Tag: Opinion

How Does Iran Grant Israel a License for Direct Attack?

There is no room for talks, compromises, or peace in the ongoing “Holy War” between Israel and Iran. The conflict has escalated far beyond the initial Israel-Hamas confrontation and Israel’s retaliatory actions following the October 7th Hamas attack. It has now transformed into a broader war between Jews and Shiite Muslims, rooted in centuries of conflict. There had been hope that the leaders of Israel and Iran would avoid direct confrontation, recognizing the massive regional repercussions, and that the fighting would remain limited to their proxies. However, recent missile attacks by Iran on Israel have raised fears that both countries are preparing for an all-out war.

While Israel and Iran do not share a direct border, the conflict would likely involve air strikes, with both sides seeking maximum destruction. Such a war would likely be more devastating than previous Israel-Arab wars. It is fair to say the Islamic Republic of Iran is at greater risk, as Israel has demonstrated its ability to eliminate enemies, even from a distance, through strategically planned operations. By engaging in direct conflict, Iran’s Islamic Republic is digging its own grave, much like Hamas did.

Israel, it seems, had been waiting for the right moment – perhaps even wanting a provocation from Hamas, one that would justify its long-standing desire to eliminate the group. When Hamas launched its attack, with its sheer scale and brazen style, it gave Israel the pretext to escalate its response to a new and more intense level. Around this time last year, Israel was in a precarious position. The nation’s political landscape was fractured, with deep divisions tearing at the fabric of its government. Protests rippled across the country, aimed squarely at its leaders. Internationally, too, Israel was grappling with a diminished standing as Saudi Arabia emerged as a rising regional power, frequently outpacing Israel in garnering the favor of the United States. Sensing an opportunity, Hamas sought to capitalize on Israel’s weakened position, launching the terrorist attack on October 7th. But what was likely intended to further destabilize Israel instead offered the nation an opportunity to unite and strike back with renewed force.

Now, nearly a year later, Israel is in a position of triumph. They have regained their place at the center of international politics, reaffirming their status as the United States top ally in the region. Domestically, they are more unified despite earlier divisions, and they have successfully eliminated key leaders of their enemies. Hamas and Hezbollah lost their top figures, Ismael Haniyeh and Hassan Nasrallah, while these leaders remain in hiding. Israel’s military success, along with its strategic use of information warfare via the internet, has garnered global support in an unprecedented way.

However, the real challenge for Israel comes from the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose theocratic government believes that eliminating Israel is their duty. Iran doesn’t intervene directly but leads the clashes through proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran has previously launched missiles in solidarity with its suffering proxies, responding to the humiliation faced from Israel, but these attempts failed. Meanwhile, Israel, which takes every step more cunningly in this war, is waiting for a motive for a direct strike on Iran.

Recently, on October 1st, a day before the Jewish New Year and the International Day of Non-Violence, Iran launched another missile barrage on Israel and supported an attack by Hamas. While the success rate was low, it stunned both Israel and the world. Iran may feel it succeeded in demonstrating its capabilities to the international community, but in reality, it has given Israel the opportunity to increase pressure and mount further attacks on Iran, much like how Hamas’s actions led Israel to invade Gaza. Israel can now present itself as being targeted by Iran, positioning its retaliatory actions as necessary for its self-defense.

The fear of an all-out war or escalation between Israel and Iran and their respective allies is at an all-time high. Iran’s recent actions are indicative of its frustration. The Islamic Republic’s most significant leverage is its role as the protector of Islam, and any questioning of that role could result in a loss of grip on power. Should Iran lose this grip, it could lead to the downfall of Hamas, Hezbollah, and many other organizations backed by Iran, making it imperative for the regime to demonstrate strength to the world. However, this situation now provides Israel with a license to target even Tehran. Israel possesses an almost insurmountable advantage over Iran in long-distance aerial attacks, advanced technology, and espionage.

Many believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its diverse ethnic backgrounds and internal cultural divisions, presents a vulnerable target for Israeli intelligence, which could weaken the country strategically before a full-scale war ever becomes necessary. Through carefully planned moves, Israel could potentially destabilize Iran, reducing the need for a large-scale conflict. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran is now a key target for Israel.

October 3, 2024
Why Is Putin Seeking Mediation from China and India in the War?

The Russia-Ukraine war is now in a stalemate, with neither side able to advance. Russia, once seen as the Goliath aiming to capture Ukraine, is now humiliated, unable to move forward, while Ukraine has even crossed into Russian territory. What many expected to be an easy victory for Russia, with the war ending in a few months, has turned into a protracted conflict, and no one expects a quick resolution – unless Putin resorts to nuclear weapons, launching the endgame. This unexpected prolongation is a challenge for all involved, but it affects Russia more than Ukraine.

Ukraine has already endured massive losses, with many of its men killed, its women fleeing to the West, and its buildings reduced to rubble. However, they remain resilient, bolstered by Western money and munitions. Russia, on the other hand, is under heavy Western sanctions and losing its strength. While not fully economically collapsed, its economy is suffering and becoming increasingly reliant on China and other allies. Meanwhile, countries that once followed the Kremlin are now recognizing its weakness and beginning to distance themselves. All of this highlights that Russia is the biggest loser in this war, and though they need to end it, their pride remains an obstacle.

Extensive discussions were held between Putin and Western leaders to avoid war. However, a confident Putin seemed intent on humiliating them, and we all remember how Macron was belittled during his meeting with Putin in Moscow. Putin initiated the war, but no one anticipated this outcome. Ukraine is fighting fiercely, and Western nations remain steadfast in their support.

Initially, Putin disregarded peace talks and negotiations, but now he appears ready to end the war. Interestingly, he is not engaging with Western leaders, but instead reaching out to countries like Brazil, China, and India – key BRICS nations, except for South Africa – who are attempting to establish an alternative power bloc. Putin mentioned a preliminary agreement reached between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators in the early weeks of the war during talks in Istanbul, which was never implemented, as a potential basis for new negotiations. However, it seems neither side is proposing a realistic plan they can agree on, raising doubts about Putin’s true intentions.

Zelenski is now more confident and is reportedly planning larger operations following the incursion near Kursk. It is expected that the current U.S. Vice President, Kamala Harris, will become the next president, so there will likely be no significant policy change regarding support for Ukraine. Putin’s recent moves may be aimed at shifting the narrative, portraying Ukraine as the aggressor and Russia as willing to settle.

China’s involvement will not be effective with Ukraine, as China remains firmly aligned with Russia and the Kremlin won’t find much common ground with Brazil despite its leftist president. India, which maintains strong relationships with both Russia and the West, is another potential mediator suggested by Russia. India has shown its neutrality through visits by Prime Minister Modi and other officials to both Russia and Ukraine. Modi’s criticism of the war during his visit to Moscow was well-received in the West. However, the chances of India intervening are slim, as India is one of the few countries benefiting from the war, securing cheaper oil and gas from Russia. India’s foreign minister has stated that this is a bilateral issue, and India would only help with peace talks if requested, otherwise it will not interfere.

So, It is clear that neither China, India, nor Brazil are likely to intervene. Putin is likely aware of this, making his actions a strategic move to convince both the Russian public and the world that Russia is not responsible for prolonging the war and is willing to negotiate.

As the war stretches into its third year, the Russia-Ukraine conflict increasingly resembles a personal battle between Putin and Zelensky. Both leaders, unwilling to compromise and driven by their egos, seem inclined to prolong the war, despite the suffering and losses on both sides. Peace talks could tarnish their images, and Putin cannot imagine conceding to Zelensky. However, as Russia begins to suffer more, they may deflect blame and place it on Ukraine. The invitations to India and China can be seen as part of this strategy to shift the narrative.

September 13, 2024
Xi Jinping’s Euro Trip: A Political Analysis

Chinese President Xi Jinping is on an important visit to Europe. Xi will engage in extensive discussions with European leaders, as Europe is actively seeking a truce in Ukraine and, in return, China is expected to reduce tariffs on Chinese products. The Chinese President’s visit marks the first time since 2019, with five eventful years having passed since then. The visit, just before the European election, is gaining importance as a trade war continues between China and Europe. Xi’s trip includes stops in France, the heart of Europe; Hungary, China’s closest ally in Europe; and Serbia, considered the unwanted child of Europe. Despite signs of growth in the Chinese economy, the ongoing disputes with their second-biggest trading partner, the European Union, are causing huge losses for China, prompting an emphasis on more trade agreements at the meetings. It is expected that the meetings will also be influenced by Russia’s demands.

Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, and Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, will meet with the President of China in Paris. Von der Leyen has expressed the European Union’s continuous dissatisfaction with China, citing the latter’s significant manufacturing subsidies. She denounced China for its unfair trade policies and the unacceptably distorted markets brought forth by these substantial subsidies. Such actions might cause Europe to become less industrialized and result in a large loss of jobs, especially in the German auto sector. Last September, the EU commenced an investigation to consider imposing punitive tariffs. The aim is to protect EU producers from the influx of cheaper Chinese Electric Vehicle (EV) imports, which benefit from state subsidies. This investigation, part of a series initiated by Brussels, covers various supplies to Europe, including medical devices and wind turbines. These products are being sold at half the cost of those made in Europe. The European Commission’s trade chief hinted that tariffs on Chinese EVs could be imposed by June, following an investigation into state support for electric car manufacturing in China. The European Union expresses concerns about the possible circumvention of sanctions against Russia by Chinese enterprises engaging in trade with their neighbor. However, China argues that the trade investigations are driven by political motives and that the consumer would be the lone casualty of a tariff war.

Regarding the war in Ukraine, Xi acknowledged the impact it has had on the people of Europe, emphasizing that China is not directly involved in the conflict but is actively pursuing a peaceful resolution. One of Europe’s long-standing requests of China, particularly from Macron, has been to exert pressure on Vladimir Putin to end the war. However, after two years, Europeans have come to realize that this is unlikely to happen, especially considering Russia’s support from China and its robust economy. Despite this, China has prioritized its stance on Taiwan, appreciating Macron’s independent position on the matter. During Macron’s visit to China last year, he emphasized France’s independent stance on Taiwan, which China respects. This stance might explain why Xi chose France over Germany for his visit. Macron will likely attempt to dissuade Xi from retaliating over the EV investigation, possibly by discussing import duties on French cognac and agricultural goods. France also aims to advance discussions on opening the Chinese market to its agricultural exports and resolving issues related to intellectual property rights in the French cosmetic industry. Additionally, during Xi’s visit, China may announce an order for approximately 50 Airbus aircraft.

China cannot afford increasing restrictions in the European market, especially considering the potential tariffs on electric vehicles (EVs), which would pose significant challenges for Beijing. According to Rhodium Group, EU imports of EVs from China reached $11.5 billion last year. Thus, China is aiming to mitigate tensions with its visit to Europe. In addition to visiting France, Xi will also travel to Serbia and Hungary during his Euro Trip. China has proposed deepening law enforcement ties with Hungary, expanding their relationship beyond the economic sphere to include a security cooperation agreement, raising concerns in other EU countries. Hungary already serves as Huawei’s largest base outside China, and it will soon host carmaker BYD’s first European factory. Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, has consistently supported China in international forums and opposed EU motions critical of China on human rights issues. The trip also includes Serbia, a state in Europe known for its favorable stance towards Russia and China. Efforts will be made to further strengthen the China-Serbia relationship. While the outcome of the trip remains unclear as both parties focus on their interests, Xi’s visit will contribute to the European Parliament election.

May 6, 2024
Rise of Political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia: An Analysis

Malaysia and Indonesia, both predominantly Muslim nations with secular governance, have charted unique paths in history, differing from many other Islamic countries. Their divergence traces back to colonial eras, with British and Dutch rule shaping them differently from Ottoman-controlled territories. Even after achieving independence, while they instituted specific Islamic frameworks – Indonesia even embracing Islamic Sharia in certain areas – they generally maintained a more liberal outlook compared to Arab nations. However, in recent years, there has been a noticeable rise in the influence of Islamic parties in both countries, signaling a shift from the waning of anti-colonial nationalist movements. This trend emerged prominently in Indonesia from the early 2000s and has more recently gained traction in Malaysia. Although these parties may not hold unilateral authority, they wield significant sway over the public.

The intertwining of religion and politics is becoming more pronounced in the region. Islamist politics is gaining significant traction in Malaysia, with PAS’s influence transcending its traditional support base. Especially in rural Malay areas, PAS has emerged as the favored choice for many Muslims. Strengthening its hold in the northern states and the east coast, PAS is also gaining ground in other parts of Peninsular Malaysia. This shift towards Islamist parties like PAS can be attributed, in part, to internal turmoil within UMNO, Malaysia’s oldest political party, including scandals such as the 1MDB controversy involving former Prime Minister Najib Razak. For the Malay Bumiputera community, race and religion stand as core values that have long guided PAS since its inception. There is a growing sense of concern that Malay voters are increasingly leaning towards conservatism, embracing PAS’s agenda of Islamization and advocacy for Shariah laws.

After Malaysia’s 2022 General Election, PAS emerged as arguably the most potent individual party at the federal level. It now commands 43 out of 222 seats in parliament, surpassing the influence of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), the multiracial-centric Democratic Action Party (DAP), and even UMNO. Historically, UMNO, a Malay nationalist party, held sway over Malaysian politics from 1957 to 2018. On the federal stage, PAS spearheads the opposition coalition PN alongside the Malay nationalist party Bersatu. In the six state elections of 2023, PAS achieved significant victories, securing 105 out of 127 contested seats. It orchestrated a clean sweep of all 32 state seats in Terengganu under the PN banner, clinching 27, while the remaining five went to Bersatu. Presently, PAS governs four states—Terengganu, Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis – in the north, known as the Malay heartland.

Fueled by its recent political successes, the conservative party is setting its sights on forming the government in the upcoming General Election. Divisive Malaysian politics have exacerbated societal fractures. In the Malaysian context, the majority comprises the Malay Bumiputera, who are predominantly Muslim. This reality underscores PAS’s unwavering stance that leaders in Malaysian politics must be Malay-Muslims, as they represent the dominant demographic in the country. PAS remains resolute in this position.

In Indonesia, a nation more diverse than Malaysia, the mission of Islamic parties focuses heavily on fostering Islamic identity within the state. The National Awakening Party and the Progressive National Mandate Party are prominent Islamic parties in Indonesia, advocating for political Islam. And there are many small parties, They have a limited regional presence, particularly in Aceh, where Sharia law is implemented. These parties have achieved varying levels of success in terms of seats won and membership.

The prominent party, The National Awakening Party (PKB) was established in 1999 by the traditionalist Muslim community in Indonesia, with significant overlap with the membership of Nahdlatul Ulama. Described as a nationalist Muslim party, PKB promotes inclusive and nationalist principles while upholding the Pancasila doctrine. In the legislative assembly, the party holds 68 out of 580 seats, with a vote percentage of 10%.

Indonesia boasts larger Islamic territories and population, dissenting voices foresee an impending demand for Sharia law in additional regions. They perceive the recent electoral defeat of figures like Anies and Muhaimin Isakander in the presidential election as part of the ongoing Jokowi wave. These proponents argue that the current 10% representation could burgeon in the future, leading to the proliferation of Islamic politics across more regions.

In the region, Muslims are devout yet also seek prosperity. Political Islam has often relied on instilling fear, anxiety, and the perception of Islam being threatened. While fear may resonate with some of the younger generation, hope tends to be more appealing. Malaysia and Indonesia, with their unique identities among Islamic nations, have pursued more modern and secular political approaches. In contrast, Islamic Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are gradually relaxing strict Islamic rules. Meanwhile, Islamic factions are gaining influence in the democracies of Malaysia and Indonesia. It’s clear that if these factions were to govern independently, it would likely result in a significant loss or alteration of the national identity of these states.

March 30, 2024
Why is Free Kurdistan Not Happening?

Kurdistan, the homeland of the Kurds, remains unrecognized by the world and is confronted with an unprecedented threat to its survival. The autonomous region in Iraq, having established separate administrations, military structures, and a distinct identity, is actively advocating for complete statehood but finds itself in a state of limbo.

As the United States’ closest ally in the region, with a majority Kurdish population, Kurdistan faces existential threats from neighboring countries that harbor a considerable Kurdish population antagonistic to their cause. Despite contemplating the immediate availability of statehood, the Kurds are indeed grappling with significant existential challenges. Various reasons contribute to the threats to the Kurds’ long standing aspiration for statehood, ranging from internal issues to concerns about the weakening of the American government.

The original Kurdistan, also referred to as Greater Kurdistan, is a loosely defined geo-cultural region in West Asia where Kurds constitute a significant majority population, and the foundation of Kurdish culture, languages, and national identity is deeply rooted. Geographically, Kurdistan spans the northwestern Zagros and the eastern Taurus mountain ranges.

Map of Kurdistan (Image Courtesy: Fondation-Institut kurde de Paris)

Kurdistan is commonly divided into four regions: Northern Kurdistan (southeastern Turkey), Southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq), Eastern Kurdistan (northwestern Iran), and Western Kurdistan (northern Syria). Some interpretations extend its boundaries into parts of southern Transcaucasia. Different Kurdish nationalist groups advocate for either an independent nation-state covering these regions with a Kurdish majority or increased autonomy within existing national boundaries. The precise demarcation of the region remains a contentious issue, with certain maps exaggerating its scope.

As of a 2016 estimate from the Kurdish Institute of Paris, Kurdistan’s total population is around 34.5 million, with Kurds constituting 86% of the population in Northern Kurdistan. The region also includes Arab, Turkish, Assyrian (Syriac), Armenian, and Azerbaijani minorities. Southern Kurdistan hosts Christian (Assyrian and Armenian) and Turkish (Turkmen) minorities. Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran have significant Caucasian populations that underwent Kurdification, adopting Kurdish as their primary language. Kurdish, part of the Indo-European language family except for the Semitic and Turkic languages around them, is a crucial component of Kurdish identity.

Geographically, Kurdistan covers approximately 190,000 km² in Turkey, 125,000 km² in Iran, 65,000 km² in Iraq, and 12,000 km² in Syria, totaling around 392,000 km². Turkish Kurdistan encompasses a substantial area in the Eastern Anatolia Region and southeastern Anatolia of Turkey, with an estimated 6 to 8 million Kurds residing in the region.

The term “Kurdistan” has historical origins, first documented in 11th-century Seljuk chronicles. From the 8th to the 19th centuries, a multitude of Kurdish dynasties, emirates, principalities, and chiefdoms emerged. In the 20th century, there were short-lived attempts to establish Kurdish entities, including the Kurdish state (1918–1919), Kingdom of Kurdistan (1921–1924), Red Kurdistan (1923–1929), Republic of Ararat (1927–1930), and Republic of Mahabad (1946).

Map of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Image Courtesy: University of Kurdistan Hewlêr)

Iraqi Kurdistan, which has the most chance for getting statehood and recognition from the international bodies, obtained autonomous status through a 1970 agreement with the Iraqi government, solidified as the autonomous Kurdistan Region within the federal Iraqi republic in 2005. In Iran, there is a Kurdistan Province, though it lacks self-rule. Kurds involved in the Syrian Civil War successfully seized control of significant portions of northern Syria, establishing self-governing regions under the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (commonly known as Rojava), where they aspire to achieve autonomy within a federal Syria post-war.

A 2010 report from the United States, predating the instability in Syria and Iraq as of 2014, predicted the potential existence of Kurdistan by the year 2030. The vulnerability of the Iraqi state, exacerbated by the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, created an opening for Iraqi Kurdistan to pursue independence. Turkey, while historically opposing Kurdish autonomy in Turkey and Syria, shifted its stance toward acknowledging the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq.

Turkey’s long standing fear has been that a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would fuel and support Kurdish separatists in Turkish provinces, leading to strong opposition to Kurdish independence in Iraq. However, amidst the chaos following the US invasion of Iraq, Turkey began collaborating more closely with the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government. Despite this, the mere mention or expression of ‘Kurdistan’ in Turkey still carries the risk of detention and prosecution.

The successful 2014 Northern Iraq offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant further weakened the Iraqi state’s ability to exert power, providing the Kurds with a “golden opportunity” to enhance their independence and potentially declare an independent Kurdish state. The Islamic State’s hostility towards Turkey made Kurdistan strategically valuable to Turkey as a buffer state. In June 2014, a spokesman for Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party expressed Turkey’s readiness to accept an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq.

Kurdistan, endowed with abundant oil resources, has been actively engaging in economic cooperation and securing oil deals primarily with its volatile neighbor, Syria. Despite the complexities surrounding the Kurdish issue in Syria, significant oil contracts have been forged between Kurdistan and Syria. Additionally, Iran, which has recently taken a stronger stance against Kurds in the region, particularly following the Mahsini issue, has also established increased economic cooperation with Kurdistan.

According to the Iranian Free Zones News Agency (Freena), Hojatollah Abdolmaleki disclosed the collaboration during a press conference at Iran’s exclusive exhibition in Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan region. Abdolmaleki emphasized the pivotal role of the newly established free zone in fostering cooperation between Iran and Kurdistan. The opening ceremony of the exhibition saw the participation of senior officials from both sides, including Abdolmaleki, the secretary general of the Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce, the Iranian envoy in Sulaymaniyah, and the head of the Union of Exporters and Importers of the Kurdistan Region.

Despite several promises for statehood from the United States, Iraq, the United Nations, and occasionally from Turkey, the Kurds have faced numerous obstacles, particularly prolonged referendums driven by various reasons. Although they came close to achieving statehood in 2017, even their allies rejected the prospect. The Iraqi government has reclaimed territories once occupied by the Kurds, including areas with significant oil reserves. The collapse of oil revenues has left the Kurds grappling with serious financial challenges.

In addition to Turkey, Iran has also intensified actions against the Kurds, further contributing to the Kurds’ predicament. A significant division exists within the Kurdish population, with the ruling KDP party leaning towards Iran’s support rather than aligning with the Iraqi federal government. The United States has a vested interest in the region, providing military aid and financial assistance, with a notable presence of administrators and officials in Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan. However, the inactive governance and increased Iranian intervention have posed challenges.

Despite the current difficulties, a people with a long history of fighting for their identity and a homeland are likely to find a solution to their current problems. However, the extended decision-making process by the United States could jeopardize a key and reliable ally in the region, potentially leading to strategic consequences.

February 11, 2024