Tag: Russia

  • Are New Rail Routes Enhancing Kazakhstan’s Strategic Role?

    Are New Rail Routes Enhancing Kazakhstan’s Strategic Role?

    Kazakhstan, the world’s ninth-largest country, is often overlooked despite its rich history, vibrant culture, and vast natural resources. For much of its modern existence, it remained a satellite of Russia, never fully stepping into its own spotlight. Its landlocked geography and strategic vulnerabilities kept it tethered to Moscow’s influence, even after gaining independence in 1991 following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Russia continued to shape its political trajectory, limiting its ability to assert true sovereignty.

    However, more than three decades after independence, Kazakhstan is now finally charting its own course. While maintaining political ties with Russia, it has strengthened its partnership with China, expanded relations with India and the Gulf states, and deepened engagement with Europe and the United States. No longer solely reliant on Moscow, Kazakhstan is leveraging its growing ties with Beijing to bolster its economic and strategic standing.

    At the heart of this transformation is the Middle Corridor—a trade route linking China to Europe through Kazakhstan while bypassing Russia. This corridor has strengthened Kazakhstan’s geopolitical standing and opened new economic opportunities, firmly establishing the country as a vital hub in global trade.

    The Middle Corridor

    The Middle Corridor, a high-stakes trade route, provides the shortest overland link between China and Europe, sidestepping war-ravaged Russia and the increasingly congested Suez Canal. More than a mere alternative, it reflects shifting geopolitical tides and economic realignments, emerging as a transformative force in global trade. Kazakhstan’s national railway company emphasizes that the corridor not only expands regional transport capacity but also improves the speed, flexibility, and reliability of international logistics.

    Beijing, driven by strategic economic ambitions, is actively expanding its access to European markets while bypassing Russia and strengthening its foothold in Central Asia by leading this project. This shift not only deprives the Kremlin of crucial transit revenue but also weakens its geopolitical leverage. As the Ukrainian news outlet Dialog notes, Chinese goods that once flowed through Russia are now shifting to these new routes—an unmistakable sign of Moscow’s declining influence over Eurasian trade. Meanwhile, rising regional powers like Kazakhstan and Turkey are positioning themselves as key players in this evolving economic landscape.

    The Corridor is Filling Out

    Despite Russia’s extensive transit network, a legacy of the Soviet era, the Middle Corridor still demands substantial infrastructure upgrades and investment. Yet, as its strategic importance becomes undeniable, countries along the route are accelerating efforts and channeling funds into its development.

    China and Kazakhstan have officially launched a new freight rail transit line to transport Chinese goods to Europe while bypassing Russia. Additionally, China is developing two more westbound freight corridors through Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea, further diminishing Moscow’s role as a key transit hub.

    According to Kazakhstan’s State Railway company, the first container train on this route departed from Chengdu in central China on March 4, bound for the Polish city of Łódź. Carrying televisions and other electronic components, the train is expected to complete its 40-day journey through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey before reaching the European Union’s border. Its success is expected to pave the way for more trains along the route.

    Kazakhstan at the Center

    Kazakhstan has strengthened its global standing by rapidly developing its infrastructure and managing its resources more effectively. Its growing geopolitical importance has allowed it to stand more confidently before Moscow and negotiate with Russia on equal footing. Analysts point to several key moments that highlight this shift, including Kazakhstan’s neutral stance during the Azerbaijan-Russia tensions following the downing of an Azerbaijani civilian plane.

    Moscow has lost its grip over land logistics between China and Europe, as Kazakhstan, China, and Turkey now control this crucial transit route. With its geopolitical influence expanding, Kazakhstan is increasingly seen as a rising power. More nations recognize its strategic importance, making it an indispensable player in regional trade and diplomacy.

    Reflecting this growing influence, Uzbekistan’s state railway agency recently launched a new freight transit route connecting India to Kazakhstan. Workers loaded twelve containers onto a freighter at India’s Mundra port, sending them to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port. From there, the shipment will travel by rail through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan before reaching its final destination near Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital. Expected to take 25 to 30 days, the new route could significantly reduce transport costs while creating more opportunities for exporters and importers.

    Russia’s war in Ukraine, far from merely redrawing battle lines, has inadvertently accelerated Kazakhstan’s ascent, hastening the emergence of a more self-assured and strategically independent Central Asia.

  • Turkmenistan Eyes a Future in the Middle Corridor

    Turkmenistan Eyes a Future in the Middle Corridor

    For decades, Turkmenistan has stood apart—an authoritarian state wrapped in bureaucracy and wary of foreign influence. Visas are notoriously difficult to obtain, and for many Turkmen citizens, the prospect of traveling abroad remains out of reach. Since breaking from Moscow, its leadership has upheld a policy of strict isolation, maintaining a state-controlled economy and a political system defined by secrecy.

    But as Central Asia’s geopolitical currents shift, Turkmenistan is beginning to reorient itself. No longer content with isolation, Ashgabat is making calculated moves to integrate into the region’s expanding trade networks. With East-West commerce surging through the Middle Corridor, the government is channeling resources into infrastructure projects that could turn the country from a reclusive state into a key transit hub.

    Path to Integration

    In early February, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Ministry announced that its officials had participated in a virtual meeting with counterparts from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Romania to discuss enhancing East-West trade connectivity. These countries are key partners in the Middle Corridor, which links China and Kazakhstan to Europe while bypassing Russian territory. According to the ministry, Ashgabat is preparing to sign a quadripartite agreement to establish a new trade route through the Middle Corridor, connecting the Caspian and Black Seas. The agreement is expected to play a crucial role in facilitating cargo transport between Central Asia and Europe.

    However, progress on the transit deal may not be swift. Turkmenistan has a history of unpredictable negotiations, as evidenced by its prolonged pricing dispute with Turkey over a gas swap deal originally agreed upon in early 2024. After months of back-and-forth, the gas flow is now set to begin on March 1, with Turkmenistan expected to supply 1.3 billion cubic meters by the end of 2025.

    The government is ramping up infrastructure development with an emphasis on aligning it with key trade routes. According to the government-affiliated Turkmenportal, a new airport near the village of Jebel in western Balkan province is nearing completion. Strategically positioned along the railway linking Ashgabat to the Caspian port city of Turkmenbashy, the airport features a 3,200-meter runway and is primarily intended for air cargo, though it may also accommodate passenger flights. Turkmenportal reports that the facility is expected to boost trade, increase transport capacity, and support the country’s broader economic ambitions.

    The Middle Corridor

    The Middle Corridor, an important international trade route, connects China, a major global production hub, to Europe, one of the world’s largest markets. It passes through Kazakhstan, crosses the Caspian Sea by ship, and continues through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. This route serves as an alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia and the congested maritime passage via the Suez Canal. Despite the Caspian Sea crossing, the Middle Corridor remains the shortest land connection between Western China and Europe. China has invested heavily in its infrastructure, completing the Trans-Kazakhstan railway—which runs east to west across Kazakhstan—in 2014 and inaugurating the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, which links the Caucasus region, three years later.

    After the Ukraine war began, cargo traffic along the Middle Corridor—bypassing Russian and Ukrainian territory—surged, reaching 3.2 million tons in 2022 as trade shifted away from the Northern Corridor. However, the route still faces challenges, including limited port capacity in the Caspian Sea, insufficient railway infrastructure, and persistent geopolitical tensions along the transit countries. While Russia plays a minimal role in this corridor, Turkey has positioned itself as a key player through the Organization of Turkic States, driving a six-fold increase in cargo transport over the past decade.

    Despite its strategic location, Turkmenistan remains outside the Middle Corridor, which primarily runs through Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Decades of neglect, compounded by the country’s insular and ultra-conservative politics, left its transportation infrastructure underdeveloped, limiting regional trade integration. However, Ashgabat is now ramping up infrastructure projects, positioning itself for potential connectivity with key trade routes. Strengthened transport links could not only facilitate energy exports to China but also provide a more efficient route for delivering Turkmenistan’s vast natural gas reserves to energy-hungry Western markets.

    What Will It Deliver?

    Turkmenistan’s economy is still recovering from the 2014 collapse in hydrocarbon prices, a downturn further exacerbated by prolonged low gas prices, the suspension of gas exports to Russia between 2016 and 2019, and poor agricultural yields. The country remains heavily reliant on natural gas, oil, and petrochemicals—sectors in which Russia is also a dominant player with limited demand for Turkmen exports. As Russia’s regional influence declines, Turkmenistan is exploring alternative economic partnerships. Despite possessing the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, its investment climate remains high risk, particularly for U.S. foreign direct investment. Strengthening ties with the Middle Corridor could boost investment in Turkmenistan, improve its connectivity, and create broader economic opportunities.

  • How Azerbaijan Found the Nerve to Stand Up to Russia

    How Azerbaijan Found the Nerve to Stand Up to Russia

    Russia is floundering on all fronts. Humiliated on the battlefield and steadily losing once-friendly nations in Europe, it faces mounting economic hardship, forced to sell its resources at cut-rate prices to China and India. Yet perhaps the greater indignity lies in the defiance of its former satellite states—once obedient, now emboldened to seek new alliances. The war in Ukraine, one of Putin’s most catastrophic miscalculations, has become a lingering nightmare for the Kremlin. Countries that once deferred to Moscow now openly challenge its authority. The latest to break ranks is Azerbaijan, a small but strategically significant Caucasus nation long dependent on Russia. As tensions rise over the downing of an Azerbaijani passenger jet, the standoff is yet another sign of Moscow’s eroding influence over its former empire.

    Azerbaijan has every right to be outraged after losing its citizens in what it considers a Russian mistake. Few, however, could have anticipated that the fallout would escalate into a full-blown standoff.

    On December 25, an Azerbaijan Airlines plane crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people after being rerouted across the Caspian Sea from southern Russia. In the aftermath, Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev—a close ally of Vladimir Putin—accused Russia of accidentally shooting down the aircraft with its air defense system. He condemned Moscow for attempting to conceal the incident for days, calling the response shocking, regrettable, and a legitimate cause for indignation in Baku.

    In an unusual move, Putin expressed condolences and referred to the crash as a tragic incident, though he stopped short of admitting Russia’s responsibility—a response that only deepened Azerbaijan’s anger.

    Tensions have been high since the incident. On Wednesday, the APA news agency, closely tied to the Azerbaijani government, reported that Baku was preparing to take Russia to international court over the alleged downing of the plane. The agency disclosed that facts and evidence were being collected, with preparations underway for an official appeal. The article also delivered a pointed criticism of Moscow, accusing it of trying to evade responsibility for the incident.

    The report revealed that Azerbaijan had identified both the individuals who gave the order to fire and those who followed through with it. The article implied that Russia was trying to craft a scenario similar to the Malaysia Airlines incident, drawing a parallel to Moscow’s ongoing denial of responsibility for the 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine. APA warned that unless Russia publicly acknowledged its role and took responsibility, Baku would escalate its response.

    The article, widely believed to have been published with the approval of local authorities in tightly controlled Azerbaijan, appeared a day after a report from Kazakh officials, which revealed that the plane had sustained external damage and had numerous holes in its fuselage. The report, however, was carefully worded and refrained from specifying the cause of the damage, including to the plane’s stabilizers, hydraulics, and trim systems. 

    On Thursday, tensions further escalated when Azerbaijan ordered Moscow to shut down the Russian House cultural center in Baku. The center, operated by Rossotrudnichestvo—a Russian federal agency viewed as a tool of Russian soft power and often suspected of functioning as a front for espionage and covert operations—was the target of this action. Simultaneously, Azerbaijani state media reported that Baku had sent a rare shipment of non-military aid to support Ukraine.

    What gives this small state, traditionally within Russia’s sphere of influence, the courage to engage in a dispute with the mighty Russia? Several factors are at play. First, Russia’s downfall is a significant motivator. When the war in Ukraine began, many expected that Ukraine would fall within a month, but now, three years later, Ukraine is still standing strong and has become a major ally of the West. Meanwhile, states like Sweden and Finland who refused to join the west previously  have joined NATO, and Russia has been unable to block them. Militarily, Russia is no longer perceived as a superpower, and Azerbaijan believes it can withstand challenges from Russia.

    Second, there’s the economic factor. Beyond the surface, Russia’s economy and businesses are struggling under the weight of sanctions. Tying Azerbaijan’s economy to Russia could cause trouble for Azerbaijan’s business interests as well. However, distancing itself from Russia opens up more economic freedom for Azerbaijan. This newfound confidence is also fueled by Azerbaijan’s growing role in the West’s energy plans, especially after the EU sought alternatives to Russian fossil fuels.

    Azerbaijan’s stance is also part of a broader regional trend. Its longtime rival, Armenia, publicly broke with the Kremlin after Russian peacekeeping forces failed to prevent Azerbaijan from seizing control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Armenia became the first country to leave the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and began turning to the West and Iran for support. Recently, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan even hinted at pursuing EU membership.

    In neighboring Georgia, thousands have taken to the streets, pushing for Western support. Azerbaijan, however, is not necessarily looking to Europe for support. With Turkey, a key ally and fellow ethnic partner, in power, Azerbaijan sees strengthening its ties with Turkey as a route to greater Western alignment. This shift also reflects a broader change in the Middle East, where Iran’s influence, along with Russia’s, is waning. More countries, including Lebanon and Syria, are gravitating toward pro-Western governments, and Azerbaijan could easily join this trend.

    Many still believe that President Aliyev is playing a delicate game, leveraging his close ties with Moscow to manage the situation. By escalating tensions with Russia, he may be attempting to redirect public anger over the incident, easing pressure on his regime and preventing mass protests. Despite the apparent standoff, Azerbaijan and Russia remain deeply intertwined economically and politically, and some caution against assuming a complete break.

    In recent years, Azerbaijan has solidified its economic ties with Russia, with Moscow increasingly dependent on Azerbaijan as a crucial transit hub. Perched on the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan facilitates the movement of goods to and from Iran and the Persian Gulf, helping Russia circumvent Western sanctions and tap into new markets. While some in Moscow hold out hope that a genuine apology could mollify tensions and restore the status quo, one cannot help but wonder: Has Azerbaijan grown strong enough to challenge the once-unstoppable Russia? Or could it be that Russia’s grip has weakened to such a degree that even a small power like Azerbaijan now dares to stand in opposition?

  • Armenia Deepens Its Ties with the West

    Armenia Deepens Its Ties with the West

    Amid the complex geopolitical tensions in the Caucasus, Armenia, traditionally aligned with both Russia and Iran, is shifting its focus firmly toward the West. As the world’s oldest Christian nation, Armenia is now resolute in its efforts to sever long-standing ties with Moscow and navigate the hurdles of Turkish blockades to move closer to Europe and Western powers.

    In recent days, Armenia has taken important steps to strengthen its growing relationship with the United States and the European Union. On January 14, US and Armenian diplomats signed a strategic partnership agreement, laying the foundation for deeper trade, political, and strategic ties. A few days earlier, Armenia passed key legislation aimed at advancing its bid for European Union membership. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called the EU Integration Act, adopted on January 9, a historic milestone but emphasized that the path to EU membership would be long and challenging, requiring sustained political will and broad public support. He later clarified that the adoption of the law does not automatically mean Armenia is joining the EU, as that decision can only be made through a referendum, not by legislation or a government decree.

    On January 13, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held talks with European Council President António Costa, focusing on the fragile peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Efforts toward a long-term resolution to their protracted conflict faced a setback when Baku revived its demand for extraterritorial rights, seeking a land corridor to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. This renewed demand poses a risk of further territorial losses and humiliation for Armenia, already struggling with significant setbacks, and is escalating hostilities toward Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia. In a social media post, Costa reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to strengthening its partnership with Armenia, highlighting their shared values and outlining initiatives to deepen cooperation in areas such as security, economic growth, democratic governance, and people-to-people ties.

    Throughout the post-Soviet era, Armenia had heavily relied on Russia for economic and strategic support. Traditionally, it was considered firmly within Moscow’s orbit as a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, after suffering a decisive defeat in Karabakh, Pashinyan’s government began reassessing the value of its relationship with Russia. For Armenia, it became evident that Russia preferred Azerbaijan, largely due to shared economic activities and mutual interests, which proved deeply unsettling. This alignment comes at a time when Armenia is already uneasy about the growing influence of the Turkic world, with Turkey to its west and Azerbaijan to its east promoting a unified Islamic Turkic identity that makes Armenia feel isolated. With Russia aligning itself more closely with this bloc, Armenia finds itself cornered, prompting what appears to be a tentative outreach to Europe.

    Armenia’s geopolitical challenges are compounded by its lack of direct geographical connectivity to Europe. Unlike Georgia, which enjoys access to the Black Sea, Armenia is landlocked, making its path to stronger ties with Europe particularly difficult. Georgia’s political gridlock, with its government leaning toward Russia, further isolates Armenia from Europe, creating significant logistical and security hurdles for both Armenia and the EU. Despite these challenges, Armenians appear confident in addressing these obstacles. Some observers suggest that Europe may have broader strategic motives for fostering closer ties with Armenia. By strengthening its relationship with Yerevan, Europe could be positioning itself to exert influence on neighboring Iran, where discontent with the Islamic regime persists among segments of the population who take pride in their rich Persian heritage. For Europe, Iran’s cultural and historical legacy remains appealing, making such a shift strategically enticing.

    The Kremlin has responded to Armenia’s recent moves with a mix of irritation and indifference. On January 14, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated that Russia continues to view Armenia as a close partner. At the same time, he criticized the United States for allegedly instigating instability in the Caucasus, claiming that Washington seeks to undermine emerging nations and has never contributed to stability in the region.

    Armenia’s adoption of the EU Integration Act has raised immediate questions about its future in the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). While Armenian officials have suspended the country’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), they insist there are no plans to leave the EAEU. Russian officials, however, have firmly stated that dual alignment with both the EAEU and the European Union is untenable. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk clarified that the two unions are fundamentally incompatible because both demand the elimination of customs barriers and the unrestricted movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. He described EAEU membership as a privilege and likened EU membership to a doomed endeavor, drawing a comparison to boarding the Titanic because of the economic and social challenges within the EU. Overchuk further predicted that Armenians would face substantially higher costs for consumer goods and energy if the country were to leave the EAEU. Which is a decent threat targeting common people. 

    The EU Integration Act represents a milestone for Yerevan, marking what feels like the conclusion of the opening chapter in its long and complex journey toward full membership. Yet, this moment is less a victory than a harbinger of the monumental challenges that lie ahead. Beyond the Herculean task of aligning Armenian legislation with the rigorous standards of the European Union, the nation faces the equally daunting imperative of brokering peace with Azerbaijan—a prerequisite for any substantive progress.

    In recent months, the prospects of a durable peace agreement have grown increasingly tenuous. However, the dynamics of the Caucasus have long been characterized by their mercurial nature, where stasis can suddenly give way to opportunity. Take, for instance, the undercurrent of tension between Azerbaijan and Russia, fueled by the Kremlin’s refusal to assume responsibility for the downing of an Azerbaijani airliner by its air defenses in Chechnya. Should this rift deepen, Baku might find itself recalibrating its hardline stance toward Armenia, offering a glimmer of hope for the peace process to regain momentum.

  • Kazakhstan’s Shrewd Neutrality in Azerbaijan-Russia Tensions

    Kazakhstan’s Shrewd Neutrality in Azerbaijan-Russia Tensions

    Russia finds itself in an embarrassing position, forced to apologize to Azerbaijan over a significant aviation incident that has created an unexpected rift between the two former Soviet republics. Once allies, their relationship—marked by Azerbaijan’s support for Russia during sanctions and Russia’s backing of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia—has been strained by the crash. The tensions evolved when Russia, amid its war with Ukraine and ongoing drone threats, accidentally shot down an Azerbaijani civilian plane. In response, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev demanded full accountability, sharply criticizing Russia’s apology while avoiding full responsibility. While some see this as political posturing by two authoritarian leaders, the discord is adding a new layer of complexity to their partnership. Kazakhstan, a common ally of both and the site of the plane crash, is now caught in the middle. As authorities prepare to hand over the black box data to Kazakhstan, the country faces the challenge of managing the geopolitical fallout.

    Kazakhstan is effectively mediating between two feuding partners, both critical to its interests. Leaning too far toward one risks alienating the other, particularly if they reconcile. Russia, as Kazakhstan’s protector and economic partner, wields considerable influence over the country’s actions. Russia holds leverage through the pipeline transporting oil from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field to export markets via the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Managed by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, this pipeline handles around 80% of Tengiz oil exports. Moscow could disrupt operations to influence Kazakhstan’s decisions or punish it for perceived missteps. As seen in the summer of 2022, Russia can halt the transportation of Kazakh oil to Europe under the guise of infrastructure repairs. This could result in significant losses for Kazakhstan, signaling a harsh warning from Russia.

    At this juncture, Kazakhstan may have even more to lose by alienating Azerbaijan. The two countries are crucial transit points for East-West trade along the Middle Corridor, and they are also collaborating on a consortium to ship solar- and wind-generated power to Western markets. For Astana, Baku is a very important partner, and in the future, an even more vital one, particularly in the joint development of the Trans-Caspian route.

    Despite Kazakhstan’s central role in the investigation, Kazakh officials have sought to remain aloof from the growing controversy. In the hours following the crash, they appeared to amplify alternative theories promoted by Russia, including the now-debunked claim that an oxygen tank inside the aircraft exploded. Kazakh officials also initially supported a Russian proposal for a CIS commission to handle the investigation, which would have given Moscow greater influence over both the scope and final report of the probe. As mounting evidence, including survivor testimonies, pointed to a shoot-down, Kazakhstan shifted to a more neutral stance. In the final days of December, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held telephone conversations with both Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as reported by the presidential press service, though the substance of those talks remained undisclosed.

    State-controlled media in Kazakhstan has largely refrained from speculating on the cause of the crash, instead highlighting the government’s commitment to uncovering the truth. Official publications emphasize that Kazakhstan is diligently working to determine what happened, strictly adhering to international guidelines. Transport Minister Marat Karabayev, for example, cited the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Chicago Convention to justify sending the jet’s black boxes to Brazil—a move likely to irk Russia, given its apparent desire to suppress evidence of a shoot-down. Independent media outlets in Kazakhstan, such as Orda.kz, have taken a more critical approach, often highlighting statements from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Western officials who attribute responsibility for the tragedy to Russia. However, the Kazakhstan government  has notably refrained from directly blaming Russia, a stance that remains intriguing.

    On most occasions, these three countries manage to resolve their issues due to the connection between flawed administrations, shared interests in blocking Western influence, and a convenient yet unholy alliance between businesses and politicians. The current drift is part of an authoritarian theater, meant to keep their populations in check. However, it’s noteworthy that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have reached a point where they can challenge Russia, showcasing the evident decline of Russian power. If this shift continues and the political theater backfires, Azerbaijan may lean closer to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., further escalating tensions. Caught between the Russian and Turkic spheres, Kazakhstan could face even more significant challenges. A shift in alliances seems to be unfolding in Central Asia, and this evolving tension deserves careful monitoring.

  • A Drift or Another Drama? What’s Happening Between Azerbaijan and Russia?

    A Drift or Another Drama? What’s Happening Between Azerbaijan and Russia?

    Azerbaijan and Russia share a strong and multifaceted relationship, characterized by cooperation in various sectors, from business to politics. They consistently support each other’s interests. Despite Russia’s political turmoil—fueled by its prolonged war and increasing sanctions, with many nations distancing themselves and turning to the West—Azerbaijan remains steadfast in its loyalty to Russia. This enduring commitment has brought Azerbaijan significant benefits, including Russia’s support in reclaiming territories once held by Armenia. As a result, Azerbaijan and its president have become prominent figures, not only in the region but also across the broader Islamic world, earning recognition comparable to that of Vladimir Putin.

    Envy often accompanies the sight of seemingly perfect couples, and similarly, some political observers are growing skeptical of the relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia. They question the true strength of their bond. On the surface, the two countries appear to maintain a strong alliance. However, some believe Azerbaijan may shift its allegiances when the time is right, strengthening ties with Turkey and other influential actors to move closer to the West. Despite this potential shift, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s close relationship with Vladimir Putin has left little doubt. 

    The recent tragic incident, in which a Russian defense system reportedly shot down an Azerbaijani Airlines civilian plane, resulted in the deaths of 38 people, including Azerbaijani citizens, sparking widespread outrage and prompting sharp criticism of the Kremlin from President Ilham Aliyev. Aliyev stated that the plane was struck by ground fire over Russian territory and made uncontrollable by electronic warfare, before criticizing Moscow for attempting to conceal the incident for several days. He expressed disappointment with Russia’s handling of the situation and accused the country of suppressing the truth, describing his reaction as upset and surprised by the initial explanations provided by Russian officials. Aliyev pointed out that for the first three days, Russia offered only absurd versions of the events. 

    Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had made three demands to Russia regarding the crash. The first was for Russia to apologize to Azerbaijan; the second, for Russia to admit its guilt; and the third, to punish those responsible, hold them criminally accountable, and provide compensation to both the Azerbaijani state and the injured passengers and crew members. Aliyev noted that the first demand had already been fulfilled when Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an apology on Saturday, referring to the crash as a “tragic incident,” though he did not acknowledge Moscow’s responsibility. Putin mentioned that an investigation was ongoing and the final version of events would be revealed once the black boxes were opened. Aliyev also emphasized that Azerbaijan had always supported the involvement of international experts in the investigation. He pointed out that Azerbaijan had “Categorically Refused” Russia’s suggestion to allow the Interstate Aviation Committee, which governs civil aviation within the Commonwealth of Independent States, to handle the inquiry. Aliyev argued that the committee, made up largely of Russian officials and led by Russian citizens, could not ensure the necessary objectivity.

    Under normal circumstances, Azerbaijan would not have had the courage to present these demands to Russia. This shift may stem from recognizing Russia’s weakened position, or it could be an effort to placate public anger. Both Aliyev and Putin are adept at directing such drama.

    Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov informed Russian state media on Sunday that President Putin had spoken with Azerbaijani President Aliyev again over the phone, though he did not disclose any details of the conversation. The Kremlin also announced that a joint investigation involving Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan was underway at the crash site near Aktau, Kazakhstan. The plane, which was traveling from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Grozny, Chechnya, unexpectedly veered off course toward Kazakhstan, hundreds of miles across the Caspian Sea, and crashed while attempting to land. Dmitry Yadrov, head of Russia’s civil aviation authority, Rosaviatsia, explained that as the plane was preparing to land in Grozny amid thick fog, Ukrainian drones were reportedly targeting the city, prompting authorities to close the area to air traffic. Passengers and crew who survived the crash later told Azerbaijani media that they heard loud noises aboard the plane as it circled over Grozny.

    This airplane crash and the subsequent incidents highlight Russia’s growing weaknesses, and Azerbaijan is sensing this shift. The country may seize the opportunity to seek out other allies. However, Aliyev understands that, unlike Zelensky, Azerbaijan cannot afford to distance itself too much from Russia. Most likely, Azerbaijan will maintain its relationship with Moscow, but it now has valid reasons to open discussions with the West.

  • Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 with a brutality few could have foreseen, has, in a technical sense, reached its conclusion. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, worn down by years of conflict and international sanctions, now belongs to history. In its place, Damascus is now under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist faction left to govern a fractured nation, torn apart by sectarian divisions and shaped by decades of authoritarian rule.

    To much of the world, HTS remains an organization shrouded in infamy, its name still marked by the stigma of terrorism. Yet, in the alleys of the capital and the corridors of power, its leaders—chief among them Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—project an image of determined ambition. Their rhetoric emphasizes a break from the grim patterns of extremist rule, rejecting comparisons to the Taliban and pledging an approach guided by pragmatism and, perhaps, restraint. However, words, however carefully crafted to reassure a skeptical world, cannot erase the unease of minorities—Shia, Kurds, and countless others—whose fragile existence on the nation’s periphery remains haunted by the specter of displacement, discrimination, or worse.

    HTS’s tenure in Idlib, long a laboratory for its ambitions, hardly inspires confidence. Reports from the years of its administration there paint a picture of a governing apparatus that struggled to transcend its militant origins, marred by accusations of repression and ineptitude. Now, thrust into the complexities of running a modern state—an endeavor demanding more than rhetoric and religious zeal—the group must wrestle with a task that has humbled leaders far better prepared.

    The biggest challenge for Syria’s new administration is shedding the “Terrorist” label attached to its leadership—a designation that complicates its path to recognition, international aid, and the maneuvering room needed in Syria’s fragmented political landscape. For Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), securing legitimacy could unlock vital support from foreign powers, bolstering its position in a potential tug-of-war with rival factions and even a looming conflict with Kurdish forces.

    Diplomacy, often defined as the art of achieving the improbable, has become the tool of choice for Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Blacklisted as a terrorist by the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and United Nations, al-Sharaa has managed to carve out surprising diplomatic inroads. Shedding his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and the trappings of militant rebellion, he has recast himself as a statesman intent on steering Syria out of five decades of Assad rule. His overtures to Western officials have already borne fruit, with the United States recently lifting a $10 million bounty on his head following what he described as “Productive” talks.

    Winning Western support could prove transformative. Access to international aid would accelerate Syria’s reconstruction after more than a decade of ruinous war. Al-Sharaa’s government, if granted a modicum of trust by the West, could also leverage Sunni solidarity to attract funds from Gulf powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. An alignment with Sunni-majority nations might ease tensions with Israel, paving the way for regional stability—or at least détente.

    The Kurdish question, however, remains a stumbling block. Turkey, HTS’s largest benefactor, vehemently opposes Kurdish autonomy in Syria, while the United States may pressure Damascus to seek a fragile coexistence with Kurdish factions as part of any broader reconciliation. Al-Sharaa’s ability—or inability—to navigate this minefield could define his administration’s relationship with the West.

    Iran poses an equally complex challenge. Maintaining the fragile allegiance of Syria’s Shia minority will require delicate handling, particularly if Tehran views the new Sunni-led administration as a threat to its regional ambitions. Any missteps here risk turning Shia groups, with Iranian support, into a destabilizing force within Syria.

    Russia, meanwhile, cannot be ignored. Marginalized on the global stage but entrenched in Syria, Moscow remains a power broker capable of influencing Damascus’s fortunes. Al-Sharaa must walk a tightrope, balancing old alliances while pursuing new ones—a test of his diplomatic finesse as much as his political will.

    The harsh realities cannot be ignored: over 90 percent of Syrians live in poverty, more than six million have fled the country, and another seven million remain displaced within its borders. A decade of war has crippled the economy, leaving the nation in ruins. For HTS, the road ahead demands more than lofty promises—it requires pragmatic leadership and skilled diplomacy to secure the support essential for Syria’s reconstruction and renewal.

    A stable Syria offers more than just domestic benefits. Refugee returns could ease migration pressures on Turkey and Europe, but the UN has cautioned that hasty repatriation without international support risks reigniting the country’s deep-seated conflicts. Damascus must aim higher than mere stability; it must pursue sustainable peace within a unified state. That vision demands foreign powers, such as Israel, which continues to occupy Syrian territory illegally, step back to allow the country to heal.

    Sharaa’s calls for revisiting Syria’s political transition, particularly the relevance of the 2015 UN Security Council resolution that shaped it, carry merit. Yet his next steps will be decisive. If he insists on entrusting the drafting of a new constitution to a handpicked committee of loyalists, he risks repeating the mistakes of his predecessors. A meaningful constitution must emerge from an assembly elected by Syrians or representatives of the country’s vast diversity—not from a closed circle of ideological allies.

    Failure to adopt an inclusive approach could erode the legitimacy of a new charter, reducing it to a document as disregarded as the Assad regime’s defunct constitution. Sharaa’s rhetoric suggests he understands the stakes, but his actions will determine whether Syria’s long-awaited renewal can take hold—or whether its divisions will only deepen.

  • As Sanctions Suffocate Russia, Kazakhstan Struggles to Breathe

    As Sanctions Suffocate Russia, Kazakhstan Struggles to Breathe

    Landlocked and deeply intertwined with Russian politics and economics, Kazakhstan has long felt the gravitational pull of its northern neighbor. For decades, the nation has relied on Russia as its gateway to the globe. But as Russia faces its toughest period in recent years and endures a deluge of sanctions over its war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s dependence has become costly.

    When the war began and Western sanctions were imposed on Russia, many speculated that Kazakhstan might benefit from Russia’s economic isolation, with businesses redirecting trade through its borders. However, the reality has been far harsher. Kazakhstan now finds itself burdened by unavoidable sanctions. The surging U.S. dollar, a weakening ruble, and a flood of Russian migrants, goods, and businesses have further strained the country’s economy. This mounting pressure has battered the tenge, stretched public finances, and made daily life increasingly difficult for its citizens.

    Over the past two weeks, the Kazakh tenge has steadily weakened, unsettling citizens just ahead of the holiday season. On December 4, the currency dropped to 522 against the U.S. dollar. Although it briefly regained ground, it slid again, trading at 521 by December 11. This sharp decline—nearly 10 percent in just ten days—has ignited a firestorm on social media across Kazakhstan. The tenge’s rapid depreciation is fueling inflation, especially for food and consumer goods, much of which is imported from Russia. In Almaty and other cities, prices continue to rise, compounding the stress on an already uneasy population.

    Kazakhstan’s National Bank, in a statement on November 28, attributed the tenge’s sharp decline to a number of external fundamental factors. The bank identified Russia’s faltering economy, grappling with a steep ruble devaluation, as a key driver of the currency’s struggles. The tenge’s drop closely followed reports of the ruble hitting its lowest level in over two years after the announcement of a fresh round of U.S. sanctions.

    The National Bank highlighted the strengthening U.S. dollar as a significant factor driving the tenge’s decline, noting that a strong dollar is traditionally a negative factor for raw materials. It also cited the worsening geopolitics and energy market price volatility as additional pressures on foreign exchange markets.

    Kazakhstan’s reliance on raw materials like oil and gas as its primary exports has heightened speculative pressure, increasing the likelihood of further currency volatility.  Energy companies, a major source of government revenue in Kazakhstan, pay their taxes in dollars. As a result, the tenge’s recent decline is not expected to significantly impact the state budget in the short term. Despite this, economic analysts remain concerned about the near future.

    In late November, the National Bank sold more than $1 billion in assets from the National Fund, the country’s strategic reserves, and plans to allocate another $900 million in December to stabilize the tenge. To curb inflation, the bank also increased the base rate by one percentage point, raising it to 15.25 percent.

    Analysts worry that Kazakhstan’s heavy dependence on the National Fund to prop up the tenge may undermine the country’s economic resilience in the medium term. In October, the International Monetary Fund called on Astana to establish clearer fiscal policy guidelines to safeguard the National Fund’s ability to finance social and economic infrastructure projects and shield the economy from future shocks.

    By the end of November, the National Bank revised its inflation forecast for 2025, raising the projected range to 6.5-8.5 percent from the earlier estimate of 5.5-7.5 percent. However, actual price increases significantly outpace the official inflation figures, as highlighted by price comparisons in stores and markets frequently shared by bloggers.

    Many investors have started to withdraw their money from the country. Despite higher interest rates and rising credit costs, people continue to take out loans, which inevitably pushes prices higher and places additional pressure on the tenge. The weakening ruble against both the U.S. dollar and the tenge could also lead to an influx of Russian food and goods into the Kazakh market. This influx, experts warn, could erode the competitiveness of local producers and further destabilize Kazakhstan’s economy. Tough times lie ahead for the country. Although the government and National Bank claim they are addressing the issue and try to spread optimism, the public remains unconvinced.

    In reality, Kazakhstan has little control over the situation, as it remains deeply tied to Russia, an influence it cannot escape. While China recently surpassed Russia as Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner in overall turnover, Russia still held the top spot as Kazakhstan’s primary source of imports during the first eight months of 2024, accounting for nearly 30 percent of the total, according to official government statistics. 

    Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia is largely a result of the country’s corrupt political elites. For over 30 years, these leaders have prioritized political maneuvering, self-promotion, and resource distribution, rather than working to strengthen the nation’s statehood. They have neglected vital areas such as economic development, infrastructure diversification (including alternative oil export routes), the creation of a secure information environment, improving public welfare, and fostering a stable middle class. By mirroring Russia’s political system, they constructed a false democracy that silences opposition and preserves their own grip on power. Closing the door to the West, they guaranteed continued alignment with Russia. As long as the current administration remains in power, Kazakhstan’s ties to Russia will endure, despite Western attempts to intervene. Meanwhile, the burden of this relationship continues to fall on the people.

  • Georgia Accelerates Toward Russia with Pro-Kremlin President

    Georgia Accelerates Toward Russia with Pro-Kremlin President

    Democracy and free speech remain intolerable for many governments, who see them as direct threats to their control over the populace and their profitable monopolies on state resources. In their quest to forestall any transfer of power to the people, ruling elites will stop at nothing. These dynamics inevitably breed tension, especially when domestic factions align with opposing global powers. And it is the scenario in Georgia, a small but strategically crucial nation at the juncture of Europe and Asia, where a political crisis is unfolding. Here, a West-leaning, democracy and free speech supporting populace finds itself in an increasingly fraught standoff with a government tethered to Moscow’s influence.

    Georgia’s political landscape is dominated by an entrenched elite, closely intertwined with powerful business magnates—a structure long shaped by Russian dominance and, more recently, tempered by Europe’s growing influence. This dual allegiance has ignited a fierce power struggle, with each side staking a claim to public support. Pro-Russian conservatives find their champion in the ruling Georgian Dream Party, while those resisting the oligarchic nexus are tied to the promise of a European future. After witnessing Ukraine’s struggle, a significant portion of Georgia’s public began favoring closer ties with Europe. However, the Kremlin-linked government, seeking to consolidate power and move closer to Russia, started pushing back. They have rewritten the constitution, held unfair elections, and enacted measures reminiscent of Russian authoritarian practices to silence dissent and retain authority.

    Following constitutional changes and a new framework set by the ruling party’s interests, Georgian lawmakers have chosen Mikheil Kavelashvili as the country’s president. A former professional football player and outspoken critic of the West, Kavelashvili is staunchly pro-Russia. Over the past year, he has repeatedly accused Western intelligence agencies of attempting to drag Georgia into a war with Russia. Under the revised system, Georgia’s president is now selected by a college of electors, comprising members of parliament and local government representatives. Of the 225 electors present, 224 voted for Kavelashvili, who was the sole nominee. His election starkly contrasts with the country’s previous practice of direct presidential elections, further fueling public discontent over Georgia’s democratic backsliding.

    The opposition has declared Saturday’s election invalid and recognizes only Salome Zourabichvili, the sitting president, as Georgia’s legitimate leader. Zourabichvili, a pro-Western figure deeply at odds with the ruling Georgian Dream Party, has refused to step down. She is demanding fresh parliamentary elections, paving the way for a looming constitutional crisis. The October parliamentary elections were widely viewed as heavily rigged, further eroding public trust in the pro-Kremlin government.

    Protests have swept across Tbilisi, with demonstrations planned at over a dozen locations. For the 16th consecutive day, thousands of pro-EU demonstrators have filled the streets, now turning their anger toward the newly nominated president as well. The protests culminated in a massive rally outside parliament, where the crowd rallied behind Salome Zourabichvili. Intensifying her criticism of the government, Zourabichvili denounced its latest actions during a press conference, stating, “What will happen in parliament tomorrow is a parody—an event entirely devoid of legitimacy, unconstitutional, and illegitimate.”

    Georgia is plunging into a significant political crisis as the country finds itself with two presidents after December. Salome Zourabishvili’s refusal to leave office, the opposition’s parliamentary boycott, and ongoing protests have already overshadowed the presidency of her successor, Gia Kavelashvili, likely weakening his position from the outset. The government’s response to Zourabishvili’s defiance following Kavelashvili’s inauguration on December 29 remains uncertain, constrained by widespread public anger.

    Adding to the turmoil, European leaders have thrown their support behind the Georgian opposition, openly rejecting the legitimacy of the recent parliamentary elections and the current parliament. Meanwhile, Washington has intensified its pressure by imposing sanctions on Georgian officials, including visa bans for around 20 individuals accused of undermining democracy, among them key ministers and parliamentarians.

    These developments raise the alarming prospect of Georgia drifting closer to Moscow. The fear is that the country could fall further into Russia’s orbit, effectively becoming another satellite state. As this political standoff deepens, those advocating for democracy face increasing risks of suppression and retaliation.

  • Mutual Defense Treaty Pulls North Korea into War

    Mutual Defense Treaty Pulls North Korea into War

    Russia is now short of men. They never anticipated, even in their distant dreams, that the war in Ukraine would last this long. After two and a half years, the death toll on the Russian side is high, and the conflict shows no signs of an immediate ceasefire, creating serious challenges. Russia has tried to boost recruitment, including from countries like Nepal. People living in poverty are being sent to the frontlines, despite having no interest in Ukraine or the war beyond the promise of some money.

    As the governments of these countries take steps to curb this recruitment flow, primarily under pressure from the West, Russia has adopted alternative measures, including enlisting its long-term ally North Korea in the war. Russia and North Korea recently formalized a significant treaty focused on military cooperation. Under this pact, North Korea plans to send troops to Ukraine to support Russia’s war efforts. With the treaty now ratified by both governments, North Korea’s entry into the Russia-Ukraine war is official.

    On Monday, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed and officially ratified the landmark mutual defense pact with Russia. The treaty, first signed on June 19 during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s famous state visit to Pyongyang, commits both nations to provide immediate military support to each other, using all means necessary, in response to any act of aggression. Kim hailed the pact as a milestone, calling it an alliance that will elevate Russia-North Korea relations to unprecedented heights. The world, especially Russia and North Korea’s adversaries, now watches closely, concerned about how this alliance will impact ongoing conflicts and global stability.

    The treaty includes a preamble and 23 articles that outline cooperation in politics, trade, investment, and security. Article 3 specifies that if either nation faces a direct threat of armed invasion, both sides must immediately open bilateral negotiations to align their positions and plan practical countermeasures. Article 4 requires immediate military and other assistance from the other party if one nation enters a state of war due to an armed invasion, resembling NATO’s mutual defense clause. Article 10 focuses on fostering exchanges and cooperation in fields such as science and peaceful nuclear energy This clause is particularly intriguing for Kim Jong-un, who has a strong interest in nuclear weapons, likely motivating him to commit troops in return for advancements in weaponry.

    Five days before North Korea ratified the treaty, Russia’s parliament approved it in Moscow on November 6, signaling the growing importance of the agreement. Observers expect Russia to extend this strategy to include more of its satellite states, which may also join the effort if the war persists. Despite U.S. attempts to disrupt these alliances, many former Soviet countries continue to depend on Russia.

    Intelligence reports from South Korea, the United States, and Ukraine confirm that at least 11,000 North Korean soldiers have already been sent to the front lines to fight against Ukrainian forces. Most of these troops have been deployed to Russia’s Kursk region, which has been partially under Ukrainian control since Kyiv’s surprise incursion into Russian territory in August. Neither Moscow nor Pyongyang has directly commented on the presence of North Korean soldiers in Russia, but their involvement under the Mutual Defense Treaty has effectively expanded the war beyond Russia and Ukraine,  drawing North Korea into the conflict.

    North Korea’s involvement could potentially draw South Korea into the war in support of Ukraine, with growing fears that Japan might also join, further escalating tensions. Earlier this month, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol warned that he might send arms to Ukraine if North Korean soldiers are not withdrawn from Russia. However, many believe this scenario is unlikely. North Korea’s role in the war appears limited to sending troops to assist Russia in exchange for advanced technologies. Still, we must consider the possibility that they are all teaming up to prepare for a larger agenda.