Category: Asia

  • Drowning Diplomacy: Taiwan’s Receding Influence Across Pacific Islands

    Drowning Diplomacy: Taiwan’s Receding Influence Across Pacific Islands

    Taiwan—officially known as the Republic of China (ROC)—has it all: a strong international ally, a military, a vibrant economy, a sovereign currency, passports that are recognized around the world, individual postage stamps, a distinctive internet top-level domain, and a constitution which governs by a president who is chosen democratically. Despite all of this, Taiwan is still lacking a vital component: recognition.

    For Taiwan, being acknowledged as a free and independent state is paramount, with recognition from supportive nations considered the most valuable asset, especially in the face of mounting pressures from Beijing. Unfortunately, Taiwan is facing adversity. Among the 11 United Nations member states maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan, three are Pacific nations witnessing China’s assertive expansion of influence, marking a significant setback for Taiwan’s dream of global recognition as a free and independent state. 

    Once a founding member of the United Nations, the Republic of China (ROC) now finds itself without official membership or observer status within the organization. This predicament arises from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mainland China, strategically blocking the ROC on the international stage. The PRC refuses diplomatic relations with any nation maintaining ties with the ROC and imposes a requirement on these nations to make a statement on its claims to Taiwan.

    As a consequence, only 11 UN member states and the Holy See currently uphold official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. This recognition from 11 states is often perceived as a component of American diplomacy, with the United States and its influenced countries supporting the ROC to preserve Taiwan’s reputation as a free nation, entangled in the intricacies of power politics. However, the current global landscape, characterized by a weakened United States and the ascendance of Mainland China, casts doubt on the sustainability of this status quo.

    About five years ago, Taiwan had six Pacific allies with full diplomatic relations. But they lost three allies rapidly. With Nauru officially severing ties in January, only three steadfast nations—Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, and Palau—now remain within Taiwan’s diplomatic orbit. Despite relentless lobbying from Beijing and alluring promises of economic and developmental support, these three nations persist in their allegiance to Taiwan. Their commitment is said to be rooted in democratic principles and cultural values, prevailing reasons they consider paramount in maintaining their diplomatic ties with Taipei.

    Tuvalu, standing as one of the last bastions maintaining diplomatic ties with Taiwan, defiantly challenges Beijing’s One China principle, eliciting a keen response from the Chinese government. Though after recent elections, these Pacific nations delicately navigate pragmatic considerations against enduring values. The recently appointed prime minister of Tuvalu faces a dual challenge, addressing immediate domestic concerns while grappling with broader regional issues, notably Tuvalu’s role in the intense political struggle for influence in the Pacific. The departure of the staunch Taiwan supporter, Natano, leaves behind a legacy that the incoming leader may contemplate, particularly as one prime ministerial candidate hints at a potential shift towards establishing relations with China.

    The specific geographic positions of Palau and the Marshall Islands render them susceptible to sustained pressure from Beijing, a dynamic that unfolds against the backdrop of their strategic importance. Situated in the second island chain, these nations are perceived to wield military and strategic influence, not only for traditional global powers but also for China, adding a layer of complexity to their diplomatic landscape.

    Palau, an archipelago nestled in the western Pacific Ocean, finds itself particularly exposed to Beijing’s relentless efforts to shift allegiances. President Surangel Whipps Jr of Palau revealed about  the consistent overtures made by Chinese officials to his government, utilizing economic promises as a persuasive tool in this geopolitical tug of war. Similarly, Tuvalu’s foreign minister, Simon Kofe, reported in 2019 that Chinese companies sought to exploit concerns about rising sea levels, offering to build artificial islands in Tuvalu to weaken its ties with Taiwan.

    President Whipps accuses Beijing of employing what he terms “economic coercion,” highlighting restrictions on the number of tourists permitted to travel to Palau. This tactic not only disrupts the flow of visitors but also serves as a form of economic pressure, impacting a crucial revenue stream for Palau’s tourism sector. The multifaceted approach underscores China’s strategic maneuvers in shaping the geopolitical landscape of the Pacific, revealing the intricate interplay between economic inducements, strategic interests, and regional influence.

    China unmistakably holds a considerable advantage over Taiwan in terms of resources. China was enticed by substantial aid pledges, as exemplified by the Solomon Islands in 2019. China’s doubled discretionary funds for MPs and financing of a $53 million sports stadium in Honiara showcase its impactful approach. In contrast, Taiwan, lacking the same economic might, adopts a different strategy, focusing on more modest yet impactful initiatives. The development agency prioritizes projects in health, agriculture, and livestock, exemplified by endeavors like supporting a piggery initiative in the Marshall Islands and establishing a vegetable farm on a remote island in Tuvalu.

    The small Pacific archipelago states are experiencing a transformative shift fueled by foreign aid dynamics. These nations, grappling with the substantial risks of climate change, find themselves in need of infrastructure development for adaptation and seek avenues to generate income, particularly through tourism. Historically, they aligned with the United States, benefiting from the aid it provided. In return, the U.S. wielded its financial influence to garner support in international bodies, utilizing these nations as essential allies in various voting scenarios.

    However, the landscape is changing, as China emerges as a potent player. The current perceived weakness in the U.S. administration provides an opportunity for China to capitalize on the void effectively. Politicians in these island nations, eager to receive funds that can be directed toward local development instead of relying on tourism and aid from Western nations, find this shift appealing. The financial incentives become a driving force, overshadowing the cultural ties that are often quoted. The possibility of a gradual disengagement from diplomatic relations looms large as Taiwan navigates the complex web of financial interests and political maneuvers. In the context of shifting geopolitical currents, China’s compelling economic offers have a significant impact, creating alliances and changing the diplomatic landscape among small Pacific island states. The complicated dynamics provided Taiwan and the US with the opportunity to reassess its approach and manage the challenges posed by shifting regional allegiances.

  • Indonesia’s Islamic State: The Story of Aceh

    Indonesia’s Islamic State: The Story of Aceh

    Islamists around the globe  are vehemently criticizing Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for current deviation from Islamic rulings and traditions. As the birthplace and home to sacred sites such as Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia was traditionally regarded as the leader of global Islam, especially after the Ottoman Empire. However, a noticeable shift has occurred as these nations, driven by economic prosperity and a desire to adopt modern European standards, have chosen to dilute Sharia laws. This includes an increased emphasis on women’s rights and limiting the application of laws exclusively to Muslim followers. These countries now actively host events such as music festivals, cinema, and participate in global fashion festivals, leading to widespread criticism within the Islamic world. 

    At the same time, some nations, which adopted secularism before are witnessing a resurgence of interest in fundamentalism, with Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, notably among them. Remarkably, Indonesia has a province that operates entirely under the Islamic Sharia system, a legal code often deemed tribal, anti-feminine, and contrary to human rights by modern societies. 

    Aceh, situated as the westernmost province of Indonesia, holds a unique position on the northern tip of Sumatra island, with its capital and largest city being Banda Aceh. Bounded by the Indian Ocean to the west and the Strait of Malacca to the northeast, Aceh shares land borders with North Sumatra to the east, while its maritime boundaries extend to Malaysia and Thailand in the east and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India to the north. Distinguished by a special autonomous status, Aceh stands out as a region adhering to a conservative religious ideology, being the sole Indonesian province to officially implement Sharia law.

    The roots of Islam in Indonesia trace back to Aceh, marking its significance as the birthplace of the spread of Islam in the archipelago. Around 1250 AD, Islam reached Aceh through the Kingdoms of Fansur and Lamuri, playing a pivotal role in the propagation of Islam across Southeast Asia. By the early 17th century, the Sultanate of Aceh had emerged as the most affluent, influential, and cultured state in the Malacca Straits region. The province boasts a historical narrative of political independence and a persistent resistance against external dominance, be it from Dutch colonizers in the past or, more recently, the Indonesian government.

    Aceh holds the distinction of being the solitary part of Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, to enforce Sharia law in its criminal justice system. Initially confined to matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, the jurisdiction of Islamic courts expanded to encompass criminal cases after the passage of special autonomy legislation in 2001. Canings serve as a punitive measure for offenses such as being alone with an unrelated member of the opposite gender and engaging in gambling. Notably, in 2014, the provincial government extended the reach of Sharia law to non-Muslims involved in offenses with a Muslim party. Non-Muslims, found in violation of the secular criminal code, can now opt for punishment under either the national criminal code (KUHP) or Aceh provincial Sharia Law. This unique legal landscape reflects the intricate interplay between religious principles and the broader legal framework in Aceh.

    Amidst stringent Islamic laws, a recent report from the Jakarta-based think tank SETARA Institute sheds light on the concerning state of tolerance in Aceh province. The Tolerant City Index 2023, an annual assessment of 94 Indonesian cities, reveals that Lhokseumawe, Sabang, and the provincial capital Banda Aceh are among the least tolerant places in the nation. The evaluation takes into account various factors, including local laws, social regulations, government actions, and socio-religious demographics.

    Halili Hasan, the Executive Director of SETARA Institute, attributes the cities’ low tolerance ranking to what he perceives as a lack of commitment from the government to promote tolerance. This deficiency, according to Hasan, results in discrimination against minority groups based on factors such as religion, gender, and race, presenting a deeply rooted issue that poses a significant challenge to the region.

    SETARA’s report sheds light on governmental and social regulations in Aceh that allegedly favor Muslims while discriminating against religious minorities. The increasing strictness on religious attire in schools and government offices, heightened obligations for religious services, and hindrances to economic activities during Ramadan are cited as examples. The report concludes that these conditions do not support the creation of a tolerant ecosystem in the region.

    The recurring placement of Aceh at the bottom of tolerance rankings underscores the ongoing challenges faced by the province in fostering inclusivity and religious harmony. The report serves as a call to action for increased government commitment to address these issues and build a more tolerant society in Aceh.

    The closure of churches in Aceh has sparked controversy, with the official justification citing the lack of appropriate permits. Governor Zaini Abdullah and Indonesian Home Affairs Minister Gamawan Fauzi, both in support of this action, maintained that the closures were legally warranted. Similar incidents had occurred in April 2012 in the Singkil regency, prompting concerns among Christians. In 2015, an escalation resulted in a church being burned down and another attacked, leading President Joko Widodo to appeal for calm.

    Historically, Aceh has been a gateway for various religions including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. The current trajectory of increased Sharia law implementation and Islamization in Aceh may shape the future of Indonesia. This shift has broader implications, potentially influencing other Indonesian provinces with significant minority populations. Jakarta and other states are already witnessing signs of fundamentalism, raising concerns about internal conflicts within Indonesia.

    Interestingly, while countries like Saudi Arabia regulate Sharia to accommodate tourism and hospitality, secular nations in the tourism and hospitality industry, such as Indonesia, are adopting Sharia to establish distinct boundaries from external influences. This complex interplay of religion, governance, and cultural identity adds a layer of intricacy to the evolving landscape of Aceh and its potential impact on the broader Indonesian context.

  • How Japan’s Decline Will Impact Asia?

    How Japan’s Decline Will Impact Asia?

    Over the last century, Japan has undeniably stood out as a powerhouse in Asia, achieving remarkable progress in politics, military strength, economic prowess, and even in the world of sports. This archipelago nation not only solidified its position as a regional leader but also emerged as a source of inspiration and a standard for other Asian countries. In a period when traditional giants in Asia, such as China, India, and Persia, were striving for  recognition, Japan assumed the role of representing Asia on the global stage.

    Japan assumed a pivotal role in shaping Asia’s participation in international events, notably representing the continent in influential spectacles like the Olympics and the World Cup. During its heyday marked by creativity, unwavering quality, and an open market, Japan left an enduring imprint. This era metamorphosed into a paradigm that neighboring Asian nations aspired to emulate for their own advancement. Countries spanning the continent, including South Korea, China, and Singapore, found inspiration in Japan’s prosperity, endeavoring to adopt its model as a blueprint for their development.

    Nevertheless, Japan’s once-unassailable leadership in Asia is presently undergoing a transformation. Beneath the surface, the nation grapples with profound challenges not immediately evident to external observers. The persistent struggles faced by Japan serve as harbingers of a shifting landscape, prompting inquiries about its enduring dominance in the region. As Japan contends with complexities, the dynamics of power and influence in Asia are undeniably undergoing an evolution.

    As Japan’s recent decline is visible in Asia’s economic landscape, the nation finds itself relinquishing its coveted position in the top three global economies. The erstwhile standing as the world’s third-largest economy has been superseded by Germany, coupled with a slide into recession, according to recent data unveiled. The challenges faced by Japan encompass a feeble yen, compounded by the burden of an aging and diminishing population. The prevailing sentiment suggests that a resurgence is not on the horizon, with projections indicating a potential descent to the sixth or seventh position in the coming decades.

    In the nominal growth realm, Japan’s economy, now the world’s fourth-largest, exhibited a modest 1.9% expansion in 2023. However, when denominated in dollars, its gross domestic product (GDP) stood at $4.2 trillion, trailing behind Germany’s $4.5 trillion. This shift, occurring more than a decade after conceding the second spot to China, is attributed to the sharp depreciation of the yen against the dollar over the past two years. The substantial decline, approximately one-fifth against the US dollar in 2022 and 2023, including a 7% dip in the previous year, erodes profits on exports when repatriated.

    Compounding the economic challenges are the failures of government-led initiatives to stimulate the birthrate, exacerbating the anticipated labor shortages. Even as Japan experiences an unprecedented influx of foreign workers, the demographic trend remains a cause for concern. Yoshitaka Shindo, the Minister for Economic Revitalization, emphasized the imperative need for structural reforms, advocating for increased participation of women in full-time employment and the reduction of barriers to foreign investment.

    The data underscores the economic downturn, with real GDP contracting by 0.1% in the last quarter of 2023, driven by weak spending by households and businesses. Private consumption, constituting over half of Japan’s economic activity, declined by 0.2% as households grappled with the escalating cost of living and diminishing real wages. Furthermore, a downward revision of the growth figures for the preceding quarter to -0.8% confirms Japan’s entry into a technical recession, defined by two consecutive quarters of contraction. Reflecting on the optimistic projections of the 1970s and 80s, wherein Japan’s prowess in producing affordable, high-quality exports fueled speculation of surpassing the United States as the world’s leading economy, the current economic landscape presents a stark contrast to those bygone expectations.

    Rather than witnessing an anticipated resurgence, the rupture of Japan’s asset-inflated bubble economy in the early 1990s cast a shadow that extended across what has since been dubbed the “lost decades” of economic stagnation and deflation.

    In 2010, China’s ascent to the position of the world’s second-largest economy prompted a bout of introspection in Japan, forcing contemplation about its capacity to keep pace with emerging economies. The recent descent to the fourth spot, attributed to significant currency fluctuations, not only marks a setback for Japan but also deals a blow to the self-esteem of the nation and its already unpopular prime minister, Fumio Kishida. Unfortunately, this downward trajectory is unlikely to find its nadir there. The International Monetary Fund projects that India, buoyed by a sizable and expanding young population, will surpass Japan in economic rankings by 2026, with Germany following suit the subsequent year.

    The Nikkei, in a recent editorial, laments Japan’s failure to elevate its growth potential, a situation economists squarely attribute to the demographic crisis facing the nation. Describing this circumstance as a wake-up call, the Nikkei urges a swifter implementation of long-neglected economic reforms to address the underlying challenges. As Japan grapples with these economic shifts, the unfolding narrative suggests a critical juncture demanding renewed attention and decisive actions to navigate the turbulent waters of a changing global economic landscape.

    At the political echelon, Japan’s diminishing stature heralds a reduction in its influence within the region. Historically, Japan has stood as a pivotal ally for the United States, facilitating the projection of American influence throughout the region. However, as Japan undergoes a decline, it is likely to grant the United States a more prominent role in shaping policies within Japan, potentially prompting the U.S. to seek additional robust alliances in the region.

    In this geopolitical environment, China and India stand out as powerful actors, and other nations—including Russia—align themselves with one of these powerful forces. China and India are both aggressively expanding their areas of influence through international investments and infrastructure projects. What’s interesting is that these Asian superpowers seem less eager to build closer connections with the US, which could lead to the rise of a multipolar Asia.

    The waning influence of Japan introduces a nuanced shift in the geopolitical dynamics, creating space for recalibrations and realignments in alliances. As the United States navigates this evolving landscape, the quest for alternative strategic partnerships becomes increasingly pertinent, highlighting the intricate interplay of power, influence, and alliances in shaping the future geopolitical contours of the Asian region.

  • Palestine or Israel: What will be the future of Gaza?

    Palestine or Israel: What will be the future of Gaza?

    In the Middle East, a minuscule piece of land has become the focal point of global attention—the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian territory situated along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Bordered by Egypt to the southwest and Israel to the east and north, this region finds itself trapped in a quagmire of discussions, extending from the realms of social media to the chambers of the United Nations, with no resolution in sight.

    Since last October, the Gaza Strip has been a war-torn landscape, grappling with a severe humanitarian crisis. The conflict pits Israel against this tiny enclave, home to Hamas—a group viewed as terrorists, while others see them as champions of Islamic rights. Against a backdrop of streets stained with human blood and strewn with the remnants of demolished homes, hospitals, schools, and buildings, the enclave is on the verge of collapse.

    Israel’s retaliation for the loss of a thousand lives shows no signs of abating, with the toll on Gaza now reaching a staggering 25,000 people. The Israeli call for the uprooting of Hamas translates into a destabilization of Gaza itself, as diplomatic efforts, including UN resolutions and international pressure, falter in bringing peace to the region.

    As Israel’s fury persists, the question looms: will an independent Gaza emerge under the banner of a Palestinian state, or is it destined to be annexed by Israel?

    How the Gaza Issue Evolved?

    One of the world’s highest population densities, Gaza stands as a complex tapestry of religious and political dynamics. Sunni Muslims form the majority, with a Palestinian Christian minority woven into the fabric.  Over the years, Gaza has symbolized Palestinian nationalism, resistance, along with global Islamic solidarity, situated as a 41km (25-mile) long and 10km-wide territory between Israel, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea. 

    Having been under Egyptian control, Gaza saw a shift during the 1967 Six-Day War when Israel captured it. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew its troops and settlers, implementing a temporary blockade that became indefinite after Hamas took control in 2007, backed by Egypt. Despite being recognized as part of Palestine by many nations, Gaza lacks UN member status.

    The West Bank and Gaza, considered a single Israeli-occupied territory by the UN, are governed separately. The West Bank, under limited self-rule by the Palestinian Authority (PA), acknowledges Israel’s existence, while Gaza, ruled by Hamas, rejects it. The UN and human rights organizations assert that Gaza remains under Israeli military occupation, facing a blockade that restricts movement and goods, earning it the moniker “open-air prison.” 

    Hamas, having seized control in 2007, seeks an Islamic state in lieu of Israel, rejecting its right to exist. The recent conflict stems from perceived Israeli transgressions, including security raids on the al-Aqsa Mosque and West Bank settlement activity. The pursuit of a two-state solution faces staunch opposition, as both sides grapple with conflicting visions of coexistence.

    What’s happening in Gaza Now?

    Palastine or Israel_ What will be the future of Gaza
    Israeli Declared Buffer Zone (Source: Ocha)

    In the ongoing chapter of this enduring conflict, Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas find themselves locked in a deadly confrontation since early October. The hostilities were sparked when Hamas gunmen launched an unprecedented attack from Gaza into Israel, resulting in the deadliest incident in Israel’s history. Subsequently, Israel initiated a military campaign in the Palestinian territory, claiming thousands of lives.

    On the fateful morning of October 7th, waves of Hamas gunmen breached Gaza’s border, causing the death of approximately 1,200 people in Israel. The casualties included children, the elderly, and 364 young individuals attending a music festival. Hamas also took more than 250 people as hostages back to Gaza. The group’s demands include the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israel and an end to the blockade on the Gaza Strip by Israel and Egypt—measures both countries justify for security reasons.

    Having engaged in several wars with Israel, firing thousands of rockets and orchestrating lethal attacks, Hamas is branded a terrorist group by Israel, the US, the EU, the UK, and others. Israel, in response, has conducted numerous airstrikes and sent troops into Gaza in 2008 and 2014. Iran supports Hamas with funding, weapons, and training, further complicating the dynamics of this enduring conflict.

    In swift retaliation to the Hamas attack, Israel initiated an extensive air campaign targeting Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the objectives as the annihilation of Hamas and the recovery of hostages. Subsequently, a ground invasion was launched three weeks later, accompanied by naval bombardment. The initial focus was on northern Gaza, particularly Gaza City and its tunnels, alleged to be central to Hamas military operations. A directive from Israel ordered the evacuation of all 1.1 million people in the north for their safety.

    After a brief truce in late November, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) extended ground operations to southern Gaza, reaching Khan Younis, the second-largest city, and refugee camps in central Gaza. Displaced individuals from the north were compelled to move further south, with plans to invade the southern town of Rafah, where approximately 1.5 million sought refuge.

    The toll on Palestinians has been devastating, with more than 28,000 killed and tens of thousands injured since the war’s onset, according to Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry. The majority of casualties are reported to be women and children. The IDF claims to have eliminated around 9,000 Hamas fighters, in addition to over 1,000 attackers inside Israel, without specifying the basis for these figures. Israel acknowledges over 230 of its soldiers killed in Gaza, while homes and structures in the region have suffered extensive damage and destruction.

    Israel employed a strategy of cutting off essential supplies, including food, water, and fuel, as a tactic to exert pressure on Hamas for the release of hostages. This approach resulted in severe shortages within Gaza’s population. Although Israel has permitted the entry of humanitarian aid, medicines, and limited fuel quantities since then, the delivered aid falls significantly below pre-war levels.

    The UN has accused Israel of hindering aid delivery, while Israel, in turn, has attributed problems to the UN. Describing the situation in Gaza as “horrific,” the UN has highlighted overflowing shelters, depleting food and water supplies, and an escalating risk of famine. Gaza’s health system is on the brink of collapse, with only 16 out of 36 hospitals partially operational. These facilities grapple with an overwhelming number of injured individuals and face shortages of staff, medical supplies, food, fuel, and water.

    Future Plans on Gaza

    The vision for Gaza’s future appears precarious, with the Israeli Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, proposing a post-war scenario where Hamas loses control, and Israel maintains overall security dominance. Under this plan, a multinational force would oversee the reconstruction efforts after the extensive destruction caused by Israeli airstrikes, and Egypt might have an unspecified role.

    However, the proposal maintains that Palestinians would be responsible for governing the territory, with the condition of non-hostility toward Israel. Despite some far-right members suggesting encouraging Palestinian citizens to leave Gaza for exile and re-establishing Jewish settlements—an idea criticized as “extremist” and “unworkable”—Gallant’s proposals are seen as relatively more practical.

    While Prime Minister Netanyahu has not publicly detailed his governance vision for Gaza, the overarching goal is to crush Hamas completely. Gallant’s plan outlines a more targeted approach in the north of Gaza, involving raids, tunnel demolitions, and air and ground strikes. The aggressive Israeli strategy signals an assertive stance against Hamas ruling Palestine, making the prospect of a free Palestine seem unlikely. In essence, Israel will decide the future of Gaza as they wish.

  • China to Deepen Ties with Hungary: A Strong Ally for China in Europe?

    China to Deepen Ties with Hungary: A Strong Ally for China in Europe?

    In a strategic maneuver, Beijing has made a notable move by extending an offer to enhance security cooperation with Budapest, a development unfolding against the backdrop of Hungary’s strained relationship with its EU and NATO allies. The burgeoning warmth in ties between Budapest and Beijing is becoming increasingly apparent.

    Hungary is portrayed by the Western media as a possible Trojan horse . The outspoken populist prime minister Viktor Orbán publicly declares his undying devotion to NATO and the European Union, but he also regularly questions important choices made by these institutions. Meanwhile, China, displaying its position as the second-biggest economy in the world and serving as a check on the US, is well-liked by Orbán and the Hungarian government. 

    The emerging Eastern axis, steered by China, actively seeks alliances in Europe. Europe grapples with the intricate challenge of navigating political and economic dynamics and is looking more aligned with the United States. Notable participants of China’s ambitious projects like Italy contemplating withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The combined pressure from the United States and European bodies creates an environment where additional participants may also contemplate withdrawal. In this time Hungary, becoming different, Viktor Orbán emerges as a formidable leader, adept at challenging the very institutions that China aims to influence. 

    Prime Minister Viktor Orbán entered into discussions with China’s Minister of Public Security, Wang Xiaohong, last Friday. In statements published by China’s official Xinhua news agency over the weekend, Wang expressed the intention to “deepen cooperation in areas including counter-terrorism, combating transnational crimes, security, and law enforcement capacity building under the Belt and Road Initiative.” The Chinese minister envisions making “law enforcement and security cooperation a new highlight of bilateral relations.”

    Hungary’s acceptance of China’s offer is a notable anomaly, considering its membership in the EU and NATO. This deviation from the norm is accentuated by Budapest’s distinctive position of maintaining closer ties to Moscow than any other EU member, while concurrently fostering a relationship with Beijing. Noteworthy is Prime Minister Orbán’s distinction last year as the sole EU leader attending a forum of the Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing. Adding substance to this diplomatic shift, China’s electric vehicle manufacturer BYD has revealed plans to establish its inaugural European production factory in Hungary.

    Following the meeting with Wang Xiaohong on Friday, Orbán’s spokesperson emphasized the Prime Minister’s declaration that “respect is increasingly missing from international diplomacy, but it has always remained between Hungary and China.” The discussions centered on crucial aspects of security and stability. This unfolding narrative of heightened cooperation between Budapest and Beijing in the realm of security occurs against the backdrop of Hungary’s strained relations with its EU and NATO partners. As Hungary’s standing in Western states continues to deteriorate, recent actions, such as reneging on a commitment not to be the last to ratify Sweden’s NATO application, contribute to a further erosion of trust.

    Budapest’s evident isolation was underscored during the Munich Security Conference over the weekend, where notable Hungarian officials were conspicuously absent. Despite this, in a speech delivered in Hungary on Saturday, Prime Minister Orbán hinted at a change, announcing, “we are on course to ratify Sweden’s accession to NATO at the beginning of parliament’s spring session.” The ongoing tension was palpable as Hungarian officials declined meetings with visitors from Washington, a move that drew criticism from the US ambassador in Budapest, David Pressman, who expressed regret over the lack of engagement with the most senior US bipartisan congressional delegation to visit Hungary in years.

    Orban’s second term in office; in 2017, the two countries formally recognized their collaboration as an all-encompassing strategic alliance. Following the public outcry and protests in 2021 over Fudan University’s plans to open a campus in Budapest, the Hungarian government decided to put the project on hold and hold a vote on the issue. But the planned referendum was ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on May 22, 2022, citing its global ramifications. Officials in Hungary promised that the project will be revived once the ruling Fidesz party won the 2022 parliamentary elections. 

    Hungary has used its veto power in 2020 and 2021 to intentionally obstruct the European Union’s attempts to formally renounce China’s activities in Hong Kong. On February 20, 2023, Wang Yi, a well-known diplomat and member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo, visited Budapest to meet with Prime Minister Orbán, underscoring the importance of the diplomatic ties between Hungary and China. Péter Szijjártó, the foreign minister of Hungary, emphasized during the conference how important it is for the two countries to work together when navigating crises, saying, “When we have faced crises in recent years, Hungary has always come out of them stronger than it went into them.” On February 27, 2023, Orbán approved Wang Yi’s peace proposal, which sought to stop Russia from invading Ukraine. 

    Hungary has consistently diverged from EU positions critical of China, particularly on human rights issues, and has welcomed Chinese investments despite the EU’s call for member states to align their relations with China according to the bloc’s stance. Notably, Hungary hosts Huawei Technologies’ largest logistics and manufacturing base outside China, a move that has raised concerns as the European Commission warns of potential security risks posed by the telecom giant.

    Since 2016, Huawei has collaborated with Shanghai-based artificial intelligence firm Yitu Technology to develop solutions for smart cities, focusing on enhancing public safety and policing through the use of AI and surveillance. This intricate web of diplomatic and economic ties underscores Hungary’s complex position within the geopolitical landscape.

    If Orban continues to hold power in Hungary, it is likely that more issues will arise, potentially deepening existing problems with Europe. As a result, Hungary may find itself increasingly isolated in the region, lacking the support of both Europe and the US. However, aligning with China could open up new possibilities for Hungary. Simultaneously, for China, this alignment serves as a counter to Europe’s realignment with Vietnam and India. By establishing ties with Hungary, China aims to strengthen its foothold in Eastern Europe and capitalize on economic opportunities.

  • The Downfall of the Indian Opposition Alliance

    The Downfall of the Indian Opposition Alliance

    Narendra Modi and the BJP is in a cruise mode.  With the impending Lok Sabha (House of Commons) elections on the horizon, a multitude of factors fortify their confidence in an enduring dominance. Modi’s magnetic leadership, forward-looking developmental initiatives, resonance with Hindu sentiment, and substantial financial backing collectively underpin what appears to be an unimpeded march toward electoral success.

    Yet, at the heart of Modi’s seemingly seamless trajectory lies a conspicuous vacuum— the absence of a formidable opposition in the Lok Sabha. The official recognition of an opposition, necessitating at least 10% representation, is notably vacant in India’s current political landscape. This void amplifies the BJP’s influence, leaving the opposition space remarkably unfilled.

    The primary opposition force, the venerable Congress party, grapples with substantial weaknesses that have diminished its efficacy. Despite these challenges, the Congress seeks to mount a credible challenge to the BJP by forging alliances with various state parties under the umbrella of the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance. 

    In its initial phases, the alliance displayed commendable performance. The Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance, commonly known as I.N.D.I.A., has emerged as a united front announced by leaders representing 28 political parties, gearing up for the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. The acronym I.N.D.I.A. was proposed during a pivotal meeting in Bengaluru, where leaders from all 28 participating parties unanimously embraced this symbolic title.

    The inaugural meeting of opposition parties, a momentous gathering in Patna, Bihar, was chaired by Chief Minister Nitish Kumar on June 23, 2023. Attended by 16 opposition parties, this assembly marked the introduction of the proposal for a new alliance. Following this milestone, the second meeting unfolded in Bengaluru, Karnataka, on July 17 and 18, 2023, under the chairmanship of UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi. During this session, the formal acceptance of the alliance’s formation took place, with an additional ten parties joining the coalition. The Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance was officially christened, and plans were set for the third meeting, scheduled to occur in Mumbai.

    The third assembly took place in Mumbai between August 31, 2023, and September 1, 2023. Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi, and chief ministers from five different states were among the notable attendees. After two days of intense discussion, the coalition reviewed key electoral issues related to the approaching general elections in great detail. During these talks, the details of the coordination committee were carefully outlined, and a complete three-point resolution was eventually adopted. This resolution is a significant step forward for the cooperative projects carried out by various political organizations uniting under the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance. It unequivocally declares the alliance’s commitment to working together to address the many issues that the general elections in India in 2024 are expected to present. 

    The fourth assembly, convened in New Delhi on December 19, 2023, honed in on pivotal elements encompassing seat-sharing, joint rallies, and the selection of a prime ministerial face and/or convenor for the alliance. A noteworthy resolution was embraced, underscoring the imperative to maximize the use of VVPATs in the imminent elections. The emphasis lay on self-verification by voters and the separate storage of VVPAT slips. Setting deadlines for seat-sharing arrangements, the alliance declared nationwide protests against the suspensions of opposition MPs in the Indian Parliament on December 22. While plans for a grand joint rally in Patna on January 30, the death anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, were alluded to, they remained unconfirmed.

    However, the trajectory took an unexpected turn with the advent of the fifth meeting, conducted virtually, with some leaders unable to participate. Post-meeting, Mallikarjun Kharge, the president of the Indian National Congress, assumed the mantle of alliance chairperson. Seat-sharing discussions took center stage, with the Chief Minister of Bihar, Nitish Kumar, declining the role of national convenor.

    As the electoral momentum initially surged, the later days unveiled the burgeoning vulnerabilities of the alliance. The dearth of robust leadership, the failure to establish a cohesive minimum program, and internal avarice within participating parties are now precipitating the coalition’s collapse. At the national level, the Indian National Congress stands as the sole representative within the alliance. However, the party grapples with internal weaknesses, marked by the absence of a prominent leader and the dominance of the Gandhi family, reluctant to relinquish control to outsiders. Regrettably, this familial stronghold has yet to recognize the urgency of the situation, failing to formulate effective policies to counter the formidable presence of Modi, despite being a national-level party. The intricate dynamics of this political landscape underscore the critical need for a resilient and strategic opposition to navigate the challenges presented by the current political climate.

    While on paper, other collaborators such as the Aam Aadmi Party, Communist Party of India (Marxist), and former national parties like the All India Trinamool Congress and Nationalist Congress Party carry or carried a nationalist label, their influence remains largely confined to their regional strongholds. Exploiting the weakened state of the Congress, these parties seek to contest and expand their influence beyond their traditional territories, a move restricted by the Congress itself.

    The complications intensify as regional parties with conflicting national interests undermine the broader image and objectives of the Congress. The alliance with the DMK, with its anti-Hindu stance and leaders making divisive statements, casts a negative shadow on the national-level standing of the Congress. Personal agendas, exemplified by JD(U)’s Nitish Kumar, further contribute to leaders withdrawing from the alliance. Modi’s strategic overtures, including awards for local parties and their leaders, have enticed collaboration with the BJP-led NDA alliance, leading parties like RLD and the National Conference to consider exiting and join NDA. A growing number of parties are preparing to contest the elections independently rather than aligning with the BJP.

    Genuine democracy necessitates the presence of an opposition. India, proudly hailed as the world’s largest democracy with a populace exceeding 100 billion, fails to meet the criteria of a commendable democratic model in the eyes of Western think tanks. The absence of a robust opposition in India poses the risk of transforming the nation into a de facto single-party state, as the BJP champions the notion of Ramarajya, departing from the modern state concept embraced by Western counterparts.

    The ideological architects behind the BJP seem to dismiss the strength of a diverse and vibrant opposition, opting instead to emphasize a narrative that weakens the West and underscores perceived conflicts with Islam. To safeguard the essence of Indian democracy, it is imperative for the opposition to awaken to the current scenario. However, the very parties constituting the opposition, driven by personal interests and avarice, appear poised to precipitate the collapse of the INDIA alliance. This potential disintegration could inadvertently pave the way for a third term for Narendra Modi, if not counteracted promptly. The intricate interplay among political forces in India emphasizes the vital significance of a robust opposition to safeguard the democratic values that characterize the nation’s democracy.

  • Prabowo’s Indonesia Will be a Key Ally for China: A Strategic Outlook

    Prabowo’s Indonesia Will be a Key Ally for China: A Strategic Outlook

    In the current trend of prematurely asserted election victories, Indonesia follows the trend, as Prabowo Subianto, endearingly dubbed the “cute grandpa” by Indonesian youth, and a seasoned statesman with a nuanced military background, boldly proclaims his victory in the recent presidential election. At 72 years old, Prabowo Subianto will be the heir to the immensely popular incumbent, President Joko Widodo, harboring aspirations to become the eighth president of the world’s third-largest democracy. Noteworthy is the inclusion of President Widodo’s son as Subianto’s running mate for the vice president position.

    Amid the absence of official declarations from election authorities and the conspicuous lack of agreements from the two other former provincial governors in the race, Subianto, leaning on unofficial results, confidently announces his victory to a gathered crowd in Jakarta. His proclamation characterizes the win as “the victory of all Indonesians,” illustrating a strategic move to unite the populace under his leadership.

    Subianto is a  figure marked by a tumultuous past, faced a ban on entry into the United States for a lengthy two-decade period, a consequence of allegations related to human rights violations. His military trajectory unfolded against the backdrop of the Suharto dictatorship, a chapter that concluded just over 25 years ago in the Indonesian archipelago. Holding a prominent position in the military hierarchy, Subianto served as an army general, notably assuming the role of a special forces commander in a unit implicated in allegations of torture and disappearances—an assertion vehemently disputed by Subianto.

    Current unofficial tallies from Indonesian polling agencies indicate Subianto securing 57% to 59% of the votes, drawing on data from over 80% of the sampled polling locations. Although the official tally may extend over a month, historical precedent suggests the reliability of quick counts based on a sampling of polling stations across Indonesia. This method has consistently provided accurate reflections of results in the nation’s previous four presidential elections since the inception of direct voting in 2004.

    Despite his hasty declaration of triumph, Subianto struck a calm tone in a broadcast speech from a sports stadium. He issued a warning against conceit, stressing the need of humility in the face of uncertainty. Declaring that this victory should go beyond individual successes, he recognized the difficult journey that Indonesia travels as a country caught between a difficult historical story with democracy. 

    Indonesia is on the trajectory to become the world’s fourth-largest economy in the next decade, and in a need to strategically shape its foreign policies, with a particular emphasis on asserting uphand in south east Asia. However, inherent disparities, including ideological opposition to the West, a foundation rooted in communism and Islam, perceived imperfections in democracy, leadership marked by corruption or crime allegations, and the sensitive issue of Western Papua, have the potential to strain relations between Indonesia and Western nations. Paradoxically, these very differences also position Indonesia as a natural ally for China, further fortified by the nation’s possession of the world’s largest nickel reserves. Probably the duo will be best friends with benefits.

    In a decisive move in 2020, Indonesia imposed a prohibition on the export of nickel ore, aiming to establish a competitive electric vehicle and battery supply chain. Recognizing the strategic importance of this decision, China has made substantial investments, injecting a notable US$3.6 billion into Indonesia’s nickel sector in the first half of 2022. This financial commitment aligns seamlessly with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and complements Indonesia’s ongoing infrastructure initiatives, led by Incumbent President Widodo. These initiatives include notable projects such as the inception of Southeast Asia’s first high-speed rail.

    The apparent stagnation in Indonesia’s ambitious new capital project needs a significant increase in investment, a void that seems poised to be filled by China. President Widodo’s stance with foreign investment underscores the nation’s need, and China stands ready to fulfill it, fostering deeper connections with both Chinese companies and the government.

    It is certain that Prabowo, poised to assume office after Widodo, is unlikely to disrupt the established economic cooperation with China, a trend notably evident in his past actions. Similar to its Southeast Asian counterparts, Indonesia contends with China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. Despite facing challenges, including the tragic explosion at a Chinese-financed nickel processing plant last year, which sparked concerns about the perceived reliability of the Chinese relationship, China maintains its position as Indonesia’s primary trade and investment partner.

    Previously, apprehensions arose regarding the prospect of Indonesia adopting an assertive stance in response to China’s escalating tensions in the South China Sea. There was speculation that Indonesia might have explored solidarity with other ASEAN countries facing similar sovereignty disputes against China, potentially forming a united front against Beijing’s actions. However, in the present scenario, Indonesia’s inclination toward China seems increasingly probable. This alignment holds the potential to cultivate a coalition involving Russia, China, Indonesia, and possibly India, shaping a resilient trade bloc with a substantial market encompassing 300 billion people. Such an alliance could exert considerable political influence, countering regional interests pursued by the United States.

  • India and UAE Agree for a Trans-Continental Trade Corridor to Counter the BRI

    India and UAE Agree for a Trans-Continental Trade Corridor to Counter the BRI

    In a momentous diplomatic development, India and the United Arab Emirates have formalized a groundbreaking agreement, establishing a trade corridor strategically linking Europe and India through the Middle East via sea and rail routes. This calculated bypass aims to navigate away from Chinese funding, mitigate pirate threats, and avoid the Suez Canal rush. Unveiled during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Gulf states, this ambitious initiative carries the endorsement of both the United States and the European Union.

    The Indian foreign ministry issued a statement detailing the framework agreement, although specific terms remained notably scarce. Emphasizing that this endeavor not only builds upon existing understandings and collaboration but also seeks to deepen cooperation between India and the UAE for the enhancement of regional connectivity. Initially introduced in September, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in New Delhi, the corridor’s expansive scope stretches from India, crossing the Arabian Sea to the UAE, and further extending through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel before ultimately reaching Europe.

    The narrative of the India-Middle East Economic Corridor unfolds against the backdrop of a persistent four-month conflict in Gaza, introducing disruptions to U.S.-backed initiatives that seek to deepen integration between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In response to the ongoing regional unrest, Saudi Arabia, a pivotal player, has opted to suspend normalization plans. Notably, inquiries seeking clarification on the specifics of the agreement from the UAE foreign ministry have remained unanswered.

    During their meeting, characterized by Indian Prime Minister Modi as a fraternal relationship, both he and UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan expressed optimism despite the formidable challenges in the region.

    In heralding the establishment of a contemporary trade route, this initiative elegantly resurrects historical pathways once traversed by ancient civilizations – the Romans, Greeks, Venetians, Arabs, and Indians. These routes, integral for centuries, regrettably fell into neglect following the opening of the Cape route and the Suez Canal. According to reports, the modern project unfolds with the development of cutting-edge ports, railways, and special economic zones. The unveiling of this initiative took place on the grand stage of the G20 summit in India, where President Biden’s plan not only secured the support of the United States but also garnered backing from the European Union, France, Italy, and Germany.

    The proposed plan outlines two distinctive routes – an east corridor linking India to the Gulf Arab states and a northern corridor connecting the Gulf states to Europe. Beyond showcasing the United States’ adeptness in rallying its Middle East allies against China’s ascendancy, this ambitious project also underscores the Gulf states’ intricate balancing act between long standing allies like the U.S. and emerging partners like China, all within the framework of an evolving global order. Analysts discern this strategic move as a direct challenge to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a monumental infrastructure project launched by Beijing a decade ago to forge global connectivity. Intriguingly, three of the nations involved in the new corridor are already members of the BRI, potentially placing them in a delicate position. Italy, a G7 member, is also part of the BRI, but reports suggest that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is exploring ways to strengthen ties with China while contemplating a “soft” exit from the BRI—a move deemed unconventional by some analysts.

    The recently formalized framework agreement between India and the UAE appears to signify a joint commitment by both nations to advance their ambitious plan for establishing a corridor.  Beyond the corridor agreement, the UAE and India have solidified their collaboration through the signing of a bilateral investment treaty. This comprehensive partnership extends to cooperation agreements covering diverse areas such as electrical interconnection, trade, and digital infrastructure. Prime Minister Modi, making his seventh visit to the Gulf state in nearly a decade, is poised to address the Indian diaspora at an Abu Dhabi stadium and participate in a summit in Dubai. Additionally, he is scheduled to inaugurate the first-ever stone-built Hindu temple in the Middle East in Abu Dhabi, underscoring the deepening ties between India and one of its major trading partners.

    The envisioned trade corridor is anticipated to streamline movements significantly, serving as a linchpin for various interests. This ambitious project acts as a tool for the United States, seamlessly connecting all relevant stakeholders in the region. For the Middle East, the corridor transcends mere business; it is inherently intertwined with politics. The financial aspect is pivotal in the collaboration between Israel and the Gulf states. This agreement ensures their alignment with the United States, as financial influxes consolidate their cooperative stance.

    Amidst the Biden era and the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Gulf states’ relationship with the U.S. has experienced a slight diminishment. However, there’s a subtle yet discernible shift in their stance, displaying a newfound interest in engaging with Russia and China. The hope lingers that this project will foster common interests with Israel.

    From a European perspective, this route promises an uninterrupted supply chain, mitigating concerns about pirate attacks, Suez Canal blockages, and political obstacles. Furthermore, the project attracts infrastructure investments from the region, providing Europe access to India’s expansive market.

    For India, the corridor is more than an economic conduit; it symbolizes a strategic move to bolster power in countering China, perceived as a potential adversary in their future trajectory. This economic trade corridor, therefore, serves as a catalyst for extensive political cooperation, poised to have a profound impact on the unfolding dynamics of the 21st century.

  • Imran Khan’s Setback: Coalition of Political Dynasties to Take Power in Pakistan

    Imran Khan’s Setback: Coalition of Political Dynasties to Take Power in Pakistan

    In the end, it’s all about power. Two arch-rivals, both hailing from prominent political dynasties and tainted by allegations of corruption, have forged an alliance to grasp the reins of authority. Following the dramatic aftermath of the recent general election in Pakistan, a coalition comprising the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has orchestrated a strategic accord, effectively sidelining the party led by the populist former prime minister, Imran Khan, despite its securing the highest number of votes.

    The coalition, composed of former collaborators who worked together to dismantle Imran Khan’s PTI government, was revealed in a press conference held in Islamabad on Tuesday night. With a shared goal of addressing the nation’s numerous challenges, these opposing factions, supported by two smaller coalition partners, publicly announced their plan to form a united government. Shehbaz Sharif, the brother of Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister and current president of PML-N, emerged as their nominee for the position of prime minister.

    In response to this intricate political maneuver, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party vehemently denounced the coalition as “mandate thieves,” criticizing the collaborative endeavor to wrest control from the party that secured the highest number of votes. Despite PTI holding the largest vote percentage and the highest number of members, their inability to contest with a uniform election symbol, due to a ban, led to PML-N emerging as the largest party according to the election commission. With PPP and smaller parties lending their support, this coalition is poised to secure the majority of 133 seats out of 265. The military, a crucial determinant of power dynamics in the nation, has already given its endorsement to this formidable coalition.

    As the final tally comes out by election commission, The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has successfully garnered support by endorsing independent candidates, securing a significant tally of 92 seats. In a tightly contested political arena, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) has strategically allied with independent candidates, consolidating a formidable bloc with 81 seats. The Pakistan People’s Party follows with 54 seats, while the Muttahida Qaumi Movement – Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F), and the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) hold 17, 6, and 3 seats, respectively. Contributing to the intricate mosaic of political representation, smaller parties like the Balochistan National Party (Mengal), Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party, Awami National Party, Balochistan Awami Party, Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen, Pakistan Muslim League (Z), and Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party each hold one or two seats. This diverse distribution highlights the multiparty dynamics in play, laying the groundwork for a coalition government that necessitates strategic alliances for effective governance.

    Initially anticipated as a straightforward victory for PML-N and its leader, the three-time former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, the election took an unexpected turn. PTI’s overwhelming support translated into the highest number of parliamentary seats, dealing a perceived blow to Nawaz Sharif, who had received tacit support from Pakistan’s influential military—an institution historically known for shaping election outcomes. PTI contends that widespread rigging tainted the electoral landscape, leading to an alleged injustice that deprived them of numerous parliamentary seats. From his prison confines on Tuesday, Khan cautioned against other political entities “venturing into the misadventure of forming a government with stolen votes.”

    The subsequent press briefing illuminated the coalition’s selection of Shehbaz Sharif, the younger sibling of Nawaz Sharif and a former prime minister from 2022 to 2023, as their nominee for the role of prime minister. With no opposition within the coalition, he stands poised to assume the position uncontested. Asif Ali Zardari, co-chair of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), elucidated the reasoning behind their alignment with PML-N, stating, “Looking at everything, we have thought and decided to sit together. We have contested elections against each other, but despite that, it is not necessary forever. Opposition happens in elections. It was electioneering opposition, not ideological opposition.”

    While Zardari is slated for the presidency nomination, the PPP affirmed their intention to abstain from holding ministries within the coalition government. These roles will be occupied by figures from PML-N and smaller coalition partners. Bilawal Bhutto, Zardari’s son and PPP co-chair, exhibited reluctance to forge a close association between the party and the coalition government, rooted in the considerable support for PTI among the masses and the perceived unpopularity of PML-N.

    Shehbaz Sharif expressed gratitude to Zardari and Bilawal, acknowledging their party’s decision to vote for PML-N. He emphasized the coalition’s unified stance, declaring, “Today we have united to tell the nation that we all accept the split mandate.” Despite this, public skepticism and legitimacy questions persist, prompting Shehbaz Sharif to pledge “revolutionary steps” to address the economic crisis. However, the new government inherits power amid a cloud of public distrust, particularly from fervent supporters of Khan and PTI, who view PML-N and PPP as enablers of military interference in politics.

    The coalition’s proclamation also underscores the sustained dominance of Pakistan’s two powerful political dynasties – the Bhuttos and the Sharifs. Maryam Nawaz, Nawaz Sharif’s daughter, assumes the role of chief minister of Punjab province, wielding significant political influence.

    In anticipation of a potential opposition role, PTI’s leadership categorically rejected coalition offers from PML-N or PPP, bolstered by the incarceration of numerous senior PTI figures who allege politically motivated legal proceedings against them. Responding to the evolving political landscape, Zardari extended an olive branch to PTI for reconciliation, stating, “It should, and every other political force should, come and talk with us. Our economic and defense agenda should be common.”

    Despite legal challenges raised by PTI, the impending government is destined to be a coalition of PML-N and PPP. Despite skepticism from international media, the military’s decisive role solidifies this alliance. The future trajectory of this government may be foreseeable, as any internal issues within this coalition are unlikely to lead to another election, given the fragile state of Pakistan’s economy. The notorious alliance of parties notorious for corruption and dynastic politics, appears poised to steer Pakistan, raising concerns about the country’s future stability.

  • Thaksin out of Prison: How Former Prime Minister’s Parole Will Affect Thailand’s Politics

    Thaksin out of Prison: How Former Prime Minister’s Parole Will Affect Thailand’s Politics

    In a surprising turn of events, Thailand’s justice minister has announced the impending release of Thaksin Shinawatra, the nation’s former prime minister currently serving time in prison. This development unfolds six months after Thaksin’s return from a self-imposed exile. Thaksin was originally given an eight-year sentence in August of the previous year due to charges of corruption and abuse of power, but King Maha Vajiralongkorn  reduced it to just one year. 

    Srettha, a member of the Pheu Thai Party led by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the youngest daughter of Thaksin, broke the news. Following the May elections, in which the progressive Move Forward Party won the majority of votes but was prevented from taking office by powerful groups allied with the military and traditional elite, the Pheu Thai Party emerged winner. This political environment in Thailand has become even more complicated as a result of this most recent event. The link between the military and the ruling Pheu Thai party is now solidified. Additionally, the military can take more serious action against Pita, the current populist leader, and his Move forward Party.

    In the current Thai political landscape, a complex dynamic unfolds as both populist leaders and the authorities find themselves in opposing positions. A populist figure, advocating for systemic change, is navigating a relentless stream of legal challenges, employing the typical lese majeste tool. Concurrently, after years of detainment and exile, a former prime minister pivotal in reshaping the nation’s authority is on the brink of release. This marks a momentous development as Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime minister, seeks liberation from imprisonment, having been a target of the country’s perilous lese majeste laws and accusations of dictatorship.

    The intrigue deepens as the military authority takes substantial actions against Pita, the current focal point of their attention, facing the looming threat of a party ban. Pita’s party holds the majority in the Thailand legislative assembly. The recent release of Thaksin, who once found himself in a similar predicament, sparks curiosity, considering his party’s prior banishment and his enduring political exile. The prevailing perception suggests that the authority’s heightened measures against Pita and the Move Forward Party are strategically aimed at garnering support from the populace, predominantly in favor of Pita.

    On Tuesday, Justice Minister Tawee Sodsong disclosed that the 74-year-old, renowned for his past ownership of Manchester City, would be among 930 prisoners granted early release. Thaksin qualifies for release after a six-month period due to his critical health condition and age exceeding 70, as outlined by Sodsong. While the specifics of his release remain unclear, there are expectations that monitoring measures, possibly including an ankle tag, and travel restrictions may be imposed. Thaksin’s return to Thailand aligns with his Pheu Thai party’s resurgence to power, in collaboration with pro-military factions, prompting speculation about a potential behind-the-scenes agreement influencing the reduction of his prison term.

    Thaksin Shinawatra was the inaugural prime minister of Thailand to serve a full term, leaving an indelible mark on the nation’s modern history. The former prime minister held the position from 2001 to 2006, and after being absent from the political arena since his 2006 ousting, he is making a comeback to Thailand after a hiatus of over 15 years. His leadership, widely considered distinctive, was characterized by a plethora of noteworthy policies that set him apart from his predecessors. These policies encompassed various domains such as the economy, public health, education, energy, social order, drug suppression, and international relations, marking a departure from the norm. Notably, Thaksin secured re-election once during his tenure. Among his most impactful initiatives were the reduction of rural poverty and the introduction of universal healthcare. These measures garnered previously overlooked support from the rural poor, particularly in the populous northeast region of the country.

    Thaksin’s cabinet comprised a diverse coalition, including academics, former student leaders, and past leaders of the Palang Dharma Party. Figures like Prommin Lertsuridej, Chaturon Chaisang, Prapat Panyachatraksa, Surapong Suebwonglee, Somkid Jatusripitak, Surakiart Sathirathai, and Sudarat Keyuraphan were instrumental in his government. Traditional regional power brokers also aligned themselves with his administration.

    Despite these achievements, Thaksin’s government faced mounting accusations of dictatorship, demagogy, corruption, conflicts of interest, human rights offenses, undiplomatic behavior, exploitation of legal loopholes, and a confrontational stance towards a free press. As a highly controversial leader, he became the subject of numerous allegations, including lese majeste, treason, usurpation of religious and royal authority, asset sales to international investors, and religious desecration.

    Rumors are circulating that Thaksin Shinawatra’s imprisonment, which commenced on August 22 last year, might conclude as early as this weekend, sparking discussions in local media. Thaksin continues to wield significant influence, stirring controversy in the nation. Since 2008, living in exile to evade legal charges, he has maintained impact by sharing viewpoints on social media and engaging in discussions on platforms. Despite his physical absence, political parties aligned with him dominated recent elections, with Move Forward, a pro-democracy party, emerging as the leading vote-getter.

    Upon his return to Bangkok, Thaksin received a hero’s welcome from supporters, making a poignant public gesture by prostrating himself before a portrait of the king at the airport. Recently, the former telecoms tycoon faced lese-majesty charges related to comments made almost a decade ago in South Korea. The outcome of the case remains uncertain, but Thaksin vehemently denies the charges and has written to the attorney general, seeking fair treatment.

    In the current landscape, Thaksin’s potential release signifies the authorities’ intent to bolster the Pheu Thai party, establishing a connection between the royal and government spheres to secure widespread support. The clear implication is that further measures will be taken against Pita and the Move Forward Party. The authorities have unequivocally identified Pita and the New Forward Party as their primary targets, signaling a strategic alignment with Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party.