investment required is manageable, and the project would create numerous jobs. However, the negatives are substantial. The process would involve moving an enormous number of files, developing extensive infrastructure, and accommodating thousands of government employees and their families.

    Despite the challenges, the positives clearly outweigh the negatives. The lack of creativity in leadership, administrative inefficiency, and political hurdles remain significant barriers, but the government cannot afford to delay action indefinitely. The capital territory is metaphorically and literally burning, and decisive steps are urgently needed.

    Historically, there have been attempts to shift the administration away from Delhi. Sikandar Lodi moved it to Agra, Jahangir to Allahabad, Muhammad bin Tughlaq to Daulatabad, and the British to Calcutta. Yet, all these changes were short-lived, with the capital eventually returning to Delhi.

    Critics opposing the idea of a capital change argue against its feasibility, but careful planning can address their concerns. Several cities could be contenders for the new capital. However, given that every state in the northern belt faces similar crises, no city in the region currently offers a viable alternative for managing border tensions.

    Meanwhile, southern and coastal cities in India, which are comparatively less polluted, also present challenges. These cities are already overcrowded and lack the infrastructure to accommodate such a significant expansion. This suggests that India may need to build a new, purpose-planned city to serve as its capital. Post-independence, India has successfully developed several cities, including Chandigarh and Amaravati, demonstrating its capability to undertake such projects. However, the challenges will be significant.

    The next generation is likely to prioritize health over emotional attachments. After all, without clean air to breathe, there can be no emotions—and no life. Therefore, experts believe the Indian government will likely embrace this idea in the near future.