Tag: Russia

How Are Trade Barrier Reforms Progressing In Central Asian States?

The economy of the United States is its greatest asset. Instead of relying solely on its military, it utilizes the hegemony of the dollar and its economic might to forge partnerships with other countries. The United States’ financial contributions led to a West-leaning, communist-averse Europe after World War II. Similarly, it spurred the resurgence of East Asia by injecting capital and ensuring the market. The United States’ economic interests have played a significant role in mitigating full-scale conflicts in the Middle East. This strategy, centered on leveraging financial resources and markets to build alliances, is now expanding to encompass Central Asia. Central Asia, once hindered by the dominant influence of the Soviet Union and Russia, is now becoming more accessible to the United States. The US initiative in the region seeks to foster a market conducive to the prosperity of Central Asian states and to attract American investment, thereby strengthening ties with the United States.

Central Asian states have long been characterized by trade barriers, bureaucratic hurdles, and regulatory complexities, greatly impeding economic progress. However, steps are currently being taken to tackle these challenges, representing a significant advancement towards creating a unified regional market similar to the streamlined documentation and policy frameworks found in Europe. Promoting the establishment of such a unified Central Asian market and facilitating smooth trade and service flow are fundamental elements of a regional economic strategy championed by the United States, known as the B5+1 initiative. Amidst a flurry of diplomatic engagements in mid-April, Central Asian leaders are actively exploring the potential of the B5+1 initiative. Launched in March, the B5+1 initiative assigns the five Central Asian nations, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, with the responsibility of spearheading efforts to promote regional free trade and enhance export opportunities.

In recent times, geopolitical analysts have turned their attention to the growing interactions among Central Asian countries, spurred by the diminishing influence of Russia and the stagnating economic growth of China . Notably, a multitude of discussions and agreements have unfolded in the region, often without the presence of Russia. A significant event occurred on April 18, when Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon signed 28 interstate agreements spanning political, economic, and social realms. Noteworthy among these were two agreements aimed at bolstering trade between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with a focus on simplifying customs procedures at border checkpoints and safeguarding industrial property rights. Preceding Mirziyoyev’s visit, a joint investment forum in Dushanbe drew around 600 officials and business leaders from both nations. They expressed keen interest in collaborative ventures, particularly within the mining and renewable energy sectors, and sought to expand trade. Initiatives such as establishing a free trade zone at the Oybek-Fotekhobod border crossing and developing a logistics hub at Andarkhan were emphasized. Additionally, plans were unveiled to streamline permit requirements for freight-carrying trucks crossing the Tajik-Uzbek border. Despite bilateral trade reaching $505 million in 2023, officials aspire to elevate it to $2 billion in the near future. This ambition was echoed by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev during his agreements signing with Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, underscoring the significance of facilitating cross-border movement and enhancing the exchange of manufactured goods. Subsequent to discussions with Japarov, Tokayev engaged in talks with Uzbekistan’s Mirziyoyev, likely focusing on regional trade dynamics. While details of these discussions were scarce, it was apparent that bilateral relations and regional cooperation were prioritized. However, challenges persist, notably between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where trade turnover declined significantly due to ongoing border disputes and unmarked border areas. Additionally, Turkmenistan poses a significant obstacle to efforts aimed at promoting connectivity, with issues such as a severe shortage of qualified personnel hindering international cooperation within contractual frameworks. Nonetheless, Ashgabat’s interest in expanding regional trade appears substantial, as evidenced by the sizable delegation it dispatched to the inaugural B5+1 conference in Almaty.

Recent diplomatic initiatives seem to have drawn the Kremlin’s attention, as it expresses concern that increased trade facilitation in Central Asia could lead to the expansion of commercial networks that bypass Russia. The ongoing developments aimed at streamlining trade processes in Central Asia appear to unsettle Moscow. Nevertheless, landlocked countries with tough terrain require substantial investments in infrastructure to connect with the global economy. They traditionally rely on Russia, and China made a lot of road and rail networks under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is unlikely that Russia, China, and Iran will cooperate with the trade union in this context. So the US could potentially influence countries such as Pakistan and the Southern Caucasus countries, which have aligned with European interests. These will lead to huge shifts in the entire asia geopolitical landscape. So the Impact of B5+1 will grow beyond Central Asia.

April 27, 2024
How to Understand the United States Military Exercises in China Seas

The world is once again experiencing a gradual polarization, yet unlike the past century, the shift is not unfolding primarily in Europe; rather, it is unfolding in Asia. Washington and Beijing have emerged as two major power centers, increasingly prioritizing their relationships with Asian countries. Military exercises are on the rise, with the United States continuously conducting such drills in waters surrounding China. These military exercises may form part of a multi-year training plan, such as those jointly established by defense authorities like the drills involving the US, Korea, and Japan. Some Military exercises are conducted annually, like those carried out by the United States and the Philippines, but they all contribute to escalating tensions in the region. The choice of locations and the actions within these drills exhibit heightened aggression, collectively sending a clear message to Beijing. Furthermore, China, Russia, and North Korea are actively preparing to counter US influence in the region.

In recent days, the South Korean navy conducted joint naval drills with the United States and Japan in international waters south of Jeju Island, an island located in close proximity to China. The aim of these military drills was to improve joint operability against the nuclear and missile threats presented by North Korea. The military exercise comprised six warships, including the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier, three Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, and two Aegis destroyers from South Korea and Japan. The primary emphasis of the military exercise lay in anti-submarine warfare training and improving responsiveness to North Korean underwater threats, including submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Moreover, the three nations engaged in maritime interception training to curb the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, alongside conducting search and rescue exercises.

Since the Camp David summit in August, Washington has been strengthening military alliances with Seoul and Tokyo, stressing the importance of “Regularizing defensive exercises” to enhance trilateral responses to North Korean threats. The recent joint military drill follows naval exercises in January, during which a US aircraft carrier was similarly positioned south of Jeju in the East China Sea. While these trilateral naval exercises primarily aim to address North Korean threats, both Beijing and Moscow are closely monitoring the deepening military cooperation among the three allies. The area south of Jeju Island in the East China Sea holds strategic importance for China, as its navy must navigate near the island and the Japanese archipelago to access the Pacific Ocean. From the perspective of the United States, the southern part of Jeju serves as a strategic vantage point for monitoring North Korea, but its geopolitical significance also positions it as a potential means of checking China’s influence. From China’s viewpoint, the North Korean nuclear issue is not new, and the joint training exercises conducted by the three countries signify an attempt to assert influence and limit China’s regional aspirations. From Russia’s view, Vladivostok is situated closer to Jeju Island in the East China Sea than Moscow.

Military exercises in the South China Sea are also on the rise. China conducted military “Combat Patrols” in the disputed region, as confirmed by its army. This activity coincided with joint military drills conducted by the Philippines, the United States, Japan, and Australia. Moreover, next week will witness extensive naval drills between the Philippines and the US, occurring amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea. With preparations underway, the possibility of military confrontations from the Chinese side cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, the United States and its allies currently maintain clear dominance over the waters, as evidenced by their repeated naval exercises. China and its partners are shown their combined power and preparedness through these military drills.

April 22, 2024
How The New Foreign Agents Bill Affects Georgia’s European Dreams

Georgia, a southern Caucasian country geographically located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, is one of the latest candidate members of the European Union. The country, which was long under the Soviet Union and is the birthplace of the famous Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, is now joining the pro-Europe movement in Eastern Europe. Georgia suffered humiliation during the war against Russia in 2008, resulting in the loss of territory, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Doubt among people towards Russia is further exacerbated in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Armenia’s humiliation in the war with Azerbaijan. From the protests in support of Ukraine to the recent celebration of Euro qualification, events have served as venues for pro-European sentiment. However, the government of Georgia and several prominent leaders are not willing to break away from their Soviet and pro-Russian past. The Georgian parliament recently passed a new Foreign Agents bill that highly resembles or mirrors Russia’s democratic bill aimed at restricting people from accessing information. During the Soviet era, this was one way of keeping knowledge under government control. But, of course, this has dealt a significant blow to this West Asian nation’s path to the European Union.

Georgian lawmakers’ passing of a controversial Foreign agents bill, igniting fresh street protests. The ruling Georgian Dream party, which has a majority in the parliament ,voted 78 to 25 to advance the draft of Foreign Agents bill for further debate. Thousands of people gathered in front of the Georgian parliament building in Tbilisi, causing traffic disruptions on the capital city’s main road. Opposition to the legislation wasn’t confined to the streets; even the country’s president spoke out against it. Georgia’s president, Salome Zurabishvili, who is at odds with the ruling party, condemned the move as “Against the will of the population”. The proposed law, if adopted, would require any independent media outlet or NGO receiving more than 20 percent of its financing from abroad to register as an “Organization pursuing the interests of a foreign power”. This represents a departure from last year’s bill, which used the term “Agent of foreign influence”. Following widespread protests last year, the ruling party was compelled to rescind the similar bill.

The law contradicts the democratic reforms that the EU asserts Tbilisi must enact to progress on its path to EU membership. The EU has previously implored Tbilisi not to proceed with the Foreign agents bill. “The draft law on transparency of foreign influence is not aligned with Georgia’s EU aspirations and its accession trajectory”, remarked European Council President Charles Michel on Tuesday, echoing Brussels’ criticism of the bill. Furthermore, he emphasized that instead of bringing Georgia closer to the EU, the draft bill would distance it. He continued to express that the rights to freedom of expression and association would be directly threatened by the new law. Last December, the EU granted Georgia official candidate status but stipulated that Tbilisi must reform its judicial and electoral systems, diminish political polarization, enhance press freedom, and limit the influence of oligarchs before membership negotiations can commence formally. But it looks like Georgia is working against the directions.

Opposition parties and civil society activists argue that the mechanism for this takeover is being facilitated by Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream. Despite ostensibly seeking EU membership, the party is seen to be aligning more closely with Moscow. Video footage was trending in which the head of the parliamentary group of the ruling Georgian Dream party and a major supporter of the Foreign Agents Bill, was punched in the face by opposition MP Aleko Elisashvili while delivering a speech from the dispatch box. Leading players in Georgia’s national men’s football team, the new national heroes, have also voiced their support from the public. They have backed mass protests sparked by a Foreign agents bill criticized for mirroring a repressive Russian law. They wrote: “Georgia’s path is to Europe. The European way unites us!! Forward to Europe!! Peace to Georgia” .

Georgia, which was formerly regarded as spearheading the democratic transition among the former Soviet states, has come under fire recently for what is thought to be a democratic regression. This further adds to the doubts for the leaders of Georgia, as they risk their dreams of joining the euro by pushing for Russian-type laws. In addition to losing territory, they are maintaining friendlier relations with Russia. As a former Soviet republic, Georgia has sought for years to deepen relations with the West, but the current ruling party is accused of attempting to steer the Black Sea nation towards closer ties with Russia.

April 18, 2024
Moscow Attack: How Secular Central Asian States Become Recruitment Hubs for Terrorist Organizations

Four individuals faced court proceedings in Moscow, accused in connection to the tragic terrorist assault on the Crocus City concert hall last Friday, which resulted in the loss of 137 lives. According to the TASS State news agency, the defendants, confirmed as Tajikistan citizens, were ordered to be held in custody for a duration of two months following a hearing on Sunday.

The international media focused on the Tajikistani nationality of the suspects, moving away from allegations against Ukraine. This situation prompts a reconsideration of Central Asian nations, known for their peaceful tendencies and reluctance towards Islamic extremism, despite Islam’s prevalence. Unlike certain Islamic countries, Central Asian societies have shown a more flexible approach to religious practices, often influenced by Soviet-era perspectives. Nonetheless, recent events suggest a changing landscape in the region.

Extremists from Tajikistan and various other Central Asian countries have been implicated in a series of recent ISIS assaults across Europe and Iran. In January, a tragic bombing during an Iranian commemoration ceremony resulted in approximately 100 fatalities. Now, in March, individuals from Tajikistan are suspected of involvement in the Moscow attack. Both Iran and Russia have vehemently opposed the Islamic State, actively engaging them in the Middle East. This casts doubt on ISIS’s claim of responsibility. Initially, Iran accused Israel and the US of the attack, but later, their intelligence ministry identified the mastermind and bombmaker as Tajik nationals. According to reports from the Iranian government press agency, the suspect entered Iran from the southeast border, departing just two days prior to the attack after constructing the bombs. Additionally, one of the suicide bombers was also Tajik.

US and European intelligence agencies have observed a notable surge in global plots associated with ISIS-K, with some analysts considering it the most formidable ISIS affiliate outside of Africa. According to a UN report, in July and August, seven individuals from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, linked to ISIS-K, were apprehended in Germany while plotting significant terrorist attacks, actively acquiring weapons and identifying potential targets. German authorities apprehended three Tajik individuals and one Uzbek national on December 31, suspecting them of planning an attack on Cologne Cathedral on New Year’s Eve. These men were linked to ISIS by investigators. Tajik nationals have been implicated in various other plots across Europe and Turkey in recent years. In January, two ISIS militants from Tajikistan and Russia carried out an attack on a church in Istanbul, resulting in one fatality and one injury. Additionally, earlier this month, Russian security forces eliminated two Kazakhstan nationals believed to be orchestrating an ISIS-KP-associated assault on a synagogue in the Kaluga region, southwest of Moscow. This shift towards international targets may be attributed to directives from senior IS leadership in Iraq and Syria, where the organization has suffered significant setbacks.

The UN report underscored the potential for extremist Islamist groups to recruit amid the conflict in Gaza. However, IS has grappled with balancing its animosity towards Hamas while desiring to incite violence against longstanding adversaries. The report noted IS’s cautious public communications in response to events in Israel and Gaza, aimed at exacerbating religious intolerance. Despite this, IS maintains staunch opposition to Hamas, labeling its members as apostates. IS’s media campaigns have focused on exploiting the situation in Gaza to provoke potential lone actors into carrying out attacks.

Presently, the Islamic State (IS) justifies indoctrinating minds, portraying itself as a champion of Islam and savior of Islam from suffering. Economic stagnation and widespread unemployment fuel the interest of disillusioned youth, priming them for participation in what they perceive as a holy war. They consider anyone opposed to their ideology, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews, as enemies.

In Central Asian countries, societal dynamics are becoming increasingly volatile as the influence of Soviet remnants diminishes among the younger generation, who are now gravitating more towards their Islamic identity. With Russia’s influence waning, other external actors, including the Islamic State and various competing factions, are seizing the opportunity to exert influence in the region. Economic growth has been sluggish, compounded by pervasive authoritarianism, corruption within the government, high unemployment rates, and a lack of prosperity for the common populace, with benefits accruing primarily to politicians and businessmen. This socioeconomic landscape provides fertile ground for extremist ideologies to flourish.

Failure by the government to address these pressing issues not only jeopardizes the country’s reputation and diaspora but also exacerbates the risk of radicalization. Reports indicate growing apprehension within the Tajik diaspora in Russia, with social media glorifying Tajik and Central Asian identities of terrorists. Such developments threaten to erode the secular image of Central Asia, potentially aligning them with the likes of Pakistan and Afghanistan, further entrenching their misery.

March 26, 2024
Central Asian States Embrace US-Facilitated Integration Plan: Redefining Regional Dynamics

Once firmly ensconced within Russia’s sphere of influence, Central Asia is now slowly stepping out of its shadow. Despite possessing vast economic potential, abundant geographical resources, and significant opportunities for tourism, the region had been reluctant to liberate itself from the iron grip of the Soviet era. However, as Russia’s influence diminishes and Central Asian nations strive to assert their own identities, they are increasingly seeking collaboration with other global actors.

China has made notable strides, participating in diverse agreements like the Belt and Road Initiative and embarking on infrastructure and mining ventures. India, an emerging economic force, similarly seeks to tap into Central Asia’s mineral resources to satisfy its expanding needs, resulting in numerous accords. Under Erdogan’s leadership, Turkey has rekindled its focus on the Turkic identity and is deepening its engagement in the region. Saudi Arabia expresses interest, while Iran sustains its presence.

Despite these shifts, the United States, a major player in global politics, has not significantly intervened in the region, largely deferring to Russian authority. Central Asian leaders have also distanced themselves from the United States to maintain favor with Russian rulers. However, as Russia’s supremacy is challenged with the incidents such as the Ukraine conflict and increasing alignment of neighboring countries with the United States, both Central Asia and the U.S. see an opportunity for closer ties and market exploration in the region.

The United States is initiating a strategic effort, akin to stringing pearls, to unify all Central Asian nations into a cohesive network of collaboration. They initiated B5+1, a diplomatic platform for Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and the U.S.. Following its inaugural Forum, the group is placing emphasis on five priority industries and outlining specific actions necessary to expedite regional integration and economic growth in Central Asia. Attendees at the March 2024 Forum in Almaty, Kazakhstan, included business leaders, investors, experts, and policymakers from the region and various other nations. The role of the United States in this initiative is that of a facilitator, anticipating that Central Asian states will lead efforts to integrate the region’s economy through robust public-private partnerships. Furthermore, the involvement of the private sector is deemed essential in shaping the process.

the United States laying a sturdy groundwork for potential success. Central Asian governments are responding positively to the plan. The objective of the primary forum was to foster discussions aimed at dismantling trade barriers hindering outside investment and fostering a regional market. This objective has been successfully realized. Interest from regional governments in developing the B5+1 initiative appears robust, with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan reportedly vying to host the forum next year.

The Kazakh government, the biggest player in the region, has shown immense support for the initiative. During the closing remarks of the initial B5+1 forum, held in Almaty from March 13-15, Kazakh First Deputy Minister of National Economy Timur Zhaksylykov expressed the government’s willingness to collaborate with the private sector in enhancing trade prospects, particularly in sectors like agribusiness and e-commerce. They also expressed a commitment to working towards the development of a unified regional market.

During the Almaty forum, private sector representatives issued a statement expressing their commitment to coordinating efforts aimed at enhancing trade, transit, and investment facilitation. Additionally, they pledged to work towards harmonizing regulations in key industries beyond the dominant energy and extractive sectors, which have traditionally attracted the majority of Western investment in the region. The B5+1 initiative has identified five economic sectors for prioritized development: trade and logistics, agribusiness, e-commerce, tourism, and renewable energy. Areas where the United States can pump their interest and money.

They also addressed the immediate need to establish a regional chamber of commerce to advocate for economic integration. One common priority identified across all sectors is the development of transnational mechanisms to harmonize regulatory and customs frameworks. One suggestion is the development of a standardized digital CMR, allowing for the smooth movement of truck-borne goods across borders through electronic contractual documentation. Currently, many customs procedures lack digitalization. Another recommendation advocates for the removal of visa requirements for truck drivers engaged in import-export activities. Additionally, to boost tourism, the B5+1 proposes the adoption of a Schengen-like tourism visa, enabling tourists to freely explore the five regional states.

Despite the promising start of the B5+1 initiative, numerous challenges persist. In a region where authoritarian governance often shapes policy, the extent to which officials are willing to relinquish control to private sector entities remains uncertain. Moreover, the private sector’s capacity in areas like policy development and advocacy is largely untested. Previous attempts to enhance regional economic integration have faltered, and the promotion of a unified Central Asian market conflicts with the interests of Russia and China.

However, if the B5+1 maintains its momentum, the envisioned outcome is a well-regulated and efficient single market that attracts significant Western investment. Under the B5+1 vision, integration can safeguard the individual sovereignty of each Central Asian state, bolstering their resilience against political and economic pressures from neighboring and external actors.

Supporters of the US-led B5+1 process acknowledge Washington’s intention to enhance its influence in Central Asia but emphasize a significant contrast between this approach and those of Russia and China. The strategy of the B5+1 aims to organically expand American influence in the region, employing methods that fundamentally differ from those employed by Moscow and Beijing.

Cooperation with the United States economy holds paramount importance for any nation’s success. From bolstering foreign reserves to attracting significant business investments, reliance on the dollar and partnerships with the United States permeate various aspects of economic development. And here, collaboration talks extend beyond financial realms, encompassing areas like travel visas, currency agreements, legal frameworks, and trade tariffs, all contributing to creating a highly competitive environment for investments in partner countries. Indeed, intensified cooperation between the United States and their allies in Asia like Saudi Arabia holds the potential for increased investment and developmental strides in the region.

Moreover, as companies engage in collaborative ventures, the United States stands to gain allies in the region, countering the dominance sought by Russia and China over resource-rich nations. This collaborative approach not only mitigates the risk of monopolistic tendencies but also accelerates the realization of development aspirations in Central Asia. While Russia may attempt to maintain control through power dynamics, the path forward may not be without challenges. Nonetheless, for Central Asian nations and the United States alike, this presents an opportunity to foster economic growth and wield greater political influence in the Asian landscape.

March 21, 2024
Putin Notified, Putin Conducted, Putin Declared Victory: The Tale of Another Russian Election Drama

In a notable comedy film titled “The Dictator,” featuring Sacha Baron Cohen portraying the character General Aladeen, there’s a memorable scene where the dictator organizes his own version of the Olympics called the “Wadiyan Games.” In this event, the dictator competes in a sprint race where all other contestants must show deference to him. Any attempt to surpass him results in dire consequences, as he fires upon them. Eventually, when he grows weary, authorities intervene to swiftly conclude the race. This sequence was eerily similar to the Russian election, but it’s more horror in real life instead of a comedy on the screen.

The Russian presidential election became the biggest drama of the year. All opponents are either jailed or eliminated, with selections manipulated by the authorities. Despite these glaring irregularities, the election proceeds, with the lion’s share of votes conveniently going to Putin. There’s no votes against mounting corruption, no votes over economic slowdown, and no votes from families of fallen soldiers. In this distorted scenario, it’s hardly a model of democracy.

Vladimir Putin has declared a resounding victory in Russia’s presidential election amidst widespread protests both within the country and abroad, highlighting concerns over his increasingly authoritarian rule, the conflict in Ukraine, and a highly orchestrated electoral process that seemingly guaranteed his triumph. The election, criticized by the United States as “Clearly Neither Free Nor Fair”, saw Putin leading with 87.14% of the vote after 75% of the ballots were counted. Trailing behind was the Communist party candidate, Nikolai Kharitonov. The government boasted a record turnout of 74% of eligible voters, with Putin’s previous highest vote share recorded in 2018 at 76.7%, accompanied by a turnout of 67.5%.

Putin delivered a victorious speech, acknowledging Western envy while staunchly affirming the fairness of the election. The conflict in Ukraine took center stage in his address, with Putin asserting his efforts to secure the border against recent incursions by pro-Ukrainian military units. He emphasized that his priorities as president would focus on the war in Ukraine, bolstering defense capabilities, and military strength.

When questioned about the potential for a direct conflict with NATO, Putin remarked, “In today’s world, anything is possible…,Everyone understands that such an escalation could lead to a full-scale third world war. I doubt anyone desires that”. This statement was accompanied by a stark warning of the risks of nuclear war.

For the first time, Putin addressed the death of Alexei Navalny, suggesting that he had consented to exchange the Kremlin critic for Russian prisoners in the West shortly before Navalny’s demise. “Regrettably, events unfolded as they did”, Putin remarked callously. “I agreed to one condition: a swap with no return. But that’s life”.

In the shadow of Putin’s expected triumph, Russia’s beleaguered opposition mobilized to demonstrate its own resilience. Long queues formed at numerous polling stations across Moscow and other Russian cities as citizens responded to a call from Navalny’s widow to cast their ballots at noon on Sunday.

Yulia Navalnaya, widow of Navalny, addressing supporters at the Russian embassy in Berlin, urged them to participate in a symbolic display of strength dubbed “Noon Against Putin”. This initiative, endorsed by her late husband before his untimely death in an Arctic prison a month prior, garnered significant attention.

Navalnaya was met with resounding applause and chants from voters as she expressed gratitude for their turnout to honor her husband. “You give me hope that our efforts are not in vain, that we will continue to fight”, she remarked in a statement on Sunday, revealing that she had inscribed “Navalny” on her own ballot paper.

Meanwhile, Navalny’s team called upon voters to invalidate their ballots, inscribe “Alexei Navalny” on the voting slip, or support one of the three candidates challenging Putin, despite the opposition’s characterization of them as Kremlin “Puppets.”

On Friday, Russian prosecutors issued threats of five-year prison sentences to any voters participating in the “Noon Against Putin” initiative. In Kazan, a southern city, over 20 individuals were detained by police for joining the protest, as reported by the independent rights monitor OVD-Info. Similar arrests occurred in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

In the lead-up to the election, Russian citizens engaged in various acts of protest, such as pouring dye into ballot boxes and initiating arson attacks at polling stations. Ella Pamfilova, Russia’s election commissioner, condemned those who spoiled ballots as “Bastards”, while former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev warned that such actions could result in treason sentences of up to 20 years. The Russian interior ministry reported 155 administrative charges and 61 criminal cases filed during the elections, Including 21 instances of obstructing voters’ rights.

Amidst Putin’s impending victory, Russia disqualified anti-war candidates, ensuring the Russian leader faced no substantive competition. Authorities barred two candidates critical of the war in Ukraine, leaving three others who did not directly challenge Putin’s authority. Their participation aimed to lend an aura of legitimacy to the electoral process.

Following constitutional amendments orchestrated in 2020, Putin is poised to seek two additional six-year terms after his current one expires next year. This could potentially extend his tenure until 2036, surpassing Joseph Stalin’s rule over the Soviet Union, which lasted 29 years. Consequently, Putin would become the country’s longest-serving leader since the era of the Russian empire. As Ukrainian President Zelensky aptly remarked, Russia now has a leader who appears addicted to power.

March 18, 2024
Russia’s Presidential Election: Putin is Ready for his “First Term”

While influential opposition leaders are either being murdered, jailed, or barred, Russia is preparing for its upcoming presidential election in the coming weeks. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has carefully crafted constitutional modifications to prolong his term in office, looks set to win his fifth election. As for the 2020 constitutional amendment, which essentially “Nullified” his prior tenure, he is officially running for another term, but the March 15–17 election will be his first under the new structure. Thanks to this clever political maneuvering, Putin is able to seize several openings, leaving his opponents with no choice but to surrender or risk certain death. The most recent victim was Alexei Navalny, who was barred from future participation in democratic elections in Russia.

In December, during a staged event in an opulently furnished Kremlin ballroom, Putin declared his candidacy while speaking with a separatist “Colonel” from the Donbas region of southeast Ukraine. He has four terms under his belt. In 2000, he won the presidency, and he was reelected in 2004, 2012, and 2018. Due to the constitution, he was not elected president during a brief tenure in between; instead, he served as prime minister and also “Super President”. As anticipated, he will serve a further six years if he prevails, as the term has been extended by constitutional revisions. His fifth term would begin with this. After that, he is eligible for a sixth term in 2030.

Since Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader, the 71-year-old former KGB spy has already led Russia for the longest period of time. Putin’s increasingly harsh handling of opponents, critics, and antiwar demonstrators has drawn comparisons to Stalin’s “Big Terror” operations. To those who support the Kremlin, however, Putin is seen as a political “Genius” who stopped Russia from collapsing, brought billionaire oligarchs under control, and defeated Chechen insurgents. In addition, Putin’s admirers refer to him as a “Gatherer of Russian Lands,” a dignified moniker bestowed upon Russian princes and czars, for his actions in the 2008 war against Georgia, the recognition of two breakaway Georgian statelets, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and his intentions to annexe full of Ukraine.

Putin’s most vocal political rival, Alexey Navalny, passed away in an Arctic prison on February 16 in what his family, followers, and a large portion of the international community considered to be political murder. In the 2018 presidential election, which Putin won with about 78% of the vote, Navalny was not allowed to register. Further opposition activists, Ilya Yashin and Vladimir Kaza-Murza, have been sentenced to eight and a half years and twenty-five years in prison, respectively, for their criticism of Putin’s war in Ukraine. Numerous opposition activists, critics, and normal Russian citizens who shared or liked antiwar comments on the internet have also been charged with crimes in thousands of cases. Tens of thousands have been detained, fined, or expelled from the nation. Russian Democracy is defined here.

This is the first three-day voting in Russian history as opposed to the usual one-day one. Additionally, this marks the debut of internet voting for voters in 29 locations. In Russia, 112 million people who are at least 18 years old are able to cast votes. Voting will also take place in occupied Crimea and other parts of Ukraine, a move that Kiev and its Western supporters have denounced as illegal. Millions of Russian citizens residing overseas, from California in the United States to the southern Kazakhstan spaceport of Baikonur, which Russia leases, are also able to cast ballots via mail, consulates, or embassies. The initial results are anticipated to be made public on March 19 and the final result on March 29. According to official estimates, the officially-expected turnout is almost as high as it was during the 2018 election, when about 68 percent of Russians cast ballots.

There’s hardly much optimism for a free and fair vote among those who follow Russian politics. Due to the widespread perception of the current United Russia party as corrupt and ineffective, Putin is contesting as an independent. It was referred to as the “Party of Crooks and Thieves” by late opposition leader Navalny. Other contenders are viewed as symbolic figures whose involvement serves mainly to demonstrate Putin’s “Popularity.” The Communist Party’s Nikolay Kharitonov is one among them.

Boris Borisovich Nadezhdin is an opposition politician who has openly condemned the war in Ukraine, said he will designate unbiased observers to supervise elections, and promised to keep appealing the rulings of the Supreme Court against him. But he’s not going to be able to run at all. Sometimes he will also in his final time.

Nobody is expecting a different result from this election; Putin is viewed as a strong leader, and he is successful in portraying this image. Additionally, his admirers claim that the Russian Federation would fall apart and pandemonium will envelop the country in his absence. The Russian nationalists are therefore standing firm beside him. His drives for “Slavic Unity” and “Russia First”. However, many disbelieve the percentage of vote he gained in elections. The unnatural death of opponents increased screening of opposing candidates, videos of election employees making dubious actions in the booth, a lot of suspicious activity raised doubts in his win. Putin, however, will still receive more than 60% of the vote in the current scenario, and all of the leaders hail him as Russia’s savior. And he will continue to be the ruler. Russia presents new conceptions of democracy that any rulers craving power can embrace.

March 11, 2024
Russia Ukraine War: Russia’s Problem With Demand of Chinese Yuan

Russian businesses have been depending more and more on the yuan to meet their foreign exchange needs since Moscow was cut off from the Western banking system. As war is not looking to end soon, Yuan financing has become both expensive and scarce in Russia, creating a bottleneck for companies seeking foreign capital. This challenge adds to the existing burdens faced by these companies, including higher domestic interest rates and a looming wave of debt due this year.

Two years following Russia’s exclusion from the Western financial system, major energy and mining corporations have significantly turned to the yuan to meet their foreign currency needs. China and Russia have notably reduced their dependence on the US dollar in bilateral trade. Over the past year, Chinese and Russian officials reached an agreement to conduct over 90% of trade between the two nations using Russia’s ruble or China’s yuan. This shift has ensured uninterrupted business, leading to a record $200 billion in total transactions between the two countries last year. Simultaneously, Russia’s trade with the US has witnessed a substantial decline, reaching a 30-year low.

Despite China’s benchmark government bond yields reaching a two-decade low, the restricted yuan liquidity in Russia, coupled with heightened demand from importers, is resulting in increased borrowing costs. This financial challenge compels companies such as MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC, Russia’s largest miner, to confront tough decisions—whether to secure expensive ruble funding or bear the rising expense of domestic yuan debt.

Over the past year, Russia has experienced a more than twofold increase in its benchmark, leading to corporate borrowers contending with an additional 1.2 trillion rubles (US$13 billion) in debt-servicing costs. In the given the current circumstances, the average cost of debt is anticipated to rise.

The volume of Russian corporate yuan bonds, primarily sold on the domestic market, nearly stalled in the final three quarters of the previous year, reaching the equivalent of 800 billion rubles, as reported by the Russian central bank. While loans in the Chinese currency surged to a record US$46 billion in 2023, their share in corporate credit portfolios remained in single digits.

Yuan liquidity in Moscow is becoming scarcer, and its costs are becoming more volatile, indicating difficulties in expanding yuan lending for domestic banks. Faced with a deepening yuan liquidity crunch, Russian lenders have resorted to the central bank’s Chinese currency swaps, leading to a substantial increase in yuan funding costs. Industry experts suggest that if the deficit persists, it could result in a further uptick in yuan bond yields.

Despite facing financial constraints, Russian companies have encountered difficulties in directly borrowing within China due to capital controls complicating the repatriation of funds abroad. Moreover, since 2018, they have refrained from issuing yuan securities like panda or dim sum bonds, a departure from the 11 such issues in the prior eight years. Even the government, despite years of planning its own yuan bonds, has encountered obstacles in discussions with China about securing loans in yuan.

Chinese lenders, including the world’s largest by assets, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. (ICBC), have notably increased their exposure to Russia through offshore branches. The Russian subsidiary of ICBC alone observed a five-fold surge in total local assets from the beginning of 2022 through October 1 of the following year, according to the latest data published by the Bank of Russia.

The increased involvement of Chinese lenders presents a challenge to the financial stability of Russian corporations, heightening concerns about the potential depletion of capital for industries, particularly as refinancing needs sharply escalate. Despite recording robust profits, companies are grappling with constraints, further exacerbated by new export taxes imposed by the government to fund the war. This development undermines the advantages of a weaker ruble that had previously contributed to record margins.

The elevated interest rates necessitate a more cautious approach by companies when considering investments that require substantial debt capital. This careful strategy reflects the impact of heightened borrowing costs on corporate decision-making and investment strategies.

The current situation poses a setback for Russia’s and China’s endeavors to promote de-dollarization. Both nations now face the challenge of intensifying efforts to establish their currencies as substitutes for the dollar. The Russian ruble seems to be out of contention, while the limited availability of the yuan is a notable hurdle, despite Beijing’s progress in internationalizing the currency. People’s Bank of China has engaged in bilateral currency swaps with over 30 central banks, including those of Saudi Arabia and Argentina.

The lack of yuan availability and the abundance of rupees for Russia reveal hurdles in cooperation between major economies. Additionally, strained relations between China and India limit the possibility of mutual acceptance of their currencies. As major economies work towards cooperation, the realization of a viable alternative to the dollar appears distant.

March 7, 2024
Kyrgyzstan’s Kyzyl-Ompol: Government’s Reassurances Fail to Quell Uranium Worries

Large-scale development projects face numerous challenges when implemented in developing countries, and Kyrgyzstan, a nation nestled in the mountains of Central Asia, is no exception. Seen as a crucial element in the country’s future, the ambitious Kyzyl-Ompol uranium mining project is entangled in a complicated relationship between environmentalists, skeptical citizens, and proponents of progressive growth.

Kyrgyzstan is one of the most economically disadvantaged in Asia, currently holding the unenviable title of the second poorest country in Central Asia, trailing behind Tajikistan. A staggering 22.4% of the population languishes below the poverty line, a stark reality exacerbated by the predominant reliance on agriculture in the challenging high mountain terrain where poor soil conditions impede progress and hinder improvements in people’s quality of life.

However, a glimmer of economic potential emerges from the nation’s vast mineral reserves, offering a promising avenue to transform Kyrgyzstan’s financial standing. Collaborating with strategic allies like Russia, China, and India, the country is cautiously exploring the untapped possibilities within its mineral wealth. Noteworthy among these resources are substantial deposits of coal, gold, uranium, antimony, and other coveted metals.

The significant presence of uranium, a mineral in high demand, amplifies Kyrgyzstan’s potential on the global stage. As diplomatic ties with China strengthen, there is an anticipation that the country will leverage its mineral reserves to forge a path towards economic revitalization.

The Kyrgyzstan government’s initiatives to harness uranium and various rare earth metals around the revered Lake Issyk-Kul, often likened to a sea for this landlocked nation and its most populous tourist destination, have sparked discontent among the people. However, a pervasive fear of reprisals has led to a muted expression of concerns among the populace.

In a concerted effort to alter public sentiment, the government is actively working to address apprehensions. President Sadyr Japarov took a significant step in this direction last month by traveling to the city of Balykchy. Here, he engaged with community representatives from the Issyk-Kul and Naryn regions, seeking to provide assurances and clarity regarding the developments at the Kyzyl-Ompol field.

During his address, President Japarov emphasized the potential creation of over 1,000 job opportunities in the area, attempting to assuage the concerns of residents like Kubatbek Japarov assured us that this venture would be akin to a second Kumtor gold mine, with all proceeds from the uranium excavation flowing directly into the state coffers.

Officials aligned with President Japarov have affirmed that the state will take charge of the mine’s development, asserting that this hands-on approach ensures the utilization of safe and responsible methods. Additionally, they downplayed the prominence of uranium at the Kyzyl-Ompol site, placing emphasis on the extraction of titanomagnetite, a unique mineral with diverse applications ranging from steel production to extracting titanium.

Concerns about the potential development of Kyzyl-Ompol have been festering for a minimum of five years. In 2019, a year prior to President Sooronbai Jeenbekov’s displacement by Japarov, local activists orchestrated protests against the exploration efforts of the Russian company UrAsia Kyrgyzstan. In response to the public outcry, authorities took decisive action and revoked the company’s license.

While the government has acknowledged the simmering protests in the recent year, there is a gradual shift in public sentiment. However, rights activists contend that a broader suppression of dissent is systematically quashing any form of disagreement throughout Kyrgyzstan through repressive measures. This crackdown has led to the imprisonment of numerous government critics, including some members of parliament.

This fear of people of Kyrgyzstan and the broader Central Asian region is stained by the toxic legacy of the Soviet Union’s nuclear industry. A uranium mine and plant in the southern Kyrgyz town of Mailuu-Suu played a crucial role in producing fuel for the Soviets’ first atomic bomb for over two decades following World War II. Although uranium mining ceased in Mailuu-Suu in 1968, the area had already become highly contaminated due to a tailings dam failure in 1958 and the negligent disposal of radioactive materials.

Mailuu-Suu, situated upstream of the densely populated Ferghana Valley, currently harbors more than 20 uranium tailings dams containing nearly 2 million cubic meters of toxic material, some of which are nestled into the banks of the local river. The town exhibits higher rates of diseases compared to other parts of Kyrgyzstan, and the looming threat of a natural disaster in this mountainous, seismically active region could have severe consequences for millions of people.

Another site with a uranium mining legacy is Ming-Kush in the neighboring Naryn Province, where remediation efforts funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have contributed to securing toxic waste storage and decontaminating the area.

Despite progress in some areas, numerous smaller-scale toxic waste sites persist across Kyrgyzstan, demanding cleanup more than three decades since gaining independence. Even if the focus shifts to mining titanomagnetite, the presence of uranium in a fairly high concentration raises concerns. During mining and transportation, the potential spread of uranium-laden dust poses risks to both the environment and the population. Some argue that this could lead to incidents akin to the 1998 spill of around a ton of cyanide into the Barskoon River, flowing into Lake Issyk-Kul, along the route to the Kumtor gold mine.

Officials have been championing optimistic appraisals of Kyzyl-Ompol’s potential wealth for Kyrgyzstan, as Akylbek Japarov, the head of the Cabinet (no relation to the president), declared in January that the field boasts deposits valued at $300 billion. President Pledged that local residents would “get rich” and Kyzyl-Ompol would transform into “a second Kumtor”.

Kyrgyz officials seem to regard uranium as a prospective source of robust currency through exports, offering a multifaceted solution. Beyond the economic dimension, there is a critical energy imperative. While Kyrgyzstan’s nuclear facility would naturally be smaller compared to those planned by its larger neighbors, the conceptual framework is already evolving. The country’s nuclear requirements are driven by climatic pressures on hydroelectric power, which currently contributes around 90 percent of domestically produced electricity.

Although the political aspirations align with the pressing energy needs, the implementation without the inclusion of public opinion and advanced technology could potentially result in disastrous consequences. The development of the nation and the success of this massive project hinges on paying close attention to what the people have to say and implementing the appropriate technological safeguards to finish the project.

March 5, 2024
Shrinking Russosphere: How Central Asia’s Cultural Uplift Will Affect Russia’s Interests?

Throughout history, language has consistently proven to be a crucial instrument in the delicate process of shaping national identities. The Russian language, in particular, stands out as one of the Soviet Union’s most powerful tools, adeptly molding diverse ethnic groups into a cohesive whole and forging a robust national identity. This linguistic force played a pivotal role in facilitating the dissemination of ideas, fostering the development of unions, and acting as a conduit for news to permeate society. Over time, it evolved into a unifying force, seamlessly binding together the disparate regions under Soviet rule.

The Russian language has had a lasting impact on the global landscape even after the Soviet Union disintegrated. Despite changes in political landscapes, Russia, which is currently the successor to a “Russosphere,” observes the enduring effect of its language history. Russian continues to be the most widely spoken language in several republics, including the current Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

As Russia, under Putin’s leadership, pursues ambitions of imperial resurgence through conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine, a counter-trend is quietly emerging in some nations seeking to rebuild their national identity by distancing themselves from the Russian language. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Central Asia.

Originating in Eastern Europe, a movement has gained traction, aiming to dismantle Russian influence and foster distinct identities, particularly notable in the Baltic countries. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, motivated by a yearning to reclaim their cultural heritage, strategically pivoted towards their ethnic languages—Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian. Simultaneously, English emerged as a Lingua Franca, supplanting Russian, enabling national radios, television, and cultural programs to successfully resonate with both domestic and international audiences. These Baltic nations adeptly navigated the transition, reclaiming their identities during the shift from the Soviet Union to Putin’s Russia.

However, the pace and assertiveness in this linguistic and cultural transition varied across different Eastern European countries. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia were comparatively slow and less assertive, leading to a different outcome. These nations continued to embrace Russian programs and news, and paid a price for not fostering a distinct cultural identity. Ukraine, in particular, faced internal divisions, as the lack of assertive Ukrainian language contributed to a large population of Russian influenced people..

Georgia lost territories, while Moldova too grappled with internal divisions. Belarus, facing a crisis of identity, is now closely aligned with Russia. The contrast in outcomes highlights the crucial role of linguistic and cultural choices in shaping a nation’s destiny, as Eastern European countries navigate the complex interplay between identity, politics, and external influences.

Central Asia also embarked on a journey of self-discovery, slowly and amicably fostering their language and identity. However, the pace and approach differ markedly, as Central Asian nations lack the robust support enjoyed by their Eastern European counterparts from Europe and the United States. With a continued reliance on Russia for resources, financial support, and tourism, their journey has been shaped by a different set of challenges.

While still dependent on Russia for essentials like gas and financial aid, the region is increasingly becoming a multi-player on the global stage. With a myriad of options, including support from Turkey, Qatar, Iran, India, China, and even Eastern Europe itself, Central Asian nations are strategically positioning themselves to diversify their alliances and reduce dependence on any single power.

This shift opens avenues for Central Asia to make bold and swift moves in establishing and strengthening their languages and cultural identities. The geopolitical realignment not only offers opportunities but also poses challenges as these nations navigate a delicate balance between maintaining historical ties and forging new partnerships in their quest for identity.

As the largest country in Central Asia, Kazakhstan grapples with intricate language dynamics, notably the coexistence of Russian and Kazakh. While Russian is not designated as a state language, Article 7 of Kazakhstan’s Constitution accords it equal status with Kazakh in state and local administration, despite Russian being the more commonly spoken language. The 2009 census sheds light on the linguistic landscape, revealing that a significant 84.8% of the population aged 15 and above in Kazakhstan can proficiently read, write, and understand Russian.

However, recent developments indicate a deliberate push towards elevating the use of the Kazakh language over Russian. In October 2023, Kazakhstan introduced a media law aimed at increasing the prominence of Kazakh. The law mandates a gradual rise in the share of the state language on television and radio, moving from 50% to 70% at a 5% annual increment, beginning in 2025.

The matter of language in Kazakhstan stands as one of the most contentious issues today, marked by periodic language-related scandals. Language has evolved into a significant aspect of political rhetoric, particularly for politicians espousing a national-patriotic agenda. Arguments advocating for the strengthening of Kazakh’s position are gaining momentum, showcasing the complex interplay between linguistic identity, political discourse, and societal tensions in the country.

Kyrgyzstan navigates a nuanced linguistic landscape, as Russian holds co-official status per Article 5 of the Constitution. According to the 2009 census, 8.99% of the population, approximately 482,200 individuals, speak Russian as a native language. Moreover, a significant 49.6% of Kyrgyzstan’s population aged 15 and above, or 1,854,700 residents, fluently speak Russian as a second language.

At the close of 2023, Kyrgyzstan implemented a law on the state language, compelling civil servants, MPs, teachers, and healthcare workers to communicate in Kyrgyz. However, this move has sparked controversy, with Russian officials and propaganda outlets criticizing it as “undemocratic” and oppressive to the Russian language. Despite objections, language tests over three years reveal gaps in officials’ Kyrgyz proficiency, highlighting the need for improvement.

The head of the National Commission for the State Language and Language Policy, Kanybek Osmonaliyev, is an advocate for allowing officials time to improve their Kyrgyz language proficiency. The new law stipulates that noncompliance with linguistic proficiency requirements will result in instant termination. Around 4.4 million people in Kyrgyzstan speak Kyrgyz, according to the census taken in 2022, and there is a rising desire among them to learn the language.

In Tajikistan, Russian serves as the language of inter-ethnic communication, permitted in official documentation under the country’s constitution. Despite being spoken by 28% of the population in 2006, and with 7% using it as their primary language in various settings, Russian remains integral in government and business. In Tajikistan, proficiency in Russian is often seen as essential for career success, granting access to modern literature and technology. While English holds promise, learning Russian is more affordable, and many families anticipate their children studying at Russian universities or working in Russia. However, Tajik language courses are scarce and expensive, with limited availability after school. The teaching system primarily focuses on literary Tajik, differing significantly from the modern spoken language.

Contrastingly, in Turkmenistan, Russian lost its status as the official lingua franca in 1996. Approximately 12% of the population, those who grew up in the Soviet era, can speak Russian. Primary and secondary education in Russian is minimal for subsequent generations. Turkmen state press and the newspaper Neytralny Turkmenistan continue to publish material in Russian, and there are schools like the Joint Turkmen-Russian Secondary School. The country has made strides in revitalizing the national language, with only 18% of residents proficient in Russian in 2020. A radical language policy, notably the shift from Cyrillic to the Latin script, led to a significant outflow of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations. The reform also impacted education, eliminating Russian-language schools and university curricula despite the declared policy of trilingual education (Turkmen, Russian, English).These linguistic landscapes underscore the delicate balance between cultural preservation, economic considerations, and the evolving educational paradigms in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Russian is the official language of documentation, the lingua franca and language of the elite in Uzbekistan, and it plays an important role in interethnic communication. An estimate from the World Factbook that is not current states that 14.2% of people speak Russian. Russian is nevertheless widely used even though it is not an official language, especially in big cities, business, and science. Its persistence in society is partly due to the belief that education in Russian is better than in Uzbek.

Uzbekistan, among Central Asian countries planning to transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet since 1993, has faced multiple delays in implementing the change, with the latest deadline set for 2023. While some school textbooks have been published in the Latin alphabet, the shift has resulted in a nuance: young people not proficient in the Cyrillic version of Uzbek find themselves disconnected from the world’s literary heritage, as limited fiction, including classical works by Uzbek authors, has been adapted into Latin.

The Russosphere stands at a crossroads, its existence intricately tied to the Russian language. Contrary to the belief that language merely spreads culture, it wields power. Former Soviet nations, once deeply connected to Russia, are now charting their own paths, fostering distinct identities and pivoting from Russian towards English. These countries aspire to align with prosperous Western standards, a departure that is transforming the geopolitical landscape. The Russosphere, once synonymous with Russian dominance, is undergoing a deterioration, signaling a new chapter in the histories of these nations.

February 29, 2024