Will Myanmar’s Rebels Trouble Bangladesh’s Borders?
Bangladesh shares its land borders with only two nations: India and Myanmar. While political uncertainty prevails under an interim government taking an anti-India stance, much of the focus has been directed towards the India-Bangladesh border. Yet, the more pressing and complex developments are unfolding along Bangladesh’s southeastern frontier with Myanmar. This border region is increasingly dominated by the Arakan Army, an ethno-nationalist militant group rooted in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Known for its violent clashes with Islamist Rohingya factions and its contentious history with Bangladesh, the Arakan Army’s growing influence raises critical concerns. Could these escalating dynamics along the southeastern border exacerbate Bangladesh’s challenges further?
Bangladesh and Myanmar are both mired in political instability. In Bangladesh, the removal of the democratically elected government has not yet threatened the country’s territorial integrity unlike Myanmar. However, with a new constitution proposed by the interim government. If the constitution manages to unite disparate groups—Islamists, students, and communists—stability could be maintained. If it fails, Bangladesh risks sliding into unrest, potentially mirroring Myanmar’s descent into chaos. Myanmar’s turmoil began with the military coup of February 2021, which overthrew the democratically elected government. The coup ignited mass protests that escalated into a widespread uprising, especially in ethnic minority areas. Opposition to the junta has formed alliances between ethnic armed groups and civilian-led defense forces, leaving the country deeply fragmented, with regions under the control of various militias.
In recent months, opposition forces have gained significant ground against Myanmar’s junta, securing control over extensive territories, particularly in northern Shan State and Rakhine State in the west. Among these groups, the Arakan Army (AA) has made notable advances, seizing dozens of townships and military outposts over the past 15 months. The group’s expanding influence and unrelenting momentum have fueled speculation about its long-term objectives. The AA operates as the armed wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA), a political organization representing the Buddhist population of western Rakhine State. Both the AA and the ULA have expressed a commitment to establishing an autonomous region in Rakhine that includes both the Buddhist Rakhine and the Muslim communities. For now, the AA appears focused on driving the Myanmar military out of Rakhine State. However, regarding the region’s political future, the group remains deliberately ambiguous, leaving open the possibility of pursuing an independent nation.
The future of tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar may largely depend on the Arakan Army’s evolving alliances and interests. While the group was once linked to China, its current ties with Beijing appear diminished, even though China remains the most influential external actor in Myanmar. Some Islamist factions claim the Arakan Army is now aligned with India, although this is questionable given the group’s previous opposition to India-backed projects in Rakhine and the limited influence India exerts over them. Pakistan, despite its weakened state, could exploit the situation by backing Islamist narratives. Such actions might position the Arakan Army as a threat to Islam, potentially provoking Islamist groups to launch attacks in Myanmar or use Rohingya Muslims as a proxy force—escalating into broader conflict. The United States also has an interest in the region, seeking to counter India’s dominance in the Bay of Bengal.
Bangladesh’s political trajectory will also play a pivotal role. If it transforms into an Islamic republic, its stance on the Rohingya issue may shift toward open support, potentially exacerbating regional tensions.
At the same time, The Arakan Army, as it consolidates control over border areas, appears poised to deepen engagement with both Bangladesh and India, aiming to reduce its reliance on central Myanmar and establish stronger regional footholds.
It goes without saying that both Bangladesh and Myanmar stand at a pivotal crossroads. These already fragile states, fractured by internal strife, appear poised for even deeper disintegration in the days ahead. As interested players—be they nation-states or other insurgent groups—maneuver to advance their agendas, they will exploit these divisions. The resulting tensions seem destined to escalate into outright conflict, likely sooner rather than later.
