Tag: Turkey

  • A Nation’s Resistance: Confronting Erdoğan’s Hunger for Power

    A Nation’s Resistance: Confronting Erdoğan’s Hunger for Power

    After consolidating power for decades, the Turkish president faces one of the most critical moments of his rule—not since the failed coup attempt, but in a new era where public opposition against him is stronger than ever. The tens of thousands who have taken to the streets in the past week are not merely supporters of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the imprisoned political rival of Erdoğan. Their outrage stems from a deeper concern: they see İmamoğlu’s arrest as a tipping point, accelerating Turkey’s shift from an authoritarian democracy to outright autocracy. Moreover, Erdoğan is seeking another term, despite it being constitutionally not allowed.

    Autocrat Erdoğan?

    Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a Turkish leader with deep Ottoman sympathies and a staunchly conservative ideology, has held power in various roles since 1998. He first gained prominence as the mayor of Istanbul—an influential political post—before serving as prime minister from 2003 to 2014. Since then, he has ruled as Turkey’s 12th and current president, systematically taking control of institutions, including the media.

    With his Justice and Development Party (AKP) dominating Turkish politics for decades, Erdoğan has maintained an unyielding hold on power despite mounting economic and political crises. He has allowed no serious challenger to emerge.

    At last, the opposition has found a formidable leader in Ekrem İmamoğlu, whose victory in Istanbul’s mayoral race directly challenged Erdoğan’s grip on the city. Now a central figure in the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition to the AKP, İmamoğlu has been propelled to the forefront of the 2028 presidential race after his party’s decisive win in the last local elections. Unsurprisingly, Erdoğan views him as a serious threat. And like any autocrat intolerant of dissent, he has acted to neutralize him—İmamoğlu has been arrested.

    Escalating protests

    But İmamoğlu’s recent arrest, widely seen as politically motivated, has sparked nationwide outrage, igniting protests across the country. In response, authorities have detained more than 1,400 demonstrators, including photojournalists and international correspondents, many of whom have been deported. The government has taken a hardline stance, tightening its grip on media coverage, while Erdoğan has dismissed the movement as “Evil.”

    Yet, for many, the legitimacy of the charges against İmamoğlu is irrelevant. Their anger is not just about one man—it is a rebellion against a system they see as increasingly oppressive. What began as opposition to İmamoğlu’s arrest is rapidly transforming into a broader uprising, driven by years of political repression and an ever-deepening economic crisis.

    Erdoğan wants it one more time

    Resentment toward Erdoğan is mounting, but he shows no intention of stepping aside. Although the constitution bars him from running again in 2028 due to term limits, speculation is growing that he may attempt to circumvent these restrictions—either by amending the constitution or calling early elections. Many believe the opposition will be weakened long before then, as opposition figures, including İmamoğlu, have consistently faced political roadblocks both before and after elections, fueling concerns that Erdoğan will not permit a fair contest.

    Yet securing another term will be no simple feat. Public frustration is intensifying amid soaring inflation, forcing the government to spend as much as $25 billion in a desperate bid to stabilize the lira—an economic crisis of its own making. Meanwhile, İmamoğlu’s affable and pragmatic image has broadened his appeal, even among conservative voters traditionally wary of the CHP. Erdoğan, however, appears to be banking on economic recovery and a fading sense of public outrage before the next election. At the same time, signs of political maneuvering are becoming increasingly apparent. A recent statement from jailed PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, calling on fighters to lay down their arms, has fueled speculation that the government is seeking support from pro-Kurdish factions.

    Although the next presidential election is still years away, İmamoğlu’s arrest on corruption and terror-related allegations suggests that Erdoğan sees him as a serious threat. Ultimately charged only with corruption, his detention came at a highly strategic moment—just days before the Republican People’s Party (CHP) was set to nominate him for the presidency. The controversy deepened further when Istanbul University annulled his diploma the night before his arrest, effectively barring him from the race. Both moves have been widely condemned as politically motivated. In response, an estimated 13 million people joined the 1.7 million CHP members in backing İmamoğlu’s candidacy, underscoring the resilience of opposition to Erdoğan’s tightening grip on power.

    What happens next?

    İmamoğlu’s arrest is, for many, a historical echo. Erdoğan himself once served as Istanbul’s mayor before being jailed—only to reemerge politically stronger. But that was in a far less consolidated political landscape. History has shown that Istanbul’s mayorship can be a stepping stone to Ankara, and İmamoğlu’s arrest has only invigorated the CHP.

    Domestically, the party has shifted from street protests to alternative forms of resistance, including economic boycotts. Yet the demonstrations have forged an unusual alliance between formal opposition figures and politically disillusioned youth, each bringing their own strategies and grievances. This coalition remains fragile and could splinter under internal tensions. However, for now, their differences have fostered a dynamic movement—one that may prove more spontaneous, unpredictable, and ultimately formidable than Erdoğan anticipates.

  • PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    PKK Lay Down Arms—What Comes Next?

    One of the deadliest conflicts of the past few decades—the struggle between the Turkish state and the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency—may finally be nearing its end. After forty years of violence that has claimed at least 40,000 lives, a landmark declaration has been made. On Thursday, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdish insurgency and an almost mythical figure among his followers, called on PKK fighters to lay down their arms after years of negotiations. In a written statement from his prison cell, where he has spent 25 years in isolation, Öcalan not only urged disarmament but also called for the complete dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

    This announcement could mark the end of a long and bloody chapter, yet optimism is cautious. A decade ago, a two-year ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish state collapsed, triggering some of the deadliest fighting in the conflict’s history, with more than 7,000 lives lost, including hundreds of civilians. Still, political analysts suggest that this time, there is reason to believe the fragile peace may hold.

    A Great Win for Erdoğan

    A staunch conservative, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long taken a hardline stance on Kurdish politics, making a lasting peace initiative under his leadership seem unlikely. Yet, this does not mean he has never pursued negotiations. The last meaningful attempt to negotiate a settlement with the PKK—a group labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey and its Western allies—occurred in a vastly different political climate, before Erdoğan’s illiberal rule fully took shape, but ultimately collapsed. However, with shifting political dynamics both domestically and regionally, he now appears more open to cooperation and more determined to end the conflict.

    Erdoğan’s ambitions to extend his rule, despite Turkey’s constitutional term limits, are well known. He has openly hinted at seeking another term if there is public support, a move that would require either early elections or a constitutional amendment. Achieving this would require backing beyond his current coalition—potentially from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). To appeal to both the party and the broader Kurdish population, Erdoğan has signaled a willingness to engage in negotiations—an ironic shift for a leader who has spent decades as one of the PKK’s fiercest opponents.

    In a calculated move, he entrusted negotiations to his ultranationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli, a figure who once demanded the execution of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This strategic gamble is designed to appease both nationalist hardliners and Kurdish factions. For Erdoğan, it is a delicate balancing act—one that allows him to present himself as a peacemaker while safeguarding the loyalty of his conservative base. A deft political maneuver from a leader adept at navigating power dynamics.

    PKK and Kurds

    The PKK’s demands have long shifted from seeking an independent Kurdish state to pushing for greater autonomy within Turkey and expanded rights for Kurds, who make up nearly a fifth of the country’s population. Yet, even with these more modest aspirations, a settlement may not necessarily lead to significant progress. Instead of political concessions, Ankara may opt for economic incentives—it recently unveiled a development plan for the Kurdish-majority southeast.

    A crucial question is whether thousands of PKK fighters—most now outside Turkey—can be persuaded to disarm. The conflict is deeply rooted in ethnic divisions and spans generations, raising concerns about how these fighters can reintegrate into society. There is also the risk that disillusioned groups may emerge, continuing the struggle for an independent Kurdish homeland.

    Another pressing issue is the broader cost of any agreement for both the Kurds and Turkey. For many Kurds, a deal may bring little meaningful change. While any step toward ending decades of bloodshed should be welcomed, there is also a fear that peace could come at the cost of indefinitely extending Erdoğan’s strongman rule. A lasting resolution would require genuine democratic representation for Kurds—something they continue to demand.

    Geopolitics of the Move

    The ongoing instability in the Middle East has strengthened Turkey’s push for security-focused strategies. Just over a month after Bahçeli’s call, Bashar al-Assad unexpectedly fell from power in Syria—partly due to Turkey’s support for the victorious rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Meanwhile, the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces remain firmly in control of their autonomous region in northeastern Syria, though they are aware that the Trump presidency may not favor their cause.

    For Turkey, neutralizing the Kurdish threat in Syria starts with eliminating the insurgency within its own borders. This is where the dissolution of the PKK becomes a strategic priority—allowing Turkey to consolidate control over its Kurdish regions. Ankara has repeatedly targeted Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria, accusing them of supporting militants inside Turkey. There is growing concern that Turkey and Syria could align against the Kurds, a move that would provoke significant backlash. Kurdish forces have gained substantial support in the West, particularly for their role in dismantling the Islamic State and their progressive stance on social issues like gender equality—areas where much of the Middle East remains deeply conservative.

    If Turkey succeeds in dismantling militant Kurdish factions in Syria, it could more easily confront Kurdish groups in Iraq, weakening their influence and furthering Ankara’s longstanding goal of regional dominance.

    What Happens Next? 

    The agreement brings together Turkey’s right-wing nationalists, driven by Ottoman-era ambitions, and Kurdish hardliners who have long fought for independence, leaving little room for dissent on either side. If the upcoming election shifts the political landscape and Erdoğan’s main rival, the center-left CHP, takes power, its leadership is also expected to pursue reconciliation. Meanwhile, DEP, the rising Kurdish political force, has signaled its willingness to collaborate with Ankara.

    However, if Syria’s new government moves to suppress Kurdish groups, the fallout will inevitably spill over into Turkey, potentially strengthening calls for Kurdish autonomy—an outcome no Turkish administration, regardless of its leadership, is willing to accept. Decades of conflict have entrenched deep divisions, making integration a daunting challenge. For the Kurdish people, the legacy of struggle and resistance makes the path to reconciliation fraught with difficulty. 

  • Saudi Arabia Reclaims Its Regional Clout with Syria’s Embrace

    Saudi Arabia Reclaims Its Regional Clout with Syria’s Embrace

    The Middle East’s power struggle, once a contest between U.S.-led allies and a Russian-backed bloc, now tilts decisively in Washington’s favor. Russia’s decline and Iran’s mounting troubles have given the United States and its staunchest ally, Saudi Arabia, a commanding edge. While Washington and Moscow shaped the broader conflict, the fight on the ground unfolded between Iran and its proxies and a Saudi-led coalition that, despite internal rifts, often included Israel and Turkey. By 2025, the U.S.-Saudi alliance had everything falling into place. Israel crushed Hamas, Lebanon installed a pro-Western president, and Syria—long the region’s geopolitical fault line—found itself under an administration deeply tied to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Many assumed Turkey would wield the greatest influence over Syria’s new leadership. But when President Al-Shaara made Saudi Arabia his first foreign destination, the message was unmistakable: Riyadh is back, reclaiming its place as the Middle East’s dominant power and the Islamic world’s standard-bearer, after years of ceding ground to Iran.

    Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh on Sunday, making his first foreign visit since taking office—a move that highlights shifting regional dynamics. Sharaa, who seized power last week after leading the uprising that ousted Iran-backed Bashar al-Assad, now faces the challenge of reintegrating Syria into the Arab fold after nearly 14 years of war. In a written statement, he said the talks focused on humanitarian and economic cooperation, as well as long-term plans in energy, technology, education, and health. Saudi Arabia’s state news agency reported that the discussions also covered strengthening bilateral ties and addressing key regional developments.

    Sharaa and his group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), are widely associated with Sunni Islamic extremism and have been accused of committing harsh acts against Alawites, other Shia groups, and Kurds in Syria. His leadership reflects a strong Sunni identity, reinforced by his personal background—born in Saudi Arabia and having spent part of his childhood there. By making Saudi Arabia his first official visit, Sharaa is signaling that Sunni Islamism is the guiding ideology of his administration and that Riyadh, its traditional power center, is his primary patron.

    Since Assad’s fall, Syria’s new leadership has worked to strengthen ties with both Arab and Western governments, with Saudi Arabia taking the lead in this effort. Riyadh hosted Syria’s new foreign and defense ministers in early January, followed by a high-level meeting with Syrian, Arab, and Western officials later that month. Initially, there was speculation about whether Sharaa’s alignment with Turkey or his connections with Qatar would shape his foreign policy. Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, was the first head of state to visit Damascus after Assad’s ouster in December, suggesting strong ties. However, despite maintaining a balanced relationship with both Ankara and Doha, Sharaa’s priorities now lean toward Saudi Arabia.

    Syria’s renewed ties with Arab leaders signal a sharp break from the years of isolation that followed Assad’s brutal crackdown on the 2011 protests, which led to the country’s suspension from the Arab League for more than a decade.

    For Saudi Arabia, the past four years under Biden marked a period of political and economic turbulence, a stark contrast to the unrestrained confidence of the Trump era. The kingdom found itself navigating a more complicated regional landscape, even losing some influence over traditional satellites like the UAE, which increasingly asserted its own interests and distanced itself from Riyadh’s shadow. Yet, despite these setbacks, the broader currents of international politics have begun to shift in Saudi Arabia’s favor.

    With Trump’s return to power, the U.S. once again needs a reliable Middle Eastern proxy, and no partner fits the role better than Riyadh. Under a renewed Republican administration, Saudi Arabia is poised not just to solidify its dominance in the region but to extend its influence, pulling more countries into its orbit—Syria now among them. After a brief period of recalibration, the kingdom is positioning itself back at the center of global politics, reclaiming its role as a primary powerhouse in the Middle East.

  • From Insurgency to the Presidency: Syria’s Uncertain Bet on Ahmed al-Sharaa

    From Insurgency to the Presidency: Syria’s Uncertain Bet on Ahmed al-Sharaa

    Nearly two months after the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria has a new president. Ahmed al-Sharaa, the supreme leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has emerged as the head of a transitional government, ending Bashar al-Assad’s twenty four-year rule with an insurrection that upended what remained of Syria’s fragile status quo. Al-Sharaa’s rise is no ordinary political evolution. Once a fugitive, he has spent decades navigating the murky underworld of militant jihadism, his career spanning al-Qaeda, Jund al-Sham, and, most notably, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda that later morphed into HTS. Under his leadership, HTS orchestrated the final push against Assad’s forces, forging a tenuous alliance of Islamist factions united less by shared governance ambitions than by their mutual enmity toward the old regime. Yet, for all its battlefield triumphs, HTS remains an organization steeped in an ideology that much of the world considers extremist, its name etched onto lists of terrorist entities from Washington to Moscow.

    Ahmed al-Sharaa, who has functioned as Syria’s de facto ruler since early December, was formally appointed president on Wednesday following a meeting of rebel faction leaders. The announcement, delivered by a military spokesperson, marked a sweeping reorganization of the country’s political and security structures.

    As part of the changes, Syria’s parliament was dissolved, to be replaced by an appointed legislative council, while the country’s 2012 constitution was formally annulled. The existing military and security agencies were also disbanded, with new institutions set to take their place. Additionally, all armed factions in Syria are to be dismantled and integrated into a unified national army. On paper, the order applies to all groups, including HTS, though the group—Syria’s dominant power—was conspicuously left unnamed.

    Sharaa has taken a more pragmatic tone in his push for international recognition, calling for inclusivity and unity in Syria. Following his appointment, he outlined three immediate priorities: filling the power vacuum, preserving civil peace, and building state institutions.

    The transitional government is officially set to transfer power to a new administration in March, though how this will unfold remains uncertain. In an interview with the UAE based media, Al Arabiya last month, Sharaa suggested that elections could take up to four years, while drafting a new constitution might take three. He has promised to hold a national dialogue conference to ensure a more representative post-Assad era, yet the event has been repeatedly postponed. So far, his meetings have been mostly with individuals rather than political parties, raising doubts about the scope of his efforts toward inclusivity.

    The dissolution of Syria’s military factions remains a contentious issue as the interim government, dominated by HTS appointees, works to consolidate power. The role and future of these armed groups have become central concerns in the country’s fragile transition.

    In mid-January, the Syrian Ministry of Defense announced plans to hold consultations with various factions to explore the creation of a unified military. But the challenges are considerable. Many radical Islamist rebel groups—particularly those within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army—lack HTS’s organizational discipline and differ significantly in ideology. The sudden collapse of the Assad regime has also left vast stockpiles of weapons, tanks, and artillery scattered across Syria, some of which have already been seized by insurgent groups, further complicating efforts to impose centralized military control.

    With Kurdish forces controlling significant territory and various other factions still holding land, the question of how Sharaa will unify the country remains unresolved. In an effort to consolidate power, he and the minister of defense have held near-daily meetings with rebel groups, appointing their leaders to key positions in the interim government, including governorships of provinces. Yet, the ideological divide between HTS and other factions—particularly the Kurds, whose vision for Syria starkly differs—poses a serious challenge.

    Foreign interests further complicate Sharaa’s path. While Iran has withdrawn much of its influence, certain factions remain in the country and are expected to cooperate with the new government. If Israel de-escalates its conflict with Lebanon, its attention could once again shift to Syria. Meanwhile, Turkey’s staunch opposition to Kurdish autonomy presents another obstacle, as does the involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, both of which are likely to assert their own strategic interests.

    For Sharaa and the Sunni Islamist factions aligned with him, securing the trust of Syria’s minorities—particularly Christians, Alawites, and Kurds—will be critical. Without their inclusion, Western powers are unlikely to offer support, and Syria risks spiraling into yet another protracted civil war.

    As negotiations between the new government and the Kurds continue, the conflict between the Kurdish-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in northern Syria escalates. The Kurds find themselves in a vulnerable position, with U.S. support for their cause diminishing under the Trump administration, while Turkey remains steadfast in its efforts to weaken them. Faced with limited options, the Kurds are likely to prioritize flight over confrontation, which will only prolong the conflict and fuel further insurgencies from various groups. This may lead to the extended rule of Sharaa, who has proven adept at managing crises. Such patterns are all too familiar in the Middle East, and under Sharaa, Syria does not appear to be charting a different course.

  • Can Turkey Mend Its Fractured Ties with the Kurds?

    Can Turkey Mend Its Fractured Ties with the Kurds?

    Turkey played a key role in ousting the Assad regime from Damascus, earning international praise for its support of HTS and its involvement in ending Syria’s 13-year civil war. This victory marked Turkey’s return to regional politics, an arena once dominated by Israel, Iran, and the Gulf states. For Erdoğan, whose aspirations have long aligned with neo-Ottoman ideals, this achievement was a significant triumph. However, at home, Erdoğan has faced increasing challenges, particularly after setbacks in the recent local elections. Eager to restore his standing, he seeks to present a major accomplishment. As military operations in Syria bolster his narrative, Erdoğan now focuses on resolving Turkey’s long-standing Kurdish conflict, which, if addressed, could strengthen Erdoğan’s domestic position.

    Turkey is actively working to improve relations with its Kurdish population. Three months ago, Erdoğan’s coalition partner, Devlet Bahceli, leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), launched a reconciliation process between the Turkish government and the Kurds. The MHP has long been linked to violent paramilitaries and organized crime, earning a reputation as neo-fascist. In October, Bahceli showed a significant political shift when he reached out to politicians from the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), a group he had previously condemned as an extension of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and called for its ban. This move signals a significant shift,  suggesting that Erdoğan plans to resolve long standing issues by bridging two previously opposing forces. Reflecting on his government’s future agenda, President Erdoğan emphasized that decisive steps would be taken to achieve a vision of a terror-free Turkey and region.

    For decades, Turkey and the Kurds have been locked in a violent history marked by bloodshed, with both sides accusing each other of terrorism. At the heart of the conflict lies the PKK, the Kurdish Workers’ Party, which initially sought independence from Turkey before turning to violent resistance. The PKK, designated a terrorist organization by multiple Western countries, including the EU and the US, has been in armed conflict with the Turkish state since 1984. The conflict has claimed around 40,000 lives between 1984 and 2009. Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK founder, has been serving a life sentence on Imrali Island near Istanbul since 1999. In a surprising twist, Bahceli, known for his tough stance, recently suggested that Öcalan could be released in exchange for renouncing violence and dissolving the PKK. This came as a shock, given that Bahceli’s party had previously called for reinstating the death penalty, particularly to execute Öcalan.

    Shortly afterward, Bahceli publicly addressed the “Millennial Brotherhood” between Turks and Kurds, clarifying that Turkey’s issue was not with the Kurdish people, but with their separatist terrorist organization. Öcalan responded, asserting that he had the competence and determination to contribute positively to the new paradigm. On December 28, two representatives from the pro-Kurdish DEM visited Öcalan at Imrali prison and expressed optimism about the future. Currently, DEM politicians are engaged in discussions with both Erdoğan’s government and the opposition. Significant developments are unfolding that could potentially bring an end to the decade-long hatred and violence.

    At the same time, across the border in Syria, Turkish-backed militias continue to battle Kurdish YPG fighters, whom Turkey sees as a threat to its territorial integrity. While Turkey regards the YPG as a Syrian offshoot of the PKK, the US supports the Kurdish YPG fighters in Syria, further complicating the region’s balance of power. Meanwhile, Turkey demands that Syria’s transitional government disband the YPG militia, which controls significant parts of northern Syria. However, achieving this is not easy. After years of conflict, the YPG has established itself as a powerful force in northeastern Syria. Regardless of potential agreements with Turkey, it remains highly unlikely that the YPG will disarm. Turkey now fears that Kurdish extremists from its territory could gain a permanent foothold in northeastern Syria under YPG control and continue their operations against Turkey. Many experts believe that Erdoğan’s efforts to bring peace aim to integrate the Kurds within Turkey’s borders while seeking to avoid the rise of pan-Kurdish nationalism.

    While many in Turkey remain hopeful about the possibility of building stronger ties between Turks and Kurds, some view this as little more than election-driven politics rather than a genuine shift in public sentiment. Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) can no longer win elections without the Kurdish vote, which represents 15% to 20% of Turkey’s population. The Erdoğan administration faces a significant political and economic crisis, as evidenced by the spring 2023 local elections. In the current climate, Kurdish voters tend to lean toward opposition candidates, forcing Erdoğan and his party to secure their support to remain in power. Politics can sometimes be a catalyst for peace.

  • Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    Can HTS Rebuild Syria Despite the Terrorist Stigma?

    The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 with a brutality few could have foreseen, has, in a technical sense, reached its conclusion. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, worn down by years of conflict and international sanctions, now belongs to history. In its place, Damascus is now under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist faction left to govern a fractured nation, torn apart by sectarian divisions and shaped by decades of authoritarian rule.

    To much of the world, HTS remains an organization shrouded in infamy, its name still marked by the stigma of terrorism. Yet, in the alleys of the capital and the corridors of power, its leaders—chief among them Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—project an image of determined ambition. Their rhetoric emphasizes a break from the grim patterns of extremist rule, rejecting comparisons to the Taliban and pledging an approach guided by pragmatism and, perhaps, restraint. However, words, however carefully crafted to reassure a skeptical world, cannot erase the unease of minorities—Shia, Kurds, and countless others—whose fragile existence on the nation’s periphery remains haunted by the specter of displacement, discrimination, or worse.

    HTS’s tenure in Idlib, long a laboratory for its ambitions, hardly inspires confidence. Reports from the years of its administration there paint a picture of a governing apparatus that struggled to transcend its militant origins, marred by accusations of repression and ineptitude. Now, thrust into the complexities of running a modern state—an endeavor demanding more than rhetoric and religious zeal—the group must wrestle with a task that has humbled leaders far better prepared.

    The biggest challenge for Syria’s new administration is shedding the “Terrorist” label attached to its leadership—a designation that complicates its path to recognition, international aid, and the maneuvering room needed in Syria’s fragmented political landscape. For Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), securing legitimacy could unlock vital support from foreign powers, bolstering its position in a potential tug-of-war with rival factions and even a looming conflict with Kurdish forces.

    Diplomacy, often defined as the art of achieving the improbable, has become the tool of choice for Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Blacklisted as a terrorist by the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and United Nations, al-Sharaa has managed to carve out surprising diplomatic inroads. Shedding his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and the trappings of militant rebellion, he has recast himself as a statesman intent on steering Syria out of five decades of Assad rule. His overtures to Western officials have already borne fruit, with the United States recently lifting a $10 million bounty on his head following what he described as “Productive” talks.

    Winning Western support could prove transformative. Access to international aid would accelerate Syria’s reconstruction after more than a decade of ruinous war. Al-Sharaa’s government, if granted a modicum of trust by the West, could also leverage Sunni solidarity to attract funds from Gulf powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. An alignment with Sunni-majority nations might ease tensions with Israel, paving the way for regional stability—or at least détente.

    The Kurdish question, however, remains a stumbling block. Turkey, HTS’s largest benefactor, vehemently opposes Kurdish autonomy in Syria, while the United States may pressure Damascus to seek a fragile coexistence with Kurdish factions as part of any broader reconciliation. Al-Sharaa’s ability—or inability—to navigate this minefield could define his administration’s relationship with the West.

    Iran poses an equally complex challenge. Maintaining the fragile allegiance of Syria’s Shia minority will require delicate handling, particularly if Tehran views the new Sunni-led administration as a threat to its regional ambitions. Any missteps here risk turning Shia groups, with Iranian support, into a destabilizing force within Syria.

    Russia, meanwhile, cannot be ignored. Marginalized on the global stage but entrenched in Syria, Moscow remains a power broker capable of influencing Damascus’s fortunes. Al-Sharaa must walk a tightrope, balancing old alliances while pursuing new ones—a test of his diplomatic finesse as much as his political will.

    The harsh realities cannot be ignored: over 90 percent of Syrians live in poverty, more than six million have fled the country, and another seven million remain displaced within its borders. A decade of war has crippled the economy, leaving the nation in ruins. For HTS, the road ahead demands more than lofty promises—it requires pragmatic leadership and skilled diplomacy to secure the support essential for Syria’s reconstruction and renewal.

    A stable Syria offers more than just domestic benefits. Refugee returns could ease migration pressures on Turkey and Europe, but the UN has cautioned that hasty repatriation without international support risks reigniting the country’s deep-seated conflicts. Damascus must aim higher than mere stability; it must pursue sustainable peace within a unified state. That vision demands foreign powers, such as Israel, which continues to occupy Syrian territory illegally, step back to allow the country to heal.

    Sharaa’s calls for revisiting Syria’s political transition, particularly the relevance of the 2015 UN Security Council resolution that shaped it, carry merit. Yet his next steps will be decisive. If he insists on entrusting the drafting of a new constitution to a handpicked committee of loyalists, he risks repeating the mistakes of his predecessors. A meaningful constitution must emerge from an assembly elected by Syrians or representatives of the country’s vast diversity—not from a closed circle of ideological allies.

    Failure to adopt an inclusive approach could erode the legitimacy of a new charter, reducing it to a document as disregarded as the Assad regime’s defunct constitution. Sharaa’s rhetoric suggests he understands the stakes, but his actions will determine whether Syria’s long-awaited renewal can take hold—or whether its divisions will only deepen.

  • Turkey and Its Syria: A United Front Against the Kurds?

    Turkey and Its Syria: A United Front Against the Kurds?

    As Iran’s influence over northern Arab states wanes and Russia, once the region’s dominant power broker, finds itself severely diminished, Turkey—or Türkiye—has begun to reassert itself after a prolonged period of restraint. With its alliance solidified with Azerbaijan, Turkey has carved out a strategic foothold in Syria, where a coalition led by Ankara now commands key territories. In this reconfigured landscape, Turkey seems poised to wield the same influence in Syria that Iran once held under Assad. Yet Turkey’s ambitions in Syria go beyond expansionism. For Ankara, a stable, centralized Syrian government—free from Kurdish control—has become essential not only to securing regional dominance but to safeguarding its own national security.

    Syria’s dominant rebel faction, which seized control of Damascus with Turkey’s blessing, has swiftly restored order to the city and appointed a new prime minister to head the country’s transitional government. Mohammad al-Bashir, the newly named premier, previously managed an administration in Idlib under the auspices of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the most formidable of the rebel groups now occupying Damascus and other critical cities. It is evident that the new government will closely align with Turkish interests, with Ankara’s primary objective being the removal of Kurdish forces, who currently control a significant portion of northern Syria.

    The Kurds, an ethnic group long settled in the rugged highlands straddling the borders of Turkey and the Arab states, have endured centuries of persecution and repression at the hands of various occupiers. Though most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, they have faced suspicion from both Sunni and Shia communities alike. The colonial division of the Middle East by the British and French in the early twentieth century left the Kurdish homeland fractured, divided among four states, with Turkey claiming the largest share. From the outset, relations between the Kurds and Turks have been fraught with animosity. What began as a simmering conflict soon escalated, with Turkey deploying brutal tactics to suppress the Kurds, while Kurdish militant groups retaliated with attacks on Turkish cities. Despite these tensions, Turkey ultimately maintained control over the Kurdish population within its borders, though the Kurds, united by a pan-Kurdish identity, sought refuge in Syria and Iraq. As the central governments in both countries weakened, the Kurds expanded their influence, breathing new life into the vision of a pan-Kurdish state—one that has, predictably, caused unease in Ankara. Following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Kurdish forces found new strength, securing territory with the support of international allies united in the battle against the Islamic State.

    Turkey’s attacks on the Kurds have remained relentless, even as the Kurds fought alongside international forces against the Islamic State. However, the conflict in Syria took an unexpected turn after the Syrian civil war, with the ousting of Assad and the rise of Turkish-backed militants in Damascus. This shift led to an intensification of Turkey’s assault on Kurdish forces. In northern Syria, Turkish airstrikes have continued to target Kurdish positions, while the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army has clashed with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who receive U.S. support. According to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, at least 218 people were killed in just three days of fighting between these two forces in Manbij, northeast of Damascus. 

    A far more urgent concern is the potential downfall of the Kurdish militias, which could lead to the Islamic State’s resurgence. If these forces’ survival is threatened, the fate of the prisons—housing numerous ISIS fighters—will no longer be a priority. The collapse of these Kurdish-run prisons could trigger a dangerous wave of ISIS attacks, both within Syria and potentially beyond, creating a significant dilemma for the Trump administration.

    Northeastern Syria is a region of remarkable ethnic diversity, home to significant Arab, Kurdish, and Assyrian populations, alongside smaller communities of Turkmen, Armenians, Circassians, and Yazidis. Contrary to common portrayals, it is not solely inhabited by Kurds. Supporters of the region’s administration argue that it functions as an officially secular polity with aspirations of direct democracy, grounded in the principles of democratic confederalism and libertarian socialism. These ideals promote decentralization, gender equality, environmental sustainability, social ecology, and pluralistic tolerance for religious, cultural, and political diversity—values reflected in its constitution, society, and political framework. The administration sees itself not as a separatist entity but as a model for a federalized Syria, advocating for decentralization rather than outright independence. Both partisan and non-partisan observers have praised the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) as the most democratic system in Syria, citing its open elections, commitment to human rights, and defense of minority and religious freedoms within the region.

    The government in Damascus, however, is a stark contrast. The Sunni Islamist militants, who have proven their governance in the small northern-western part of the country, have left minorities deeply suffering under their rule, prompting comparisons to the Taliban’s Afghanistan. Despite the assurances from HTS leaders that they aim to create a government that upholds the rights of minorities and women, such claims are met with skepticism. Should Turkey and HTS succeed in establishing a legitimate government with a fair constitution, the Kurds may be compelled to join and accept Turkish dominance. However, if governance mirrors that of Idlib, where minorities suffered under harsh rule, the Kurds will likely resist, continuing the fight.

    On most occasions, Turkey—and the Turkish-backed government now exerting control in Syria—will likely resort to military force to annex Kurdish territories, particularly in the wake of Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces, which has left the Kurdish military considerably weakened. Turkey perceives the Kurds as an ongoing threat to its strategic interests in Syria, and for Ankara, conflict appears to offer more leverage than peace. As a result, Turkey’s overarching goal to dominate Syria and dismantle the Kurdish region could spark more  confrontations, further destabilizing an already fractured nation.

  • Is Syria Entering a New Era of Peace?

    Is Syria Entering a New Era of Peace?

    After thirteen years of devastating civil war—claiming around 600,000 lives and displacing six million—rebels have seized Damascus, ending Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime. Once a symbol of unshakable power, Assad has fled, leaving behind a nation scarred by his rule and the violence that defined it. The Islamist coalition Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is now administrating Damascus. Their triumphant march through Syrian cities is marked by the hoisting of a new flag—a poignant echo of the 1930s nationalist movement against French colonial rule. This banner, now embraced by crowds and draped along Damascus’s streets, signifies more than a regime’s collapse; it is a declaration of an era’s end.

    For decades, the Syrian Arab Republic operated less as a democratic state and more as a personal fiefdom under the Assad dynasty. Yet, as the dust settles, the flag’s promise of renewal carries an unspoken question: will this new chapter fulfill the dreams of a fractured nation, or will it lead to yet another uncharted and precarious path?

    A fragile yet palpable sense of hope has begun to spread across Syria in the wake of Assad’s official ouster from the war—a moment that feels almost surreal to a population accustomed to despair. For those who once fled the carnage, enduring the indignities of life as migrants, the news signals the faintest possibility of a return, however uncertain, to a land they scarcely recognize. In liberated cities, the crackle of celebratory gunfire fills the air, and once-omnipresent statues of Assad are toppled with theatrical fervor. Rebels parade captured allies of the former regime through the streets, as the nation’s official flag—its somber hues now synonymous with repression—is replaced with the green-bannered emblem of the opposition. It is a victory both symbolic and intoxicating.

    This moment is being hailed as another hard-won victory for the Arab Spring’s enduring mission to unseat entrenched dictatorships across the Arab world. Yet the cost of this triumph is staggering: thirteen years of relentless conflict, nearly half a million lives lost, and the displacement of more than half of the population—a scale of human suffering that defies comprehension. The rebels’ lightning-fast march from their stronghold in Idlib to Damascus, achieved in a mere two weeks, has drawn inevitable comparisons to the Taliban’s startlingly swift seizure of Kabul. In Syria’s case, the speed of the advance lays bare the hollowed-out power of Assad’s government and the waning influence of its embattled backers, Russia and Iran

    Syria’s descent into chaos was never simply a civil war; it was a stage upon which global powers enacted their rivalries. The United States, Israel, and a constellation of Sunni states found themselves embroiled in a proxy confrontation against Russia and Iran, each seeking to reshape the region’s political contours to their advantage. Now, with reports suggesting that President Bashar al-Assad has fled to Russia alongside his family, the once formidable Russia-Iran axis seems on the brink of relinquishing its tenuous hold over Syria’s fractured state.

    Amid the shifting alliances and fractured ambitions of Syria’s long war, Turkey has emerged as the unequivocal victor in a geopolitical chess that drew in superpowers and regional actors alike. What began as a conflict shaped by American support for liberal factions and the staunch backing of Bashar al-Assad’s regime by Russia and Iran—complicated further by the shadowy maneuvers of Israel and the Sunni bloc—soon morphed into a theater where Ankara played a decisive hand. Faced with the dual pressures of a staggering migrant crisis and an emboldened Kurdish presence along its southern border, Turkey deftly repositioned itself from a peripheral participant to a central player, reshaping the war’s trajectory in ways that no other power could.

    Under Turkey’s strategic direction, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—a Sunni Islamist organization deemed a terrorist group by the United States—cemented alliances with Turkish-backed factions, forging a cohesive and well-supported coalition. Operating from its stronghold in Idlib, HTS received Turkish logistical and tactical support, including training that bolstered its capacity to wage a coordinated campaign. As these forces advanced with astonishing speed, ultimately seizing control in Damascus, Turkey’s influence in Syria became unmistakable. This ascendancy not only underscores Ankara’s newfound leverage but also signals a revival of Turkey’s long-diminished prominence in the complex power dynamics of the Middle East.

    Will the rebels’ triumph herald a lasting peace in Syria? The answer, steeped in the country’s deep-seated divisions, remains elusive. Even as the official government signals a willingness to cooperate with the rebel coalition and promises elections, skepticism pervades. A significant segment of the population—primarily Alawites and Shias—continues to rally behind Assad, their allegiance rooted in sectarian solidarity. Adding to the complexity is the Christian minority’s apprehension toward the Sunni Islamist factions that now dominate the coalition. Distrust runs deep, and it is far from certain that a religiously aligned organization can effectively navigate the intricacies of Syria’s fractured social fabric.

    For the Sunni rebels, forging alliances with these wary communities poses a daunting challenge. Within their own coalition, cracks are already visible, with the specter of internal discord looming and threatening to unravel their fragile unity. Adding to the precariousness is the broader geopolitical chessboard. The risk of another civil war hangs heavy over this uneasy settlement. For now, the promise of peace remains as tenuous as ever, a fragile hope in a nation scarred by relentless conflict and irreconcilable divisions.

    The fall of the Assad regime and the rise of a new administration in Damascus have been met with widespread approval across the globe. The United States and France, two of the West’s most prominent actors in Syria, have openly expressed support for the shift in power. Turkey, meanwhile, has welcomed the outcome, as has Saudi Arabia, which now champions the Sunni-led takeover. Israel, too, seems content, having played a role in Assad’s decline through its strikes on Hezbollah, and now looks favorably upon the prospect of a Sunni populist government in Damascus.

    Despite the optimistic global response, a pressing question lingers: can Syria’s deeply divided population come together under the new administration? Should the proposed government adopt a Sunni Islamist constitution, could this herald yet another chapter of turmoil, akin to the upheavals that followed other Arab Spring uprisings? The answer remains uncertain, as the country’s fractures, both sectarian and political, threaten to undo even the most well-intentioned reforms.

  • How long will Syria remain a battleground?

    How long will Syria remain a battleground?

    After Sunni Islamist rebels captured Aleppo, the Syrian civil war once again grabbed international attention. The conflict, which began in 2011 between Syria’s official government under authoritarian leader Bashar al-Assad and the opposition, has now lasted almost 14 years, claiming nearly 600,000 lives and displacing at least 10 million people. It has filled headlines at various points over the years and shows no signs of slowing down. The civil war in Syria has undoubtedly become one of the biggest disasters in the 21st century and a significant benchmark in modern warfare. While, on the surface, the war appears to be a power struggle between Assad and the opposition, a closer examination reveals a deeper dynamic. The war involves numerous parties, each pursuing its own interests, and Syria has become a battleground for various countries.

    President Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist government receives political and military support from its Shia partner, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and its long-time ally, Russia, another authoritarian regime. The Lebanese Hezbollah group, the Palestinian PFLP-GC, and other factions also actively back the regime. Since September 30, 2015, Russia has deployed military assets in Syria, conducting a major air campaign against anti-government forces at Assad’s request. The U.S. and its regional allies have criticized Russia’s military actions. However, these regional allies soon pursued their own interests in the war. In November 2015, Turkey, a U.S. ally, clashed with Russia over alleged airspace violations and Russian bombings of areas in Syria that were supported by Turkey’s anti-government factions. Meanwhile, the United States did not align with Turkey and ran its own operations.

    The Syrian opposition, represented politically by the Syrian National Coalition, receives financial, logistical, and sometimes military support from Sunni-majority states allied with the U.S., particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-majority group fighting against Assad in northern Syria, receive military and logistical support from NATO countries, except Turkey, due to their historic rivalry. Instead of helping them, Turkey fights the SDF and has captured a significant amount of territory from them.

    Besides the superpowers and their factions, from 2014 to October 2017, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a group internationally recognized as a terrorist organization, controlled a significant portion of Syria’s territory. During this period, Western nations, including the U.S., Russia, Britain, and France, conducted direct military actions against ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Now, ISIL has shrunk to only a few desert pockets.

    As of December 2024, five key countries are directing the war in Syria: the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Israel. Despite its war in Ukraine, Russia remains a staunch supporter of Assad’s regime. Even after Islamist advances in Aleppo, Russia continues to send support to Assad, signaling its long-term plans in the region. By the summer of 2023, Russia had maintained 20 military bases and 85 other military points in Syria, with plans to enhance infrastructure to strengthen its military presence and capabilities.

    As Iran seeks to cement Shia dominance in Syria, engage in a power struggle with Israel, and ensure Assad’s regime remains strong, it actively supports Shia militants in Syria. Neighboring Lebanon and Iraq, though not directly involved, serve as havens for militants, effectively acting as breeding grounds for various Shia armed groups.

    The United States remains present in Syria, albeit with reduced involvement compared to earlier years. It operates a small portion near the Jordanian and Iraqi borders and supports rebel factions in the region. The U.S. maintains strong ties with Kurdish forces, now the second-largest military group in Syria, who control significant territory in the northeast.

    Turkey, a NATO member and nominal U.S. ally, pursues its own agenda in Syria. Opposed to both Assad and the Kurds, Turkey has seized and controls large areas in northern Syria, creating a buffer zone. Turkish forces have clashed with Kurdish groups, and Ankara reportedly has ties to Sunni Islamist factions, including HTS, which recently captured Aleppo. Turkey’s primary goal is to establish a Sunni, anti-Kurdish opposition  presence in the region.

    Israel remains highly active in Syria, viewing Iranian involvement in the country as a direct threat. Israeli forces frequently target Iranian officials and Hezbollah members operating in Syria, particularly those linked to attacks on Israel. If opportunities arise, Israel may also seek to expand its territorial control in the region.

    What is the future of the Syrian civil war? When will it end? How long will it last?

    The answer is that it will continue. Syria has already collapsed, but the war will persist as long as foreign powers maintain their interests in Syria. A complete takeover by Assad, as seen in the past, is unlikely. Russia and Iran, Assad’s key allies, are deeply entangled in other wars and face significant financial strains, limiting their ability to recapture all the territory back.

    The United States, under leadership like Trump’s, is unlikely to deploy troops actively to support the rebels against Russia and Iran. However, the U.S. will not entirely abandon the Opposition and Kurds, as they align with American interests in the region.

    Meanwhile, Turkey will remain a major player, continuing its support for HTS and other anti-Kurd factions. The conflict is evolving into a three-way war, with Assad’s official army, supported by Russia and Iranian-backed Shia militias, on one side; Kurdish forces and U.S.-backed militias on another; and HTS, Turkey, and Sunni militias on the third.

    These factions will continue to clash, ensuring that Syria endures more bloodshed and tears in the years ahead.

  • Resurgence of Syria’s Rebel Islamists: Trouble Brewing Again?

    Resurgence of Syria’s Rebel Islamists: Trouble Brewing Again?

    The Syrian civil war is once again drawing global attention as Islamist groups in northwest Syria conquer Aleppo by defeating the official Syrian army. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist militant group leading the Syrian Salvage Government from Idlib, has announced its victory and shared images from Aleppo, Syria’s historic and second-largest city. Although HTS is not directly affiliated with the former Islamic State, its victory in Aleppo has raised global concerns about Syria potentially falling under renewed Islamist rule, reviving the horrific memories of the Islamic State.

    The Sunni Islamist faction HTS views this advancement as a major victory over the Shia-dominated Assad regime and his sponsors, Iran and Russia. Taking Aleppo is not only a strategic victory for the rebels but also an emotional one. The city has been a focal point in Syria’s civil war for over a decade. The 2016 battle for Aleppo, in which Assad’s forces recaptured the city, turned the civil war in his favor. Now, Aleppo is once again under the control of Islamists. Many people are fleeing Aleppo, fearing that Islamist factions could revive the horrors of ISIS’s reign. They consider Assad’s oppressive rule a lesser evil compared to the horror that Islamist control would bring.

    Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a major offensive earlier this week. Within three days, they reached Aleppo, exposing the weakness of the official army’s defense. This marked the first time in four years that insurgents captured territory around the city’s outskirts. On Friday afternoon, Turkish media reported that jihadists and allied factions had seized significant portions of Aleppo. In response, Syrian government forces based in Damascus launched at least 125 airstrikes and shelled rebel-controlled areas in Idlib and western Aleppo. However, there has been no significant progress in their favor.

    Damascus expects more Russian military equipment to help it navigate the current situation. However, doubts persist due to Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine, where it faces shortages of ammunition and personnel. While  Russia itself is relying on North Korean soldiers to reinforce its forces in Ukraine, questions arise about how much assistance it can offer Syria. Iran and Hezbollah, Assad’s key allies, have also suffered significant setbacks in their conflict with Israel, which has caused heavy losses. Although they recently brokered a ceasefire, the lull allowed Syria’s Salvation Government to seize the opportunity to act. Meanwhile, Palestine supporters on social media are accusing Israel, the United States, Turkey, and HTS of forming a possible alliance. 

    HTS’s capture of Aleppo has escalated the civil war, which began in 2011 and continues to tear Syria apart. The war is likely to see further developments, possibly becoming a battleground for world powers. Currently, the rebels cannot unite with other groups against Damascus due to ideological differences. HTS may team up with Turkey and its groups within Syria to confront the Kurds, who control significant territory. This shift could overshadow the ongoing struggle between the rebels and the Assad regime.

    The future of Syria likely involves a divided nation with shifting borders. HTS, the militants in Idlib, have tried to demonstrate their ability to govern but face accusations of suppressing dissent and relying heavily on dwindling international aid to meet civilians’ needs. For now, the militants are more focused on expanding the battlefield than on addressing the people’s needs and The people of Syria find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place.