Tag: Kurdistan

  • PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    One of the deadliest conflicts of the past few decades—the struggle between the Turkish state and the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency—may finally be nearing its end. After forty years of violence that has claimed at least 40,000 lives, a landmark declaration has been made. On Thursday, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdish insurgency and an almost mythical figure among his followers, called on PKK fighters to lay down their arms after years of negotiations. In a written statement from his prison cell, where he has spent 25 years in isolation, Öcalan not only urged disarmament but also called for the complete dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

    This announcement could mark the end of a long and bloody chapter, yet optimism is cautious. A decade ago, a two-year ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish state collapsed, triggering some of the deadliest fighting in the conflict’s history, with more than 7,000 lives lost, including hundreds of civilians. Still, political analysts suggest that this time, there is reason to believe the fragile peace may hold.

    A Great Win for Erdoğan

    A staunch conservative, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long taken a hardline stance on Kurdish politics, making a lasting peace initiative under his leadership seem unlikely. Yet, this does not mean he has never pursued negotiations. The last meaningful attempt to negotiate a settlement with the PKK—a group labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey and its Western allies—occurred in a vastly different political climate, before Erdoğan’s illiberal rule fully took shape, but ultimately collapsed. However, with shifting political dynamics both domestically and regionally, he now appears more open to cooperation and more determined to end the conflict.

    Erdoğan’s ambitions to extend his rule, despite Turkey’s constitutional term limits, are well known. He has openly hinted at seeking another term if there is public support, a move that would require either early elections or a constitutional amendment. Achieving this would require backing beyond his current coalition—potentially from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). To appeal to both the party and the broader Kurdish population, Erdoğan has signaled a willingness to engage in negotiations—an ironic shift for a leader who has spent decades as one of the PKK’s fiercest opponents.

    In a calculated move, he entrusted negotiations to his ultranationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli, a figure who once demanded the execution of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This strategic gamble is designed to appease both nationalist hardliners and Kurdish factions. For Erdoğan, it is a delicate balancing act—one that allows him to present himself as a peacemaker while safeguarding the loyalty of his conservative base. A deft political maneuver from a leader adept at navigating power dynamics.

    PKK and Kurds

    The PKK’s demands have long shifted from seeking an independent Kurdish state to pushing for greater autonomy within Turkey and expanded rights for Kurds, who make up nearly a fifth of the country’s population. Yet, even with these more modest aspirations, a settlement may not necessarily lead to significant progress. Instead of political concessions, Ankara may opt for economic incentives—it recently unveiled a development plan for the Kurdish-majority southeast.

    A crucial question is whether thousands of PKK fighters—most now outside Turkey—can be persuaded to disarm. The conflict is deeply rooted in ethnic divisions and spans generations, raising concerns about how these fighters can reintegrate into society. There is also the risk that disillusioned groups may emerge, continuing the struggle for an independent Kurdish homeland.

    Another pressing issue is the broader cost of any agreement for both the Kurds and Turkey. For many Kurds, a deal may bring little meaningful change. While any step toward ending decades of bloodshed should be welcomed, there is also a fear that peace could come at the cost of indefinitely extending Erdoğan’s strongman rule. A lasting resolution would require genuine democratic representation for Kurds—something they continue to demand.

    Geopolitics of the Move

    The ongoing instability in the Middle East has strengthened Turkey’s push for security-focused strategies. Just over a month after Bahçeli’s call, Bashar al-Assad unexpectedly fell from power in Syria—partly due to Turkey’s support for the victorious rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Meanwhile, the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces remain firmly in control of their autonomous region in northeastern Syria, though they are aware that the Trump presidency may not favor their cause.

    For Turkey, neutralizing the Kurdish threat in Syria starts with eliminating the insurgency within its own borders. This is where the dissolution of the PKK becomes a strategic priority—allowing Turkey to consolidate control over its Kurdish regions. Ankara has repeatedly targeted Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria, accusing them of supporting militants inside Turkey. There is growing concern that Turkey and Syria could align against the Kurds, a move that would provoke significant backlash. Kurdish forces have gained substantial support in the West, particularly for their role in dismantling the Islamic State and their progressive stance on social issues like gender equality—areas where much of the Middle East remains deeply conservative.

    If Turkey succeeds in dismantling militant Kurdish factions in Syria, it could more easily confront Kurdish groups in Iraq, weakening their influence and furthering Ankara’s longstanding goal of regional dominance.

    What Happens Next? 

    The agreement brings together Turkey’s right-wing nationalists, driven by Ottoman-era ambitions, and Kurdish hardliners who have long fought for independence, leaving little room for dissent on either side. If the upcoming election shifts the political landscape and Erdoğan’s main rival, the center-left CHP, takes power, its leadership is also expected to pursue reconciliation. Meanwhile, DEP, the rising Kurdish political force, has signaled its willingness to collaborate with Ankara.

    However, if Syria’s new government moves to suppress Kurdish groups, the fallout will inevitably spill over into Turkey, potentially strengthening calls for Kurdish autonomy—an outcome no Turkish administration, regardless of its leadership, is willing to accept. Decades of conflict have entrenched deep divisions, making integration a daunting challenge. For the Kurdish people, the legacy of struggle and resistance makes the path to reconciliation fraught with difficulty. 

  • Why is Free Kurdistan Not Happening?

    Why is Free Kurdistan Not Happening?

    Kurdistan, the homeland of the Kurds, remains unrecognized by the world and is confronted with an unprecedented threat to its survival. The autonomous region in Iraq, having established separate administrations, military structures, and a distinct identity, is actively advocating for complete statehood but finds itself in a state of limbo.

    As the United States’ closest ally in the region, with a majority Kurdish population, Kurdistan faces existential threats from neighboring countries that harbor a considerable Kurdish population antagonistic to their cause. Despite contemplating the immediate availability of statehood, the Kurds are indeed grappling with significant existential challenges. Various reasons contribute to the threats to the Kurds’ long standing aspiration for statehood, ranging from internal issues to concerns about the weakening of the American government.

    The original Kurdistan, also referred to as Greater Kurdistan, is a loosely defined geo-cultural region in West Asia where Kurds constitute a significant majority population, and the foundation of Kurdish culture, languages, and national identity is deeply rooted. Geographically, Kurdistan spans the northwestern Zagros and the eastern Taurus mountain ranges.

    Kurdistan is commonly divided into four regions: Northern Kurdistan (southeastern Turkey), Southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq), Eastern Kurdistan (northwestern Iran), and Western Kurdistan (northern Syria). Some interpretations extend its boundaries into parts of southern Transcaucasia. Different Kurdish nationalist groups advocate for either an independent nation-state covering these regions with a Kurdish majority or increased autonomy within existing national boundaries. The precise demarcation of the region remains a contentious issue, with certain maps exaggerating its scope.

    As of a 2016 estimate from the Kurdish Institute of Paris, Kurdistan’s total population is around 34.5 million, with Kurds constituting 86% of the population in Northern Kurdistan. The region also includes Arab, Turkish, Assyrian (Syriac), Armenian, and Azerbaijani minorities. Southern Kurdistan hosts Christian (Assyrian and Armenian) and Turkish (Turkmen) minorities. Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran have significant Caucasian populations that underwent Kurdification, adopting Kurdish as their primary language. Kurdish, part of the Indo-European language family except for the Semitic and Turkic languages around them, is a crucial component of Kurdish identity.

    Geographically, Kurdistan covers approximately 190,000 km² in Turkey, 125,000 km² in Iran, 65,000 km² in Iraq, and 12,000 km² in Syria, totaling around 392,000 km². Turkish Kurdistan encompasses a substantial area in the Eastern Anatolia Region and southeastern Anatolia of Turkey, with an estimated 6 to 8 million Kurds residing in the region.

    The term “Kurdistan” has historical origins, first documented in 11th-century Seljuk chronicles. From the 8th to the 19th centuries, a multitude of Kurdish dynasties, emirates, principalities, and chiefdoms emerged. In the 20th century, there were short-lived attempts to establish Kurdish entities, including the Kurdish state (1918–1919), Kingdom of Kurdistan (1921–1924), Red Kurdistan (1923–1929), Republic of Ararat (1927–1930), and Republic of Mahabad (1946).

    Iraqi Kurdistan, which has the most chance for getting statehood and recognition from the international bodies, obtained autonomous status through a 1970 agreement with the Iraqi government, solidified as the autonomous Kurdistan Region within the federal Iraqi republic in 2005. In Iran, there is a Kurdistan Province, though it lacks self-rule. Kurds involved in the Syrian Civil War successfully seized control of significant portions of northern Syria, establishing self-governing regions under the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (commonly known as Rojava), where they aspire to achieve autonomy within a federal Syria post-war.

    A 2010 report from the United States, predating the instability in Syria and Iraq as of 2014, predicted the potential existence of Kurdistan by the year 2030. The vulnerability of the Iraqi state, exacerbated by the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, created an opening for Iraqi Kurdistan to pursue independence. Turkey, while historically opposing Kurdish autonomy in Turkey and Syria, shifted its stance toward acknowledging the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq.

    Turkey’s long standing fear has been that a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would fuel and support Kurdish separatists in Turkish provinces, leading to strong opposition to Kurdish independence in Iraq. However, amidst the chaos following the US invasion of Iraq, Turkey began collaborating more closely with the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government. Despite this, the mere mention or expression of ‘Kurdistan’ in Turkey still carries the risk of detention and prosecution.

    The successful 2014 Northern Iraq offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant further weakened the Iraqi state’s ability to exert power, providing the Kurds with a “golden opportunity” to enhance their independence and potentially declare an independent Kurdish state. The Islamic State’s hostility towards Turkey made Kurdistan strategically valuable to Turkey as a buffer state. In June 2014, a spokesman for Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party expressed Turkey’s readiness to accept an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq.

    Kurdistan, endowed with abundant oil resources, has been actively engaging in economic cooperation and securing oil deals primarily with its volatile neighbor, Syria. Despite the complexities surrounding the Kurdish issue in Syria, significant oil contracts have been forged between Kurdistan and Syria. Additionally, Iran, which has recently taken a stronger stance against Kurds in the region, particularly following the Mahsini issue, has also established increased economic cooperation with Kurdistan.

    According to the Iranian Free Zones News Agency (Freena), Hojatollah Abdolmaleki disclosed the collaboration during a press conference at Iran’s exclusive exhibition in Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan region. Abdolmaleki emphasized the pivotal role of the newly established free zone in fostering cooperation between Iran and Kurdistan. The opening ceremony of the exhibition saw the participation of senior officials from both sides, including Abdolmaleki, the secretary general of the Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce, the Iranian envoy in Sulaymaniyah, and the head of the Union of Exporters and Importers of the Kurdistan Region.

    Despite several promises for statehood from the United States, Iraq, the United Nations, and occasionally from Turkey, the Kurds have faced numerous obstacles, particularly prolonged referendums driven by various reasons. Although they came close to achieving statehood in 2017, even their allies rejected the prospect. The Iraqi government has reclaimed territories once occupied by the Kurds, including areas with significant oil reserves. The collapse of oil revenues has left the Kurds grappling with serious financial challenges.

    In addition to Turkey, Iran has also intensified actions against the Kurds, further contributing to the Kurds’ predicament. A significant division exists within the Kurdish population, with the ruling KDP party leaning towards Iran’s support rather than aligning with the Iraqi federal government. The United States has a vested interest in the region, providing military aid and financial assistance, with a notable presence of administrators and officials in Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan. However, the inactive governance and increased Iranian intervention have posed challenges.

    Despite the current difficulties, a people with a long history of fighting for their identity and a homeland are likely to find a solution to their current problems. However, the extended decision-making process by the United States could jeopardize a key and reliable ally in the region, potentially leading to strategic consequences.