Tag: World

The US Military to Construct a Port in Gaza: Will it Help Reach Humanitarian Aid to Gaza?

This is cruel punishment. Whatever the reason for the Gaza people are suffering, They are suffering it in a very cruel manner. Basic need of people is declining, there is nothing left, buildings are collapsing , the casualties by the Israeli army’s attack is skyrocketing, and the war effect is now deepening in Gaza, kids are starving, some find peace by the death. And the war of the neighbors, war for religion is getting its very disastrous situation. For the 1200 Israeli’ blood, Israel took back more than 30000 lives of Palestinians.

The conflict in Gaza appears to have no imminent resolution. Israel remains steadfast in its pursuit of complete control over the region, contributing to a prolonged war. The division among Islamic countries adds complexity, and the Western world, despite its advocacy for human rights, faces challenges in providing even humanitarian aid. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Saudi Arabia no one has been unable to reach Gaza with aid.

Israel’s reluctance to open doors for humanitarian assistance, coupled with Egypt’s cautious approach, further exacerbates the dire situation. The region appears to be ensnared in a fortress-like blockade, contending not only with external threats but also facing internal challenges, particularly from groups like Hamas. In the absence of diplomatic breakthroughs and open avenues, the looming risk of one of the world’s largest massacres hangs over Gaza.

As Prominent supporter of Israel, the United States is finally acting in response to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. President Joe Biden is set to unveil a substantial initiative in his upcoming State of the Union address, as disclosed by three senior administration officials on Thursday. This initiative entails a pivotal role for the U.S. military, tasked with establishing a temporary port in Gaza. The strategic plan leverages the distinctive capabilities of the U.S. military, aiming to construct a port or causeway without deploying troops to Gaza’s shores. The primary objective is to enhance access to essential provisions, encompassing food, water, medicine, and various other forms of aid, for the Palestinian population.

Officials emphasized, the operation is not intended to involve U.S. boots on the ground. The initiative aims to create a maritime corridor from Cyprus to Gaza in collaboration with governments and commercial partners, supplementing aid delivered through airdrops and land routes. The decision to resort to this military mission stems from concerns that Israel is not permitting sufficient aid to address the humanitarian crisis resulting from the Israel-Hamas conflict affecting 2.2 million Palestinians in Gaza. In addition to the establishment of a temporary port in Gaza, The U.S. is actively urging Israel to open more land routes, enabling quicker and more efficient assistance to reach those in need.

While the scheme, involving the construction of a temporary pier by U.S. military engineers off the coast of Gaza City, will take several weeks to implement, concerns persist that it may supply insufficient relief too late. Aid experts, while acknowledging it as a step in the right direction, argue that leveraging U.S. influence to open more land routes for humanitarian assistance would be a more effective strategy.

The Larnaca port in Cyprus will serve as the primary relief hub, facilitating aid shipments to Gaza. President Biden is set to announce this emergency mission during his State of the Union address, with the aid deliveries expected to come through a collaborative effort with like-minded countries and humanitarian partners.

Though The maritime corridor plan encounters numerous challenges, particularly in addressing how to efficiently unload, secure, and distribute the aid. Several U.S., European, and Middle Eastern officials, including four others, have indicated that many aspects of the plan are still under discussion. While smaller aid packages are expected to arrive by sea soon, a coordinated effort is required to establish a regular schedule for larger assistance shipments across the Mediterranean, a process anticipated to take 45 to 60 days.

The initial entry point for aid will be the Larnaca port in Cyprus, situated approximately 230 miles from Gaza and already equipped with advanced screening technology for Israeli officials in Cyprus to inspect deliveries. Given Gaza’s lack of a functioning port, President Biden has directed the U.S. military to assist in establishing a temporary pier, though the specific roles of other partners in this endeavor remain uncertain. Negotiations with Israel regarding a security and crowd-control mission on the beachhead are ongoing, including discussions about potential Israeli involvement in demining staging areas for the aid.

Criticism of Biden within his own party for the failure to facilitate humanitarian aid to Gaza, where a famine is looming and casualties from the conflict have reached 30,000, has intensified. The UN has warned of catastrophic levels of deprivation and starvation among over a quarter of Gaza’s population, emphasizing the urgency of action to prevent widespread famine.

Dispersing aid throughout Gaza, an active war zone with security risks for aid workers, presents a significant challenge. The multinational coalition plans to rely on the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and other groups to ensure targeted distribution. Talks between the United Arab Emirates and Qatar with the Cypriots are underway to explore their potential contributions to the maritime corridor. While officials from both governments have not responded to requests for comment, there are reports of UAE-funded aid arriving in Gaza the following week.

March 8, 2024
Shrinking Russosphere: How Central Asia’s Cultural Uplift Will Affect Russia’s Interests?

Throughout history, language has consistently proven to be a crucial instrument in the delicate process of shaping national identities. The Russian language, in particular, stands out as one of the Soviet Union’s most powerful tools, adeptly molding diverse ethnic groups into a cohesive whole and forging a robust national identity. This linguistic force played a pivotal role in facilitating the dissemination of ideas, fostering the development of unions, and acting as a conduit for news to permeate society. Over time, it evolved into a unifying force, seamlessly binding together the disparate regions under Soviet rule.

The Russian language has had a lasting impact on the global landscape even after the Soviet Union disintegrated. Despite changes in political landscapes, Russia, which is currently the successor to a “Russosphere,” observes the enduring effect of its language history. Russian continues to be the most widely spoken language in several republics, including the current Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

As Russia, under Putin’s leadership, pursues ambitions of imperial resurgence through conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine, a counter-trend is quietly emerging in some nations seeking to rebuild their national identity by distancing themselves from the Russian language. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Central Asia.

Originating in Eastern Europe, a movement has gained traction, aiming to dismantle Russian influence and foster distinct identities, particularly notable in the Baltic countries. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, motivated by a yearning to reclaim their cultural heritage, strategically pivoted towards their ethnic languages—Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian. Simultaneously, English emerged as a Lingua Franca, supplanting Russian, enabling national radios, television, and cultural programs to successfully resonate with both domestic and international audiences. These Baltic nations adeptly navigated the transition, reclaiming their identities during the shift from the Soviet Union to Putin’s Russia.

However, the pace and assertiveness in this linguistic and cultural transition varied across different Eastern European countries. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia were comparatively slow and less assertive, leading to a different outcome. These nations continued to embrace Russian programs and news, and paid a price for not fostering a distinct cultural identity. Ukraine, in particular, faced internal divisions, as the lack of assertive Ukrainian language contributed to a large population of Russian influenced people..

Georgia lost territories, while Moldova too grappled with internal divisions. Belarus, facing a crisis of identity, is now closely aligned with Russia. The contrast in outcomes highlights the crucial role of linguistic and cultural choices in shaping a nation’s destiny, as Eastern European countries navigate the complex interplay between identity, politics, and external influences.

Central Asia also embarked on a journey of self-discovery, slowly and amicably fostering their language and identity. However, the pace and approach differ markedly, as Central Asian nations lack the robust support enjoyed by their Eastern European counterparts from Europe and the United States. With a continued reliance on Russia for resources, financial support, and tourism, their journey has been shaped by a different set of challenges.

While still dependent on Russia for essentials like gas and financial aid, the region is increasingly becoming a multi-player on the global stage. With a myriad of options, including support from Turkey, Qatar, Iran, India, China, and even Eastern Europe itself, Central Asian nations are strategically positioning themselves to diversify their alliances and reduce dependence on any single power.

This shift opens avenues for Central Asia to make bold and swift moves in establishing and strengthening their languages and cultural identities. The geopolitical realignment not only offers opportunities but also poses challenges as these nations navigate a delicate balance between maintaining historical ties and forging new partnerships in their quest for identity.

As the largest country in Central Asia, Kazakhstan grapples with intricate language dynamics, notably the coexistence of Russian and Kazakh. While Russian is not designated as a state language, Article 7 of Kazakhstan’s Constitution accords it equal status with Kazakh in state and local administration, despite Russian being the more commonly spoken language. The 2009 census sheds light on the linguistic landscape, revealing that a significant 84.8% of the population aged 15 and above in Kazakhstan can proficiently read, write, and understand Russian.

However, recent developments indicate a deliberate push towards elevating the use of the Kazakh language over Russian. In October 2023, Kazakhstan introduced a media law aimed at increasing the prominence of Kazakh. The law mandates a gradual rise in the share of the state language on television and radio, moving from 50% to 70% at a 5% annual increment, beginning in 2025.

The matter of language in Kazakhstan stands as one of the most contentious issues today, marked by periodic language-related scandals. Language has evolved into a significant aspect of political rhetoric, particularly for politicians espousing a national-patriotic agenda. Arguments advocating for the strengthening of Kazakh’s position are gaining momentum, showcasing the complex interplay between linguistic identity, political discourse, and societal tensions in the country.

Kyrgyzstan navigates a nuanced linguistic landscape, as Russian holds co-official status per Article 5 of the Constitution. According to the 2009 census, 8.99% of the population, approximately 482,200 individuals, speak Russian as a native language. Moreover, a significant 49.6% of Kyrgyzstan’s population aged 15 and above, or 1,854,700 residents, fluently speak Russian as a second language.

At the close of 2023, Kyrgyzstan implemented a law on the state language, compelling civil servants, MPs, teachers, and healthcare workers to communicate in Kyrgyz. However, this move has sparked controversy, with Russian officials and propaganda outlets criticizing it as “undemocratic” and oppressive to the Russian language. Despite objections, language tests over three years reveal gaps in officials’ Kyrgyz proficiency, highlighting the need for improvement.

The head of the National Commission for the State Language and Language Policy, Kanybek Osmonaliyev, is an advocate for allowing officials time to improve their Kyrgyz language proficiency. The new law stipulates that noncompliance with linguistic proficiency requirements will result in instant termination. Around 4.4 million people in Kyrgyzstan speak Kyrgyz, according to the census taken in 2022, and there is a rising desire among them to learn the language.

In Tajikistan, Russian serves as the language of inter-ethnic communication, permitted in official documentation under the country’s constitution. Despite being spoken by 28% of the population in 2006, and with 7% using it as their primary language in various settings, Russian remains integral in government and business. In Tajikistan, proficiency in Russian is often seen as essential for career success, granting access to modern literature and technology. While English holds promise, learning Russian is more affordable, and many families anticipate their children studying at Russian universities or working in Russia. However, Tajik language courses are scarce and expensive, with limited availability after school. The teaching system primarily focuses on literary Tajik, differing significantly from the modern spoken language.

Contrastingly, in Turkmenistan, Russian lost its status as the official lingua franca in 1996. Approximately 12% of the population, those who grew up in the Soviet era, can speak Russian. Primary and secondary education in Russian is minimal for subsequent generations. Turkmen state press and the newspaper Neytralny Turkmenistan continue to publish material in Russian, and there are schools like the Joint Turkmen-Russian Secondary School. The country has made strides in revitalizing the national language, with only 18% of residents proficient in Russian in 2020. A radical language policy, notably the shift from Cyrillic to the Latin script, led to a significant outflow of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations. The reform also impacted education, eliminating Russian-language schools and university curricula despite the declared policy of trilingual education (Turkmen, Russian, English).These linguistic landscapes underscore the delicate balance between cultural preservation, economic considerations, and the evolving educational paradigms in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Russian is the official language of documentation, the lingua franca and language of the elite in Uzbekistan, and it plays an important role in interethnic communication. An estimate from the World Factbook that is not current states that 14.2% of people speak Russian. Russian is nevertheless widely used even though it is not an official language, especially in big cities, business, and science. Its persistence in society is partly due to the belief that education in Russian is better than in Uzbek.

Uzbekistan, among Central Asian countries planning to transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet since 1993, has faced multiple delays in implementing the change, with the latest deadline set for 2023. While some school textbooks have been published in the Latin alphabet, the shift has resulted in a nuance: young people not proficient in the Cyrillic version of Uzbek find themselves disconnected from the world’s literary heritage, as limited fiction, including classical works by Uzbek authors, has been adapted into Latin.

The Russosphere stands at a crossroads, its existence intricately tied to the Russian language. Contrary to the belief that language merely spreads culture, it wields power. Former Soviet nations, once deeply connected to Russia, are now charting their own paths, fostering distinct identities and pivoting from Russian towards English. These countries aspire to align with prosperous Western standards, a departure that is transforming the geopolitical landscape. The Russosphere, once synonymous with Russian dominance, is undergoing a deterioration, signaling a new chapter in the histories of these nations.

February 29, 2024
Palestine or Israel: What will be the future of Gaza?

In the Middle East, a minuscule piece of land has become the focal point of global attention—the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian territory situated along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Bordered by Egypt to the southwest and Israel to the east and north, this region finds itself trapped in a quagmire of discussions, extending from the realms of social media to the chambers of the United Nations, with no resolution in sight.

Since last October, the Gaza Strip has been a war-torn landscape, grappling with a severe humanitarian crisis. The conflict pits Israel against this tiny enclave, home to Hamas—a group viewed as terrorists, while others see them as champions of Islamic rights. Against a backdrop of streets stained with human blood and strewn with the remnants of demolished homes, hospitals, schools, and buildings, the enclave is on the verge of collapse.

Israel’s retaliation for the loss of a thousand lives shows no signs of abating, with the toll on Gaza now reaching a staggering 25,000 people. The Israeli call for the uprooting of Hamas translates into a destabilization of Gaza itself, as diplomatic efforts, including UN resolutions and international pressure, falter in bringing peace to the region.

As Israel’s fury persists, the question looms: will an independent Gaza emerge under the banner of a Palestinian state, or is it destined to be annexed by Israel?

How the Gaza Issue Evolved?

Map of Gaza (Source: Britannica)

One of the world’s highest population densities, Gaza stands as a complex tapestry of religious and political dynamics. Sunni Muslims form the majority, with a Palestinian Christian minority woven into the fabric. Over the years, Gaza has symbolized Palestinian nationalism, resistance, along with global Islamic solidarity, situated as a 41km (25-mile) long and 10km-wide territory between Israel, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea.

Having been under Egyptian control, Gaza saw a shift during the 1967 Six-Day War when Israel captured it. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew its troops and settlers, implementing a temporary blockade that became indefinite after Hamas took control in 2007, backed by Egypt. Despite being recognized as part of Palestine by many nations, Gaza lacks UN member status.

The West Bank and Gaza, considered a single Israeli-occupied territory by the UN, are governed separately. The West Bank, under limited self-rule by the Palestinian Authority (PA), acknowledges Israel’s existence, while Gaza, ruled by Hamas, rejects it. The UN and human rights organizations assert that Gaza remains under Israeli military occupation, facing a blockade that restricts movement and goods, earning it the moniker “open-air prison.”

Hamas, having seized control in 2007, seeks an Islamic state in lieu of Israel, rejecting its right to exist. The recent conflict stems from perceived Israeli transgressions, including security raids on the al-Aqsa Mosque and West Bank settlement activity. The pursuit of a two-state solution faces staunch opposition, as both sides grapple with conflicting visions of coexistence.

What’s happening in Gaza Now?

Israeli Declared Buffer Zone (Source: Ocha)

In the ongoing chapter of this enduring conflict, Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas find themselves locked in a deadly confrontation since early October. The hostilities were sparked when Hamas gunmen launched an unprecedented attack from Gaza into Israel, resulting in the deadliest incident in Israel’s history. Subsequently, Israel initiated a military campaign in the Palestinian territory, claiming thousands of lives.

On the fateful morning of October 7th, waves of Hamas gunmen breached Gaza’s border, causing the death of approximately 1,200 people in Israel. The casualties included children, the elderly, and 364 young individuals attending a music festival. Hamas also took more than 250 people as hostages back to Gaza. The group’s demands include the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israel and an end to the blockade on the Gaza Strip by Israel and Egypt—measures both countries justify for security reasons.

Having engaged in several wars with Israel, firing thousands of rockets and orchestrating lethal attacks, Hamas is branded a terrorist group by Israel, the US, the EU, the UK, and others. Israel, in response, has conducted numerous airstrikes and sent troops into Gaza in 2008 and 2014. Iran supports Hamas with funding, weapons, and training, further complicating the dynamics of this enduring conflict.

In swift retaliation to the Hamas attack, Israel initiated an extensive air campaign targeting Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the objectives as the annihilation of Hamas and the recovery of hostages. Subsequently, a ground invasion was launched three weeks later, accompanied by naval bombardment. The initial focus was on northern Gaza, particularly Gaza City and its tunnels, alleged to be central to Hamas military operations. A directive from Israel ordered the evacuation of all 1.1 million people in the north for their safety.

After a brief truce in late November, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) extended ground operations to southern Gaza, reaching Khan Younis, the second-largest city, and refugee camps in central Gaza. Displaced individuals from the north were compelled to move further south, with plans to invade the southern town of Rafah, where approximately 1.5 million sought refuge.

The toll on Palestinians has been devastating, with more than 28,000 killed and tens of thousands injured since the war’s onset, according to Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry. The majority of casualties are reported to be women and children. The IDF claims to have eliminated around 9,000 Hamas fighters, in addition to over 1,000 attackers inside Israel, without specifying the basis for these figures. Israel acknowledges over 230 of its soldiers killed in Gaza, while homes and structures in the region have suffered extensive damage and destruction.

Israel employed a strategy of cutting off essential supplies, including food, water, and fuel, as a tactic to exert pressure on Hamas for the release of hostages. This approach resulted in severe shortages within Gaza’s population. Although Israel has permitted the entry of humanitarian aid, medicines, and limited fuel quantities since then, the delivered aid falls significantly below pre-war levels.

The UN has accused Israel of hindering aid delivery, while Israel, in turn, has attributed problems to the UN. Describing the situation in Gaza as “horrific,” the UN has highlighted overflowing shelters, depleting food and water supplies, and an escalating risk of famine. Gaza’s health system is on the brink of collapse, with only 16 out of 36 hospitals partially operational. These facilities grapple with an overwhelming number of injured individuals and face shortages of staff, medical supplies, food, fuel, and water.

Future Plans on Gaza

The vision for Gaza’s future appears precarious, with the Israeli Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, proposing a post-war scenario where Hamas loses control, and Israel maintains overall security dominance. Under this plan, a multinational force would oversee the reconstruction efforts after the extensive destruction caused by Israeli airstrikes, and Egypt might have an unspecified role.

However, the proposal maintains that Palestinians would be responsible for governing the territory, with the condition of non-hostility toward Israel. Despite some far-right members suggesting encouraging Palestinian citizens to leave Gaza for exile and re-establishing Jewish settlements—an idea criticized as “extremist” and “unworkable”—Gallant’s proposals are seen as relatively more practical.

While Prime Minister Netanyahu has not publicly detailed his governance vision for Gaza, the overarching goal is to crush Hamas completely. Gallant’s plan outlines a more targeted approach in the north of Gaza, involving raids, tunnel demolitions, and air and ground strikes. The aggressive Israeli strategy signals an assertive stance against Hamas ruling Palestine, making the prospect of a free Palestine seem unlikely. In essence, Israel will decide the future of Gaza as they wish.

February 21, 2024
China to Deepen Ties with Hungary: A Strong Ally for China in Europe?

In a strategic maneuver, Beijing has made a notable move by extending an offer to enhance security cooperation with Budapest, a development unfolding against the backdrop of Hungary’s strained relationship with its EU and NATO allies. The burgeoning warmth in ties between Budapest and Beijing is becoming increasingly apparent.

Hungary is portrayed by the Western media as a possible Trojan horse . The outspoken populist prime minister Viktor Orbán publicly declares his undying devotion to NATO and the European Union, but he also regularly questions important choices made by these institutions. Meanwhile, China, displaying its position as the second-biggest economy in the world and serving as a check on the US, is well-liked by Orbán and the Hungarian government.

The emerging Eastern axis, steered by China, actively seeks alliances in Europe. Europe grapples with the intricate challenge of navigating political and economic dynamics and is looking more aligned with the United States. Notable participants of China’s ambitious projects like Italy contemplating withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The combined pressure from the United States and European bodies creates an environment where additional participants may also contemplate withdrawal. In this time Hungary, becoming different, Viktor Orbán emerges as a formidable leader, adept at challenging the very institutions that China aims to influence.

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán entered into discussions with China’s Minister of Public Security, Wang Xiaohong, last Friday. In statements published by China’s official Xinhua news agency over the weekend, Wang expressed the intention to “deepen cooperation in areas including counter-terrorism, combating transnational crimes, security, and law enforcement capacity building under the Belt and Road Initiative.” The Chinese minister envisions making “law enforcement and security cooperation a new highlight of bilateral relations.”

Hungary’s acceptance of China’s offer is a notable anomaly, considering its membership in the EU and NATO. This deviation from the norm is accentuated by Budapest’s distinctive position of maintaining closer ties to Moscow than any other EU member, while concurrently fostering a relationship with Beijing. Noteworthy is Prime Minister Orbán’s distinction last year as the sole EU leader attending a forum of the Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing. Adding substance to this diplomatic shift, China’s electric vehicle manufacturer BYD has revealed plans to establish its inaugural European production factory in Hungary.

Following the meeting with Wang Xiaohong on Friday, Orbán’s spokesperson emphasized the Prime Minister’s declaration that “respect is increasingly missing from international diplomacy, but it has always remained between Hungary and China.” The discussions centered on crucial aspects of security and stability. This unfolding narrative of heightened cooperation between Budapest and Beijing in the realm of security occurs against the backdrop of Hungary’s strained relations with its EU and NATO partners. As Hungary’s standing in Western states continues to deteriorate, recent actions, such as reneging on a commitment not to be the last to ratify Sweden’s NATO application, contribute to a further erosion of trust.

Budapest’s evident isolation was underscored during the Munich Security Conference over the weekend, where notable Hungarian officials were conspicuously absent. Despite this, in a speech delivered in Hungary on Saturday, Prime Minister Orbán hinted at a change, announcing, “we are on course to ratify Sweden’s accession to NATO at the beginning of parliament’s spring session.” The ongoing tension was palpable as Hungarian officials declined meetings with visitors from Washington, a move that drew criticism from the US ambassador in Budapest, David Pressman, who expressed regret over the lack of engagement with the most senior US bipartisan congressional delegation to visit Hungary in years.

Orban’s second term in office; in 2017, the two countries formally recognized their collaboration as an all-encompassing strategic alliance. Following the public outcry and protests in 2021 over Fudan University’s plans to open a campus in Budapest, the Hungarian government decided to put the project on hold and hold a vote on the issue. But the planned referendum was ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on May 22, 2022, citing its global ramifications. Officials in Hungary promised that the project will be revived once the ruling Fidesz party won the 2022 parliamentary elections.

Hungary has used its veto power in 2020 and 2021 to intentionally obstruct the European Union’s attempts to formally renounce China’s activities in Hong Kong. On February 20, 2023, Wang Yi, a well-known diplomat and member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo, visited Budapest to meet with Prime Minister Orbán, underscoring the importance of the diplomatic ties between Hungary and China. Péter Szijjártó, the foreign minister of Hungary, emphasized during the conference how important it is for the two countries to work together when navigating crises, saying, “When we have faced crises in recent years, Hungary has always come out of them stronger than it went into them.” On February 27, 2023, Orbán approved Wang Yi’s peace proposal, which sought to stop Russia from invading Ukraine.

Hungary has consistently diverged from EU positions critical of China, particularly on human rights issues, and has welcomed Chinese investments despite the EU’s call for member states to align their relations with China according to the bloc’s stance. Notably, Hungary hosts Huawei Technologies’ largest logistics and manufacturing base outside China, a move that has raised concerns as the European Commission warns of potential security risks posed by the telecom giant.

Since 2016, Huawei has collaborated with Shanghai-based artificial intelligence firm Yitu Technology to develop solutions for smart cities, focusing on enhancing public safety and policing through the use of AI and surveillance. This intricate web of diplomatic and economic ties underscores Hungary’s complex position within the geopolitical landscape.

If Orban continues to hold power in Hungary, it is likely that more issues will arise, potentially deepening existing problems with Europe. As a result, Hungary may find itself increasingly isolated in the region, lacking the support of both Europe and the US. However, aligning with China could open up new possibilities for Hungary. Simultaneously, for China, this alignment serves as a counter to Europe’s realignment with Vietnam and India. By establishing ties with Hungary, China aims to strengthen its foothold in Eastern Europe and capitalize on economic opportunities.

February 20, 2024
India and UAE Agree for a Trans-Continental Trade Corridor to Counter the BRI

In a momentous diplomatic development, India and the United Arab Emirates have formalized a groundbreaking agreement, establishing a trade corridor strategically linking Europe and India through the Middle East via sea and rail routes. This calculated bypass aims to navigate away from Chinese funding, mitigate pirate threats, and avoid the Suez Canal rush. Unveiled during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Gulf states, this ambitious initiative carries the endorsement of both the United States and the European Union.

The Indian foreign ministry issued a statement detailing the framework agreement, although specific terms remained notably scarce. Emphasizing that this endeavor not only builds upon existing understandings and collaboration but also seeks to deepen cooperation between India and the UAE for the enhancement of regional connectivity. Initially introduced in September, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in New Delhi, the corridor’s expansive scope stretches from India, crossing the Arabian Sea to the UAE, and further extending through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel before ultimately reaching Europe.

The narrative of the India-Middle East Economic Corridor unfolds against the backdrop of a persistent four-month conflict in Gaza, introducing disruptions to U.S.-backed initiatives that seek to deepen integration between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In response to the ongoing regional unrest, Saudi Arabia, a pivotal player, has opted to suspend normalization plans. Notably, inquiries seeking clarification on the specifics of the agreement from the UAE foreign ministry have remained unanswered.

During their meeting, characterized by Indian Prime Minister Modi as a fraternal relationship, both he and UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan expressed optimism despite the formidable challenges in the region.

India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (Source: SCMP)

In heralding the establishment of a contemporary trade route, this initiative elegantly resurrects historical pathways once traversed by ancient civilizations – the Romans, Greeks, Venetians, Arabs, and Indians. These routes, integral for centuries, regrettably fell into neglect following the opening of the Cape route and the Suez Canal. According to reports, the modern project unfolds with the development of cutting-edge ports, railways, and special economic zones. The unveiling of this initiative took place on the grand stage of the G20 summit in India, where President Biden’s plan not only secured the support of the United States but also garnered backing from the European Union, France, Italy, and Germany.

The proposed plan outlines two distinctive routes – an east corridor linking India to the Gulf Arab states and a northern corridor connecting the Gulf states to Europe. Beyond showcasing the United States’ adeptness in rallying its Middle East allies against China’s ascendancy, this ambitious project also underscores the Gulf states’ intricate balancing act between long standing allies like the U.S. and emerging partners like China, all within the framework of an evolving global order. Analysts discern this strategic move as a direct challenge to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a monumental infrastructure project launched by Beijing a decade ago to forge global connectivity. Intriguingly, three of the nations involved in the new corridor are already members of the BRI, potentially placing them in a delicate position. Italy, a G7 member, is also part of the BRI, but reports suggest that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is exploring ways to strengthen ties with China while contemplating a “soft” exit from the BRI—a move deemed unconventional by some analysts.

The recently formalized framework agreement between India and the UAE appears to signify a joint commitment by both nations to advance their ambitious plan for establishing a corridor. Beyond the corridor agreement, the UAE and India have solidified their collaboration through the signing of a bilateral investment treaty. This comprehensive partnership extends to cooperation agreements covering diverse areas such as electrical interconnection, trade, and digital infrastructure. Prime Minister Modi, making his seventh visit to the Gulf state in nearly a decade, is poised to address the Indian diaspora at an Abu Dhabi stadium and participate in a summit in Dubai. Additionally, he is scheduled to inaugurate the first-ever stone-built Hindu temple in the Middle East in Abu Dhabi, underscoring the deepening ties between India and one of its major trading partners.

The envisioned trade corridor is anticipated to streamline movements significantly, serving as a linchpin for various interests. This ambitious project acts as a tool for the United States, seamlessly connecting all relevant stakeholders in the region. For the Middle East, the corridor transcends mere business; it is inherently intertwined with politics. The financial aspect is pivotal in the collaboration between Israel and the Gulf states. This agreement ensures their alignment with the United States, as financial influxes consolidate their cooperative stance.

Amidst the Biden era and the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Gulf states’ relationship with the U.S. has experienced a slight diminishment. However, there’s a subtle yet discernible shift in their stance, displaying a newfound interest in engaging with Russia and China. The hope lingers that this project will foster common interests with Israel.

From a European perspective, this route promises an uninterrupted supply chain, mitigating concerns about pirate attacks, Suez Canal blockages, and political obstacles. Furthermore, the project attracts infrastructure investments from the region, providing Europe access to India’s expansive market.

For India, the corridor is more than an economic conduit; it symbolizes a strategic move to bolster power in countering China, perceived as a potential adversary in their future trajectory. This economic trade corridor, therefore, serves as a catalyst for extensive political cooperation, poised to have a profound impact on the unfolding dynamics of the 21st century.

February 17, 2024
Why is Free Kurdistan Not Happening?

Kurdistan, the homeland of the Kurds, remains unrecognized by the world and is confronted with an unprecedented threat to its survival. The autonomous region in Iraq, having established separate administrations, military structures, and a distinct identity, is actively advocating for complete statehood but finds itself in a state of limbo.

As the United States’ closest ally in the region, with a majority Kurdish population, Kurdistan faces existential threats from neighboring countries that harbor a considerable Kurdish population antagonistic to their cause. Despite contemplating the immediate availability of statehood, the Kurds are indeed grappling with significant existential challenges. Various reasons contribute to the threats to the Kurds’ long standing aspiration for statehood, ranging from internal issues to concerns about the weakening of the American government.

The original Kurdistan, also referred to as Greater Kurdistan, is a loosely defined geo-cultural region in West Asia where Kurds constitute a significant majority population, and the foundation of Kurdish culture, languages, and national identity is deeply rooted. Geographically, Kurdistan spans the northwestern Zagros and the eastern Taurus mountain ranges.

Map of Kurdistan (Image Courtesy: Fondation-Institut kurde de Paris)

Kurdistan is commonly divided into four regions: Northern Kurdistan (southeastern Turkey), Southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq), Eastern Kurdistan (northwestern Iran), and Western Kurdistan (northern Syria). Some interpretations extend its boundaries into parts of southern Transcaucasia. Different Kurdish nationalist groups advocate for either an independent nation-state covering these regions with a Kurdish majority or increased autonomy within existing national boundaries. The precise demarcation of the region remains a contentious issue, with certain maps exaggerating its scope.

As of a 2016 estimate from the Kurdish Institute of Paris, Kurdistan’s total population is around 34.5 million, with Kurds constituting 86% of the population in Northern Kurdistan. The region also includes Arab, Turkish, Assyrian (Syriac), Armenian, and Azerbaijani minorities. Southern Kurdistan hosts Christian (Assyrian and Armenian) and Turkish (Turkmen) minorities. Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran have significant Caucasian populations that underwent Kurdification, adopting Kurdish as their primary language. Kurdish, part of the Indo-European language family except for the Semitic and Turkic languages around them, is a crucial component of Kurdish identity.

Geographically, Kurdistan covers approximately 190,000 km² in Turkey, 125,000 km² in Iran, 65,000 km² in Iraq, and 12,000 km² in Syria, totaling around 392,000 km². Turkish Kurdistan encompasses a substantial area in the Eastern Anatolia Region and southeastern Anatolia of Turkey, with an estimated 6 to 8 million Kurds residing in the region.

The term “Kurdistan” has historical origins, first documented in 11th-century Seljuk chronicles. From the 8th to the 19th centuries, a multitude of Kurdish dynasties, emirates, principalities, and chiefdoms emerged. In the 20th century, there were short-lived attempts to establish Kurdish entities, including the Kurdish state (1918–1919), Kingdom of Kurdistan (1921–1924), Red Kurdistan (1923–1929), Republic of Ararat (1927–1930), and Republic of Mahabad (1946).

Map of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Image Courtesy: University of Kurdistan Hewlêr)

Iraqi Kurdistan, which has the most chance for getting statehood and recognition from the international bodies, obtained autonomous status through a 1970 agreement with the Iraqi government, solidified as the autonomous Kurdistan Region within the federal Iraqi republic in 2005. In Iran, there is a Kurdistan Province, though it lacks self-rule. Kurds involved in the Syrian Civil War successfully seized control of significant portions of northern Syria, establishing self-governing regions under the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (commonly known as Rojava), where they aspire to achieve autonomy within a federal Syria post-war.

A 2010 report from the United States, predating the instability in Syria and Iraq as of 2014, predicted the potential existence of Kurdistan by the year 2030. The vulnerability of the Iraqi state, exacerbated by the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, created an opening for Iraqi Kurdistan to pursue independence. Turkey, while historically opposing Kurdish autonomy in Turkey and Syria, shifted its stance toward acknowledging the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq.

Turkey’s long standing fear has been that a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would fuel and support Kurdish separatists in Turkish provinces, leading to strong opposition to Kurdish independence in Iraq. However, amidst the chaos following the US invasion of Iraq, Turkey began collaborating more closely with the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government. Despite this, the mere mention or expression of ‘Kurdistan’ in Turkey still carries the risk of detention and prosecution.

The successful 2014 Northern Iraq offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant further weakened the Iraqi state’s ability to exert power, providing the Kurds with a “golden opportunity” to enhance their independence and potentially declare an independent Kurdish state. The Islamic State’s hostility towards Turkey made Kurdistan strategically valuable to Turkey as a buffer state. In June 2014, a spokesman for Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party expressed Turkey’s readiness to accept an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq.

Kurdistan, endowed with abundant oil resources, has been actively engaging in economic cooperation and securing oil deals primarily with its volatile neighbor, Syria. Despite the complexities surrounding the Kurdish issue in Syria, significant oil contracts have been forged between Kurdistan and Syria. Additionally, Iran, which has recently taken a stronger stance against Kurds in the region, particularly following the Mahsini issue, has also established increased economic cooperation with Kurdistan.

According to the Iranian Free Zones News Agency (Freena), Hojatollah Abdolmaleki disclosed the collaboration during a press conference at Iran’s exclusive exhibition in Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan region. Abdolmaleki emphasized the pivotal role of the newly established free zone in fostering cooperation between Iran and Kurdistan. The opening ceremony of the exhibition saw the participation of senior officials from both sides, including Abdolmaleki, the secretary general of the Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce, the Iranian envoy in Sulaymaniyah, and the head of the Union of Exporters and Importers of the Kurdistan Region.

Despite several promises for statehood from the United States, Iraq, the United Nations, and occasionally from Turkey, the Kurds have faced numerous obstacles, particularly prolonged referendums driven by various reasons. Although they came close to achieving statehood in 2017, even their allies rejected the prospect. The Iraqi government has reclaimed territories once occupied by the Kurds, including areas with significant oil reserves. The collapse of oil revenues has left the Kurds grappling with serious financial challenges.

In addition to Turkey, Iran has also intensified actions against the Kurds, further contributing to the Kurds’ predicament. A significant division exists within the Kurdish population, with the ruling KDP party leaning towards Iran’s support rather than aligning with the Iraqi federal government. The United States has a vested interest in the region, providing military aid and financial assistance, with a notable presence of administrators and officials in Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan. However, the inactive governance and increased Iranian intervention have posed challenges.

Despite the current difficulties, a people with a long history of fighting for their identity and a homeland are likely to find a solution to their current problems. However, the extended decision-making process by the United States could jeopardize a key and reliable ally in the region, potentially leading to strategic consequences.

February 11, 2024
North Korea Declares South Korea as the ‘Primary Foe’: Will it mark the end of Unified Korea?

The prospect of a unified Korea appears remote. The Korean Peninsula continues to be separated, housing a shared population in two separate nations: one receiving support from Russia and China, and the other backed by the United States and Japan. Despite some advancements in the last decade, North Korea emphatically dismisses any prospects for future cooperation and negotiations. At the moment, there is a clear division among the politicians of the two nations, highlighting ongoing challenges that impede the reunification of Korea and reminiscent of the sorrowful consequences of sibling strife.

As per state media reports, Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, declared on Friday that South Korea has once again become the North’s “primary foe.” He asserted that the nation would be safeguarded through force rather than diplomatic negotiations. Kim said this at a moment when North Korea had recently given up on its long-standing objective of uniting with South Korea. Instead, the North has insisted on formalizing its pledge to “completely occupy” South Korea land in the event of hostilities. Kim stated, “Defining the South Korean puppets as the most harmful primary foe and invariable principal enemy and deciding it as a national policy to occupy their territory in the event of a contingency is a reasonable measure for the eternal safety of our country and the peace and stability of the future.”

Kim also called for full-fledged battle readiness and a strengthened military might during a visit to the defense ministry on Thursday to mark the 76th anniversary of the North’s Korean People’s Army’s creation. Rejecting the notion of pursuing peace through discussions, Kim said, “Peace is not something that should be begged for or gained in exchange for talks.” The North, he claimed, no longer saw the need to go through the “unrealistic ordeal” of cooperating and holding negotiations with the South.

North Korea has been more aggressive in its criticism of and military provocations against the South in recent times. This is especially true after Kim described inter-Korean relations as that of “two states hostile to each other” at a party end-of-year gathering, claiming that efforts to bring the two Koreas together are pointless.

North Korea has officially terminated its economic collaboration with South Korea. During a plenary meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly on Wednesday, officials voted unanimously to abolish the law governing inter-Korean economic cooperation. The decision reflects a broader move by the Supreme People’s Assembly to annul all agreements aimed at fostering economic collaboration with South Korea.

Concurrently, the legislative assembly has passed resolutions to revoke laws associated with economic relations with Seoul, including those governing the once-prominent Mount Kumgang tourism project. This initiative, symbolizing past economic cooperation, had its origins during a period of engagement between the two Koreas in the early 2000s, attracting nearly 2 million South Korean visitors to the scenic mountain just north of the eastern border. This development unfolds against the backdrop of a significant deterioration in relations between the two Koreas.

Yoon Suk Yeol, the president of South Korea, accepted the “extraordinary change” in North Korea’s inter-Korea policy but said he had trouble understanding the underlying reasoning. Yoon emphasized that, in spite of the change, North Korea has continued to advance communism during the previous 70 years, which has culminated in the country’s pursuit of nuclear weapons that might endanger South Korea. Yoon, who is well-known for taking a strong stand against Pyongyang, expressed a willingness to communicate, even suggesting a summit with Kim and providing assistance with finances. He did point out that many view the North Korean leadership as “not a rational group.”

The potential reunification of Korea holds the promise of significantly reshaping the regional power dynamics, particularly given South Korea’s current standing as a regional powerhouse. In September 2009, Goldman Sachs conducted an in-depth exploration of the economic implications of a unified Korea in its 188th Global Economics Paper titled “Reassessing North Korea Risks and A United Korea.” The paper offered a comprehensive analysis of the economic strength that a united Korea could command, surpassing several G7 nations, including Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and potentially Japan, within 30–40 years post-reunification. The projected GDP is estimated to exceed $6 trillion by 2050. Key factors identified as propelling this potential growth include the combination of a youthful, skilled labor force and abundant natural resources in the North, coupled with advanced technology, infrastructure, and substantial capital in the South. Additionally, Korea’s strategic location, linking three major economic powers, further contributes to the envisioned economic prowess.

However, some argue that as long as the country remains divided, people may not be actively concerned about reunification. Surveys in South Korea indicate that younger generations are less preoccupied with this issue compared to their older counterparts, as they are forging distinct identities separate from the North. Meanwhile, the attitudes of North Korean citizens, who are less exposed to the outside world, may also differ significantly, suggesting a preference for maintaining separate entities. It is evident that negotiations and peaceful means alone will not lead to Korean unification. The only foreseeable scenarios for a unified Korea, given recent developments, involve the collapse of communism in the North, the presence of a robust leadership figure from the South, or a notable global conflict.

February 10, 2024
In the Year of the Dragon: Will Luck Shine on China Again After Tough Times?

The excitement surrounding the world’s second-largest economy seems to have recently faded. Despite grappling with various challenges, including economic stagnation, declining birth rates, the relocation of manufacturing projects, and heightened tensions with the United States and India, China is entering the new year with aspirations of reclaiming its stature as a global superpower.

As the Year of the Dragon commences, bringing a sense of renewal, even within the context of a communist nation, the Chinese people remain steadfast in their adherence to traditional beliefs and horoscopes. This year, traditionally associated with prosperity, holds considerable promise in the eyes of Chinese Culture. Nations following the Chinese zodiac or hosting substantial Overseas Chinese communities often experience a surge in birth rates during the Year of the Dragon. The belief that “Dragon babies” born during this time possess auspicious qualities contributing to improved life outcomes further bolsters the positive outlook.

Similar to individuals, China eagerly anticipates the approaching year with aspirations for prosperity. The nation aims to liberate itself from the burdens of the pandemic and is prepared to introduce new initiatives, with a focus on revitalizing the Chinese economy and strengthening foreign relationships—an imperative agenda at this critical juncture.

China strategically invests in various nations through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, but its trajectory is intricately tied to partnerships with Russia and India. The US and EU’s shift away from supporting China’s economic expansion is evident in the reconfiguration of financial flows. Collaborative efforts among these three nations are vital for development, and the future course of China will undoubtedly be shaped by coordinated measures to encourage increased cooperation.

In contemporary times, China and Russia stand as exceptionally close allies, actively participating in extensive cooperation. This collaboration is strengthening, providing essential support to Russia in navigating the challenging landscape of tight Western sanctions. Additionally, China offers crucial political support amid ongoing Western resolutions concerning Ukraine. Despite their resilience in the face of Western pressure, both China and Russia exhibit a sense of economic unease when confronted with challenges such as losing access to Western markets, technologies, and investments. This constraint gradually impedes their ability to fully leverage their economic potential.

Putin is heading into the presidential election in March, with the Ukraine war prominently featured in his re-election campaign. His victory is virtually assured. Alongside his electoral focus, Putin closely monitors Russia’s economy for signs of overheating and breakdown. The International Monetary Fund predicts a 1.1% growth this year, primarily fueled by war expenditures, with over 29% of the budget allocated to defense. Persistent inflation and tightening sanctions further strain the economy, even as the energy sector remains robust. However, sustained war and social spending are contingent on oil prices staying above US$50-US$60 per barrel. And China is ready to buy Oil.

While Xi exudes confidence, he grapples with concerns about the economy, Taiwan, and US-China relations. Surface-level indicators suggest a robust Chinese economy, with a 5.2% growth last year meeting the government’s target. Yet, underlying trends signal potential long-term challenges and stagnation. High deflation, real estate sector issues affecting confidence and investment, declining foreign direct investment, and local debt problems contribute to economic tensions in the provinces. The election of William Lai Ching-te in Taiwan has crushed aspirations for more conciliatory leadership and popular opinion in the country, as it is less advantageous to Beijing. Any Tensions raised in the area, China needs Russia there or Russia is only superpower to help China in Taiwan Issue.

Another possible challenge for Xi comes from the impending US election; if Trump wins, it might worsen the trade conflict and adversely affect China’s ties with Russia and India. Trump has favorable ties with Putin and Modi. Russia and China united this much only because of the Ukraine War, and Trump can possibly bring a resolution of the war. So any events in the Ukraine War will deteriorate resolution. Putin is still cautious of any signs that China is cutting down on its diplomatic and economic backing for Russia, but Xi will be keeping a careful eye on Russia’s activities in Ukraine and its dealings with North Korea.

Currently, China and India grapple with a strained relationship, marked by eleven military conflicts. Despite Western support for India, they don’t want to align with Western interests, India is judiciously maintaining a cautious distance in its diplomatic engagements. Recognizing the potential drawbacks of aligning too closely with Western interests, India, under the leadership of Narendra Modi, who initially sought positive relations with China before the Galwan Valley conflict, is now openly critical of China. As Modi faces elections this year, he is likely to continue as India’s Prime Minister. Modi’s commitment to upholding Indian identity, along with his party’s emphasis on Indian principles over Western ones, underscores India’s reluctance to align itself closely with the West in the future. Consequently, it becomes evident that China and India need to foster cooperation in the future. Despite their differences, their shared interest in attaining a global superpower position allows for substantial mutual support. Russia, serving as a common friend to both nations, could play a crucial role in solidifying this relationship in the near future.

In contrast, recent years have posed challenges for China. However, as the nation transitions from the setbacks reminiscent of a rabbit to the promising Year of the Dragon, optimism prevails. The impending Chinese New Year serves as a symbolic turning point, demonstrating China’s resilience in overcoming adversities. No longer defined by the difficulties of the recent past, China enters its auspicious Year of the Dragon with a renewed sense of purpose, poised to shape a more prosperous future.

February 9, 2024
Escalating Tensions: US Unleashes Fresh Strikes on Houthis in Yemen

After Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State, the United States has shifted its focus toward yet another extremist Islamic faction—the Houthis. This group has emerged as a substantial threat to the global trade route extending from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The disruptive activities of the Houthis pose a significant risk to the critical trade pathway linking Asia and Europe, causing considerable financial losses for businesses worldwide.

The United States has entered the arena, initiating targeted strikes against the Houthi group to incapacitate their offensive capabilities. Reports from Centcom indicate that the US precision-targeted a land-attack cruise missile and four anti-ship missiles, positioned for launch in the Red Sea. These military actions followed coordinated strikes by both the US and the UK on Houthi targets the day before. Yahya Sarea, the Houthi group’s military spokesman, affirmed, “These attacks will not deter us from our moral, religious, and humanitarian stance in support of the resilient Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and will not go unanswered or unpunished.”

The Houthi movement, self-identifying as Ansar Allah (Supporters of God), emerged as a Shia Islamist political and military entity rooted in Yemen during the 1990s. Predominantly consisting of Zaidi Shias, its leadership maintains close affiliations with the Houthi tribe. By targeting ships linked to Israel, the Houthis project an image of themselves as formidable fighters for Islam. Notably, there is an alliance between Hamas, responsible for the October 7 attack on southern Israel, and the Houthis, both receiving substantial backing from Iran. The Houthis assert their assaults on Red Sea shipping as a demonstration of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, causing disruptions in crucial shipping routes and consequential impacts on international trade.

Starting from November 19, the Houthis have seized a commercial ship in the Red Sea and subsequently directed attacks on over two dozen others using a combination of drones, missiles, and speed boats. Despite the Houthis claiming to specifically target Israeli-owned, flagged, or operated ships, or those bound for Israeli ports, a significant number of the vessels under attack have no discernible connection with Israel. Notably, even a British-linked tanker fell victim to Houthi attacks, which were attributed to “American-British aggression.” The Houthi ship attacks have significantly affected global economies, compelling shipping companies to alter routes, resulting in delivery delays, price hikes, and overall economic repercussions. Egypt reported a nearly 50% drop in Suez Canal revenue in January, accompanied by a more than one-third decrease in the number of ships navigating the vital trade route. Major shipping companies have chosen a longer route around southern Africa in order to reduce risk.

The United States and the United Kingdom initiated airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen on January 11, responding to the attacks on Red Sea ships that posed threats to trade and freedom of navigation. President Joe Biden characterized the strikes as a “direct response” to safeguard these interests. UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak deemed the action “necessary and proportionate” to protect global shipping. While US-led naval forces have successfully thwarted numerous attacks, the dynamics underwent a significant shift with the direct intervention of the United States in Yemen, aligning its interests with those of global shipping companies, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

If the current tensions escalate into a war, the U.S. would face a challenging scenario. The Houthi rebels exercise control over Sanaa and the northwest, including the Red Sea coastline, effectively functioning as a quasi-government with the ability to levy taxes and issue currency. Given that the majority of Yemen’s population resides in these regions, any further escalation is likely to lead to a prolonged and intricate conflict. The Houthi involvement in Yemen’s civil war traces back to 2014, endowing them with substantial experience in enduring prolonged conflicts with the official government. Their resilience has been demonstrated through years of enduring airstrikes and ground combat.

Saudi Arabia, a possible future participant in the conflict, has encountered significant Houthi attacks, prompting diplomatic endeavors to facilitate a peace accord. Despite a UN-mediated ceasefire in effect since April 2022, recent developments have diminished the likelihood of long-term stability in the region.

According to the US, Iran is actively supporting Houthi attacks on ships, which is vigorously refuted by Iran and led President Biden to send a “private message” to Tehran requesting an end to these activities. There are still ongoing claims that Iran has secretly sent weapons to the Houthis, including ballistic, cruise, and drone missiles, in violation of a UN arms embargo. According to the Italian Institute of International Political Studies, Iran has been crucial in helping the Houthis set up drone factories in Yemen. In addition, there is evidence of military direction and assistance coming from the Islamist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is embarking on a Middle East trip with scheduled meetings in Israel, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the West Bank. According to Mr. Sullivan, Blinken’s top priority will be brokering a deal between Israel and Hamas, focusing on securing the release of hostages in exchange for a temporary cessation of hostilities in Gaza. The push for de-escalation in both Gaza and the Red Sea region is expected.

In this context, the likelihood of a full-scale war akin to Iraq and Afghanistan is diminished, given the United States’ reluctance for such conflicts in the region. A settlement involving Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and the USA appears as the most plausible outcome, given that economic interests take precedence for modern nations. The rapid rise in oil prices, compounded by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, poses further risks to the global economy. The potential costs of an escalating war would negatively impact every country, everyone will be a loser.

Sometimes, indeed, oil can play a crucial role in saving the world.

February 6, 2024
The Power Play: A Closer Look at Pakistan General Election 2024

Pakistan finds itself in its most challenging period since its inception. Confronted with an array of formidable obstacles encompassing poverty, inflation, corruption, substantial public debt, escalating military expenditures, and a surging wave of extremism, the nation is navigating the complexities of organizing a general election for the national and state assemblies.

Set for February 8, 2024, the impending general elections in Pakistan stand as a critical juncture in shaping the composition of the 16th National Assembly. The spotlight is on two major political contenders vying for the leadership: the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML-N), led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), helmed by former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, the prevailing party in the previous elections, faces a unique predicament, with its leader and former Prime Minister Imran Khan prohibited from contesting in the election. Moreover, a contentious Supreme Court ruling, stripping them of their electoral symbol in the lead-up to the elections, has compelled them to field candidates as Independents.

The oscillation between democratic and military rule in the so-called “Islamic Republic” State adds a touch of irony when discussing tenures. While the constitution stipulates a consistent 5-year term for the government, the actual duration often hinges on military decisions. The last General Elections in Pakistan took place in 2018. The National level election occurred in 272 constituencies, each selecting one member for the National Assembly. Simultaneously, at the provincial level, elections transpired in all four provinces to elect Members of the Provincial Assemblies (MPA). Despite numerous changes in government leadership, the 2018 parliament successfully completed its mandated 5-year term.

The aftermath of the elections saw the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) emerge as the single largest party at the national level, securing both the popular vote and a majority of seats. At the provincial level, the PTI maintained its dominance in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), while the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) retained its stronghold in Sindh. The newly-formed Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) claimed the top spot in Balochistan. In Punjab, a closely contested scenario unfolded, with the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML-N) initially securing the largest number of directly elected seats. However, with the support of Pakistan Muslim League (Q) and the inclusion of independent MPAs into the PTI, the latter ultimately became the largest party, successfully forming the government. The intricacies of Pakistan’s political landscape, shaped by these elections, highlight the intricate dance between democratic processes and military influences.

The landscape of 2024 diverges significantly from that of 2018. Imran Khan, the once-popular leader who secured victory in the 2018 election, was compelled to step down from the head of the government following a no-confidence vote in 2022. His political fortunes took a further hit with a 10-year ban, preventing his participation in the upcoming general election. The party he led, PTI, has faced neglect in the election arena, with its symbol removed and often obscured in television broadcasts.

Shehbaz Sharif assumed the role of the new prime minister after the successful no-confidence vote. Subsequently, in 2023, as the parliament’s five-year tenure concluded, Anwar ul Haq Kakar took charge as the Caretaker Prime Minister. After protracted negotiations and disputes over the election date, Pakistan finally settled on a definitive schedule in February.

As the 129 million citizens prepare to select their prime minister, the political scenario is still completely unpredictable. The potential for low voter turnout and concerns over terrorist activities cast a shadow on the election. With Imran Khan absent from the arena, and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) not participating, discussions about the last election’s winner are set aside. In the previous election, PTI, with its populist ideology under Imran Khan’s charismatic leadership, military support, and a stance against corruption, secured 31.82% of the votes. This translated into 149 seats out of 342 after the election, surpassing the majority threshold of 171 with the assistance of smaller parties.

The main candidates in the current election contest are the Pakistan People’s Party, led by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), led by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Another prominent candidate in this election is Fazal ur Rahman, who is affiliated with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Pakistan (Fazl).

The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) or PML(N), positioned as a center-right and conservative political entity in Pakistan, currently holds the status of the third-largest party in the Senate. Established in 1993, the party emerged as a consolidation of influential conservative figures after the dissolution of the Islamic Democratic Alliance, with former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at its helm. While the party’s foundational principles lean towards conservatism, advocating for free markets, deregulation, lower taxes, and private ownership, recent years have witnessed a shift towards a more liberal stance on social and cultural matters. However, members have faced allegations of employing Islamist populist rhetoric.

The historic 2018 general election in Pakistan saw a close race between the PML-N and PTI. The PML-N won 165 seats in the Punjab legislature and 64 seats in the National legislature of Pakistan, their influence was less pronounced in the assemblies of Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Baluchistan. After the election, his son, Hamza Shahbaz, became the Leader of the Opposition in Punjab (Pakistan), while Shehbaz Sharif became the Opposition Leader in the National Assembly.

PML-N played a pivotal role in the opposition alliance, Pakistan Democratic Movement, which successfully orchestrated a No-confidence motion against Imran Khan, leading to his removal from office on April 10, 2022. Subsequently, Shehbaz Sharif ascended to the position of Prime Minister of Pakistan. As the upcoming elections approach, PML-N, led by Nawaz Sharif, anticipates a triumph in the absence of PTI. Pre-election opinion polls conducted by reputable Pakistani surveyors, including Gallup Pakistan and the Institute of Public Opinion Research (IPOR), indicate that PMLN has regained ground against its rival, PTI, particularly since June 2023. The return of Nawaz Sharif from exile and the Supreme Court’s decision disallowing the bat symbol associated with former national cricket team skipper Imran Khan have been influential factors in this resurgence.

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) stands as a center-left, social-democratic political force in Pakistan, currently holding the position of the second-largest party in the Senate. Established in 1967, the party emerged in response to the military rule of President Muhammad Ayub Khan, uniting prominent left-wing politicians under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While the PPP’s initial platform was rooted in socialism, its objectives persistently include the transformation of Pakistan into a social-democratic state, the promotion of egalitarian values, the establishment of social justice, and the maintenance of a robust military. Among the three largest political parties in Pakistan, alongside the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, the PPP has played a pivotal role in shaping the political landscape. The advent of PTI in Pakistan’s political arena significantly impacted the PPP, but they aspire to gain ground in some provinces and witness a substantial boost in their vote share.

On the other hand, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Pakistan (Fazl) (JUI-F) represents a Deobandi Sunni political entity in Pakistan, often hailed as “the biggest religious-political party” in the country. Concentrated predominantly in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and northern Baluchistan, areas primarily inhabited by Pashtuns, JUI-F may not clinch a victory single-handedly in the upcoming election. However, experts posit that the party holds the potential to influence the ruling dynamics, with some believing that the chance of PML-N securing a single-party majority is relatively low.

Regardless of the election outcome, the military’s influence will loom large over Pakistan’s future, presenting a myriad of challenges in the years to come. Hopes for a government capable of controlling the military and fostering economic prosperity seem bleak. However, even maintaining the current situation could be considered a positive scenario for Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, once prominent funders of Pakistan as an Islamic nation, have curtailed their financial support, redirecting their focus towards their own growth. Meanwhile, China’s mounting debt and increasing control over the country, coupled with the waning interest of the USA and the West in the region, along with Iran’s aggression and India’s aspirations for superpower status, all contribute to the turbulent times ahead for Pakistan.

In an effort to present themselves favorably on the global stage, Pakistan must project an image of a democratic nation governed by rule of law. This election assumes paramount importance in shaping the country’s future, serving as a crucial factor in navigating the challenging geopolitical landscape.

February 3, 2024