Tag: Syria

  • Syria’s Constitutional Declaration: A Step Toward Inclusion or a Veil for Exclusion?

    Syria’s Constitutional Declaration: A Step Toward Inclusion or a Veil for Exclusion?

    Syria’s diverse social fabric has long been a source of tension. Despite the dominance of Arab and Muslim identities, deep internal divisions persisted. Slogans like “One, one, one! The Syrian people are one!” were widespread, but they failed to bridge the sectarian and ethnic divides that shaped the country’s reality.

    For decades, the Assad family ruled Syria by consolidating power within the Alawite minority to which they belonged, a strategy that deepened resentment among other communities. Before the civil war, Sunni Arab Muslims made up approximately 68% of the population, while Alawites accounted for 9% to 13%. Kurds comprised 8% to 10%, alongside Druze, Christians, Armenians, Circassians, Turkmen, Palestinians, and Yazidis. The Assad regime skillfully exploited these divisions to maintain its grip on power.

    With the regime’s collapse in December, a new Sunni-majority government, led by former militant factions, took power, reigniting debates over political inclusion. While Kurdish groups have expressed willingness to integrate, Druze remain skeptical, and Alawites face escalating persecution, raising concerns about their place in the emerging political order. Despite resisting meaningful minority representation, the government faces mounting international pressure, with the European Union and other global actors conditioning the lifting of sanctions on the establishment of an inclusive political framework.

    Constitutional Declaration

    Late last week, Syria’s interim government unveiled a preliminary draft of the country’s new constitution, which will serve as the governing framework for the coming years until a permanent constitution is established. The interim constitution establishes a presidential system, concentrating executive power in the hands of the president, who appoints ministers without the presence of a prime minister. Strongly Islamic in orientation, the document offers little accommodation for Syria’s ethnic diversity, leaving minorities uncertain about their place in the post-Assad era.

    Speaking at the presidential palace on Thursday, Sharaa hailed the constitutional declaration as a turning point, stating that the government was replacing oppression with justice and suffering with mercy as he signed the document.

    Abdul Hamid al-Awak, a member of the drafting committee, emphasized that the declaration guarantees women’s rights in employment, education, and politics. However, it also mandates that the president must be a Muslim and designates Islamic jurisprudence as the primary source of legislation. Executive authority remains heavily concentrated in the presidency, with the president retaining sole power to declare a state of emergency. Additionally, one-third of the legislature will be appointed by the executive. While the legislature is responsible for drafting laws, it lacks the authority to impeach the president, and the president cannot dissolve the legislative body.

    Defending the centralized structure, Awak argued that strong executive power is essential for maintaining stability during the transition. The declaration also guarantees judicial independence and upholds freedoms of speech, expression, and the press. A separate committee will be tasked with drafting a permanent constitution.

    Despite these assurances, constitutional experts have highlighted a major omission: the document makes no reference to Syria’s minority groups. Local communities have also voiced concerns over their exclusion from the recent National Dialogue event, where key decisions about the transition were made.

    Meanwhile, the caretaker government, which is expected to remain in power indefinitely as elections remain uncertain, continues to maintain close ties to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former Sunni extremist group that led the December offensive that ousted Bashar al-Assad. An analysis of 21 cabinet ministers and 154 senior appointments made between December and late February reveals that Sunni Muslim men overwhelmingly dominate the government. While experts acknowledge the exceptional circumstances under which these appointments were made, they warn that the continued exclusion of minorities could lead to serious long-term instability.

    Representation of Minorities

    A quota system that distributes administrative positions among different sects was initially expected to be part of Syria’s new political framework. However, the recently unveiled constitutional declaration has rejected this approach, dismissing both sectarian quotas and the idea of reserving parliamentary seats for specific groups.

    Pro-government factions argue that sectarian power-sharing has repeatedly failed in the region and should be abandoned. Lebanon’s 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the country’s civil war, institutionalized sectarian representation in government, yet instead of fostering stability, it led to widespread dysfunction. Similarly, in Iraq, following the 2003 U.S. invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein, American authorities introduced a power-sharing system that allocated governance among the country’s three main demographic groups, further deepening societal divisions.

    Response to the New Order

    The Kurdish-led administration in northeastern Syria has strongly criticized the newly unveiled constitutional declaration, arguing that it contradicts Syria’s diverse reality. Earlier this week, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the military arm of the Kurdish-led administration, reached an agreement with authorities in Damascus to integrate into state institutions. However, Kurdish officials swiftly rejected the declaration, stating that it does not represent the aspirations of their people and undermines efforts to achieve true democracy. Without Kurdish participation, a unified and stable Syria is unlikely. The Kurdish administration is highly organized and efficient, and its exclusion could lead to further conflict.

    Similarly, the Alawite community, long associated with the Assad regime and now targeted by the new government, has also rejected the constitutional declaration. Reports indicate that Alawites are facing massacres, raising fears of systematic persecution. Beyond the staggering death toll, what makes these killings particularly alarming is that many of the perpetrators belong to the newly established Syrian army, formed under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The violence has cast a dark shadow over Syria’s future, raising serious doubts about the government’s ability to control its forces and rein in the patchwork of militias that now wield power.

    The massacre of Alawite civilians has also raised concerns among influential evangelical members of the Trump White House, who view the protection of Syria’s religious minorities as a key benchmark for engaging with the new government. In such a volatile environment, the absence of a quota system in the constitutional declaration is particularly alarming. While quota-based governance has its flaws, it at least ensures some degree of representation for marginalized communities—a safeguard that is currently lacking in Syria’s new political framework.

    What happens next?

    Ensuring inclusive governance in post-conflict societies is rarely straightforward, as every approach to improving minority representation faces counterarguments. In this context, federalism is often proposed as a solution. Some of the world’s most complex democracies, including Germany, the United States, and Russia, operate under federal systems that divide power between national and subnational governments. While central authorities typically handle defense and foreign policy, state or regional governments oversee local matters and can influence national decision-making.

    However, Syria currently lacks leadership capable of implementing such a system effectively. A government that excludes minority participation and enforces strong centralized control will only deepen the crisis. As a result, Syria’s instability is likely to persist.

    The declaration comes amid the deadliest violence since Assad’s overthrow, which analysts view as the greatest threat to the transitional process. Mass killings, primarily targeting Alawites, have left at least 1,476 civilians dead at the hands of security forces and allied militias, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. President Ahmed al-Sharaa has vowed to prosecute those responsible, and authorities have announced several arrests. However, with a newly consolidated Sunni-dominated government, Syria’s problems seem far from over—raising concerns that the country may simply transition from an Assad-led regime to a Sunni-dominated authoritarian rule.

  • Kurdish Accord: Al Sharra’s Big Break

    Kurdish Accord: Al Sharra’s Big Break

    In a surprising development, the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government—a Sunni Islamist administration led by former militant leader Al-Sharra—has reached an agreement with the Kurdish forces in the northeast. These two factions, previously engaged in violent conflict causing significant casualties, have now struck a deal that could bring some stability to Damascus new rulers. The agreement aligns with their efforts to unify the fractured country and gain international recognition.

    As part of the deal, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which currently control the northeast, will integrate into the national army, paving the way for a nationwide ceasefire. The flag of the new Syrian administration—green, white, and black—will now be raised in Rojava as well.

    Toward a United Syria

    After the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government, under Al-Sharra, and its military coalition ousted Assad’s regime in Damascus, they assumed the daunting task of rebuilding Syria after a decade-long civil war. Yet, the country remained deeply fractured, with various regions establishing their own autonomous administrations. Chief among these was the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controlled the northeast. Strong and well-organized, the SDF posed a significant challenge, raising concerns that tensions between Damascus and the Kurds could escalate into another prolonged conflict.

    Contrary to expectations, Syria’s new HTS-led administration and the SDF reached an agreement that allowed the central government to reclaim much of its former territory, leaving only a few smaller, weaker enclaves outside its control. Over time, these remaining areas are expected to align under HTS leadership, with Al-Sharra overseeing interim governance and the eventual transition to elections.

    Now, both HTS and the SDF are spearheading efforts to rebuild Syria, seeking to restore stability after years of destruction. Their cooperation—despite stark ideological differences—marks a critical turning point in the country’s recovery. However, questions remain about whether the SDF will fully integrate into the Islamist-led government in Damascus, given its distinct governance model, particularly its emphasis on women’s rights and decentralization, which diverges sharply from the political traditions of Arab states.

    The End of Kurdish State

    The agreement will bring northeast Syria under Damascus’ control for the first time since the Kurdish-led administration gained autonomy over the region in 2012 during the civil war. Set for implementation by the end of the year, the deal will transfer authority over all public institutions—including borders, airports, and oilfields—to the central government.

    Crucially, the agreement also recognizes Kurdish rights, which had long been suppressed under the Assad regime, where Kurdish language education was banned and Kurdish holidays were prohibited. The text affirms that all Syrians, regardless of religious or ethnic background, will have the right to participate in the country’s new political process.

    However, the deal represents a significant setback for the long-standing Kurdish aspiration of an independent Kurdistan. This area had long been considered the most viable location for a Kurdish state, but the agreement effectively closes that path. The news comes amid similar developments in other Kurdish territories, where aspirations for statehood are increasingly being curtailed. In Turkey, Kurdish political integration has deepened as the separatist PKK has largely withdrawn. In Iraq, Baghdad has tightened its grip over Kurdish regions. With Syrian Kurds now aligning with Damascus, the dream of an independent Kurdistan appears more elusive than ever.

    Al Sharaa’s Big Win

    The agreement marks a major victory for Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who prioritized negotiations with the SDF as part of his effort to consolidate government control. Rather than resorting to force, he pursued diplomacy, engaging directly with the SDF and addressing their key demands to swiftly resolve one of Syria’s most pressing internal conflicts.

    For a former militant leader, this moment signifies a remarkable transformation. Once a battlefield commander, Al-Sharaa now emerges as a shrewd diplomat, navigating Syria’s turbulent political landscape with pragmatism and restraint. His success in brokering this deal is expected to strengthen his government’s credibility on the international stage—recognition that Syria’s new leadership urgently seeks.

    News of the agreement ignited celebrations, with crowds taking to the streets of Raqqa, northeast Syria, and Damascus. For a nation long fractured by war, it was a rare moment of unity—an image unseen for years and a defining milestone for Al-Sharaa.

    Focus to the Northwest

    While diplomacy was being celebrated between Damascus and the Kurds, and hopes for peace grew in the northeast, trouble was brewing in the northwest, threatening to overshadow these gains. Though Al-Sharaa may have neutralized a powerful adversary in the northeast, some minority factions in the northwest continue to challenge his authority and that of the Damascus government.

    The escalating clashes between the Syrian army and Alawite fighters have drawn international scrutiny and heightened concerns. A brutal five-day battle in northwestern Syria claimed over 1,000 lives, including at least 745 civilians. The violence also sparked retaliatory attacks, as the army targeted Alawite civilians in villages across the region.

    The Syrian defense ministry announced the end of its military operations against Assad loyalists along the Syrian coast. Fighting had erupted when regime loyalists launched a coordinated assault on Syrian security forces last Thursday. Now, with the northeast stabilized, Syrian forces can shift their focus to quelling Alawite resistance in the northwest.

    What Happens Next?

    While trouble is visible in the northwest and along the Israeli border, the accord with the Kurds provides a significant boost for Damascus to move forward. Al-Sharaa is acting more diplomatically and has pledged accountability for the recent violence, stating that anyone involved in the bloodshed of civilians, mistreatment of civilians, overreach of state authority, or abuse of power for personal gain will be held accountable with full decisiveness.

    However, uncertainty looms over how this wave of killings will affect the SDF’s transition of military authority to the state. Syria’s Kurdish population, long subjected to oppression under the Assad regime, remains deeply wary. Any disruption to the agreement risks reigniting the cycle of marginalization and conflict they have fought to overcome.

  • Is Syria’s Islamist Government Turning Against the Alawites?

    Is Syria’s Islamist Government Turning Against the Alawites?

    As Damascus fell under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a former jihadist faction now rebranded as Syria’s new rulers, some hoped the country might finally emerge from its long nightmare. The civil war was over, Assad was gone, and the new government spoke of reconciliation and democratic transition. Everything seemed promising—but within months, sectarian divisions, far from fading, had only deepened. The Kurds remained locked in uneasy negotiations over their hold on northeastern Syria. Christians, their numbers already dwindling, watched warily from the sidelines. But it was the Alawites—the sect once represented by Assad—who found themselves most at risk.

    Reports describe a brutal crackdown by the Islamist-led government against Alawites, with thousands killed, systematic torture, and sexual violence carried out under the pretext of rooting out traitors. Videos and eyewitness accounts depict mass executions and forced expulsions. Yet Syrian officials, in statements reminiscent of past regimes, insist that Alawite factions were the true instigators of the violence, provoking the clashes that have since spiraled into bloodshed.

    Latakia Violence

    More than 1,000 people, including 745 civilians, have been killed in two days of clashes in Latakia, the western coastal region of Syria. The violence erupted as Syrian security forces battled fighters loyal to the former Assad regime, followed by a wave of revenge killings that has deepened fears of sectarian bloodshed, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

    The UK-based monitor reported that 745 civilians were executed, while 125 security personnel and 148 Assad loyalists also lost their lives. Some reports suggest the death toll may be even higher.

    According to The Guardian, the fighting began on Thursday when Assad loyalists ambushed security forces in Jableh, a city in Latakia province. Meanwhile, some Arab media outlets have reported an Alawite rebellion, while pro-Alawite social media accounts claim that Syrian opposition forces were the true instigators, carrying out raids and executions targeting Alawites.

    Damascus Turns to Iron Fist?

    To suppress the rebellion, the Syrian government called for reinforcements, leading to the deployment of thousands of fighters to the country’s coastal region. While these forces officially operate under the new Syrian government, militias—some with histories of human rights abuses—continue to act with little oversight or discipline.

    The government has attributed civilian killings to “Individual Actions” and claimed that the influx of fighters has contributed to human rights violations. In a speech on Friday, President Ahmad al-Sharaa vowed that “anyone who harms civilians will face severe punishment.” However, on the ground, serious crimes against civilians persist, with Syrian forces themselves implicated in the violence.

    Videos circulating online reveal fighters in security uniforms executing captives at point-blank range, forcing men to bark like dogs, and brutally beating detainees. In the town of al-Mukhtariya, footage shows dozens of civilians lying dead, with the Syrian Network for Human Rights reporting that at least 40 people died in a single incident.

    Alawites in Uncertainty

    Though most Alawites had no direct ties to the Assad regime, they are now being targeted and punished for his legacy. Syria’s new authorities assured the Alawite community of their safety, promising that there would be no acts of revenge. Yet that promise has proven hollow, offering no real protection. The recent killing of hundreds of Alawite civilians by government security forces has only intensified fear among the community.

    Reports of atrocities continue to surface. Alawites who spoke to the Media recounted the murder of family members, widespread looting, and deteriorating conditions in Alawite neighborhoods. They described a dire situation—no water or electricity for more than 24 hours, armed factions killing indiscriminately, and corpses piling up in the streets. Many see these actions as collective punishment, deepening the community’s sense of uncertainty and dread.

    Syria Unfixed

    The scale of violence against Alawites was unexpected, raising fears that Jolani is reverting to his old ways—those of an Islamist extremist. This resurgence has unsettled Syria’s minorities, with Christians growing increasingly anxious and the Kurds facing a decisive choice: to resist and risk prolonging the conflict or to negotiate and shape Syria’s fragile transition. Beyond political survival, Syria’s new rulers must also contend with the pressing need to secure international funding for the country’s post-war reconstruction. For international backing, Jolani may attempt—or at least pretend to attempt—to curb escalating violence and include Alawites who opposed Assad in the new government. 

    Political experts stress that a genuine commitment to transitional justice and inclusive governance is critical to preventing Syria from sliding back into chaos. As the country’s transitional authorities prepare to announce a new government this month, its composition will be closely scrutinized, particularly for its treatment of Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities in light of the recent bloodshed.

  • PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    One of the deadliest conflicts of the past few decades—the struggle between the Turkish state and the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency—may finally be nearing its end. After forty years of violence that has claimed at least 40,000 lives, a landmark declaration has been made. On Thursday, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdish insurgency and an almost mythical figure among his followers, called on PKK fighters to lay down their arms after years of negotiations. In a written statement from his prison cell, where he has spent 25 years in isolation, Öcalan not only urged disarmament but also called for the complete dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

    This announcement could mark the end of a long and bloody chapter, yet optimism is cautious. A decade ago, a two-year ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish state collapsed, triggering some of the deadliest fighting in the conflict’s history, with more than 7,000 lives lost, including hundreds of civilians. Still, political analysts suggest that this time, there is reason to believe the fragile peace may hold.

    A Great Win for Erdoğan

    A staunch conservative, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long taken a hardline stance on Kurdish politics, making a lasting peace initiative under his leadership seem unlikely. Yet, this does not mean he has never pursued negotiations. The last meaningful attempt to negotiate a settlement with the PKK—a group labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey and its Western allies—occurred in a vastly different political climate, before Erdoğan’s illiberal rule fully took shape, but ultimately collapsed. However, with shifting political dynamics both domestically and regionally, he now appears more open to cooperation and more determined to end the conflict.

    Erdoğan’s ambitions to extend his rule, despite Turkey’s constitutional term limits, are well known. He has openly hinted at seeking another term if there is public support, a move that would require either early elections or a constitutional amendment. Achieving this would require backing beyond his current coalition—potentially from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). To appeal to both the party and the broader Kurdish population, Erdoğan has signaled a willingness to engage in negotiations—an ironic shift for a leader who has spent decades as one of the PKK’s fiercest opponents.

    In a calculated move, he entrusted negotiations to his ultranationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli, a figure who once demanded the execution of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This strategic gamble is designed to appease both nationalist hardliners and Kurdish factions. For Erdoğan, it is a delicate balancing act—one that allows him to present himself as a peacemaker while safeguarding the loyalty of his conservative base. A deft political maneuver from a leader adept at navigating power dynamics.

    PKK and Kurds

    The PKK’s demands have long shifted from seeking an independent Kurdish state to pushing for greater autonomy within Turkey and expanded rights for Kurds, who make up nearly a fifth of the country’s population. Yet, even with these more modest aspirations, a settlement may not necessarily lead to significant progress. Instead of political concessions, Ankara may opt for economic incentives—it recently unveiled a development plan for the Kurdish-majority southeast.

    A crucial question is whether thousands of PKK fighters—most now outside Turkey—can be persuaded to disarm. The conflict is deeply rooted in ethnic divisions and spans generations, raising concerns about how these fighters can reintegrate into society. There is also the risk that disillusioned groups may emerge, continuing the struggle for an independent Kurdish homeland.

    Another pressing issue is the broader cost of any agreement for both the Kurds and Turkey. For many Kurds, a deal may bring little meaningful change. While any step toward ending decades of bloodshed should be welcomed, there is also a fear that peace could come at the cost of indefinitely extending Erdoğan’s strongman rule. A lasting resolution would require genuine democratic representation for Kurds—something they continue to demand.

    Geopolitics of the Move

    The ongoing instability in the Middle East has strengthened Turkey’s push for security-focused strategies. Just over a month after Bahçeli’s call, Bashar al-Assad unexpectedly fell from power in Syria—partly due to Turkey’s support for the victorious rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Meanwhile, the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces remain firmly in control of their autonomous region in northeastern Syria, though they are aware that the Trump presidency may not favor their cause.

    For Turkey, neutralizing the Kurdish threat in Syria starts with eliminating the insurgency within its own borders. This is where the dissolution of the PKK becomes a strategic priority—allowing Turkey to consolidate control over its Kurdish regions. Ankara has repeatedly targeted Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria, accusing them of supporting militants inside Turkey. There is growing concern that Turkey and Syria could align against the Kurds, a move that would provoke significant backlash. Kurdish forces have gained substantial support in the West, particularly for their role in dismantling the Islamic State and their progressive stance on social issues like gender equality—areas where much of the Middle East remains deeply conservative.

    If Turkey succeeds in dismantling militant Kurdish factions in Syria, it could more easily confront Kurdish groups in Iraq, weakening their influence and furthering Ankara’s longstanding goal of regional dominance.

    What Happens Next? 

    The agreement brings together Turkey’s right-wing nationalists, driven by Ottoman-era ambitions, and Kurdish hardliners who have long fought for independence, leaving little room for dissent on either side. If the upcoming election shifts the political landscape and Erdoğan’s main rival, the center-left CHP, takes power, its leadership is also expected to pursue reconciliation. Meanwhile, DEP, the rising Kurdish political force, has signaled its willingness to collaborate with Ankara.

    However, if Syria’s new government moves to suppress Kurdish groups, the fallout will inevitably spill over into Turkey, potentially strengthening calls for Kurdish autonomy—an outcome no Turkish administration, regardless of its leadership, is willing to accept. Decades of conflict have entrenched deep divisions, making integration a daunting challenge. For the Kurdish people, the legacy of struggle and resistance makes the path to reconciliation fraught with difficulty. 

  • Saudi Arabia Reclaims Its Regional Clout with Syria’s Embrace

    Saudi Arabia Reclaims Its Regional Clout with Syria’s Embrace

    The Middle East’s power struggle, once a contest between U.S.-led allies and a Russian-backed bloc, now tilts decisively in Washington’s favor. Russia’s decline and Iran’s mounting troubles have given the United States and its staunchest ally, Saudi Arabia, a commanding edge. While Washington and Moscow shaped the broader conflict, the fight on the ground unfolded between Iran and its proxies and a Saudi-led coalition that, despite internal rifts, often included Israel and Turkey. By 2025, the U.S.-Saudi alliance had everything falling into place. Israel crushed Hamas, Lebanon installed a pro-Western president, and Syria—long the region’s geopolitical fault line—found itself under an administration deeply tied to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Many assumed Turkey would wield the greatest influence over Syria’s new leadership. But when President Al-Shaara made Saudi Arabia his first foreign destination, the message was unmistakable: Riyadh is back, reclaiming its place as the Middle East’s dominant power and the Islamic world’s standard-bearer, after years of ceding ground to Iran.

    Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh on Sunday, making his first foreign visit since taking office—a move that highlights shifting regional dynamics. Sharaa, who seized power last week after leading the uprising that ousted Iran-backed Bashar al-Assad, now faces the challenge of reintegrating Syria into the Arab fold after nearly 14 years of war. In a written statement, he said the talks focused on humanitarian and economic cooperation, as well as long-term plans in energy, technology, education, and health. Saudi Arabia’s state news agency reported that the discussions also covered strengthening bilateral ties and addressing key regional developments.

    Sharaa and his group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), are widely associated with Sunni Islamic extremism and have been accused of committing harsh acts against Alawites, other Shia groups, and Kurds in Syria. His leadership reflects a strong Sunni identity, reinforced by his personal background—born in Saudi Arabia and having spent part of his childhood there. By making Saudi Arabia his first official visit, Sharaa is signaling that Sunni Islamism is the guiding ideology of his administration and that Riyadh, its traditional power center, is his primary patron.

    Since Assad’s fall, Syria’s new leadership has worked to strengthen ties with both Arab and Western governments, with Saudi Arabia taking the lead in this effort. Riyadh hosted Syria’s new foreign and defense ministers in early January, followed by a high-level meeting with Syrian, Arab, and Western officials later that month. Initially, there was speculation about whether Sharaa’s alignment with Turkey or his connections with Qatar would shape his foreign policy. Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, was the first head of state to visit Damascus after Assad’s ouster in December, suggesting strong ties. However, despite maintaining a balanced relationship with both Ankara and Doha, Sharaa’s priorities now lean toward Saudi Arabia.

    Syria’s renewed ties with Arab leaders signal a sharp break from the years of isolation that followed Assad’s brutal crackdown on the 2011 protests, which led to the country’s suspension from the Arab League for more than a decade.

    For Saudi Arabia, the past four years under Biden marked a period of political and economic turbulence, a stark contrast to the unrestrained confidence of the Trump era. The kingdom found itself navigating a more complicated regional landscape, even losing some influence over traditional satellites like the UAE, which increasingly asserted its own interests and distanced itself from Riyadh’s shadow. Yet, despite these setbacks, the broader currents of international politics have begun to shift in Saudi Arabia’s favor.

    With Trump’s return to power, the U.S. once again needs a reliable Middle Eastern proxy, and no partner fits the role better than Riyadh. Under a renewed Republican administration, Saudi Arabia is poised not just to solidify its dominance in the region but to extend its influence, pulling more countries into its orbit—Syria now among them. After a brief period of recalibration, the kingdom is positioning itself back at the center of global politics, reclaiming its role as a primary powerhouse in the Middle East.

  • From Insurgency to the Presidency: Syria’s Uncertain Bet on Ahmed al-Sharaa

    From Insurgency to the Presidency: Syria’s Uncertain Bet on Ahmed al-Sharaa

    Nearly two months after the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria has a new president. Ahmed al-Sharaa, the supreme leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has emerged as the head of a transitional government, ending Bashar al-Assad’s twenty four-year rule with an insurrection that upended what remained of Syria’s fragile status quo. Al-Sharaa’s rise is no ordinary political evolution. Once a fugitive, he has spent decades navigating the murky underworld of militant jihadism, his career spanning al-Qaeda, Jund al-Sham, and, most notably, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda that later morphed into HTS. Under his leadership, HTS orchestrated the final push against Assad’s forces, forging a tenuous alliance of Islamist factions united less by shared governance ambitions than by their mutual enmity toward the old regime. Yet, for all its battlefield triumphs, HTS remains an organization steeped in an ideology that much of the world considers extremist, its name etched onto lists of terrorist entities from Washington to Moscow.

    Ahmed al-Sharaa, who has functioned as Syria’s de facto ruler since early December, was formally appointed president on Wednesday following a meeting of rebel faction leaders. The announcement, delivered by a military spokesperson, marked a sweeping reorganization of the country’s political and security structures.

    As part of the changes, Syria’s parliament was dissolved, to be replaced by an appointed legislative council, while the country’s 2012 constitution was formally annulled. The existing military and security agencies were also disbanded, with new institutions set to take their place. Additionally, all armed factions in Syria are to be dismantled and integrated into a unified national army. On paper, the order applies to all groups, including HTS, though the group—Syria’s dominant power—was conspicuously left unnamed.

    Sharaa has taken a more pragmatic tone in his push for international recognition, calling for inclusivity and unity in Syria. Following his appointment, he outlined three immediate priorities: filling the power vacuum, preserving civil peace, and building state institutions.

    The transitional government is officially set to transfer power to a new administration in March, though how this will unfold remains uncertain. In an interview with the UAE based media, Al Arabiya last month, Sharaa suggested that elections could take up to four years, while drafting a new constitution might take three. He has promised to hold a national dialogue conference to ensure a more representative post-Assad era, yet the event has been repeatedly postponed. So far, his meetings have been mostly with individuals rather than political parties, raising doubts about the scope of his efforts toward inclusivity.

    The dissolution of Syria’s military factions remains a contentious issue as the interim government, dominated by HTS appointees, works to consolidate power. The role and future of these armed groups have become central concerns in the country’s fragile transition.

    In mid-January, the Syrian Ministry of Defense announced plans to hold consultations with various factions to explore the creation of a unified military. But the challenges are considerable. Many radical Islamist rebel groups—particularly those within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army—lack HTS’s organizational discipline and differ significantly in ideology. The sudden collapse of the Assad regime has also left vast stockpiles of weapons, tanks, and artillery scattered across Syria, some of which have already been seized by insurgent groups, further complicating efforts to impose centralized military control.

    With Kurdish forces controlling significant territory and various other factions still holding land, the question of how Sharaa will unify the country remains unresolved. In an effort to consolidate power, he and the minister of defense have held near-daily meetings with rebel groups, appointing their leaders to key positions in the interim government, including governorships of provinces. Yet, the ideological divide between HTS and other factions—particularly the Kurds, whose vision for Syria starkly differs—poses a serious challenge.

    Foreign interests further complicate Sharaa’s path. While Iran has withdrawn much of its influence, certain factions remain in the country and are expected to cooperate with the new government. If Israel de-escalates its conflict with Lebanon, its attention could once again shift to Syria. Meanwhile, Turkey’s staunch opposition to Kurdish autonomy presents another obstacle, as does the involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, both of which are likely to assert their own strategic interests.

    For Sharaa and the Sunni Islamist factions aligned with him, securing the trust of Syria’s minorities—particularly Christians, Alawites, and Kurds—will be critical. Without their inclusion, Western powers are unlikely to offer support, and Syria risks spiraling into yet another protracted civil war.

    As negotiations between the new government and the Kurds continue, the conflict between the Kurdish-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in northern Syria escalates. The Kurds find themselves in a vulnerable position, with U.S. support for their cause diminishing under the Trump administration, while Turkey remains steadfast in its efforts to weaken them. Faced with limited options, the Kurds are likely to prioritize flight over confrontation, which will only prolong the conflict and fuel further insurgencies from various groups. This may lead to the extended rule of Sharaa, who has proven adept at managing crises. Such patterns are all too familiar in the Middle East, and under Sharaa, Syria does not appear to be charting a different course.

  • Can Turkey Mend Its Fractured Ties with the Kurds?

    Can Turkey Mend Its Fractured Ties with the Kurds?

    Turkey played a key role in ousting the Assad regime from Damascus, earning international praise for its support of HTS and its involvement in ending Syria’s 13-year civil war. This victory marked Turkey’s return to regional politics, an arena once dominated by Israel, Iran, and the Gulf states. For Erdoğan, whose aspirations have long aligned with neo-Ottoman ideals, this achievement was a significant triumph. However, at home, Erdoğan has faced increasing challenges, particularly after setbacks in the recent local elections. Eager to restore his standing, he seeks to present a major accomplishment. As military operations in Syria bolster his narrative, Erdoğan now focuses on resolving Turkey’s long-standing Kurdish conflict, which, if addressed, could strengthen Erdoğan’s domestic position.

    Turkey is actively working to improve relations with its Kurdish population. Three months ago, Erdoğan’s coalition partner, Devlet Bahceli, leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), launched a reconciliation process between the Turkish government and the Kurds. The MHP has long been linked to violent paramilitaries and organized crime, earning a reputation as neo-fascist. In October, Bahceli showed a significant political shift when he reached out to politicians from the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), a group he had previously condemned as an extension of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and called for its ban. This move signals a significant shift,  suggesting that Erdoğan plans to resolve long standing issues by bridging two previously opposing forces. Reflecting on his government’s future agenda, President Erdoğan emphasized that decisive steps would be taken to achieve a vision of a terror-free Turkey and region.

    For decades, Turkey and the Kurds have been locked in a violent history marked by bloodshed, with both sides accusing each other of terrorism. At the heart of the conflict lies the PKK, the Kurdish Workers’ Party, which initially sought independence from Turkey before turning to violent resistance. The PKK, designated a terrorist organization by multiple Western countries, including the EU and the US, has been in armed conflict with the Turkish state since 1984. The conflict has claimed around 40,000 lives between 1984 and 2009. Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK founder, has been serving a life sentence on Imrali Island near Istanbul since 1999. In a surprising twist, Bahceli, known for his tough stance, recently suggested that Öcalan could be released in exchange for renouncing violence and dissolving the PKK. This came as a shock, given that Bahceli’s party had previously called for reinstating the death penalty, particularly to execute Öcalan.

    Shortly afterward, Bahceli publicly addressed the “Millennial Brotherhood” between Turks and Kurds, clarifying that Turkey’s issue was not with the Kurdish people, but with their separatist terrorist organization. Öcalan responded, asserting that he had the competence and determination to contribute positively to the new paradigm. On December 28, two representatives from the pro-Kurdish DEM visited Öcalan at Imrali prison and expressed optimism about the future. Currently, DEM politicians are engaged in discussions with both Erdoğan’s government and the opposition. Significant developments are unfolding that could potentially bring an end to the decade-long hatred and violence.

    At the same time, across the border in Syria, Turkish-backed militias continue to battle Kurdish YPG fighters, whom Turkey sees as a threat to its territorial integrity. While Turkey regards the YPG as a Syrian offshoot of the PKK, the US supports the Kurdish YPG fighters in Syria, further complicating the region’s balance of power. Meanwhile, Turkey demands that Syria’s transitional government disband the YPG militia, which controls significant parts of northern Syria. However, achieving this is not easy. After years of conflict, the YPG has established itself as a powerful force in northeastern Syria. Regardless of potential agreements with Turkey, it remains highly unlikely that the YPG will disarm. Turkey now fears that Kurdish extremists from its territory could gain a permanent foothold in northeastern Syria under YPG control and continue their operations against Turkey. Many experts believe that Erdoğan’s efforts to bring peace aim to integrate the Kurds within Turkey’s borders while seeking to avoid the rise of pan-Kurdish nationalism.

    While many in Turkey remain hopeful about the possibility of building stronger ties between Turks and Kurds, some view this as little more than election-driven politics rather than a genuine shift in public sentiment. Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) can no longer win elections without the Kurdish vote, which represents 15% to 20% of Turkey’s population. The Erdoğan administration faces a significant political and economic crisis, as evidenced by the spring 2023 local elections. In the current climate, Kurdish voters tend to lean toward opposition candidates, forcing Erdoğan and his party to secure their support to remain in power. Politics can sometimes be a catalyst for peace.

  • With the New President, Can Lebanon Chart a Course Toward the West?

    With the New President, Can Lebanon Chart a Course Toward the West?

    Lebanon, grappling with political, economic, and social unrest, seems to be shifting away from Iran’s influence by electing a new president who is supported by the West and advocates for a stronger Lebanon. The country’s parliament has chosen Army Commander Joseph Aoun as the new president, ending a two-year vacancy and raising hopes for the long-term stability of a ceasefire with Israel. Aoun received 99 out of 128 votes in the parliament’s 13th attempt to select a new head of state, succeeding former President Michel Aoun—who is unrelated to Joseph Aoun—after his departure in October 2022.

    Lebanon’s political system often undermines democratic principles, with a convoluted structure built around a confessionalist framework that allocates key political positions to religious communities through quotas. The system requires the president to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister to come from the Sunni branch of Islam, and the speaker of Parliament to be from the Shia branch of Islam—reflecting a fragile power-sharing arrangement. Political appointments, from the presidency to parliamentary seats, strictly follow sectarian divisions. The parliament elects the president for a single six-year term, and the president works with lawmakers to appoint the prime minister, adhering to the same quota system. Sectarian interests dominate political parties, complicating governance and eroding democratic values. This flawed structure has led to Lebanon’s mismanagement, resulting in one of the most severe economic and sociological crises in modern history. According to the United Nations, over 80%—or four out of five—of Lebanon’s population now lives in poverty.

    While the presidency in Lebanon holds limited authority, the election of Joseph Aoun hints at a significant shift in the country’s political trajectory. Aoun, who has built strong ties with international powers like Saudi Arabia, France, and the United States during his time as the head of Lebanon’s armed forces, reflects a broader trend of Lebanon leaning westward and distancing itself from Iran’s influence.

    Iran’s sway has been steadily diminishing, a process notably accelerated by the 2022 parliamentary elections. In those elections, the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement and its allies lost their majority in parliament, signaling a notable decline in Tehran’s grip on the country. At the same time, Hezbollah’s Christian ally, the Free Patriotic Movement of outgoing President Michel Aoun, was overtaken as the dominant Christian faction by the Lebanese Forces, a party led by Samir Geagea, who shares close ties with Saudi Arabia.

    The evolution in Lebanon’s politics mirrors the broader regional shifts, particularly Turkey’s efforts to limit Iran’s influence in Syria. Now, with Saudi Arabia—another U.S. ally—on the scene, it seems likely that the Kingdom will play a central role in weakening Iran’s hold over Lebanon, marking a strategic recalibration in the delicate balance of power.

    International leaders, particularly from the West, expressed optimism over the election of Lebanon’s new president, Joseph Aoun. A spokesman for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres described the election as an important step toward resolving Lebanon’s long-standing political and institutional impasse, which had persisted for over two years due to the presidential vacancy. U.S. President Joe Biden praised Aoun as a suitable leader for the current challenges facing Lebanon.

    Aoun’s primary focus will be on strengthening the Lebanese army, especially in southern Lebanon, where its authority has been challenged since the late 1970s by groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hezbollah. His efforts are expected to be bolstered by assistance from Saudi Arabia, the United States, and France, and Israel is likely to view these developments positively as they improve security along its northern border. After his election, Aoun addressed parliament, emphasizing the state’s right to control the possession of weapons and highlighting the importance of the army in safeguarding Lebanon’s borders.

    The 2004 UN resolution required all armed groups in Lebanon to disarm, but Hezbollah has refused to comply, insisting it is the only force capable of defending Lebanon from Israel. However, he has an opportunity to act as Hezbollah grapples with mounting difficulties, including Iran’s waning regional influence and reduced support from Syria. During Lebanon’s prolonged leadership vacuum, Hezbollah exploited the instability to tighten its grip on southern Lebanon and engage in skirmishes with Israel. By reinforcing the army, Aoun can directly counter Hezbollah’s dominance in the region.

    Hope is on the rise in Lebanon with the election of a new, Western-backed president and the diminishing influence of both Hezbollah and Iran. Now, the country stands at a pivotal moment to rebuild and strengthen its institutions. However, this task will not be simple, as Lebanon’s deep-rooted divisions remain a significant obstacle. Yet, with strong leadership, support from global powers, and a weakened opposition, the Lebanese president is presented with a better opportunity. Though President Aoun faces limitations due to Lebanon’s unique constitution, his six-year term gives him a critical platform to shape the nation’s future. He will also play a vital role in the 2026 parliamentary elections—or potentially in a snap election—that could break the long-standing political deadlock. This moment marks a potential shift toward the West, signaling that Lebanon is indeed charting a new course in its international orientation.

  • Can Yemen’s Crisis Find a Resolution, Like Syria’s?

    Can Yemen’s Crisis Find a Resolution, Like Syria’s?

    The Arab Spring, fueled by Islamist populist movements advocating for Islamic rule and opposing dictatorial regimes, plunged many nations into chaos. This upheaval fractured several countries, leaving them embroiled in civil wars that have lasted over 13 years. Despite numerous peace talks over this period, most efforts ended in stalemates. Meanwhile, several global powers exploited these conflicts, strengthening their influence. Iran, in particular, expanded its regional power by funding and directing proxy groups involved in civil wars across various nations.

    However, The ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran is helping various factions in war to break long-standing deadlocks. Syria offers a key example. Despite significant risks, Israel-backed forces successfully challenged Iran-aligned factions, collaborating with allies like Turkey to oust the Iran-backed regime and ultimately reach a resolution. A similar shift appears to be unfolding in Yemen, where Israel’s growing focus on the region has sparked renewed optimism that a resolution to the prolonged conflict may finally be within sight.

    Yemen, with its strategic geopolitical location, once served as a vital trade hub between the East and West. For much of its history, Yemeni cities were among the wealthiest in the Arabian Peninsula, flourishing along key trade routes. However, its strategic importance made Yemen vulnerable to superpowers, and it eventually fell under the control of Islamic kingdoms and European powers. The modern state of Yemen, as we know it today, was established in 1990 following the unification of the previously divided South and North. Yet, foreign influence and interests did not diminish. Saudi Arabia and the United States continued to pursue their agendas in Yemen—Saudi Arabia aiming to create a Shia-free region, while the U.S. sought to maintain control over this vital geopolitical location.

    Ali Abdullah Saleh, the leader who unified Yemen, soon began treating the country as his personal fiefdom. However, his failure to build strong state institutions hampered Yemen’s development into a stable nation. Instead, Yemen’s political landscape became defined by a fragile form of collaborative governance, where competing tribal, regional, religious, and political interests coexisted through an unspoken arrangement. This informal structure was underpinned by a power-sharing agreement among three key figures: President Saleh, who controlled the state; Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who commanded the majority of Yemen’s armed forces; and Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar, the leader of the Islamist al-Islah party, who served as a Saudi-appointed broker overseeing transnational patronage payments to various political factions, including influential tribal leaders.

    Misgovernance, internal divisions, and deteriorating living conditions in Yemen created a fertile environment for terrorism, turning the country into a recruitment hub for various Islamic organizations. Despite the worsening situation, Saleh managed to hold on to power through fraudulent elections. During the Arab Spring, multiple groups united in opposition to him, sparking a new wave of civil war. However, the opposition quickly fragmented, and as various factions seized control of different regions, each pursuing its own agenda, Yemen was pushed further into crisis, edging closer to collapse.

    Like in Syria, Iran plays a significant role in Yemen by backing the Houthis, a group of militants advocating for the implementation of Shia Islamic law. The Houthis are notorious for their attacks on maritime shipping routes, as well as for their strikes on Saudi oil refineries and their solidarity with Hamas and Iran in their opposition to Israel. They control a large portion of Yemen, primarily in the former northern part of the country. For years, international watchdogs and superpowers largely avoided engaging with the Houthis or seeking resolutions in Yemen. However, as the Houthis continue their attacks on Israel, it’s increasingly likely that Israel will retaliate. Israel may follow a strategy similar to the one it used in Syria, which could bring hope for Yemen. In Syria, Israel successfully targeted Hezbollah fighters, aligned with Iran, forcing them to collapse and paving the way for forces backed by the United States ally Turkey to topple the Iran-supported regime, ultimately bringing an end to the civil war.

    In Yemen, Israel may target the Houthis with the support of its intelligence agencies, while Saudi-backed troops, potentially bolstered by U.S. assistance, could attempt to seize control of Sanaa. However, Yemen presents a unique challenge for Israel due to its geographical distance and the significant cultural and social differences from Syria.

    Yemen is now fragmented into at least six parts, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States playing key roles within the country. While Iran and its Houthi allies remain entrenched, other factions could unite in the conflict. If Israel were to target the Houthis, opposing groups or their coalition partners could likely execute a relatively straightforward mission. This would involve a surgical strike strategy and targeted attacks similar to those that severely weakened Hezbollah by eliminating key leaders. If successful, the Houthis would be significantly diminished, reducing their threat. Although the timeline for such an outcome remains uncertain, if the Houthis persist in their missile attacks against Israel, a resolution will eventually emerge. This could provide an opportunity for opposition groups in Yemen to retake the capital and reunify the nation.

  • Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 with a brutality few could have foreseen, has, in a technical sense, reached its conclusion. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, worn down by years of conflict and international sanctions, now belongs to history. In its place, Damascus is now under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist faction left to govern a fractured nation, torn apart by sectarian divisions and shaped by decades of authoritarian rule.

    To much of the world, HTS remains an organization shrouded in infamy, its name still marked by the stigma of terrorism. Yet, in the alleys of the capital and the corridors of power, its leaders—chief among them Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—project an image of determined ambition. Their rhetoric emphasizes a break from the grim patterns of extremist rule, rejecting comparisons to the Taliban and pledging an approach guided by pragmatism and, perhaps, restraint. However, words, however carefully crafted to reassure a skeptical world, cannot erase the unease of minorities—Shia, Kurds, and countless others—whose fragile existence on the nation’s periphery remains haunted by the specter of displacement, discrimination, or worse.

    HTS’s tenure in Idlib, long a laboratory for its ambitions, hardly inspires confidence. Reports from the years of its administration there paint a picture of a governing apparatus that struggled to transcend its militant origins, marred by accusations of repression and ineptitude. Now, thrust into the complexities of running a modern state—an endeavor demanding more than rhetoric and religious zeal—the group must wrestle with a task that has humbled leaders far better prepared.

    The biggest challenge for Syria’s new administration is shedding the “Terrorist” label attached to its leadership—a designation that complicates its path to recognition, international aid, and the maneuvering room needed in Syria’s fragmented political landscape. For Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), securing legitimacy could unlock vital support from foreign powers, bolstering its position in a potential tug-of-war with rival factions and even a looming conflict with Kurdish forces.

    Diplomacy, often defined as the art of achieving the improbable, has become the tool of choice for Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Blacklisted as a terrorist by the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and United Nations, al-Sharaa has managed to carve out surprising diplomatic inroads. Shedding his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and the trappings of militant rebellion, he has recast himself as a statesman intent on steering Syria out of five decades of Assad rule. His overtures to Western officials have already borne fruit, with the United States recently lifting a $10 million bounty on his head following what he described as “Productive” talks.

    Winning Western support could prove transformative. Access to international aid would accelerate Syria’s reconstruction after more than a decade of ruinous war. Al-Sharaa’s government, if granted a modicum of trust by the West, could also leverage Sunni solidarity to attract funds from Gulf powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. An alignment with Sunni-majority nations might ease tensions with Israel, paving the way for regional stability—or at least détente.

    The Kurdish question, however, remains a stumbling block. Turkey, HTS’s largest benefactor, vehemently opposes Kurdish autonomy in Syria, while the United States may pressure Damascus to seek a fragile coexistence with Kurdish factions as part of any broader reconciliation. Al-Sharaa’s ability—or inability—to navigate this minefield could define his administration’s relationship with the West.

    Iran poses an equally complex challenge. Maintaining the fragile allegiance of Syria’s Shia minority will require delicate handling, particularly if Tehran views the new Sunni-led administration as a threat to its regional ambitions. Any missteps here risk turning Shia groups, with Iranian support, into a destabilizing force within Syria.

    Russia, meanwhile, cannot be ignored. Marginalized on the global stage but entrenched in Syria, Moscow remains a power broker capable of influencing Damascus’s fortunes. Al-Sharaa must walk a tightrope, balancing old alliances while pursuing new ones—a test of his diplomatic finesse as much as his political will.

    The harsh realities cannot be ignored: over 90 percent of Syrians live in poverty, more than six million have fled the country, and another seven million remain displaced within its borders. A decade of war has crippled the economy, leaving the nation in ruins. For HTS, the road ahead demands more than lofty promises—it requires pragmatic leadership and skilled diplomacy to secure the support essential for Syria’s reconstruction and renewal.

    A stable Syria offers more than just domestic benefits. Refugee returns could ease migration pressures on Turkey and Europe, but the UN has cautioned that hasty repatriation without international support risks reigniting the country’s deep-seated conflicts. Damascus must aim higher than mere stability; it must pursue sustainable peace within a unified state. That vision demands foreign powers, such as Israel, which continues to occupy Syrian territory illegally, step back to allow the country to heal.

    Sharaa’s calls for revisiting Syria’s political transition, particularly the relevance of the 2015 UN Security Council resolution that shaped it, carry merit. Yet his next steps will be decisive. If he insists on entrusting the drafting of a new constitution to a handpicked committee of loyalists, he risks repeating the mistakes of his predecessors. A meaningful constitution must emerge from an assembly elected by Syrians or representatives of the country’s vast diversity—not from a closed circle of ideological allies.

    Failure to adopt an inclusive approach could erode the legitimacy of a new charter, reducing it to a document as disregarded as the Assad regime’s defunct constitution. Sharaa’s rhetoric suggests he understands the stakes, but his actions will determine whether Syria’s long-awaited renewal can take hold—or whether its divisions will only deepen.