Tag: Vietnam

  • Amid Regional Tensions, Singapore and Vietnam Deepen Ties

    Amid Regional Tensions, Singapore and Vietnam Deepen Ties

    Amid deglobalization and rising trade tensions, Singapore is strengthening its ties with regional markets. With U.S.-China friction intensifying and Trump threatening even allied nations, the city-state—keen on safeguarding its economic resilience—is deepening its engagement with ASEAN partners.

    As part of this strategy, Singapore and Vietnam have agreed to elevate their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The decision came during a visit last week by To Lam, Vietnam’s general secretary and its most powerful political figure. Lam met with Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong and other senior officials to discuss expanding economic and security cooperation.

    The visit led to several key agreements, including plans for collaboration on undersea cable development, digital connectivity, and cross-border data flows. Both sides also explored opportunities in green development, industrial park expansion, and regional stability, according to a joint statement.

    Singapore wants Vietnam in

    While maintaining strong ties with the U.S., China, and other major Asian powers, Singapore continues to expand its economic influence by fostering business opportunities. Vietnam, a rising manufacturing hub, has become a key part of this strategy. Strengthening economic ties with Vietnam allows Singapore to tap into a fast-growing market while mitigating risks from shifts in U.S. policy.

    As ASEAN members, Singapore and Vietnam share strong commercial ties. Bilateral trade between the two nations reached $23.5 billion (€21.7 billion) last year, a 9.5% increase from the previous year. Singapore is also one of Vietnam’s top foreign investors, contributing approximately $10.2 billion—27% of Vietnam’s total foreign investment—according to official data.

    With limited land, agriculture, and manufacturing capacity, Singapore relies on strategic partnerships to sustain its growth. However, overdependence on any single partner could disrupt its carefully balanced approach. By diversifying its alliances and expanding its economic network, Singapore reduces risks and strengthens its position as a key regional hub.

    Friends With Benefits

    Vietnam, aiming to achieve developed-nation status within the next five years, is reaping significant benefits from its growing partnership with Singapore. Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, Hanoi is prioritizing stable relationships with key regional players, seeking security through closer ties with like-minded nations rather than relying on unpredictable global powers.

    For over a decade, Vietnam has pursued a “Bamboo Diplomacy” strategy, carefully balancing relations with major global powers. However, its territorial dispute with China over the South China Sea remains a persistent challenge. Hanoi’s measured approach toward Beijing has sparked public frustration, with many viewing it as overly accommodating to a historical rival.

    In recent years, Vietnam has expanded its diplomatic footprint, forging comprehensive strategic partnerships with countries such as Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. Since taking office last August following the death of his predecessor, Nguyen Phu Trong, To Lam has accelerated efforts to deepen regional ties, further solidifying Vietnam’s position in Southeast Asia. So, Singapore and Vietnam stand as well-matched partners at a crucial moment.

    Future of the Relationship

    The future of Singapore-Vietnam relations appears increasingly robust. Vietnam, with its expanding manufacturing sector, gains from Singapore’s financial backing and infrastructure support, reinforcing their partnership amid regional uncertainty. At the same time, closer ties with Singapore provide Vietnam with greater strategic flexibility, reducing its reliance on China.

    Singapore also views this partnership as an opportunity to strengthen Vietnam’s defense capabilities, enabling it to push back against China’s growing military presence in the South China Sea. If both nations can rally other Southeast Asian countries into their network, the entire region stands to gain, fostering stability and economic growth.

  • Will Bold Governance Reforms Help Vietnam?

    Will Bold Governance Reforms Help Vietnam?

    Vietnam is undertaking a sweeping administrative overhaul in an effort to streamline governance and address long-standing inefficiencies within its bureaucracy. Over the next five years, the government aims to cut one in five public sector jobs, a significant reduction affecting state-owned media, the civil service, the police, and the military.

    As part of the restructuring, four ministries—transport, planning and investment, communications, and labor—have been dissolved. On Tuesday, the country’s parliament approved a plan to reduce the number of ministries from eighteen to fourteen. Government projections indicate that around 100,000 employees will either be laid off or offered early retirement.

    The Communist Party, under the leadership of To Lam, has positioned these reforms as a crucial step in its fight against entrenched corruption. The emphasis, officials say, is on fiscal discipline and ministerial efficiency rather than expanding government employment.

    What are the main changes?

    Among the most significant changes, the Ministry of Planning and Investment, which oversees foreign investment approvals, will be merged with the Ministry of Finance—a move that signals an effort to curb corruption tied to foreign capital, particularly as Vietnam seeks greater investment from Europe. Similarly, the Ministry of Transport will be combined with the Ministry of Construction, while the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment will be folded into the Ministry of Agriculture.

    Why now?

    Vietnam has experienced a surge in foreign investment in recent years, yet its rigid bureaucracy has failed to convert these inflows into concrete economic gains. Once regarded as an emerging economic powerhouse, the country has instead become a case study in bureaucratic gridlock, where excessive red tape and inefficiency have stifled growth. Now, in an effort to rein in an overstretched public sector—where government jobs are not just sources of employment but symbols of social standing—the government is pushing through a sweeping restructuring plan. The planned cuts are expected to ease financial pressure on the state while streamlining governance.

    At the same time, Vietnam is navigating external pressures, particularly in its trade relationship with its largest market, the United States. As an export-driven economy, it faces uncertainty over Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House. Trump has repeatedly threatened broad tariffs of 10–20% on all imports and has singled out Vietnam as “the worst abuser” of U.S. trade, pointing to its rapidly growing trade surplus since 2019. In this context, cost-cutting measures have become even more critical.

    What will be the result?

    Vietnam’s administrative overhaul is being presented as a bold step toward modernizing its state apparatus and addressing long-standing inefficiencies that have hindered governance and economic growth. The consolidation of ministries and commissions is expected to reduce bureaucratic hurdles for investment, infrastructure, and real estate projects. The reforms also seek to eliminate institutional redundancies that often create contradictions within the government, where one authority mandates a particular course of action while another demands the opposite. By reducing a bloated bureaucracy, the restructuring aims to reshape the country’s administrative landscape, potentially solidifying the legacy of To Lam—widely regarded as Vietnam’s most powerful politician—and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh as pragmatic reformers.

    Analysts highlight that the current restructuring is unprecedented in both scale and speed, with Communist Party General Secretary To Lam describing it as an institutional revolution. While the government frames these reforms as essential for efficiency and modernization, their ultimate impact depends on execution. Whether they will result in meaningful administrative improvements or merely serve to consolidate power within the bureaucracy remains uncertain.

    What Are the Broader Implications?

    The timing of these reforms carries significant political weight, coming just a year before the Communist Party’s 2026 congress, where To Lam’s leadership will be up for confirmation. While he is widely expected to secure another term as general secretary, there are murmurs of discontent within the party. His push to restructure the government aligns with his apparent strategy of placing trusted allies in key positions, reinforcing his grip on power.

    The political dynamics surrounding this overhaul are impossible to ignore. To Lam ascended to the party’s top position in August following the death of his predecessor, Nguyen Phu Trong, the architect of Vietnam’s sweeping blazing furnace anti-corruption campaign. As a former minister of public security, he cemented his influence through high-profile graft investigations, and since 2021, the Ministry of Public Security, the military, and the police have increasingly dominated the Politburo, the party’s most powerful decision-making body. His rise has also been accompanied by growing accusations of authoritarianism. Earlier this year, he briefly held both the roles of party chief and state president—an almost unprecedented consolidation of power in Vietnam’s modern political history.

  • The New China? Vietnam’s Quest to Silence Opposition and Critique

    The New China? Vietnam’s Quest to Silence Opposition and Critique

    At its core, communism seeks not only to shape society but also to command the very essence of human existence — from daily routines to private thoughts. The ideology thrives on pervasive control, and history provides a stark record of its manifestations. The Soviet Union and Cuba epitomized the authoritarian model of communist regimes, enforcing conformity through relentless oversight and suppression.

    However, communist China has charted a unique path. While many contemporaneous communist states collapsed under the weight of popular dissent, China adapted by providing its people with what they desire while maintaining tighter governmental control. By intertwining its authoritarian governance with technological prowess, it has created a model where digital tools not only entertain but also enforce seamless and far-reaching control over its citizens. Through surveillance, censorship, and data collection, the government wields the internet as its most effective weapon.

    Vietnam seems intent on following China’s lead. Historically seen as an iteration of Chinese communism, its government has sought to mirror China’s trade successes while upholding a communist structure. Now, with a new internet law set to take effect, Vietnam appears ready to tighten its grip. This legislation grants the government broad powers over internet services and their users, facilitating meticulous surveillance and censorship. By leveraging digital platforms as tools of authoritarian control, Vietnam is paving the way for a more intense model of communist governance — one in which dissent is quickly silenced and every digital footprint is monitored.

    This is the perfect communism for the digital age: control, refined and perfected through the internet.

    Social media users in Vietnam, including those on platforms like Facebook and TikTok, will be required to verify their identities under strict new internet regulations. The law, which took effect on Christmas Day, mandates tech companies operating in Vietnam to store user data, provide it to authorities upon request, and remove content deemed “Illegal” by the government within 24 hours. Known as Decree 147, the law builds on the controversial 2018 cybersecurity law, which drew sharp criticism from the U.S., EU, and advocates for internet freedom, who claimed it mirrors China’s repressive internet censorship model.

    Under the new regulations, tech companies, along with all “Foreign Organizations, Enterprises, and Individuals,” must verify user accounts through phone numbers or Vietnamese identification numbers and store that information alongside users full names and dates of birth. They are required to provide this data to the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) or the Ministry of Public Security upon demand. Decree 147 significantly expands the government’s control over online access to information, citing concerns over “National Security” and “Social Order”. The law also obligates social media platforms to remove content deemed “Illegal” by authorities within 24 hours, further tightening state oversight of the internet.

    Vietnam’s hardline government has a well-established record of swiftly silencing dissent and imprisoning critics, particularly those who gain prominence on social media. In October, blogger Duong Van Thai, who had nearly 120,000 followers on YouTube, where he frequently live streamed critiques of the government, was sentenced to 12 years in prison for publishing anti-state content. Months earlier, prominent independent journalist Huy Duc, known for his popular blog critical of the government on issues like media control and corruption, was arrested on charges that his posts “Violated the Interests of the State”.

    Critics warn that Decree 147 will further expose dissidents—especially those posting anonymously—to the risk of arrest. Nguyen Hoang Vi, a blogger and rights activist based in Ho Chi Minh City, explained that many people work quietly but effectively in advancing universal human rights. She also cautioned that the new decree may encourage self-censorship, with people refraining from expressing dissenting views to safeguard their safety, ultimately stifling the development of democratic values in Vietnam.

    Former political prisoner Le Anh Hung called it the latest sign of infringement on basic freedoms, noting the vague distinction between what is considered legal and what is not. She added that no one wants to go to jail, so some activists will undoubtedly become more cautious and fearful of this decree. In a chilling reminder of the government’s stance on dissent, Duong Van Thai’s October conviction underlines the escalating crackdown on those who challenge the state.

    Le Quang Tu Do, from the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC), told state media that Decree 147 would regulate behavior to maintain social order, national security, and sovereignty in cyberspace. The decree also stipulates that only verified accounts will be allowed to livestream, which could impact the growing number of people earning a living through social commerce on platforms like TikTok.

    In addition to its impact on social media companies, the new laws impose restrictions on gaming for individuals under 18, aimed at curbing addiction. Game publishers are expected to enforce a time limit of one hour per session and a maximum of 180 minutes of gameplay per day. Do remarked that games are “Designed to be Addictive”, noting that players often spend hours engaged in continuous matches.

    According to data from research firm Newzoo, just over half of Vietnam’s 100 million people regularly play such games. A significant portion of the population is also active on social media, with the MIC estimating around 65 million Facebook users, 60 million on YouTube, and 20 million on TikTok.

    While many pro-communist individuals believe the law will help protect people from the addiction to social media and the influence of Western culture, many young people have noted that their time spent on social media and playing games has negatively affected their lives. The harmful consequences are drawing increasing attention as the government’s actions unfold. The country is experiencing a resurgence of communist ideologies, reinforced by sweeping government and authority-led initiatives, such as the widely praised anti-corruption drive. These measures, framed as necessary to safeguard the state from its enemies, reflect a growing shift toward controlling governance and suppressing dissent.

  • Will the China-Backed Canal Reduce Cambodia’s Reliance on Vietnam?

    Will the China-Backed Canal Reduce Cambodia’s Reliance on Vietnam?

    For decades, Cambodia has regarded Vietnam with a wary eye, an undercurrent of suspicion flowing through its society. Across the country’s diverse social fabric, a significant portion of the population nurses a deep-seated animosity toward its eastern neighbor, blaming Vietnam for a host of domestic troubles. This long-standing resentment has crystallized into a widely held belief that the Vietnamese are not only untrustworthy but capable of malevolent deeds.

    The friction between the two nations is not confined to old grievances; it festers in the present. Border disputes linger unresolved, and the presence of Vietnamese immigrants within Cambodia’s borders stirs anxieties of a more existential nature. Some Cambodians fear that these immigrants could become pawns in a broader Vietnamese strategy to exert dominance over the country. This rising tide of anti-Vietnamese sentiment is fed by a variety of factors – both historical and contemporary – and has recently manifested in protests across Phnom Penh. These demonstrations are but the latest iteration of a familiar political strategy, wherein leaders, sensing an opportunity, stoke fears of foreign encroachment to rally popular support.

    Despite this animosity, Cambodia’s political and economic structures remain deeply intertwined with Vietnam, especially in trade and business. The Mekong River, Cambodia’s lifeline and vital for agriculture and the transportation of goods and people, flows into Vietnam and eventually opens to the sea, making Cambodia dependent on Vietnamese ports for maritime access. This reliance gives Vietnam significant leverage in its dealings with Cambodia. Although Cambodia has its own coastline and ports, the challenging terrain makes the Mekong River a more practical route for transporting goods and facilitating commerce.

    Reducing this dependence has long been a goal for Cambodian policymakers. In pursuit of this objective, the government has proposed a costly project to reroute the Mekong River to the Cambodian coast via a canal. However, securing funding for such a massive undertaking has proven challenging. The only nation willing to assist Cambodia is China, known for financing projects in countries with limited capacity for repayment. China has expressed interest in the canal project, even considering the potential disruptions it may cause to Vietnamese ports – an intriguing dilemma, especially given China’s close relationship with Vietnam.

    The canal, commonly known as the Funan Techno Canal and officially named the Tonle Bassac Navigation Road and Logistics System Project, will span 180 km. The project aims to connect Phnom Penh with Cambodia’s only deep-sea port in Sihanoukville and the newly developed port in Kampot. The plan includes the construction of three dams with sluices and eleven bridges. The estimated completion date is 2028, with a projected cost of $1.7 billion, entirely funded by the China Road and Bridge Corporation. The canal will be developed under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract, with hopes of reducing reliance on Vietnamese ports, particularly Cai Mep. Unsurprisingly, Vietnam has raised environmental concerns regarding the project, but Cambodia is determined to move forward. The canal’s groundbreaking ceremony took place on August 5, 2024.

    Photo Credit: Radio Free Asia

    The canal offers enormous opportunities for Cambodia by providing crucial access to the sea, which is essential for economic growth. With this project, Cambodian businesses will gain direct access to maritime routes, significantly reducing costs. The areas surrounding the canal are expected to experience a surge in investment, leading to further infrastructure development that will undoubtedly boost the economy. Cambodia is already a favored partner of China, and reports indicate that developing infrastructure will create more investment opportunities in the country, signaling a potential influx of foreign capital.

    Politically, the leaders who have brought this project to fruition are likely to be celebrated as heroes, particularly for fulfilling a generational demand to reduce Cambodia’s dependence on Vietnam. President Hun Sen, whose administration has championed this ambitious initiative, envisions it as a cornerstone of his legacy – not as a leader besmirched by corruption, but as the architect of a transformative achievement for Cambodia. The canal is also anticipated to alter the region’s geopolitical landscape, fostering a greater separation between Cambodia and Vietnam. In a recent speech, Prime Minister Hun Manet underscored that the canal – his father’s brainchild – will not only boost the economy but also enhance Cambodia’s independence, promote trade, industry, and agriculture, and ensure efficient water management.

    However, this project also carries significant risks. The massive investment from China, coupled with interest rates that Cambodia may struggle to repay, could further bind the country to Chinese influence. This dependence on Chinese policies and products might lead to a challenging economic situation, with Cambodia potentially falling into a debt trap similar to those experienced by Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Consequently, much of the revenue generated by the project may ultimately flow back to China.

    Projects involving transboundary rivers are often mired in disputes, driven by conflicting national interests. While the canal promises substantial benefits for Cambodia, it simultaneously poses risks for Vietnam, likely exacerbating tensions between the two countries. As a partner to both, China may find itself in the delicate position of mediating the issue, seeking to navigate the complexities without drawing in external parties. Yet, it is evident that this canal has the potential to alter the political and economic dynamics of the region.

  • Vietnam and China Deepen Party and Government Relations

    Vietnam and China Deepen Party and Government Relations

    China and Vietnam, often considered communist brothers, are unlikely to part ways as many political analysts believe. Instead, they are fostering closer relations between their communist parties and governments. With the passing of Nguyen Phu Trong, one of Vietnam’s influential leaders since Ho Chi Minh, it appears that Vietnam is drawing closer to the Chinese Communist Party and its government.

    Vietnam’s new General Secretary of the Communist Party and President, Tô Lâm, conducted a state visit to China from August 18-20. This marked his first foreign visit since being appointed to the powerful position following the passing of Phu Trong, signaling his prioritization of China. The official welcome, attended by Tô Lâm, his spouse, and a high-level Vietnamese delegation, was held with full honors at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Monday. The ceremony was presided over by Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and President of China, along with his spouse.

    The event featured a notable presence of senior leaders from both the Chinese government and the Communist Party. Attendees included Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, Secretary of the Secretariat, and Director of the General Office of the CPC; Wang Yi, Politburo member, Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Wang Xiaohong, State Councilor and Minister of Public Security; Liu Jianchao, Head of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee; Zheng Shanjie, Director of the National Development and Reform Commission; Jin Zhuanglong, Minister of Industry and Information Technology; and Wang Wentao, Minister of Commerce, among others. The presence of these high-ranking officials underscores the significance of the visit and Several agreements are anticipated from the visit, which could benefit Vietnam, particularly as China seeks greater cooperation with Vietnam amid its ongoing tensions with the United States.

    Both sides expressed satisfaction with the historic advancement of their relationship, which has reached an unprecedented level of intensity, comprehensiveness, and substance. Notable achievements include strengthened political trust, elevated bilateral ties, regular exchanges and contacts at all levels, robust trade collaboration, significant growth in Chinese investments in Vietnam, a strong recovery in tourism, and enhanced local and people-to-people cooperation.

    President Lâm welcomed China’s participation in three standard-gauge railway projects linking the two countries, including the Vientiane–Vũng Áng railway and the metro system in Hanoi. He encouraged China to continue expanding its market for high-quality Vietnamese farm products and to support the establishment of Vietnam’s Consulate General in Chongqing and trade promotion offices in China. Additionally, he proposed that China accelerate large-scale, high-quality investments in Vietnam, implement smart border gates, consider local currency payment cooperation, and enhance collaboration in science and technology, innovation, green transition, digital transformation, and high-tech agriculture. Vietnam hopes China will favorably consider these proposals, particularly in light of its general hesitation towards foreign investments from the West.

    Agreeing with Lâm, Li emphasized the need for both countries to maintain their cooperative structure and focus on win-win development. Li also highlighted efforts to improve rail connections between Vietnam and Europe via China, expedite the feasibility study for the Lào Cai–Hà Nội–Hải Phòng railway, plan the Đồng Đăng–Hà Nội and Móng Cái–Hạ Long–Hải Phòng railways, and facilitate the entry of high-quality Vietnamese agro-fishery products into China.

    Recognizing the significant potential for cooperation between their countries, the two leaders agreed to work together to enhance political and economic confidence and build a Việt Nam-China community with a shared future of strategic importance. They aim to advance bilateral relations to a new level based on the six major orientations, maintain regular communication at all levels, and promote exchanges and cooperation through Party, Government, National Assembly/National People’s Congress, and Fatherland Front/People’s Political Consultative Conference channels.

    While former Party Secretary of Vietnam Nguyễn Phú Trọng engaged with many Western countries, including the United States, and attracted investments from nations such as Germany, many expected Vietnam to align with the U.S. and Japan, which are positioning themselves against China in the region. However, recent diplomatic actions by the Communist Party of Vietnam indicate that, despite disagreements over South China Sea territories, Vietnam remains closely aligned with the Chinese Communist Party. This collaboration could negatively influence the United States by enhancing China’s regional position. As China extends its influence in the South China Sea, it may secure a strategic advantage.

  • Vietnamese Politics After Nguyen Phu Trong

    Vietnamese Politics After Nguyen Phu Trong

    Vietnamese politics is entering a new era following the death of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. Trong was Vietnam’s most powerful leader in decades, having served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) for the past 13 years across three terms. As Vietnam is a single-party state under an authoritarian system led by the CPV, the General Secretary holds the de facto highest position in Vietnamese politics. This new era, with a new General Secretary, is being closely observed both domestically and internationally, particularly in the context of serious geopolitical tensions in the region.

    Vietnamese politics remains largely stable despite frequent changes in the presidency and prime ministership, as the national congress, led by the Communist Party, makes the key decisions that shape the country’s direction. Over the past decade, Trong is credited with directing crucial policies, including those against corruption. He is arguably Vietnam’s most influential leader since its founding revolutionary, Ho Chi Minh. Trong became the general secretary of the ruling party in 2011 and made history by securing a third five-year term in 2021. He was also in the role of Vietnam’s president from 2018 to 2020. Despite the rapid changes in the presidency and prime ministership, the leadership of the Communist Party has remained stable, helping to preserve the country’s communist system. However, some uncertainty looms in Hanoi following the death of this long-serving leader. Trong left behind a mixed political and economic legacy, having overseen Vietnam’s rapid economic growth and a “blazing furnace” crackdown on corruption.

    Duties temporarily transferred to Lam, the 66-year-old who became president in May and was previously Vietnam’s public security minister. Lam is widely considered as Trong’s successor, particularly because he oversees Trong’s ambitious anti-corruption drive. Since 2016, this campaign has ensnared 40 members of the party’s Central Committee and dozens of military and police generals. Although the crackdown has enjoyed public support, the removal of six out of 18 Politburo members since December 2022, including three of Vietnam’s top five leaders since March, has sparked concerns about factional infighting and fears of a potential succession crisis. Acting leader Lam will hold the position until the Communist Party’s 14th Congress in January 2026. During the next 17 months, there will be limited policymaking as the Communist Party of Vietnam concentrates on selecting new personnel and preparing policies for the Congress.

    Despite the political turmoil, no change is expected in Vietnam’s foreign policy, with Hanoi remaining studiously neutral and maintaining deep economic ties with both China and the US and its allies. Observers generally viewed Hanoi’s pragmatic “Bamboo Diplomacy” under Trong’s leadership positively, as it delicately balanced relations between China and the United States amid a deepening rift with its northern neighbor in the South China Sea. However, Vietnam’s foreign policy could be influenced by external events. Potential flashpoints include Beijing’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea, deteriorating relations with Cambodia, and possible changes in US policy under a new administration. Despite differences, Trong always maintained a good relationship with the Chinese Communist Party. Following the announcement of Trong’s death, the Communist Party of China and Xi Jinping issued a condolence message, honoring him as a good comrade, a good brother, and a good friend.

    Under Trong’s leadership, Vietnam’s relationships with the US and Russia also reached new heights. Over the past 10 months, despite his health issues, Trong hosted both Xi and US President Joe Biden in Hanoi and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in June. Hanoi has also advanced its relationships with Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, and ASEAN neighbors.

    Trong did much to shape the country’s direction, and the likelihood of revising his policies or changing course is low. His successor remains uncertain, and the Politburo offers little clarity, as most recent additions have military backgrounds and are likely to be more obedient with fewer disputes. It is expected that there will be no clash in the succession. However, tough years lie ahead for Vietnam, and the Vietnam-China and Vietnam-US relationships will be tested as tensions rise in the region.

  • Is Vietnam Truly Reliable for the West?

    Is Vietnam Truly Reliable for the West?

    Vietnam, the Southeast Asian communist country and birthplace of communist legend Ho Chi Minh, is known for its complex foreign relationships. Despite its communist single-party system and historical ties with the Soviet Union, Vietnam joined the non-aligned movement in 1976. Today, Vietnam is considered a friendly country in Asia by both Europe and the United States, who view it as a potential counterbalance to China in South China Sea disputes. Vietnam skillfully maintains good relations with other communist nations while being seen as a potential ally of the West in the region, engaging in significant diplomatic discussions and attracting European investments. However, Vietnam’s policy of non-alignment still causes confusion, especially following recent receptions of Western pariah Vladimir Putin and its ongoing ties with Russia.

    Vladimir Putin’s visit to Hanoi is aimed at reaffirming Russia’s importance in the region and maintaining its relationship with the country. The Russian president landed at Hanoi airport on Thursday following a significant visit to North Korea. President Putin was greeted on the red carpet by Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Tran Hong Ha and top party diplomat Le Hoai Trung. Russia and Vietnam pledged to enhance their relationship. However, there are no reports that important military trade and aid agreements will be signed as they were in Pyongyang. Speaking to the press in Vietnam after his two-day visit to North Korea, Putin mentioned the possibility of providing high-precision weapons to North Korea and criticized NATO for posing a security threat to Russia in Asia. The increasing U.S. presence in Asia has become a significant concern for Russia. Meanwhile, the United States is forging more relationships in Asia, leading to shifts among traditionally Russian-aligned countries like India and Vietnam toward the West.

    The Vietnamese president, To Lam, had earlier stated that his country and Russia aimed to enhance cooperation in defense and security, addressing non-traditional security challenges based on international law, for Regional and global peace and security. Lam and Putin signed 11 memorandums for cooperation in areas including civil nuclear projects, energy and petroleum cooperation, education, and disease prevention. Putin informed reporters that the talks were constructive and that both sides held “Identical or very close” positions on key international issues. In an opinion piece published in Vietnam’s Communist Party newspaper Nhan Dan to coincide with his visit, Putin listed progress on payments, energy, and trade between the countries, and commended Vietnam for supporting “A pragmatic way to solve the crisis” in Ukraine. 

    The outcoming statements and warm relationships with these two countries cast doubt on recent reports about Vietnam’s shift to the West. When U.S. President Biden visited the country, reports emerged suggesting that Vietnam, facing several disputes with China, was getting closer to the West and would join the bloc of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Australia in opposing China’s dominance in the region. Visits by Vietnamese Communist Party leaders to Western countries and policy changes favoring business and investment have supported this view. However, Vietnam has repeatedly abstained from UN General Assembly votes relating to Russia’s war in Ukraine, despite its strong relationship with Europe. This suggests that while Vietnam may need the economic support of the West, the communist country cannot fully align with the West, positioning itself as a smaller version of China.

    Vietnam’s leadership favors a so-called “Bamboo Diplomacy”, which sways with the winds and avoids picking sides in international disputes, including those involving Ukraine and the rivalry between the US and China. There is no doubt that Russia has a longstanding friendship with Vietnam, as many still remember the support the Soviet Union provided during past wars against the French and the US. The former Soviet Union was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Ho Chi Minh’s Vietnamese government.

    However, the economy is the most potent weapon in the 21st century. Russia is not a major trade partner for Vietnam, and international sanctions have weakened Russia. The US, UK, and the European Union all announced new sanctions over the past week. Therefore, for the sake of its economy, Vietnam needs to make decisions in favor of the West. Trade between Vietnam and Russia amounted to just $3.5 billion in 2022, compared to Vietnam’s $175 billion trade with China and $123 billion with the US. More than Russia and China, the US is now crucial for Vietnam. A spokesperson for the US embassy in Hanoi warned before Putin’s visit that “No country should give Putin a platform to promote his war of aggression and otherwise allow him to normalize his atrocities”, and highlighted Putin’s international crimes. Although the likelihood of the US taking strong actions against Vietnam is low, given Vietnam’s importance in potential tensions with China, Vietnam, now mimicking China in the early 2000s, will need the economic support of Western countries. However, its communist government may struggle to maintain these relationships in the long term.

  • Vietnam’s Spratly Reclamation Impact on Dispute

    Vietnam’s Spratly Reclamation Impact on Dispute

    The multi-party dispute in the South China Sea is escalating as more land reclamation projects are being carried out on the disputed islands. It’s not only China; other parties are involved as well. International media are mainly highlighting China’s actions, including their reclamation efforts and bullying tactics in the South China Sea, which serve their demand for complete control of the territory. Reports and maps show China’s major projects to turn rocks in international waters or disputed areas into artificial islands, converting them into military bases. This gives China an advantage, allowing them to claim more land and, through that, more sea. However, in reality, other parties interested in the region or sharing borders with the South China Sea are also making efforts to claim land using the same strategy. There are reports of Vietnam reclaiming land from the South China Sea, particularly around the Spratly Islands, which is causing serious tensions in the region.

    According to a report by the South China Morning Post, Vietnam, which has a long shoreline along the South China Sea, has reclaimed more land in the South China Sea in the past three years. This action could complicate and expand disputes in the contested waters. The report highlighted increased construction on islands and reefs occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia in the Nansha Islands, the name in which Beijing calls Spratly islands. The Beijing-based Grandview Institution stated that until 2019, the Vietnamese government had carried out only modest reclamation efforts on the 29 disputed islands and reefs it controlled in the Spratly Islands. However, Vietnam then embarked on major dredging and landfill work. Vietnam has carried out large-scale land expansion on several islands and reefs, adding 3 sq km of new land, far exceeding the total construction scale of the previous 40 years. Reports originating from Beijing allege that Vietnam has occupied a greater number of Chinese islands and reefs, stationed more troops, and erected more facilities than any other coastal state in the South China Sea. The report also noted that after 2021, following the initial COVID-19 lockdowns, Vietnam started using large cutter suction dredgers to reclaim land. These dredgers are specialized maritime vessels equipped with a rotating cutter designed to dredge rock, clay, silt, and sand. The Grandview Institution stated that the Vietnamese government had been extremely low-key and secretive about its island construction.

    The Spratly Islands, the small archipelago in the South China Sea with more than 100 reefs, islets, and islands, are the focal point of rival claims between China and Vietnam. The South China Sea islands, called the Nanshas by Beijing and referred to as Quần đảo Trường Sa by Hanoi, hold strategic significance for both countries. These islands are also subject to disputes along the Vietnamese coast. Although these communist nations currently do not engage in direct confrontations like China and the Philippines, and Vietnam avoids close cooperation with the United States, neither China nor Vietnam is willing to relinquish their claims. Both nations employ the same strategy to support their claims: extensive land reclamation. Vietnam and China are just two of the various parties claiming parts of the resource-rich South China Sea, through which important sea routes connect East Asia to Europe. Both of them know that control over these islands offers strategic dominance in the region and that the archipelago offers rich fishing grounds and potentially significant oil and natural gas reserves. These resources are crucial to the claimants in their attempts to establish international boundaries. Some of the islands in the Spratly archipelago have civilian settlements, while fewer than 50 islands are entirely occupied and contain structures suitable for military purposes. These islands are under the control of China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, and all these nations make great efforts to secure control over their territory.

    Morning Post’s report also referred to the Philippines’ increasing efforts to repair and reinforce a warship it grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal, another outcrop in the Spratlys. Coastguard vessels from China and the Philippines have clashed around the Scarborough Shoal, and tensions are brewing over Sabina Shoal. Philippines’ construction on its occupied features in the Spratlys was low-level and the defenses there were weak, so they were unlikely to pose a substantial threat to the military presence of other countries and the surrounding waters.  These actions all serve to complicate and escalate the disputes, impacting peace and stability in the region. Some observers say the South China Sea presents an even greater risk of conflict than the Taiwan Strait, but many believe the water is not a priority of China as Taiwan. But everyone doing their own part makes the sea more heated.

  • Will the Death Penalty for the Property Tycoon Truong My Lan, Help Vietnam’s Reputation?

    Will the Death Penalty for the Property Tycoon Truong My Lan, Help Vietnam’s Reputation?

    When we examine the history of communism, behind the failures of communist governments, corruption often emerges as one of the prominent causes. It’s true that the communist ruling system, the state-owned ruling system, often becomes the paradise of corruption practitioners. Vietnam, a well-known communist country, does not want to be in such a situation; the country is taking harsh actions against corruption. With an ongoing anti-corruption drive called “Blazing Furnace”, led by the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, cracking down on corruption at the administration level, many important officials, including two presidents and two deputy prime ministers, were forced to resign. Now, Vietnam is extending its war against corruption beyond the administration level. As a recent development, on Thursday, in a shocking move, one of the country’s influential property tycoons, Truong My Lan, was charged with fraud, bribery, and violation of rules, and sentenced to death.

    Truong My Lan, aged 68, is the founder and chair of the developer Van Thinh Phat, and a well-known businesswoman from Vietnam. Prosecutors indicated on Thursday that the total losses generated by the Truong My Lan swindle now amount to $27 billion, approximately 3% of Vietnam’s GDP. Lan was convicted of embezzling money over a ten-year period from Saigon Commercial Bank (SCB), the largest bank in Vietnam in terms of assets. Despite lacking direct executive authority at SCB, Lan possessed 91.5% of the bank’s shares through intermediaries and shell corporations. She was charged with creating fictitious loan applications to withdraw cash from the bank between 2012 and 2022. Official media reported that these loans constituted 93% of the bank’s entire credit provided. Without these activities, Lan and other SCB bankers were accused of paying state officials the largest bribe ever recorded in Vietnam, worth $5.2 million, to conceal the fraud. During the trial, Do Thi Nhan, a former top banking inspector of the State Bank of Vietnam, testified that the funds were handed over in Styrofoam boxes. Nhan stated that she refused the boxes upon discovering they contained money, but Lan declined to take them back. Lan was put on trial alongside eighty-five other individuals, including former SCB executives, government officials, and central bankers. Lan denied the accusations, and a relative informed Reuters that she would file an appeal prior to the ruling.

    Though the death sentence is an unusually severe punishment for a corruption case, and often considered to create a bad image in front of the modern world, the message brought by the trial and death penalty is clear. No mercy for the corruption. During the trial in Ho Chi Minh City, the decision stated that the defendant’s acts “eroded people’s trust in the leadership of the Communist Party and state.” State media, which is under tight control of the communist party, followed a five-week trial and covered it in great detail. According to VN Express, authorities had erected security cameras and fire safety equipment to preserve the evidence ahead of the hearings; trial-related documents were stored in 105 boxes and weighed 6 tonnes. Over 1,000 of Lan’s properties have been taken into custody, and approximately 2,700 people, 200 of whom were attorneys, were called to the trial. The country, which aims to become China’s replacement or the next industrial and manufacturing hub, is seeking to attract investors, but it is unclear if this tough approach would inspire confidence or suspicion among them. However, in terms of Vietnam’s anti-corruption campaign, it is unparalleled and historic.

  • Vietnam’s “Blazing Furnace” Effect: President Vo Van Thuong Steps Down After Just Over A Year

    Vietnam’s “Blazing Furnace” Effect: President Vo Van Thuong Steps Down After Just Over A Year

    Vietnam witnesses its second president departing within two years. President Vo Van Thuong, the youngest ever to hold the position in Vietnam’s history, steps down from his role as president after just 12 months and 19 days in office. The cause of his resignation remains unclear. State media, citing an announcement from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, suggests that President Vo Van Thuong’s actions and shortcomings have negatively impacted public perception and the reputation of the party and the state. However, specific details about these alleged violations have not been disclosed. This Stepping down occurs amid an administration-level campaign against corruption, dubbed the “blazing furnace” by Vietnam’s general secretary and leader Nguyen Phu Trong, which has led to the scrutiny and prosecution of thousands of officials, from top ministers to low-level bureaucrats. 

    In Vietnam’s political hierarchy, the presidency is the second most significant post within the confines of the country’s one-party system. However, the paramount position is that of the Communist Party General Secretary, currently occupied by Trong, who, at 79 years old, has held the post since 2011. Consequently, the resignation of the president is not expected to directly alter the nation’s policies. Nevertheless, it attracts attention due to its potential ramifications for succession, particularly regarding the 54-year-old who some experts speculated could succeed Trong. 

    President Vo Van Thuong rose to the presidency owing to his close relationship with Trong. He assumed the presidency after being introduced at an extraordinary meeting of the Party Central Committee on 1st March of 2023, succeeding Nguyễn Xuân Phúc following Phúc’s resignation due to corruption scandals. Thuong quickly emerged as a top contender for the presidency following Phúc’s departure. However, now that he appears to have fallen out of favor, he is resigning from his post. Võ Thị Ánh Xuân, serves as the Acting President of Vietnam since March 2024, having previously held this position for two months in 2023.

    The recent changes in high-level leadership, a rare occurrence in Vietnam, have sparked concerns among analysts and potential investors. Vietnam is often seen as the “Next China” in Asia, drawing significant investment interest as companies seek to diversify away from China amid escalating tensions between Beijing and Washington. Despite Vietnam’s appeal as a key investment destination, political instability has resulted in the postponement or cancellation of several critical meetings, including those involving the World Bank president and representatives from the Royal Dutch Authority. While the foreign direct investment (FDI) sector has been relatively insulated from the anti-corruption campaign, the prevailing uncertainty may cause investors to adopt a cautious approach, monitoring developments in Vietnam’s increasingly uncertain political landscape.

    For a nation that often prides itself on political stability, the resignations of two presidents in less than two years raise concerns. Thuong’s departure also casts doubts on Vietnam’s future leadership, especially with the next National Congress scheduled for 2026. With his youth and close ties to General Secretary Trong, Thuong was viewed as a strong contender for leadership, making his exit a significant loss for other potential candidates. 

    Furthermore, Thuong’s departure could inadvertently exacerbate a consequence of the anti-corruption campaign, wherein officials opt for passivity to prevent making mistakes, thereby hindering progress on critical issues. In numerous nations, heightened scrutiny of corruption often leads to the rejection of development initiatives and stalls progress. Vietnam is likely to experience similar effects. Nevertheless, it’s evident that such actions will bolster anti-corruption efforts and influence the nation’s reputation, contributing to long-term development.

    According to the state-controlled Tuoi Tre news website, the Vietnamese parliament endorsed Thuong’s resignation during a highly unusual closed-door session. Discussions regarding the successor to Vo Van Thuong are on the brink of commencement. The individual assuming this role will collaborate closely with the existing framework. It is paramount to uphold and enhance Vietnam’s investment-attracting strategy to distinguish the nation as a symbol of “Good and Democratic” manufacturing hub, diverging from China’s reputation for being “Bad and Authoritarian”.