Tajikistan’s Election Charade Cements One-Party Rule
Tajikistan, a republic in Central Asia, offers yet another case study in the art of electoral theater—an exercise in ritual rather than representation. Like many of its neighbors, it conducts elections not as a contest of ideas but as a carefully managed reaffirmation of the ruling party’s dominance.
On March 2, the country staged yet another parliamentary vote, ostensibly to select representatives for the lower house. The result, of course, was never in question. International media paid little attention, having long dismissed Tajikistan’s elections as political formalities. And sure enough, as the Central Commission for Elections and Referendums dutifully announced its preliminary figures, the expected supermajority materialized, less a revelation than a reminder of how power is preserved in the region.
The 2025 Elections
Tajikistan is holding two elections within a single month, one for each house of parliament. On March 2, 2025, voters elected members of the Assembly of Representatives, the lower house responsible for direct representation. Later, on March 28, 2025, the National Assembly, the upper house, will be selected.
The Assembly of Representatives, or Majlisi Namoyandagon, consists of 63 deputies serving five-year terms. Under Tajikistan’s electoral system, 41 members are elected through single-member districts, while the remaining 22 are chosen from party lists.
As expected, the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan, which has long dominated the country’s political landscape, secured an overwhelming victory. It won 49 of the 63 seats, including 37 of the 41 constituency-based seats. Through the party-list system, it received 2.43 million votes—51.9 percent of the total—claiming 12 of the 22 seats allocated by proportional representation.
The Agrarian Party of Tajikistan followed with 986,000 votes (21 percent), securing five seats through the party list system and a total of seven seats, including two won in single-member districts. The Party of Economic Reforms obtained three party-list seats with 595,000 votes (12.7 percent) and gained two additional constituency seats. The Democratic Party and the Socialist Party each received around 250,000 votes (5 percent), earning three seats apiece.
Meanwhile, the Communist Party of Tajikistan, with just 89,000 votes (1.9 percent), failed to secure representation, as it fell short of the 5 percent threshold required for party-list allocation.
A Sham election?
A total of 3,500 polling stations were established across Tajikistan, with an additional 36 set up at the country’s diplomatic missions in 28 nations to accommodate citizens abroad. According to the Central Commission for Elections and Referendums (CCER), 4.7 million people—85.3 percent of the 5.5 million eligible voters—participated in the elections. This strikingly high turnout figure appears dubious, given the widespread political apathy in Tajikistan, the lack of significant electoral campaigning, and the timing of the vote during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which likely reduced voter turnout.
The government declared the elections valid and successful. CCER Chairman Bakhtiyor Khudoyorzoda claimed they were conducted in a transparent and open manner, with free and alternative choices, and that most voters participated with a strong sense of civic responsibility. However, independent verification of the March 2 election results remains nearly impossible.
Tajikistan remains one of the world’s most repressive and undemocratic states, having been under the control of the same leadership since 1992. Every presidential and parliamentary election has faced strong criticism over a lack of transparency and fairness. Election observation missions in the country have long followed a predictable pattern—reports note compliance with technical procedures while simultaneously highlighting the absence of genuine competition, ultimately offering recommendations for reform that the government has consistently ignored.
This time, in addition to barring international election observers, the government denied accreditation to major foreign media outlets, including the BBC, further reinforcing doubts about the election’s legitimacy.
The Mighty PDPT
The People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) has been the country’s dominant and ruling party since 2000. Originally founded in 1994 by Abdulmajid Dostiev as the People’s Party of Tajikistan, it has been led by President Emomali Rahmon since April 1998. Rahmon has consistently secured more than 75 percent of the vote in presidential elections, while the PDPT has maintained a supermajority in parliament since 2005.
The PDPT maintains close ties with foreign political parties, particularly Russia’s ruling party, United Russia. It follows a similar ideology of ultranationalism, statism, and authoritarianism, reinforcing Moscow’s influence in the region and preserving the so-called “Russosphere.“
What the Opposition Says
The five parties that contested the elections alongside the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan served more as symbolic opposition than actual challengers. The true opposition to Dushanbe was excluded from the race, and its leaders—now largely in exile—have dismissed the March 2 elections as a sham.
Sharofiddin Gadoev, chairman of the Amsterdam-based Movement for Reform and Development, challenged the official turnout figures, alleging that only 300,000 people actually voted. The leader of Group 24, an opposition movement outlawed in Tajikistan, also denounced the elections.
Further tightening the regime’s grip is the long-expected transfer of power from 72-year-old President Emomali Rahmon to his son, Rustam, the mayor of Dushanbe and speaker of parliament. As in many former Soviet republics, the authoritarian playbook endures—only the façade has changed.
