Author: Caracal

  • Iran Legislative Elections 2024: Polls Open for “Ceremonial” Election

    Iran Legislative Elections 2024: Polls Open for “Ceremonial” Election

    The Islamic Republic of Iran is now holding elections for the legislative assembly and the Assembly of Experts. Sixty-two million eligible voters are ready and willing to carry out their civic duties on Friday. Starting at 8:00 a.m. local time, the event is scheduled to last for ten hours. However, historical trends suggest that voting hours may be extended until midnight, just as they have in prior elections. 

    The candidates are obtained by passing through high refinement processes. There are a lot of criteria to contest in the election. Interestingly even though there are tight restrictions to contest, About 15,200 individuals are running for the 290 seats, which is unusual. Candidates face disqualification if found actively supporting the Shah, endorsing political parties or organizations considered illegal, facing charges related to anti-government activities, converting to another faith, renouncing the Islamic faith, being convicted of corruption, treason, fraud, bribery, involvement in drug-related activities, or violating Sharia law. Additionally, candidates are ineligible if they played a role in the pre-1979 government, possess significant land holdings, have a history of drug addiction, hold convictions for actions against the state, or have been charged with apostasy. These stringent criteria underscore the complex eligibility standards aimed at ensuring the suitability and alignment of candidates with the Islamic principles and the state’s interests.

    And Islamic Republic’s election is very interesting because of its lower turnouts. And this time there are a lot of reasons for the lower turnouts. People’s interest in this ceremonial election is very low, questioning even the essence of democracy. A low turnout, reflective of a populace disenchanted and losing hope. The aftermath of Iran’s severe crackdown on protesters, resulting in numerous casualties, injuries, arrests, and even death penalties, has cast a shadow over the political and social milieu. Consequently, the atmosphere has grown more repressive, fostering widespread dissatisfaction among the public. Millions of Iranians, according to many observers, have given up on the idea that the country’s governing mullahs can pull out of an economic catastrophe brought on by a confluence of corruption, incompetence, and U.S. sanctions. Many Iranians may stay at home due to popular outrage about declining living conditions and widespread corruption, even if establishment loyalists are expected to favor hardline candidates.In recent months, the cost of staples including bread, pork, rice, and dairy products has soared. About 40% is the official inflation rate. Over 50% is what analysts and insiders estimate. Since the presidential elections in 2021, the national currency has depreciated sharply against the dollar on the open market. Housing costs have risen, motorists’ fuel quotas have been reduced and prices for internet services increased. The economic pain, blamed by the ruling conservatives on the former administration, has earned the government criticism from all sides. And in the weird political landscape of Islamic Republic, people doesnt have another option, just vote to satisfy the authority’s watch dogs, or be brave and stay out of polling.

    Recent polls conducted by the state television channel indicate a projected national turnout of 41.5%, while a survey from Ispa, a semi-official polling agency, estimates a slightly lower turnout at 38.5%. The conservative establishment’s decision to exclude moderates and reformists from standing within the regime’s ranks during President Ebrahim Raisi’s 2021 election contributed to a turnout below 50%—a departure from the trend observed since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

    Critics, particularly reformists, characterize the elections as “meaningless, non-competitive, unfair, and ineffective in the administration of the country.” This sentiment underscores the prevailing disillusionment with the current state of Iran’s governance. The Twitter hashtags #VOTENoVote are being actively disseminated on social media by Iranian activists and opposition groups, who contend that a high voter turnout will validate the Islamic Republic. Hardliners and subdued conservatives who all pledge allegiance to Iran’s Islamic revolutionary ideals will face off in Friday’s poll, which has been boycotted by mainstream moderates and conservatives and dubbed an “unfree and unfair election” by reformists.   On the international front, U.S. spokesperson Matthew Miller underscored that a significant portion of Iranians harbors no expectation of a free and fair electoral process. He further highlighted the long-standing perception of Iran’s political system as featuring undemocratic, non-transparent administrative, judicial, and electoral systems. The global awareness of these systemic issues amplifies the stakes of the ongoing elections, casting a critical spotlight on Iran’s political trajectory and the public’s perception of its leadership.

    In this occasion call for boycotts , The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has been in power for more than 30 years, urged Iranians to cast ballots on Thursday. He claimed that abstaining from voting “would not solve anything”. State media broadcast numerous election specials and launched new channels to feature candidates in an effort to boost voter turnout and excitement in the lead-up to the polls. State media broadcast numerous election specials and launched new channels to feature candidates in an effort to boost voter turnout and excitement in the lead-up to the polls. Though a state-affiliated polling firm is predicting a 41% turnout for the parliamentary elections. 

    In the current electoral proceedings, the landscape is such that the outcomes may not instigate any substantive alterations within the nation, nor do they appear poised to address consequential political ramifications. Despite this, the election holds a heightened degree of fascination, primarily due to its potential role in determining the successor to Khomeni. This figure, vested with the comprehensive authority to shape policies and function as the country’s commander in chief, presides over a nation characterized by a volatile stance towards its neighbors and the United States.

    It is noteworthy that the Parliament, in the broader context, wields limited influence over foreign policy and Iran’s nuclear agenda. The prevailing sentiment is one of disinterest and non-participation, characterizing this electoral episode as yet another Asian drama that seems to mock the essence of democracy. Perhaps, this lukewarm response can be interpreted as a reflection of people’s resentment towards the challenges of life, the formidable economic situation, and the widespread protests that ensued following the tragic demise of Mahsa Amini. Just another electoral act for the sake of an election, nothing more.

  • Shrinking Russosphere: How Central Asia’s Cultural Uplift Will Affect Russia’s Interests?

    Shrinking Russosphere: How Central Asia’s Cultural Uplift Will Affect Russia’s Interests?

    Throughout history, language has consistently proven to be a crucial instrument in the delicate process of shaping national identities. The Russian language, in particular, stands out as one of the Soviet Union’s most powerful tools, adeptly molding diverse ethnic groups into a cohesive whole and forging a robust national identity. This linguistic force played a pivotal role in facilitating the dissemination of ideas, fostering the development of unions, and acting as a conduit for news to permeate society. Over time, it evolved into a unifying force, seamlessly binding together the disparate regions under Soviet rule.

    The Russian language has had a lasting impact on the global landscape even after the Soviet Union disintegrated. Despite changes in political landscapes, Russia, which is currently the successor to a “Russosphere,” observes the enduring effect of its language history. Russian continues to be the most widely spoken language in several republics, including the current Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

    As Russia, under Putin’s leadership, pursues ambitions of imperial resurgence through conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine, a counter-trend is quietly emerging in some nations seeking to rebuild their national identity by distancing themselves from the Russian language. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Central Asia.

    Originating in Eastern Europe, a movement has gained traction, aiming to dismantle Russian influence and foster distinct identities, particularly notable in the Baltic countries. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, motivated by a yearning to reclaim their cultural heritage, strategically pivoted towards their ethnic languages—Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian. Simultaneously, English emerged as a Lingua Franca, supplanting Russian, enabling national radios, television, and cultural programs to successfully resonate with both domestic and international audiences. These Baltic nations adeptly navigated the transition, reclaiming their identities during the shift from the Soviet Union to Putin’s Russia.

    However, the pace and assertiveness in this linguistic and cultural transition varied across different Eastern European countries. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia were comparatively slow and less assertive, leading to a different outcome. These nations continued to embrace Russian programs and news, and paid a price for not fostering a distinct cultural identity. Ukraine, in particular, faced internal divisions, as the lack of assertive Ukrainian language contributed to a large population of Russian influenced people..

    Georgia lost territories, while Moldova too grappled with internal divisions. Belarus, facing a crisis of identity, is now closely aligned with Russia. The contrast in outcomes highlights the crucial role of linguistic and cultural choices in shaping a nation’s destiny, as Eastern European countries navigate the complex interplay between identity, politics, and external influences.

    Central Asia also embarked on a journey of self-discovery, slowly and amicably fostering their language and identity. However, the pace and approach differ markedly, as Central Asian nations lack the robust support enjoyed by their Eastern European counterparts from Europe and the United States. With a continued reliance on Russia for resources, financial support, and tourism, their journey has been shaped by a different set of challenges.

    While still dependent on Russia for essentials like gas and financial aid, the region is increasingly becoming a multi-player on the global stage. With a myriad of options, including support from Turkey, Qatar, Iran, India, China, and even Eastern Europe itself, Central Asian nations are strategically positioning themselves to diversify their alliances and reduce dependence on any single power.

    This shift opens avenues for Central Asia to make bold and swift moves in establishing and strengthening their languages and cultural identities. The geopolitical realignment not only offers opportunities but also poses challenges as these nations navigate a delicate balance between maintaining historical ties and forging new partnerships in their quest for identity.

    As the largest country in Central Asia, Kazakhstan grapples with intricate language dynamics, notably the coexistence of Russian and Kazakh. While Russian is not designated as a state language, Article 7 of Kazakhstan’s Constitution accords it equal status with Kazakh in state and local administration, despite Russian being the more commonly spoken language. The 2009 census sheds light on the linguistic landscape, revealing that a significant 84.8% of the population aged 15 and above in Kazakhstan can proficiently read, write, and understand Russian. 

    However, recent developments indicate a deliberate push towards elevating the use of the Kazakh language over Russian. In October 2023, Kazakhstan introduced a media law aimed at increasing the prominence of Kazakh. The law mandates a gradual rise in the share of the state language on television and radio, moving from 50% to 70% at a 5% annual increment, beginning in 2025.

    The matter of language in Kazakhstan stands as one of the most contentious issues today, marked by periodic language-related scandals. Language has evolved into a significant aspect of political rhetoric, particularly for politicians espousing a national-patriotic agenda. Arguments advocating for the strengthening of Kazakh’s position are gaining momentum, showcasing the complex interplay between linguistic identity, political discourse, and societal tensions in the country.

    Kyrgyzstan navigates a nuanced linguistic landscape, as Russian holds co-official status per Article 5 of the Constitution. According to the 2009 census, 8.99% of the population, approximately 482,200 individuals, speak Russian as a native language. Moreover, a significant 49.6% of Kyrgyzstan’s population aged 15 and above, or 1,854,700 residents, fluently speak Russian as a second language.

    At the close of 2023, Kyrgyzstan implemented a law on the state language, compelling civil servants, MPs, teachers, and healthcare workers to communicate in Kyrgyz. However, this move has sparked controversy, with Russian officials and propaganda outlets criticizing it as “undemocratic” and oppressive to the Russian language. Despite objections, language tests over three years reveal gaps in officials’ Kyrgyz proficiency, highlighting the need for improvement.

    The head of the National Commission for the State Language and Language Policy, Kanybek Osmonaliyev, is an advocate for allowing officials time to improve their Kyrgyz language proficiency. The new law stipulates that noncompliance with linguistic proficiency requirements will result in instant termination. Around 4.4 million people in Kyrgyzstan speak Kyrgyz, according to the census taken in 2022, and there is a rising desire among them to learn the language. 

    In Tajikistan, Russian serves as the language of inter-ethnic communication, permitted in official documentation under the country’s constitution. Despite being spoken by 28% of the population in 2006, and with 7% using it as their primary language in various settings, Russian remains integral in government and business. In Tajikistan, proficiency in Russian is often seen as essential for career success, granting access to modern literature and technology. While English holds promise, learning Russian is more affordable, and many families anticipate their children studying at Russian universities or working in Russia. However, Tajik language courses are scarce and expensive, with limited availability after school. The teaching system primarily focuses on literary Tajik, differing significantly from the modern spoken language.

    Contrastingly, in Turkmenistan, Russian lost its status as the official lingua franca in 1996. Approximately 12% of the population, those who grew up in the Soviet era, can speak Russian. Primary and secondary education in Russian is minimal for subsequent generations. Turkmen state press and the newspaper Neytralny Turkmenistan continue to publish material in Russian, and there are schools like the Joint Turkmen-Russian Secondary School. The country has made strides in revitalizing the national language, with only 18% of residents proficient in Russian in 2020. A radical language policy, notably the shift from Cyrillic to the Latin script, led to a significant outflow of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations. The reform also impacted education, eliminating Russian-language schools and university curricula despite the declared policy of trilingual education (Turkmen, Russian, English).These linguistic landscapes underscore the delicate balance between cultural preservation, economic considerations, and the evolving educational paradigms in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

    Russian is the official language of documentation, the lingua franca and language of the elite in Uzbekistan, and it plays an important role in interethnic communication. An estimate from the World Factbook that is not current states that 14.2% of people speak Russian. Russian is nevertheless widely used even though it is not an official language, especially in big cities, business, and science. Its persistence in society is partly due to the belief that education in Russian is better than in Uzbek. 

    Uzbekistan, among Central Asian countries planning to transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet since 1993, has faced multiple delays in implementing the change, with the latest deadline set for 2023. While some school textbooks have been published in the Latin alphabet, the shift has resulted in a nuance: young people not proficient in the Cyrillic version of Uzbek find themselves disconnected from the world’s literary heritage, as limited fiction, including classical works by Uzbek authors, has been adapted into Latin.

    The Russosphere stands at a crossroads, its existence intricately tied to the Russian language. Contrary to the belief that language merely spreads culture, it wields power. Former Soviet nations, once deeply connected to Russia, are now charting their own paths, fostering distinct identities and pivoting from Russian towards English. These countries aspire to align with prosperous Western standards, a departure that is transforming the geopolitical landscape. The Russosphere, once synonymous with Russian dominance, is undergoing a deterioration, signaling a new chapter in the histories of these nations.

  • Drowning Diplomacy: Taiwan’s Receding Influence Across Pacific Islands

    Drowning Diplomacy: Taiwan’s Receding Influence Across Pacific Islands

    Taiwan—officially known as the Republic of China (ROC)—has it all: a strong international ally, a military, a vibrant economy, a sovereign currency, passports that are recognized around the world, individual postage stamps, a distinctive internet top-level domain, and a constitution which governs by a president who is chosen democratically. Despite all of this, Taiwan is still lacking a vital component: recognition.

    For Taiwan, being acknowledged as a free and independent state is paramount, with recognition from supportive nations considered the most valuable asset, especially in the face of mounting pressures from Beijing. Unfortunately, Taiwan is facing adversity. Among the 11 United Nations member states maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan, three are Pacific nations witnessing China’s assertive expansion of influence, marking a significant setback for Taiwan’s dream of global recognition as a free and independent state. 

    Once a founding member of the United Nations, the Republic of China (ROC) now finds itself without official membership or observer status within the organization. This predicament arises from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mainland China, strategically blocking the ROC on the international stage. The PRC refuses diplomatic relations with any nation maintaining ties with the ROC and imposes a requirement on these nations to make a statement on its claims to Taiwan.

    As a consequence, only 11 UN member states and the Holy See currently uphold official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. This recognition from 11 states is often perceived as a component of American diplomacy, with the United States and its influenced countries supporting the ROC to preserve Taiwan’s reputation as a free nation, entangled in the intricacies of power politics. However, the current global landscape, characterized by a weakened United States and the ascendance of Mainland China, casts doubt on the sustainability of this status quo.

    About five years ago, Taiwan had six Pacific allies with full diplomatic relations. But they lost three allies rapidly. With Nauru officially severing ties in January, only three steadfast nations—Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, and Palau—now remain within Taiwan’s diplomatic orbit. Despite relentless lobbying from Beijing and alluring promises of economic and developmental support, these three nations persist in their allegiance to Taiwan. Their commitment is said to be rooted in democratic principles and cultural values, prevailing reasons they consider paramount in maintaining their diplomatic ties with Taipei.

    Tuvalu, standing as one of the last bastions maintaining diplomatic ties with Taiwan, defiantly challenges Beijing’s One China principle, eliciting a keen response from the Chinese government. Though after recent elections, these Pacific nations delicately navigate pragmatic considerations against enduring values. The recently appointed prime minister of Tuvalu faces a dual challenge, addressing immediate domestic concerns while grappling with broader regional issues, notably Tuvalu’s role in the intense political struggle for influence in the Pacific. The departure of the staunch Taiwan supporter, Natano, leaves behind a legacy that the incoming leader may contemplate, particularly as one prime ministerial candidate hints at a potential shift towards establishing relations with China.

    The specific geographic positions of Palau and the Marshall Islands render them susceptible to sustained pressure from Beijing, a dynamic that unfolds against the backdrop of their strategic importance. Situated in the second island chain, these nations are perceived to wield military and strategic influence, not only for traditional global powers but also for China, adding a layer of complexity to their diplomatic landscape.

    Palau, an archipelago nestled in the western Pacific Ocean, finds itself particularly exposed to Beijing’s relentless efforts to shift allegiances. President Surangel Whipps Jr of Palau revealed about  the consistent overtures made by Chinese officials to his government, utilizing economic promises as a persuasive tool in this geopolitical tug of war. Similarly, Tuvalu’s foreign minister, Simon Kofe, reported in 2019 that Chinese companies sought to exploit concerns about rising sea levels, offering to build artificial islands in Tuvalu to weaken its ties with Taiwan.

    President Whipps accuses Beijing of employing what he terms “economic coercion,” highlighting restrictions on the number of tourists permitted to travel to Palau. This tactic not only disrupts the flow of visitors but also serves as a form of economic pressure, impacting a crucial revenue stream for Palau’s tourism sector. The multifaceted approach underscores China’s strategic maneuvers in shaping the geopolitical landscape of the Pacific, revealing the intricate interplay between economic inducements, strategic interests, and regional influence.

    China unmistakably holds a considerable advantage over Taiwan in terms of resources. China was enticed by substantial aid pledges, as exemplified by the Solomon Islands in 2019. China’s doubled discretionary funds for MPs and financing of a $53 million sports stadium in Honiara showcase its impactful approach. In contrast, Taiwan, lacking the same economic might, adopts a different strategy, focusing on more modest yet impactful initiatives. The development agency prioritizes projects in health, agriculture, and livestock, exemplified by endeavors like supporting a piggery initiative in the Marshall Islands and establishing a vegetable farm on a remote island in Tuvalu.

    The small Pacific archipelago states are experiencing a transformative shift fueled by foreign aid dynamics. These nations, grappling with the substantial risks of climate change, find themselves in need of infrastructure development for adaptation and seek avenues to generate income, particularly through tourism. Historically, they aligned with the United States, benefiting from the aid it provided. In return, the U.S. wielded its financial influence to garner support in international bodies, utilizing these nations as essential allies in various voting scenarios.

    However, the landscape is changing, as China emerges as a potent player. The current perceived weakness in the U.S. administration provides an opportunity for China to capitalize on the void effectively. Politicians in these island nations, eager to receive funds that can be directed toward local development instead of relying on tourism and aid from Western nations, find this shift appealing. The financial incentives become a driving force, overshadowing the cultural ties that are often quoted. The possibility of a gradual disengagement from diplomatic relations looms large as Taiwan navigates the complex web of financial interests and political maneuvers. In the context of shifting geopolitical currents, China’s compelling economic offers have a significant impact, creating alliances and changing the diplomatic landscape among small Pacific island states. The complicated dynamics provided Taiwan and the US with the opportunity to reassess its approach and manage the challenges posed by shifting regional allegiances.

  • Indonesia’s Islamic State: The Story of Aceh

    Indonesia’s Islamic State: The Story of Aceh

    Islamists around the globe  are vehemently criticizing Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for current deviation from Islamic rulings and traditions. As the birthplace and home to sacred sites such as Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia was traditionally regarded as the leader of global Islam, especially after the Ottoman Empire. However, a noticeable shift has occurred as these nations, driven by economic prosperity and a desire to adopt modern European standards, have chosen to dilute Sharia laws. This includes an increased emphasis on women’s rights and limiting the application of laws exclusively to Muslim followers. These countries now actively host events such as music festivals, cinema, and participate in global fashion festivals, leading to widespread criticism within the Islamic world. 

    At the same time, some nations, which adopted secularism before are witnessing a resurgence of interest in fundamentalism, with Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, notably among them. Remarkably, Indonesia has a province that operates entirely under the Islamic Sharia system, a legal code often deemed tribal, anti-feminine, and contrary to human rights by modern societies. 

    Aceh, situated as the westernmost province of Indonesia, holds a unique position on the northern tip of Sumatra island, with its capital and largest city being Banda Aceh. Bounded by the Indian Ocean to the west and the Strait of Malacca to the northeast, Aceh shares land borders with North Sumatra to the east, while its maritime boundaries extend to Malaysia and Thailand in the east and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India to the north. Distinguished by a special autonomous status, Aceh stands out as a region adhering to a conservative religious ideology, being the sole Indonesian province to officially implement Sharia law.

    The roots of Islam in Indonesia trace back to Aceh, marking its significance as the birthplace of the spread of Islam in the archipelago. Around 1250 AD, Islam reached Aceh through the Kingdoms of Fansur and Lamuri, playing a pivotal role in the propagation of Islam across Southeast Asia. By the early 17th century, the Sultanate of Aceh had emerged as the most affluent, influential, and cultured state in the Malacca Straits region. The province boasts a historical narrative of political independence and a persistent resistance against external dominance, be it from Dutch colonizers in the past or, more recently, the Indonesian government.

    Aceh holds the distinction of being the solitary part of Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, to enforce Sharia law in its criminal justice system. Initially confined to matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, the jurisdiction of Islamic courts expanded to encompass criminal cases after the passage of special autonomy legislation in 2001. Canings serve as a punitive measure for offenses such as being alone with an unrelated member of the opposite gender and engaging in gambling. Notably, in 2014, the provincial government extended the reach of Sharia law to non-Muslims involved in offenses with a Muslim party. Non-Muslims, found in violation of the secular criminal code, can now opt for punishment under either the national criminal code (KUHP) or Aceh provincial Sharia Law. This unique legal landscape reflects the intricate interplay between religious principles and the broader legal framework in Aceh.

    Amidst stringent Islamic laws, a recent report from the Jakarta-based think tank SETARA Institute sheds light on the concerning state of tolerance in Aceh province. The Tolerant City Index 2023, an annual assessment of 94 Indonesian cities, reveals that Lhokseumawe, Sabang, and the provincial capital Banda Aceh are among the least tolerant places in the nation. The evaluation takes into account various factors, including local laws, social regulations, government actions, and socio-religious demographics.

    Halili Hasan, the Executive Director of SETARA Institute, attributes the cities’ low tolerance ranking to what he perceives as a lack of commitment from the government to promote tolerance. This deficiency, according to Hasan, results in discrimination against minority groups based on factors such as religion, gender, and race, presenting a deeply rooted issue that poses a significant challenge to the region.

    SETARA’s report sheds light on governmental and social regulations in Aceh that allegedly favor Muslims while discriminating against religious minorities. The increasing strictness on religious attire in schools and government offices, heightened obligations for religious services, and hindrances to economic activities during Ramadan are cited as examples. The report concludes that these conditions do not support the creation of a tolerant ecosystem in the region.

    The recurring placement of Aceh at the bottom of tolerance rankings underscores the ongoing challenges faced by the province in fostering inclusivity and religious harmony. The report serves as a call to action for increased government commitment to address these issues and build a more tolerant society in Aceh.

    The closure of churches in Aceh has sparked controversy, with the official justification citing the lack of appropriate permits. Governor Zaini Abdullah and Indonesian Home Affairs Minister Gamawan Fauzi, both in support of this action, maintained that the closures were legally warranted. Similar incidents had occurred in April 2012 in the Singkil regency, prompting concerns among Christians. In 2015, an escalation resulted in a church being burned down and another attacked, leading President Joko Widodo to appeal for calm.

    Historically, Aceh has been a gateway for various religions including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. The current trajectory of increased Sharia law implementation and Islamization in Aceh may shape the future of Indonesia. This shift has broader implications, potentially influencing other Indonesian provinces with significant minority populations. Jakarta and other states are already witnessing signs of fundamentalism, raising concerns about internal conflicts within Indonesia.

    Interestingly, while countries like Saudi Arabia regulate Sharia to accommodate tourism and hospitality, secular nations in the tourism and hospitality industry, such as Indonesia, are adopting Sharia to establish distinct boundaries from external influences. This complex interplay of religion, governance, and cultural identity adds a layer of intricacy to the evolving landscape of Aceh and its potential impact on the broader Indonesian context.

  • What Will the New Government in Pakistan Mean for the Neighbors?

    What Will the New Government in Pakistan Mean for the Neighbors?

    After the widely rigged recent national election, Pakistan is set to form a new government. Caretaker prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif is well-positioned to return to the prime minister’s office by the partnership developed between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). They underscored having secured the requisite majority to establish a coalition government. The inaugural session of the National Assembly, expected at the end of February or in early March, is poised to witness the taking of Shehbaz Sharif as the new prime minister, representing the cohesive front of the PML-N. The inception of this new government is accompanied by a myriad of internal and external challenges. Anticipated public anger over mandate rigging may intensify and extend. The state is currently confronting economic challenges, with citizens contending with poverty and a deepening hunger crisis. In the midst of these hardships, public confidence in the system is diminishing.

    Will this transition affect any change in Pakistan’s volatile relationship with neighbors? Sadly No. More than the Pakistan Government, Pakistan Military is crafting foreign policy. As some political experts said before, for every state there will be an army. But in the case of Pakistan, the army owns that state. Yes, the Pakistan Military is still a powerful authority in that country. And they need peace? Never!!

    Whenever Pakistan grapples with internal obstacles, a recurrent pattern appears: a highly powerful military seizes power and pushes out any remaining democratic elements. The historical precedent of this occurred last time in 1999 when Pervez Musharraf orchestrated a military coup to overthrow the government led by Nawaz Sharif. This move was spurred by tensions with India, culminating in a war that Pakistan lost in the same year. Notably, this conflict, which was not necessarily desired by either the Pakistani or Indian government, was perceived as aligning with the preferences of the powerful Pakistan military.

    The dominance of the Pakistan military is visible even it democratic governments, they drive Pakistan’s external affairs. The Pakistan army is considered as one of the fiercest,  and they hold a large arsenal including nuclear weapons. So countries are often connecting with the Pakistan military instead of governments. The United States, intricately linked with the Pakistani army, has consistently endorsed the military’s expanding autonomy, often diverting authority from elected governments. Despite the state being officially an “Islamic republic,” the Pakistan Military’s proximity to both the USA and the UK suggests a closer alignment with Western interests. This alignment gains particular significance in light of the substantial debt owed to China. Faced with an overwhelming debt burden, Pakistan is compelled to open its markets and economy to China while simultaneously maintaining the military in alignment with U.S. interests. This dynamic played a role in Imran Khan’s removal from office as he leaned towards China over the U.S. 

    India, Pakistan’s largest neighbor, is viewed as a dangerous enemy.  The existence of Pakistan and the people’s loyalty to the military often hinge on the animosity towards India. During periods of internal turmoil, conflicts with India are used to rally the nation. The Kashmir issue is still fuming. And India’s current leadership under Modi has a strong stance in the case of Kashmir and they continuously cite the annexation of Pak occupied Kashmir to their side of Kashmir. And Pakistan uses separatism, Muslim extremist in India, to counter the growth of India. And the Military need to continue their strategy that will lead to further tensions. And in any case Pakistan military wants to topple Sharif government, they will choose a conflict with India.

    Iran, another neighbor of Pakistan who is ready to fight with the United States, engaged in air strikes within Pakistan’s borders last year. Although Pakistan retaliated, bringing an end to the immediate violence, the relationship remains strained. The longstanding issue of Balochistan, akin to the Kashmir problem with India, adds complexity. India and Iran appear to be close allies, making it imperative for the new government in Pakistan to prioritize peace with Iran while maintaining popular anti-India sentiments.

    The historical connections between the Taliban’s emirate in Afghanistan are facing a decline. The Taliban maintains strong affiliations with Islamic groups in Pakistan, particularly within the ethnic Pashtun community. Recently, this association has evolved into a potential threat to Pakistan’s stability. Certain factions within Pakistan advocate for the autonomy of Pashtun-majority regions, urging immediate intervention from the Pakistani military. In the years ahead, this particular region of Pakistan is poised to become the most precarious. Given historical precedents, there is a likelihood that various militia groups may challenge Pakistan’s authority in the area, even if a Taliban-led Afghanistan refrains from overt opposition due to their official ties.

    In Pakistan’s political arena, the military’s hegemony frequently obscures democracy. And this is the ongoing story. It’s clear, The Pakistan military operates as a distinct entity from the government and they shape foreign policies. Consequently, there is expected to be minimal change in Pakistan’s foreign policies in the coming years.  Nonetheless, enduring geopolitical hurdles pose challenges in fostering constructive relationships with neighboring nations. Issues such as radical Islam, the increasing influence of India, and the deterioration of Iran and the US relationships, may necessitate a shift in foreign policy. It is evident that Pakistan is navigating through turbulent times, raising concerns for the broader region.

  • How Japan’s Decline Will Impact Asia?

    How Japan’s Decline Will Impact Asia?

    Over the last century, Japan has undeniably stood out as a powerhouse in Asia, achieving remarkable progress in politics, military strength, economic prowess, and even in the world of sports. This archipelago nation not only solidified its position as a regional leader but also emerged as a source of inspiration and a standard for other Asian countries. In a period when traditional giants in Asia, such as China, India, and Persia, were striving for  recognition, Japan assumed the role of representing Asia on the global stage.

    Japan assumed a pivotal role in shaping Asia’s participation in international events, notably representing the continent in influential spectacles like the Olympics and the World Cup. During its heyday marked by creativity, unwavering quality, and an open market, Japan left an enduring imprint. This era metamorphosed into a paradigm that neighboring Asian nations aspired to emulate for their own advancement. Countries spanning the continent, including South Korea, China, and Singapore, found inspiration in Japan’s prosperity, endeavoring to adopt its model as a blueprint for their development.

    Nevertheless, Japan’s once-unassailable leadership in Asia is presently undergoing a transformation. Beneath the surface, the nation grapples with profound challenges not immediately evident to external observers. The persistent struggles faced by Japan serve as harbingers of a shifting landscape, prompting inquiries about its enduring dominance in the region. As Japan contends with complexities, the dynamics of power and influence in Asia are undeniably undergoing an evolution.

    As Japan’s recent decline is visible in Asia’s economic landscape, the nation finds itself relinquishing its coveted position in the top three global economies. The erstwhile standing as the world’s third-largest economy has been superseded by Germany, coupled with a slide into recession, according to recent data unveiled. The challenges faced by Japan encompass a feeble yen, compounded by the burden of an aging and diminishing population. The prevailing sentiment suggests that a resurgence is not on the horizon, with projections indicating a potential descent to the sixth or seventh position in the coming decades.

    In the nominal growth realm, Japan’s economy, now the world’s fourth-largest, exhibited a modest 1.9% expansion in 2023. However, when denominated in dollars, its gross domestic product (GDP) stood at $4.2 trillion, trailing behind Germany’s $4.5 trillion. This shift, occurring more than a decade after conceding the second spot to China, is attributed to the sharp depreciation of the yen against the dollar over the past two years. The substantial decline, approximately one-fifth against the US dollar in 2022 and 2023, including a 7% dip in the previous year, erodes profits on exports when repatriated.

    Compounding the economic challenges are the failures of government-led initiatives to stimulate the birthrate, exacerbating the anticipated labor shortages. Even as Japan experiences an unprecedented influx of foreign workers, the demographic trend remains a cause for concern. Yoshitaka Shindo, the Minister for Economic Revitalization, emphasized the imperative need for structural reforms, advocating for increased participation of women in full-time employment and the reduction of barriers to foreign investment.

    The data underscores the economic downturn, with real GDP contracting by 0.1% in the last quarter of 2023, driven by weak spending by households and businesses. Private consumption, constituting over half of Japan’s economic activity, declined by 0.2% as households grappled with the escalating cost of living and diminishing real wages. Furthermore, a downward revision of the growth figures for the preceding quarter to -0.8% confirms Japan’s entry into a technical recession, defined by two consecutive quarters of contraction. Reflecting on the optimistic projections of the 1970s and 80s, wherein Japan’s prowess in producing affordable, high-quality exports fueled speculation of surpassing the United States as the world’s leading economy, the current economic landscape presents a stark contrast to those bygone expectations.

    Rather than witnessing an anticipated resurgence, the rupture of Japan’s asset-inflated bubble economy in the early 1990s cast a shadow that extended across what has since been dubbed the “lost decades” of economic stagnation and deflation.

    In 2010, China’s ascent to the position of the world’s second-largest economy prompted a bout of introspection in Japan, forcing contemplation about its capacity to keep pace with emerging economies. The recent descent to the fourth spot, attributed to significant currency fluctuations, not only marks a setback for Japan but also deals a blow to the self-esteem of the nation and its already unpopular prime minister, Fumio Kishida. Unfortunately, this downward trajectory is unlikely to find its nadir there. The International Monetary Fund projects that India, buoyed by a sizable and expanding young population, will surpass Japan in economic rankings by 2026, with Germany following suit the subsequent year.

    The Nikkei, in a recent editorial, laments Japan’s failure to elevate its growth potential, a situation economists squarely attribute to the demographic crisis facing the nation. Describing this circumstance as a wake-up call, the Nikkei urges a swifter implementation of long-neglected economic reforms to address the underlying challenges. As Japan grapples with these economic shifts, the unfolding narrative suggests a critical juncture demanding renewed attention and decisive actions to navigate the turbulent waters of a changing global economic landscape.

    At the political echelon, Japan’s diminishing stature heralds a reduction in its influence within the region. Historically, Japan has stood as a pivotal ally for the United States, facilitating the projection of American influence throughout the region. However, as Japan undergoes a decline, it is likely to grant the United States a more prominent role in shaping policies within Japan, potentially prompting the U.S. to seek additional robust alliances in the region.

    In this geopolitical environment, China and India stand out as powerful actors, and other nations—including Russia—align themselves with one of these powerful forces. China and India are both aggressively expanding their areas of influence through international investments and infrastructure projects. What’s interesting is that these Asian superpowers seem less eager to build closer connections with the US, which could lead to the rise of a multipolar Asia.

    The waning influence of Japan introduces a nuanced shift in the geopolitical dynamics, creating space for recalibrations and realignments in alliances. As the United States navigates this evolving landscape, the quest for alternative strategic partnerships becomes increasingly pertinent, highlighting the intricate interplay of power, influence, and alliances in shaping the future geopolitical contours of the Asian region.

  • India’s New Megacity in the Mouth of Malacca Strait: A Geopolitical Study

    India’s New Megacity in the Mouth of Malacca Strait: A Geopolitical Study

    India is setting up a pioneering initiative by allocating a substantial investment of $9 billion (£7 billion) to establish a dynamic port city on Great Nicobar Island. Positioned at the entrance of the narrow Malacca Strait, serving as a gateway to the Indian Ocean, this ambitious project represents a transformative effort aimed at reshaping the regional dynamics. The comprehensive plan envisions the evolution of the Indian Ocean island, home to 8,000 inhabitants, into what has been termed the ‘Hong Kong of India.’ Which involves the creation of an international shipping terminal, airport, power plant, military base, and industrial park, strategically aligned with considerations for tourism development.

    India’s New Megacity in the Mouth of Malacca Strait: A Geopolitical Study
    Location of Nicobar Islands

    At the heart of this venture lies India’s dream for dominance over the Malacca trade route, adding layers of geopolitical significance. Predictably, environmentalists, often vocal opponents of infrastructure projects in developing nations, are already raising concerns about one of India’s most ambitious undertakings. Scholars from diverse global perspectives are collectively urging India to reassess its mega-construction plans for the island. Their cautionary message emphasizes that proceeding with the project could potentially deliver a ‘death sentence’ to the indigenous Shompen hunter-gatherer community residing there.

    India’s Ambitious Plan

    India’s New Megacity in the Mouth of Malacca Strait: A Geopolitical Study
    Great Nicobar Islands in Nicobar Islands Map

    Nestled within the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago in India, Great Nicobar Island stands as a haven predominantly inhabited by tribes. As the largest and southernmost among the Nicobar Islands, its strategic positioning serves as a gateway to the vast Indian Ocean via the narrow Malacca Strait. Notably closer to Indonesia than the Indian Mainland, this island is located just 93 miles northwest of Aceh on the Indonesian island of Sumatra and approximately 800 miles east of Chennai on the Indian mainland.

    Great Nicobar accommodates a population of Shompen people estimated to be between 100 and 400. Encompassing 921 km2 (356 sq mi), this sparsely inhabited island is characterized by lush rainforests, earning renown for its rich and diverse wildlife. Presently, the only signs of development on this often-neglected island are an airstrip of 915m at Campbell Bay/Ten Lua on the East coast and at least one small shipping dock.

    The island’s history is marked by a significant event – the 2004 earthquake and tsunami – which brought dire consequences, including a day-long isolation from external interactions. Despite its strategic importance and ecological richness, Great Nicobar remains a largely undeveloped landscape, waiting to unfold its potential.

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has unveiled an ambitious investment plan of $9 billion (€8.38 billion) to revolutionize Great Nicobar, envisioning it as a pivotal military and trade hub. The proposed developments encompass an international container terminal, deep-water port, dual-use airport, power plant, and a greenfield township, with the potential to elevate the population to the hundreds of thousands. Positioned strategically near the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s most bustling shipping lanes, the envisioned port in Galathea Bay adds a critical dimension to the plan.

    There is a hopeful anticipation for the implementation of free trade policies, distinct laws, and a separate entity, similar to the Hong Kong model. Experts posit that the success of such island endeavors often hinges on exemptions from the mainland’s stringent regulations.

    This visionary proposal, brought forth on January 18, 2021, by India’s policy development team NITI Aayog and informed by a comprehensive feasibility report from AECOM India Private Limited, projects a flourishing population of 650,000 inhabitants on the island by 2050. Currently, the island is home to a modest 8,500 residents, while the entire archipelago, comprising over 500 islands, with only about 40 inhabited, accommodates a total population of approximately 380,000. The anticipated population surge raises valid concerns about the substantial ecological pressure it may exert on the island and its environs.

    A Stalemate For China

    The enduring and contentious border dispute between China and India, Which is unrecognized by either side, has led to significant confrontations on multiple occasions. As India strengthens its alliances with key players like Japan and the U.S., China watches with heightened concern. Part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative strategically invests in India’s neighbors grappling with political and economic instability, including Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. This financial leverage not only provides China with a considerable advantage but also allows it to shape political alliances and influence media narratives against India.

    India’s foremost geopolitical challenge with China extends beyond the harsh geography and climate of the land border. It encompasses critical port leases, where vital transport hubs have fallen into Chinese hands due to the inability of recipient countries to repay substantial loans. Notably, Hamabanthotta, a key port leased to China, poses a significant threat to Indian navies, with reports of Chinese naval and spy ships utilizing these strategic locations. If tensions escalate, there is a potential for all Indian ports to be targeted from these Chinese-controlled ports, pushing these nations into a proxy war, given their high dependency on China.

    The economic repercussions are twofold: these Chinese ports not only divert trade routes between China and Europe away from traditional Indian ports like Mumbai, Kolkata, and Kochi but also contribute to an economic setback for India. Amidst this complex scenario, India’s newly proposed port city emerges as a potential game-changer. Positioned strategically at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, a critical juncture in the China-Europe trade route, it becomes a focal point in one of the world’s most vital economic conduits in terms of goods’ value and shipping volume. The Indian navy’s presence in these waters creates a strategic stalemate, compelling Chinese ships to navigate through this crucial point, providing India with both economic and military advantages. Despite China exploring alternative land routes through Russia and Pakistan, the conventional route through the Malacca Strait remains irreplaceable. Any Indian blockade in the Malacca Strait could significantly impact the Chinese economy.

    The West Bloc’s Opposition

    The Western powers, notably the USA and UK, exerting their influence in the Indian Ocean, harbor reservations about India akin to their concerns about China. Despite their inclination to counterbalance China, they are cautious about empowering India too much. Western nations, alongside China, are wary of India gaining an upper hand in the trade route that facilitates 60 percent of global maritime trade. In contrast to the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait region doesn’t currently pose many problems.  because there are no unilateral claims.   It includes the territorial waters of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and India, which is a major player in the area. Even if no one country wants to rule the route by itself, India’s bold actions on Great Nicobar, which were previously disregarded, indicate a change in its strategic priorities. With this action, India’s influence in the Malacca Strait is expected to grow. 

    As the initial stages of discontent, the US and UK media expressed numerous reservations about the Nicobar project. Concerns have been prominently raised, particularly in relation to the Great Nicobar actions, with a focus on potential impacts on the Shompen community, deforestation, and seismic activity in the region. This scrutiny has been extensively covered by sources such as The Guardian, BBC, and Deutsche Welle. Evidently, Western nations, disapproving of India’s approach in Great Nicobar, are adhering to their established method of critiquing infrastructure projects in developing countries.. The alignment of India’s trajectory with China’s stirs expectations among Western powers that India will assertively seek a more substantial share in the region. This, in turn, is foreseen to directly impact the trade flowing through this pivotal route.

    In Summary

    A significant geopolitical shift looms on the horizon if India proceeds with its Great Nicobar plan. This strategic move promises an unprecedented advantage for India in the Malacca Strait. China, finding itself potentially blocked from the Indian Ocean, faces a challenge in advancing its cooperation with India unless its trade route is jeopardized in an unprecedented manner. The impact could be substantial for smaller nations heavily dependent on the trade route. Therefore, the persisting rivalry for influence between China and India in these smaller countries is expected to endure.

    It is evident that India is strategically deploying its trump card against China, presenting a formidable challenge. Interestingly, this shift is not welcomed by Western nations, adding an intriguing layer to the evolving geopolitical landscape

  • Cambodia Readies for Senate Election: Hun Sen Assumes New Role

    Cambodia Readies for Senate Election: Hun Sen Assumes New Role

    The impending Senate election in Cambodia appears to be a mere formality, with the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) poised to secure the majority of seats. The anticipation is that former Prime Minister Hun Sen, who ceded power to his son last year after a nearly four-decade-long tenure, will seek a Senate seat and subsequently assume the presidency of the body. Hun Sen has declared his candidacy in Kandal province, where he has held a National Assembly seat since 1993, signaling a potential change in leadership as the current president, Say Chhum, prepares for retirement.

    The political landscape of Cambodia operates within the confines of a constitutional monarchy, where the king assumes the role of the head of state, and the prime minister serves as the head of government. Legislative power resides in a bicameral legislature consisting of the National Assembly, responsible for voting on draft laws, and the Senate, which holds the power of review. After approval by both chambers, draft laws are presented to the monarch for signing and promulgation.

    The current constitution, which was enacted in 1993 in the wake of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements and the elections that followed, which were aided by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, defines Cambodia as a “independent, sovereign, peaceful, permanently neutral, and non-aligned country.” Concerns were raised by the lack of foreign observers during the national election in 2023 and the communal election in 2022. This helped to create the impression that the administration was dictatorial and had stifled opposing voices by dissolving political parties.

    In the July 2023 elections, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) secured a decisive victory in a flawed election, marked by the disqualification of a significant opposition force, the Candlelight Party. On August 22, 2023, Hun Manet, son of Hun Sen, assumed the role of the new Cambodian prime minister. This scenario, though labeled as ‘democracy’ by Southeast Asian politicians, underscores the challenges and complexities within the political landscape.

    Upcoming election on February 25th is for the Senate. The legislative upper chamber in Cambodia goes by the name of the Senate, with a total of sixty-one members. Among them, two are designated by the king, an additional two are chosen by the lower house of the government, while the remaining fifty-seven undergo popular elections by electors from provincial and local governments—a system reminiscent of the Senate in France. Members of this chamber serve terms lasting six years.

    Cambodia’s Senate elections unfold within notably constrained parameters, even within the local context. The electorate is limited to National Assembly lawmakers and members of the 1,652 commune councils, a mere 11,747 individuals. Consequently, the election outcomes merely reflect the dominance of the CPP in these bodies. Of the 62 Senate positions, 58 are determined by these groups, with the King appointing two senators and the National Assembly electing two more. In the previous national election, the CPP secured an overwhelming victory, claiming 120 out of 125 seats in the National Assembly. The commune council elections in 2022 further solidified their control, capturing 74.3 percent of the vote, securing 1,648 out of 1,652 commune chief positions, and 9,376 out of 11,622 available commune council seats. While the Candlelight Party managed to win 2,198 commune council positions, its impact on the Senate election remains limited. The anticipated appointment of Hun Sen as Senate president on Sunday is widely perceived as a predetermined result.

    The role of the Senate president is largely ceremonial, stemming from power-sharing negotiations after the 1998 election. Created not out of legislative necessity, but as a means to establish a new power base for the late president of the CPP, Chea Sim, after he relinquished his position as National Assembly president. While the Senate theoretically holds the power to review and propose changes to laws passed by the National Assembly, it has seldom exercised this function, often simply approving legislation from the lower chamber. So, The Senate presidency will just add to the array of honorary positions held by the 71-year-old Hun Sen in the twilight of his career. These include the presidency of the CPP and the presidency of the Supreme Privy Council to the King, a position deemed to have “equal rank” to that of the prime minister

    Despite the largely ceremonial nature of the Senate presidency, it holds one significant power – the authority to act as the interim head of state when the King is absent. While the likelihood of any potential challenger utilizing this role to undermine Prime Minister Hun Manet, who assumed office in August, is low, Hun Sen’s occupancy of the Senate presidency serves as a precautionary measure. Although last year’s power transition to Manet unfolded smoothly, the prospect of internal challenges within the existing power structure always looms. By assuming this position, Hun Sen strategically fortifies his son’s position and preempts any potential threats to his control over the legislature. This week, Hun Sen’s youngest son, Hun Many, was appointed as a deputy prime minister, solidifying the family’s presence in key positions across the administration and ensuring their continued influence over Cambodia well beyond Hun Sen’s lifetime.

    As the Senate Election campaign concludes, participating political parties now pivot their attention towards the imminent election and the ensuing vote counting slated for this weekend on Sunday. Hang Puthea, the spokesperson for the National Election Committee, has reassured the public of the seamless progression of the campaign unfolding between February 10 and 23. Registered political parties actively engaged in campaigning, nominated candidates, and, despite the overarching uncertainties regarding governmental responsibilities, the process has been characterized as running smoothly. This has provided eligible parties with ample opportunities to actively participate and present their cases to the electorate.

    Yet, the entire democracy in Cambodia can be viewed as comedy. Countries like Cambodia have turned the democratic process into a farcical performance, and the upcoming Senate election appears to be just another episode in this narrative. The dynastic grip on power ensures that the nation remains a mere pawn in the hands of a ruling family, sharing the stage with the royals, making a mockery of the democratic principles at play.

  • Singapore Beats Hong Kong as the Asian Headquarters for Multinationals, Including Those from China

    Singapore Beats Hong Kong as the Asian Headquarters for Multinationals, Including Those from China

    The 21st century is celebrated as the century of Asia, yet the cooperation between different countries,  akin to the European Union remains a distant goal. The intricate fabric of Asian politics creates a complex landscape for corporations to navigate. The critical decision of choosing the optimal location for business headquarters becomes a nuanced process, demanding meticulous consideration of factors encompassing politics, international relations, and competitive advantage.

    While extending hands to multinational companies undoubtedly proves advantageous for states, promising potential economic boosts through taxes and investments. In the race for Asia’s business headquarter position, Singapore and Hong Kong emerge as primary rivals. Each highlighting distinctive features such as their city-state status, robust international relations, proximity to major economies, business-friendly environments, and low corruption levels. Although both have thrived in the past decades, the most recent Bloomberg report decisively crowns Singapore as the unequivocal champion. This declaration dispels uncertainties, firmly establishing it as the undisputed leader in the competition to host corporate headquarters in Asia

    Singapore’s appeal to multinational corporations is on a steady ascent, propelled by its Western affiliations and an abundant talent pool, as highlighted in a recent Bloomberg Intelligence report. The 50-page report attributes this change to Singapore’s stronger ties with the West, a diversified economy, and enticing tax incentives. The document argues that Singapore surpasses Hong Kong in terms of perceived political stability and freedom, especially in the face of heightened geopolitical risks in the region. In the ongoing competition for the title of Asia’s premier business hub, Singapore has firmly solidified its position by hosting regional headquarters for 4,200 multinational firms in 2023. This outpaces its primary rival, Hong Kong, which accommodated 1,336, according to the report.

    A notable revelation emerges as even Chinese companies, navigating geopolitical intricacies and aiming to broaden their global presence, increasingly favor Singapore over Hong Kong. This shift marks a departure from the historical concentration of both Chinese and international companies in Hong Kong.  While Hong Kong boasts a lower standard corporate tax rate at 16.5%, the report highlights Singapore’s competitive edge with programs that can reduce its 17% tax rate to 13.5% or even lower for specific activities. Singapore’s targeted incentives for foreign companies establishing regional hubs have proven successful, attracting a prestigious lineup of multinational corporations, including FedEx, Microsoft, Google, Mead Johnson, Rolls-Royce, and General Motors.

    Singapore’s allure extends to companies navigating sensitive sectors, as evidenced by the presence of TikTok and the online fashion giant Shein, both having established business hubs in the city-state. Chinese enterprises, including electric-vehicle maker Nio and tech giants like Huawei Technologies, are also increasingly expanding their operations in Singapore. The report’s conclusion underscores Singapore’s corporate critical mass and diversified economy, positioning it favorably to attract even more global business in the next five years compared to Hong Kong. 

    Hong Kong , China’s financial hub had a special status and independent governance were instrumental in its growth as an Asian business hub, recent increase in China’s influence, leading to widespread protests that tarnished its international reputation. Last decade witnessed a lot of political protests against the government and the country’s stringent zero-Covid policy throughout the pandemic was horrible. In contrast, Singapore asserted its independence and emerged as the favored destination for international business offices. The decline of Hong Kong, often seen as a symbol of China’s waning influence, is underscored by the Chinese economy losing its pre-pandemic momentum. Factors contributing to this include a sharp decline in population growth and Western decisions to relocate businesses to Southeast Asian nations and India.

    The United States revoked Hong Kong’s special status amid escalating tensions. The ongoing geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea are poised to impact corporate decisions, potentially escalating in the coming decade if disruptions to China’s economy and global trade persist.

    The report emphasizes that Hong Kong has ceded its status as the preferred choice for international business headquarters to Singapore. This is a big achievement for Singapore, echoing its prominent standings in various global indices such as the Human Development Index, passport rankings, and corruption index. Crucially, this serves as a distinct indication of the waning influence of China and Japan, set against the escalating prominence of Southeast Asian nations and India. 

  • Palestine or Israel: What will be the future of Gaza?

    Palestine or Israel: What will be the future of Gaza?

    In the Middle East, a minuscule piece of land has become the focal point of global attention—the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian territory situated along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Bordered by Egypt to the southwest and Israel to the east and north, this region finds itself trapped in a quagmire of discussions, extending from the realms of social media to the chambers of the United Nations, with no resolution in sight.

    Since last October, the Gaza Strip has been a war-torn landscape, grappling with a severe humanitarian crisis. The conflict pits Israel against this tiny enclave, home to Hamas—a group viewed as terrorists, while others see them as champions of Islamic rights. Against a backdrop of streets stained with human blood and strewn with the remnants of demolished homes, hospitals, schools, and buildings, the enclave is on the verge of collapse.

    Israel’s retaliation for the loss of a thousand lives shows no signs of abating, with the toll on Gaza now reaching a staggering 25,000 people. The Israeli call for the uprooting of Hamas translates into a destabilization of Gaza itself, as diplomatic efforts, including UN resolutions and international pressure, falter in bringing peace to the region.

    As Israel’s fury persists, the question looms: will an independent Gaza emerge under the banner of a Palestinian state, or is it destined to be annexed by Israel?

    How the Gaza Issue Evolved?

    Palastine or Israel: What will be the future of Gaza?
    Map of Gaza (Source: Britannica)

    One of the world’s highest population densities, Gaza stands as a complex tapestry of religious and political dynamics. Sunni Muslims form the majority, with a Palestinian Christian minority woven into the fabric.  Over the years, Gaza has symbolized Palestinian nationalism, resistance, along with global Islamic solidarity, situated as a 41km (25-mile) long and 10km-wide territory between Israel, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea. 

    Having been under Egyptian control, Gaza saw a shift during the 1967 Six-Day War when Israel captured it. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew its troops and settlers, implementing a temporary blockade that became indefinite after Hamas took control in 2007, backed by Egypt. Despite being recognized as part of Palestine by many nations, Gaza lacks UN member status.

    The West Bank and Gaza, considered a single Israeli-occupied territory by the UN, are governed separately. The West Bank, under limited self-rule by the Palestinian Authority (PA), acknowledges Israel’s existence, while Gaza, ruled by Hamas, rejects it. The UN and human rights organizations assert that Gaza remains under Israeli military occupation, facing a blockade that restricts movement and goods, earning it the moniker “open-air prison.” 

    Hamas, having seized control in 2007, seeks an Islamic state in lieu of Israel, rejecting its right to exist. The recent conflict stems from perceived Israeli transgressions, including security raids on the al-Aqsa Mosque and West Bank settlement activity. The pursuit of a two-state solution faces staunch opposition, as both sides grapple with conflicting visions of coexistence.

    What’s happening in Gaza Now?

    Palastine or Israel_ What will be the future of Gaza
    Israeli Declared Buffer Zone (Source: Ocha)

    In the ongoing chapter of this enduring conflict, Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas find themselves locked in a deadly confrontation since early October. The hostilities were sparked when Hamas gunmen launched an unprecedented attack from Gaza into Israel, resulting in the deadliest incident in Israel’s history. Subsequently, Israel initiated a military campaign in the Palestinian territory, claiming thousands of lives.

    On the fateful morning of October 7th, waves of Hamas gunmen breached Gaza’s border, causing the death of approximately 1,200 people in Israel. The casualties included children, the elderly, and 364 young individuals attending a music festival. Hamas also took more than 250 people as hostages back to Gaza. The group’s demands include the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israel and an end to the blockade on the Gaza Strip by Israel and Egypt—measures both countries justify for security reasons.

    Having engaged in several wars with Israel, firing thousands of rockets and orchestrating lethal attacks, Hamas is branded a terrorist group by Israel, the US, the EU, the UK, and others. Israel, in response, has conducted numerous airstrikes and sent troops into Gaza in 2008 and 2014. Iran supports Hamas with funding, weapons, and training, further complicating the dynamics of this enduring conflict.

    In swift retaliation to the Hamas attack, Israel initiated an extensive air campaign targeting Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the objectives as the annihilation of Hamas and the recovery of hostages. Subsequently, a ground invasion was launched three weeks later, accompanied by naval bombardment. The initial focus was on northern Gaza, particularly Gaza City and its tunnels, alleged to be central to Hamas military operations. A directive from Israel ordered the evacuation of all 1.1 million people in the north for their safety.

    After a brief truce in late November, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) extended ground operations to southern Gaza, reaching Khan Younis, the second-largest city, and refugee camps in central Gaza. Displaced individuals from the north were compelled to move further south, with plans to invade the southern town of Rafah, where approximately 1.5 million sought refuge.

    The toll on Palestinians has been devastating, with more than 28,000 killed and tens of thousands injured since the war’s onset, according to Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry. The majority of casualties are reported to be women and children. The IDF claims to have eliminated around 9,000 Hamas fighters, in addition to over 1,000 attackers inside Israel, without specifying the basis for these figures. Israel acknowledges over 230 of its soldiers killed in Gaza, while homes and structures in the region have suffered extensive damage and destruction.

    Israel employed a strategy of cutting off essential supplies, including food, water, and fuel, as a tactic to exert pressure on Hamas for the release of hostages. This approach resulted in severe shortages within Gaza’s population. Although Israel has permitted the entry of humanitarian aid, medicines, and limited fuel quantities since then, the delivered aid falls significantly below pre-war levels.

    The UN has accused Israel of hindering aid delivery, while Israel, in turn, has attributed problems to the UN. Describing the situation in Gaza as “horrific,” the UN has highlighted overflowing shelters, depleting food and water supplies, and an escalating risk of famine. Gaza’s health system is on the brink of collapse, with only 16 out of 36 hospitals partially operational. These facilities grapple with an overwhelming number of injured individuals and face shortages of staff, medical supplies, food, fuel, and water.

    Future Plans on Gaza

    The vision for Gaza’s future appears precarious, with the Israeli Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, proposing a post-war scenario where Hamas loses control, and Israel maintains overall security dominance. Under this plan, a multinational force would oversee the reconstruction efforts after the extensive destruction caused by Israeli airstrikes, and Egypt might have an unspecified role.

    However, the proposal maintains that Palestinians would be responsible for governing the territory, with the condition of non-hostility toward Israel. Despite some far-right members suggesting encouraging Palestinian citizens to leave Gaza for exile and re-establishing Jewish settlements—an idea criticized as “extremist” and “unworkable”—Gallant’s proposals are seen as relatively more practical.

    While Prime Minister Netanyahu has not publicly detailed his governance vision for Gaza, the overarching goal is to crush Hamas completely. Gallant’s plan outlines a more targeted approach in the north of Gaza, involving raids, tunnel demolitions, and air and ground strikes. The aggressive Israeli strategy signals an assertive stance against Hamas ruling Palestine, making the prospect of a free Palestine seem unlikely. In essence, Israel will decide the future of Gaza as they wish.