Tag: Azerbaijan

  • A Peace Deal in the Caucasus, Sealed Under Baku’s Shadow

    A Peace Deal in the Caucasus, Sealed Under Baku’s Shadow

    One of history’s most entrenched rivalries has reached a critical moment. Azerbaijan and Armenia have finalized a peace agreement after a conflict that ended in Armenia’s crushing defeat. The foreign ministries of both Caucasus neighbors have confirmed the treaty, marking what could be a historic breakthrough—though deep-seated animosities remain.

    The hostility between these two ethnic groups stretches back centuries, shaped by a long history of massacres and territorial disputes that have left thousands dead. Their struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region deeply intertwined with Armenian identity, has been a focal point of bloodshed for generations. Wars erupted with the Soviet Union’s collapse and again in 2020, before Azerbaijan launched a swift and overwhelming offensive in September 2023, reclaiming Nagorno-Karabakh and fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitics.

    Today, relations between the two nations are at their lowest point. While international pressure—particularly from Europe and Russia—has long sought to push both sides toward reconciliation, negotiations have repeatedly collapsed under the weight of unresolved disputes.

    Finally, a Peace Deal

    Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister, Jeyhun Bayramov, declared that negotiations on the peace agreement with Armenia had concluded, stating that Armenia had accepted Azerbaijan’s proposals on the two previously unresolved articles. Armenia’s foreign ministry later confirmed that the draft agreement had been finalized and was ready for signing. However, highlighting lingering tensions, Armenia criticized Azerbaijan for announcing the deal unilaterally instead of issuing a joint statement. Despite this, it expressed willingness to discuss the timing and location for the formal signing.

    The peace deal ultimately took shape with Armenia conceding to Azerbaijan’s demands. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan formally recognized Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively ending three decades of Armenian separatist rule—a move widely viewed as a pivotal step toward normalization. Additionally, Armenia had already ceded four border villages to Azerbaijan the previous year, relinquishing territory held for decades. In the end, Azerbaijan secured an unquestionable victory, while Armenia endured a resounding and humiliating defeat.

    Who Made the Deal Happen?

    A peace deal had long been a priority for key regional players, particularly Russia and the European Union, both seeking to maintain their foothold in the region. Traditionally, Russia acted as the primary mediator between these deeply divided ethnic rivals, maintaining a peacekeeping presence. However, Armenia’s defeat in the war—and its sense of betrayal by Moscow—fundamentally shifted this dynamic.

    Tensions over the conflict further strained Armenia-Russia relations, with Yerevan openly accusing Moscow of failing to provide support. In response to what it saw as Russian inaction, Armenia suspended its participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) last year. While Russia, the United States, and the EU each attempted to mediate at different stages, Moscow’s waning influence became increasingly evident—not just in its inability to shape the outcome but also in the tone of official statements.

    The Minsk Group—formed in 1992 under the leadership of the United States, Russia, and France—was originally tasked with overseeing the peace process. However, its relevance diminished over the years, particularly as Azerbaijan accused it of favoring Armenia. As a result, the draft peace treaty was largely negotiated outside the Minsk Group framework, with the final agreement reached directly between the two countries.

    The credit for the peace deal goes to both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Despite the political fallout from Armenia’s defeat, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan chose to push forward with negotiations, ensuring that discussions remained on track. With international actors facilitating the process, Azerbaijan reaffirmed its commitment to ongoing dialogue, expressing its readiness to engage in bilateral talks on normalization and other unresolved issues.

    What Does It Mean for the Region?

    Deep-seated ethnic animosities endure, passed down through generations, ensuring that distrust remains deeply ingrained. True reconciliation remains elusive, as neither side fully trusts the other, and the scars of war—along with the terms of the peace deal—are unlikely to fade from their collective memory. Azerbaijan, having secured a decisive victory, still harbors ambitions for further territorial gains at Armenia’s expense, a demand shaped by historical grievances and nationalist aspirations.

    The region’s geopolitical complexities further heighten the uncertainty, deterring direct intervention from external powers. Russia has positioned itself firmly behind Azerbaijan while maintaining strategic ties with Turkey and, notably, Israel. Armenia, meanwhile, counts on support from Europe, the United States, and, unexpectedly, Iran—creating a tangle of alliances that makes the situation even more precarious.

    With Azerbaijan holding the upper hand, the potential for renewed conflict remains high. Should Europe strengthen its backing for Armenia, Russia may encourage further Azerbaijani assertiveness, exacerbating tensions. At the same time, any instability involving Iran could ripple across the region, adding another layer of volatility. While the peace deal may provide a temporary reprieve, its long-term viability remains uncertain, leaving the specter of future conflict looming over the region.

    More Issues to Be Settled

    Disputes also continued over proposals for both nations to withdraw legal cases from international courts. Armenia and Azerbaijan remain embroiled in litigation before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human Rights, each accusing the other of rights violations committed before, during, and after their armed conflicts.

    Pashinyan emphasized the need for clarity, stating that withdrawal from international courts must come with a complete renunciation of the cases. He warned that without such assurances, there could be a scenario where both sides formally drop their legal claims, only for Azerbaijan to later revive these issues bilaterally, potentially escalating tensions.

    Azerbaijan has also made additional demands. Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that Baku expects Armenia to amend its constitution by removing references to its declaration of independence, which asserts territorial claims over Nagorno-Karabakh. Such amendments would require a national referendum. Meanwhile, nearly all of Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population—more than 100,000 people—fled the region after Azerbaijan reclaimed it in a swift, 24-hour offensive.

    In the months leading up to the announcement that the peace treaty text had been finalized, bilateral relations deteriorated sharply, raising doubts about a near-term settlement. Azerbaijan hardened its stance on securing a land corridor to Nakhchivan, while Baku’s rhetoric grew increasingly aggressive. This hardline approach now appears to have pressured Armenia—still reeling from its disastrous defeat in the Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan’s reconquest of the region in late 2023—into making key concessions on the treaty’s most contentious issues.

    With their differences on two critical negotiating points now settled, Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to be advancing toward the formal signing of a peace agreement. However, this does not guarantee lasting peace for both of them.

  • How Azerbaijan Found the Nerve to Stand Up to Russia

    How Azerbaijan Found the Nerve to Stand Up to Russia

    Russia is floundering on all fronts. Humiliated on the battlefield and steadily losing once-friendly nations in Europe, it faces mounting economic hardship, forced to sell its resources at cut-rate prices to China and India. Yet perhaps the greater indignity lies in the defiance of its former satellite states—once obedient, now emboldened to seek new alliances. The war in Ukraine, one of Putin’s most catastrophic miscalculations, has become a lingering nightmare for the Kremlin. Countries that once deferred to Moscow now openly challenge its authority. The latest to break ranks is Azerbaijan, a small but strategically significant Caucasus nation long dependent on Russia. As tensions rise over the downing of an Azerbaijani passenger jet, the standoff is yet another sign of Moscow’s eroding influence over its former empire.

    Azerbaijan has every right to be outraged after losing its citizens in what it considers a Russian mistake. Few, however, could have anticipated that the fallout would escalate into a full-blown standoff.

    On December 25, an Azerbaijan Airlines plane crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people after being rerouted across the Caspian Sea from southern Russia. In the aftermath, Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev—a close ally of Vladimir Putin—accused Russia of accidentally shooting down the aircraft with its air defense system. He condemned Moscow for attempting to conceal the incident for days, calling the response shocking, regrettable, and a legitimate cause for indignation in Baku.

    In an unusual move, Putin expressed condolences and referred to the crash as a tragic incident, though he stopped short of admitting Russia’s responsibility—a response that only deepened Azerbaijan’s anger.

    Tensions have been high since the incident. On Wednesday, the APA news agency, closely tied to the Azerbaijani government, reported that Baku was preparing to take Russia to international court over the alleged downing of the plane. The agency disclosed that facts and evidence were being collected, with preparations underway for an official appeal. The article also delivered a pointed criticism of Moscow, accusing it of trying to evade responsibility for the incident.

    The report revealed that Azerbaijan had identified both the individuals who gave the order to fire and those who followed through with it. The article implied that Russia was trying to craft a scenario similar to the Malaysia Airlines incident, drawing a parallel to Moscow’s ongoing denial of responsibility for the 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine. APA warned that unless Russia publicly acknowledged its role and took responsibility, Baku would escalate its response.

    The article, widely believed to have been published with the approval of local authorities in tightly controlled Azerbaijan, appeared a day after a report from Kazakh officials, which revealed that the plane had sustained external damage and had numerous holes in its fuselage. The report, however, was carefully worded and refrained from specifying the cause of the damage, including to the plane’s stabilizers, hydraulics, and trim systems. 

    On Thursday, tensions further escalated when Azerbaijan ordered Moscow to shut down the Russian House cultural center in Baku. The center, operated by Rossotrudnichestvo—a Russian federal agency viewed as a tool of Russian soft power and often suspected of functioning as a front for espionage and covert operations—was the target of this action. Simultaneously, Azerbaijani state media reported that Baku had sent a rare shipment of non-military aid to support Ukraine.

    What gives this small state, traditionally within Russia’s sphere of influence, the courage to engage in a dispute with the mighty Russia? Several factors are at play. First, Russia’s downfall is a significant motivator. When the war in Ukraine began, many expected that Ukraine would fall within a month, but now, three years later, Ukraine is still standing strong and has become a major ally of the West. Meanwhile, states like Sweden and Finland who refused to join the west previously  have joined NATO, and Russia has been unable to block them. Militarily, Russia is no longer perceived as a superpower, and Azerbaijan believes it can withstand challenges from Russia.

    Second, there’s the economic factor. Beyond the surface, Russia’s economy and businesses are struggling under the weight of sanctions. Tying Azerbaijan’s economy to Russia could cause trouble for Azerbaijan’s business interests as well. However, distancing itself from Russia opens up more economic freedom for Azerbaijan. This newfound confidence is also fueled by Azerbaijan’s growing role in the West’s energy plans, especially after the EU sought alternatives to Russian fossil fuels.

    Azerbaijan’s stance is also part of a broader regional trend. Its longtime rival, Armenia, publicly broke with the Kremlin after Russian peacekeeping forces failed to prevent Azerbaijan from seizing control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Armenia became the first country to leave the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and began turning to the West and Iran for support. Recently, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan even hinted at pursuing EU membership.

    In neighboring Georgia, thousands have taken to the streets, pushing for Western support. Azerbaijan, however, is not necessarily looking to Europe for support. With Turkey, a key ally and fellow ethnic partner, in power, Azerbaijan sees strengthening its ties with Turkey as a route to greater Western alignment. This shift also reflects a broader change in the Middle East, where Iran’s influence, along with Russia’s, is waning. More countries, including Lebanon and Syria, are gravitating toward pro-Western governments, and Azerbaijan could easily join this trend.

    Many still believe that President Aliyev is playing a delicate game, leveraging his close ties with Moscow to manage the situation. By escalating tensions with Russia, he may be attempting to redirect public anger over the incident, easing pressure on his regime and preventing mass protests. Despite the apparent standoff, Azerbaijan and Russia remain deeply intertwined economically and politically, and some caution against assuming a complete break.

    In recent years, Azerbaijan has solidified its economic ties with Russia, with Moscow increasingly dependent on Azerbaijan as a crucial transit hub. Perched on the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan facilitates the movement of goods to and from Iran and the Persian Gulf, helping Russia circumvent Western sanctions and tap into new markets. While some in Moscow hold out hope that a genuine apology could mollify tensions and restore the status quo, one cannot help but wonder: Has Azerbaijan grown strong enough to challenge the once-unstoppable Russia? Or could it be that Russia’s grip has weakened to such a degree that even a small power like Azerbaijan now dares to stand in opposition?

  • Kazakhstan’s Shrewd Neutrality in Azerbaijan-Russia Tensions

    Kazakhstan’s Shrewd Neutrality in Azerbaijan-Russia Tensions

    Russia finds itself in an embarrassing position, forced to apologize to Azerbaijan over a significant aviation incident that has created an unexpected rift between the two former Soviet republics. Once allies, their relationship—marked by Azerbaijan’s support for Russia during sanctions and Russia’s backing of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia—has been strained by the crash. The tensions evolved when Russia, amid its war with Ukraine and ongoing drone threats, accidentally shot down an Azerbaijani civilian plane. In response, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev demanded full accountability, sharply criticizing Russia’s apology while avoiding full responsibility. While some see this as political posturing by two authoritarian leaders, the discord is adding a new layer of complexity to their partnership. Kazakhstan, a common ally of both and the site of the plane crash, is now caught in the middle. As authorities prepare to hand over the black box data to Kazakhstan, the country faces the challenge of managing the geopolitical fallout.

    Kazakhstan is effectively mediating between two feuding partners, both critical to its interests. Leaning too far toward one risks alienating the other, particularly if they reconcile. Russia, as Kazakhstan’s protector and economic partner, wields considerable influence over the country’s actions. Russia holds leverage through the pipeline transporting oil from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field to export markets via the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Managed by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, this pipeline handles around 80% of Tengiz oil exports. Moscow could disrupt operations to influence Kazakhstan’s decisions or punish it for perceived missteps. As seen in the summer of 2022, Russia can halt the transportation of Kazakh oil to Europe under the guise of infrastructure repairs. This could result in significant losses for Kazakhstan, signaling a harsh warning from Russia.

    At this juncture, Kazakhstan may have even more to lose by alienating Azerbaijan. The two countries are crucial transit points for East-West trade along the Middle Corridor, and they are also collaborating on a consortium to ship solar- and wind-generated power to Western markets. For Astana, Baku is a very important partner, and in the future, an even more vital one, particularly in the joint development of the Trans-Caspian route.

    Despite Kazakhstan’s central role in the investigation, Kazakh officials have sought to remain aloof from the growing controversy. In the hours following the crash, they appeared to amplify alternative theories promoted by Russia, including the now-debunked claim that an oxygen tank inside the aircraft exploded. Kazakh officials also initially supported a Russian proposal for a CIS commission to handle the investigation, which would have given Moscow greater influence over both the scope and final report of the probe. As mounting evidence, including survivor testimonies, pointed to a shoot-down, Kazakhstan shifted to a more neutral stance. In the final days of December, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held telephone conversations with both Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as reported by the presidential press service, though the substance of those talks remained undisclosed.

    State-controlled media in Kazakhstan has largely refrained from speculating on the cause of the crash, instead highlighting the government’s commitment to uncovering the truth. Official publications emphasize that Kazakhstan is diligently working to determine what happened, strictly adhering to international guidelines. Transport Minister Marat Karabayev, for example, cited the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Chicago Convention to justify sending the jet’s black boxes to Brazil—a move likely to irk Russia, given its apparent desire to suppress evidence of a shoot-down. Independent media outlets in Kazakhstan, such as Orda.kz, have taken a more critical approach, often highlighting statements from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Western officials who attribute responsibility for the tragedy to Russia. However, the Kazakhstan government  has notably refrained from directly blaming Russia, a stance that remains intriguing.

    On most occasions, these three countries manage to resolve their issues due to the connection between flawed administrations, shared interests in blocking Western influence, and a convenient yet unholy alliance between businesses and politicians. The current drift is part of an authoritarian theater, meant to keep their populations in check. However, it’s noteworthy that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have reached a point where they can challenge Russia, showcasing the evident decline of Russian power. If this shift continues and the political theater backfires, Azerbaijan may lean closer to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., further escalating tensions. Caught between the Russian and Turkic spheres, Kazakhstan could face even more significant challenges. A shift in alliances seems to be unfolding in Central Asia, and this evolving tension deserves careful monitoring.

  • A Drift or Another Drama? What’s Happening Between Azerbaijan and Russia?

    A Drift or Another Drama? What’s Happening Between Azerbaijan and Russia?

    Azerbaijan and Russia share a strong and multifaceted relationship, characterized by cooperation in various sectors, from business to politics. They consistently support each other’s interests. Despite Russia’s political turmoil—fueled by its prolonged war and increasing sanctions, with many nations distancing themselves and turning to the West—Azerbaijan remains steadfast in its loyalty to Russia. This enduring commitment has brought Azerbaijan significant benefits, including Russia’s support in reclaiming territories once held by Armenia. As a result, Azerbaijan and its president have become prominent figures, not only in the region but also across the broader Islamic world, earning recognition comparable to that of Vladimir Putin.

    Envy often accompanies the sight of seemingly perfect couples, and similarly, some political observers are growing skeptical of the relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia. They question the true strength of their bond. On the surface, the two countries appear to maintain a strong alliance. However, some believe Azerbaijan may shift its allegiances when the time is right, strengthening ties with Turkey and other influential actors to move closer to the West. Despite this potential shift, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s close relationship with Vladimir Putin has left little doubt. 

    The recent tragic incident, in which a Russian defense system reportedly shot down an Azerbaijani Airlines civilian plane, resulted in the deaths of 38 people, including Azerbaijani citizens, sparking widespread outrage and prompting sharp criticism of the Kremlin from President Ilham Aliyev. Aliyev stated that the plane was struck by ground fire over Russian territory and made uncontrollable by electronic warfare, before criticizing Moscow for attempting to conceal the incident for several days. He expressed disappointment with Russia’s handling of the situation and accused the country of suppressing the truth, describing his reaction as upset and surprised by the initial explanations provided by Russian officials. Aliyev pointed out that for the first three days, Russia offered only absurd versions of the events. 

    Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had made three demands to Russia regarding the crash. The first was for Russia to apologize to Azerbaijan; the second, for Russia to admit its guilt; and the third, to punish those responsible, hold them criminally accountable, and provide compensation to both the Azerbaijani state and the injured passengers and crew members. Aliyev noted that the first demand had already been fulfilled when Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an apology on Saturday, referring to the crash as a “tragic incident,” though he did not acknowledge Moscow’s responsibility. Putin mentioned that an investigation was ongoing and the final version of events would be revealed once the black boxes were opened. Aliyev also emphasized that Azerbaijan had always supported the involvement of international experts in the investigation. He pointed out that Azerbaijan had “Categorically Refused” Russia’s suggestion to allow the Interstate Aviation Committee, which governs civil aviation within the Commonwealth of Independent States, to handle the inquiry. Aliyev argued that the committee, made up largely of Russian officials and led by Russian citizens, could not ensure the necessary objectivity.

    Under normal circumstances, Azerbaijan would not have had the courage to present these demands to Russia. This shift may stem from recognizing Russia’s weakened position, or it could be an effort to placate public anger. Both Aliyev and Putin are adept at directing such drama.

    Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov informed Russian state media on Sunday that President Putin had spoken with Azerbaijani President Aliyev again over the phone, though he did not disclose any details of the conversation. The Kremlin also announced that a joint investigation involving Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan was underway at the crash site near Aktau, Kazakhstan. The plane, which was traveling from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Grozny, Chechnya, unexpectedly veered off course toward Kazakhstan, hundreds of miles across the Caspian Sea, and crashed while attempting to land. Dmitry Yadrov, head of Russia’s civil aviation authority, Rosaviatsia, explained that as the plane was preparing to land in Grozny amid thick fog, Ukrainian drones were reportedly targeting the city, prompting authorities to close the area to air traffic. Passengers and crew who survived the crash later told Azerbaijani media that they heard loud noises aboard the plane as it circled over Grozny.

    This airplane crash and the subsequent incidents highlight Russia’s growing weaknesses, and Azerbaijan is sensing this shift. The country may seize the opportunity to seek out other allies. However, Aliyev understands that, unlike Zelensky, Azerbaijan cannot afford to distance itself too much from Russia. Most likely, Azerbaijan will maintain its relationship with Moscow, but it now has valid reasons to open discussions with the West.

  • The Politics of Climate Conference

    The Politics of Climate Conference

    There are no longer any doubts about climate change, as its effects are evident to everyone. People’s suffering continues to grow, but climate spending and the politics surrounding it have caused significant division. The global right-wing and those burdened by rising living costs protest the expenses tied to climate initiatives, while the global left and climate activists demand more funding for climate action. As this polarization grows, the United Nations held its annual Climate Change Conference, COP29, in Azerbaijan, a country made up of oil. The conference took place in Baku from November 11 to 22, 2024.

    Unlike previous years, the event failed to generate significant attention. Despite the Azerbaijani government investing substantial oil revenues in PR campaigns, international media provided minimal coverage. The conference lost the global focus it once enjoyed, though it sparked some interesting controversies. The controversy began with the choice of hosts. Last year, Dubai—a wealthy, oil-rich desert hub—hosted the conference. This year, the decision to hold COP29 in Azerbaijan raised eyebrows once again. Azerbaijan, a major oil and gas producer, is also known for its authoritarian governance and widespread corruption. Adding to the controversy, Mukhtar Babayev, a longtime official with Azerbaijan’s state-owned oil company SOCAR, served as the president of COP29. These contradictions are glaring, much like LGBTQ+ advocates supporting Muslim rights. The peak of these ironies fuels doubts among the public and erodes trust in global climate efforts. Many accuse these actions of greenwashing, with little positive impact on the climate. Countries and businesses use climate change as a means to generate public opinion, much like how sports-washing works.

    COP29 Chief Executive Elnur Soltanov was secretly recorded discussing potential oil and gas deals during the conference, raising serious concerns about the need for such high-cost events. And EU diplomats criticized Azerbaijan for excluding fossil fuel phase-out from the conference agenda, which focused solely on mitigation. These events led Papua New Guinea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Justin Tkatchenko, to announce a boycott of the summit, calling it a total waste of time.

    Discussions largely focused on climate-related finances. A key agenda item was negotiating the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, which sought to establish a new financial target to support developing nations after 2025, building on the previous $100 billion annual commitment. Proposed solutions included blended finance, which combines public and private investments to boost funding for climate initiatives, and debt-for-nature swaps, allowing countries to redirect debt repayments toward environmental and climate projects. COP29 encouraged global financial institutions and the private sector to increase climate finance and invest in green innovation. 

    Delegates also agreed on rules and established a UN registry to facilitate and track international carbon credit trading. Key points of tension in the negotiations involved the donor base. Developed economies, such as the US and the European Union, argued that resource-rich countries like China and Gulf Cooperation Council nations should automatically contribute. Another point of contention was the share of funding coming from public budgets, with developing countries demanding significant increases in public, non-loan grants. The final $300 billion climate finance agreement stipulates that both public and private sources will provide funding and encourages voluntary contributions from developing countries, including China and Middle Eastern nations.

    The next COP, set to take place in Brazil in 2025, is expected to witness more intense political friction. The United States will have a new president, one who has shown little interest in climate-related issues. This shift could influence major countries, particularly in Europe, where there is significant opposition to spending large amounts of money on climate initiatives. The rise of right-wing movements and the weakening of climate-focused green parties in Europe may further undermine pledges, as they may not come to fruition. Meanwhile, China and India, the world’s growing economies, are unlikely to bear the burden even though they find clear opportunities in the process. As a result, the climate will continue to heat up.

  • Putin Still Seeks to Mediate Peace in the Caucasus

    Putin Still Seeks to Mediate Peace in the Caucasus

    A notable shift in sentiment is occurring among the populations of former Soviet countries, commonly known as the Russosphere. Younger generations, largely unexposed to Soviet propaganda, are increasingly influenced by Western ways of living. Eastern Europe, with the exception of Belarus, which still has a pro-Russian government, appears to be slipping away from Russia’s influence. Russia now fears it may lose its grip on the Caucasus next. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has exposed Russia’s weaknesses, leading many to question its ability to act as the heir of the Soviet Union. Despite initiating the war two years ago, Russia has struggled to invade Ukraine and achieve its objectives, facing repeated humiliations. The Caucasus, a compact yet geopolitically pivotal region bridging Asia and Europe, once firmly under Russia’s sway, is now drifting towards Europe. In Georgia and Armenia, a growing Europhile sentiment is visible, as the people increasingly look westward, aligning their aspirations more closely with Europe Any significant move in this direction could pose a serious challenge to Moscow. Putin and the Kremlin seem to have recognized this changing mood and appear to be taking steps to address it.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent two-day visit to Azerbaijan makes it clear that he intends to maintain his role as a powerbroker in the Caucasus. However, whether he still has the influence to do so remains uncertain. Putin’s trip to Baku on August 18th and 19th occurred against the backdrop of Russia’s deteriorating strategic partnership with Armenia, where Yerevan has increasingly strengthened its political and security ties with the West, and a continuing Ukrainian offensive in Russia’s Kursk region. Despite these challenges, Putin adopted a business-as-usual attitude throughout his visit, highlighting the economic advantages of the Declaration of Alliance between Russia and Azerbaijan signed in 2022, just days before Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine. Putin mentioned that cooperation could extend beyond energy to include industrial collaboration, transport, logistics, and light industry. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, in turn, highlighted Azerbaijan’s commitment to preserving and promoting the Russian language, noting that over 160,000 students were enrolled in more than 300 Russian schools in the country. He also acknowledged Russia’s peacekeeping role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    With Russia’s strained relations with Armenia, the central question during Putin’s visit was whether Moscow could still play a meaningful role in brokering peace between Baku and Yerevan. Putin certainly seems eager to try. At one point, he expressed to Aliyev his willingness to facilitate efforts to delimit and demarcate the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as well as to broker a peace deal. Putin clearly does not want to see himself-or Russia-sidelined in the peace negotiations.

    Even though Russia can influence Armenian politicians with business ties to Moscow, significant discontent remains among the Armenian population. Many Armenians view the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh as a betrayal by Russia, believing that Russia now favors Azerbaijan, thus undermining their historical Orthodox alliance. It is important to recognize that public sentiment may differ from the views of their politicians. Putin and Russia have a vested interest in Azerbaijan due to its rich natural resources and its strategic position as a route from Turkey and the Middle East to Russia for money and investments. This interest aligns with Putin’s ambitious North-South Corridor project, which aims to boost direct trade with Iran and India, bypassing intermediaries. This initiative could help offset the loss of business with Europe and reduce Russia’s current overreliance on China, which greatly benefits from this dependence. Thus, Azerbaijan is a top priority in the Caucasus for Russia, even though Moscow does not want to lose Armenia entirely. If Russia cannot settle its issues with Armenia, it is likely that Armenia will turn more towards the West. With both Georgia and Armenia moving away from Russian influence, Russia faces severe security risks.

    Russia’s historical involvement in the South Caucasus underscores the necessity of its participation in the peace process. However, Armenian officials, who have accused Moscow of failing to uphold security guarantees during the Second Karabakh War, appear reluctant to accept further Russian involvement. On August 19, a representative from the Armenian Foreign Ministry criticized Russian diplomats for making biased and disrespectful remarks about Armenia and questioned Russia’s commitment to fostering constructive engagement between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials. It also seems that as countries increasingly challenge Putin and Russia in the region. On this occasion,  Putin is attempting to maintain a presence and their importance through his diplomatic meetings in Baku.

  • Armenia’s Blossoming Relationship with India

    Armenia, feeling abandoned after its humiliating loss in the war with Azerbaijan, struggles to make decisions in international relations. Russia has chosen to side with Azerbaijan, but Armenia cannot become hostile toward Russia as it still heavily relies on Russian military support and the Russian economy. Armenia cannot turn much toward the West either, as it observes the situation in Ukraine. Considering NATO is challenging for Armenia because Turkey, a NATO member, is a historical enemy. China does not prioritize its relationship with Armenia since Azerbaijan is one of its important trade partners. Therefore, no superpower is completely reliable for Armenia at the moment. However, in this situation, a surprising entry is gaining importance. Despite being a developing country, India is a rising superpower both militarily and economically, with aspirations for greater influence. India, which maintains friendly relations with both Russia and the USA, is becoming a great partner for Armenia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who heads a Hindu nationalist party and has shown past animosity towards Islam, is looking interested in strengthening ties with Armenia.

    For Armenia, partnering with India is an excellent option at present. Armenia seems interested in further developing its relationship with India, which has flourished through bilateral military cooperation. In March 2020, Armenia signed an important agreement to purchase four Swathi Weapon Locating Radars for $40 million from India. In September 2022, Armenia agreed to purchase four batteries of Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank rockets, and various types of ammunition from India for $240 million. Indian Aerospace Defence News reports that by the start of the current fiscal year 2024-25, Armenia’s total weapons purchases from India had reached $600 million, making it the largest buyer of Indian weapons.

    There will be restrictions on obtaining military equipment from Russia, which is at war and favors Azerbaijan. Buying U.S. weapons could send the wrong message to Russia, and Israel will not supply weapons to Armenia due to its good relationship with Palestine. Thus, Indian weapons are currently the best option for Armenia. Additionally, Indian weapons are inexpensive and compatible with those Turkey supplies to Azerbaijan. 

    For India, the relationship with Armenia is somewhat emotional. The current Indian government, led by Hindu organizations that are critical of Islamization, feels sympathy for Armenia’s Christians, who have been treated harshly by their Islamic neighbors. Pakistan, India’s Muslim-majority neighbor with whom India has ongoing conflicts, maintains a strong relationship with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Although not of Turkic ethnicity and predominantly of Indian background, Pakistan claims a Turkic heritage and seeks to ally with Azerbaijan and Turkey. This alliance of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan appears to have grown beyond social media, and Turkey’s criticism of India is considered part of the worsening relationship between these countries. As a result, India has decided to boost its relationship with Armenia.

    Armenia and India have had a strong relationship throughout history. Both countries have exchanged culture and trade since medieval times, even when they were under Islamic empires. Many people of Armenian origin still live in India, and Armenian Christians have churches there. The relationship between modern Armenia and India has also blossomed. Indian presidents and prime ministers visited Armenia when it was a socialist republic in the Soviet Union, and India was among the first to recognize Armenia’s independence. In 1995, 2003, and 2017, Armenian Presidents Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Robert Kocharyan, and Serzh Sargsyan visited India, resulting in the establishment of several agreements. In a 2019 interview, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan expressed Armenia’s support for India in the Kashmir conflict with Pakistan. This was a significant support for India, as Western countries and Islamic states tend to side with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Amid the deepening relationship between India and Armenia, calls for recognizing the Armenian Genocide have increased in India, though there is opposition from Islamist and liberal factions. And For the first time under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership, the Indian embassy in Armenia officially acknowledged the genocide, and in 2021, Indian Ambassador Kishan Dan Dewal paid tribute to its victims.

    India and Armenia are a perfect match, like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, as both nations have maintained their culture and beliefs despite significant regional changes. They now share common adversaries. Prime Minister Modi’s interest in cultures and histories fosters a desire for closer ties. This relationship is undoubtedly beneficial for Armenia, as it offers military, technological, and economic support without antagonizing Russia or the United States.

  • Why is the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace pact challenging?

    Why is the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace pact challenging?

    The Armenia-Azerbaijan war ended almost a year ago. Armenia lost the war, and Azerbaijan gained control of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, a historic Armenian region also claimed by Azerbaijan. The Republic of Artsakh, the entity established by ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, is officially dissolved, but tensions remain high. A peace treaty between the two countries is not yet possible, as this is not merely a political dispute over borders; it is an ethnic clash, and solving it is not easy.

    Coexistence was only possible while they were under the Soviet Union; otherwise, ethnic clashes were common and led to deep-seated resentment. Peace can only be achieved through a formal treaty. Now, Europe and the West are taking a greater interest in resolving the issue, while conflicts of interest among the parties involved in the region persist. Russia supports Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan has strong ties with Turkey, Turkey has historical animosity towards Armenia, Armenia maintains a relationship with Iran, and Iran is an ally of Russia. This complex web of connections complicates the situation.

    At the recent NATO summit in Washington, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken indicated that the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process might be nearing a resolution. However, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are currently adopting a cautious stance, hesitant to show too much eagerness to make concessions. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev were expected to hold direct talks in London during the European Political Community summit, but the meeting did not take place. As anticipated, both sides have accused each other of obstructing the discussion. Their most recent meeting occurred in Berlin in February, mediated by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. This was the first encounter since Azerbaijan’s complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. At that time, the prospects for a peace agreement seemed remote.

    In May, Pashinyan’s government made a significant breakthrough by agreeing to transfer four villages in disputed border areas to Azerbaijan. Since then, both sides have shown interest in finalizing a peace agreement. On July 20, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated at a media forum in the Karabakh town of Shusha that up to 90 percent of the draft peace treaty has been settled. However, reaching an agreement on the remaining 10 percent may prove challenging. Azerbaijan’s demands including Karabakh pose challenges for Armenian politicians. 

    One major condition set by Aliyev is Armenia’s formal agreement to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, which has traditionally overseen the peace process but has recently been largely ineffective. Aliyev has criticized the Minsk Group for being biased towards Armenia and has claimed that it has been dysfunctional for many months, possibly even for a couple of years.

    The second condition is more difficult: Azerbaijan is demanding that Armenia amend a provision in its constitution’s preamble that identifies Karabakh as part of Armenia. Aliyev has argued that this provision represents a territorial threat to Azerbaijan because it implies the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. This demand for a constitutional amendment could potentially derail the negotiations.

    On July 25, an Armenian Foreign Ministry representative said that the government is preparing a response to Azerbaijan’s demands. Pashinyan has started internal discussions about possible constitutional amendments, leading to speculation that his government might be exploring ways to meet Aliyev’s conditions. Daniel Ioannisyan, a member of the working group on constitutional amendments, noted that any changes are unlikely to be finalized before 2027, and that modifying the preamble’s wording is not currently being considered. Edmon Marukyan, a former ally of Pashinyan and ex-ambassador-at-large of Armenia, said that Armenians are seeking clarity on several unresolved issues, including the process for returning prisoners of war.

    While maintaining a tough stance on the constitutional provision, Aliyev’s administration extended an invitation to Armenia to attend the UN climate conference (COP29), which will be held in Baku in November. An administration representative described the invitation as a gesture of goodwill. Yerevan has not yet announced whether Armenian officials will attend COP29. 

    Countries situated in the small area  between the seas and mountain ranges are struggling to resolve their tensions. The region is drawing the attention of various external parties, which could lead to increased volatility in the future. As a result, resolving ongoing disputes through a peace pact is crucial. Armenia, grappling with both domestic and international challenges, faces extra hurdles in reaching an agreement, with some emotional issues likely to persist across generations.

  • Russia Seems Unhappy with the US Flirting with Armenia

    Russia Seems Unhappy with the US Flirting with Armenia

    Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia continued to control the politics of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. They cultivated and protected many authoritarian leaders in these regions and propagated anti-Western views. However, over the last decade, it has become evident that a new generation in these countries, free from Soviet nostalgia, desires better living standards and opportunities similar to those in the West. Consequently, the politics of many of these countries have shifted accordingly.

    Recognizing this change in sentiment, other parties began to seize the opportunity. The European Union has integrated parts of the former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe and is now extending its influence into the Caucasus. Meanwhile, Turkey is growing its presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, all contributing to the weakening of Russia’s sphere of influence. The United States has played a significant role in altering the mindset of politicians through diplomatic talks, investment plans, and various other initiatives aimed at shaping public sentiment. Together, they have slowly begun to lift the Iron Curtain. 

    Armenia, a long-term ally of Russia with deep religious and political ties, also joined the race and is now looking towards the West. Despite its Russian-linked politics, the public mood in Armenia has shifted considerably, particularly after the loss of the war with Azerbaijan, which resulted in the loss of a significant Armenian territory tied to their heritage. This defeat has fueled anger within the country, with many believing that Russia, which was supposed to protect them, contributed to Azerbaijan’s victory. There is a widespread belief that a wealthier Azerbaijan received more preferential treatment from Russia, and some suspect that Russia betrayed them.

    As a result, Armenia has started cooperating with the United States. The US, a country with a large Armenian diaspora, is making efforts to align Armenia with Western and European partners. This time, the United States does not want to repeat the mistakes made in Ukraine, and as a first step, they are discussing military collaboration.

    A joint military exercise involving a small number of American and Armenian troops is taking place at a base in the suburbs of Yerevan. Naturally, this has sparked a paroxysm of rage in Moscow. The 11-day exercise, dubbed Eagle Partner, began on July 15 and aims to boost interoperability between the US and Armenia during peacekeeping and stability operations. It’s not the number of troops involved that’s drawing attention; It’s the timing and symbolism of the joint exercise. This exercise is a tangible measure of Armenia’s progress in its geopolitical pivot away from Russia.

    According to US Ambassador to Armenia Kristina Kvien, the US and Armenian troops are at the forefront of a crucial and rapidly growing relationship and partnership. Simultaneously, the Armenian media outlet Hetq reported that a resident adviser from the Pentagon will be attached to Armenia’s Ministry of Defense. The adviser’s specific duties and responsibilities have not been publicly disclosed. Additionally, the US and Armenia are actively exploring cooperation on constructing a new nuclear power plant in Armenia. These fascinating and significant developments from both sides highlight a promising and dynamic relationship.

    Regarding Armenia’s rapid embrace of the West, exemplified by the Eagle Partner exercise, the vitriol expressed by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova was notable. She characterized the presence of American forces in the Caucasus in alarming terms, alleging that the United States and NATO aimed to disrupt the fragile balance in the region and provoke conflict. She also asserted that Western countries are obsessively involving Armenia in various interactions in Transcaucasia.

    Zakharova’s comments indicate that the Kremlin is alarmed by the rapid erosion of its influence in Armenia and is concerned that an expanding US strategic presence in the region could impede the development of the North-South corridor, a developing trade network connecting Russia, Iran, and India. This corridor has been crucial in supporting the Kremlin’s efforts to evade sanctions and its military operations in Ukraine. Moscow may also worry that the US presence in the region will influence other countries and restive regions within Russia, such as Chechnya. Furthermore, if Armenia fully aligns with the West, Russia would face a significant power check from NATO.

    Russia still maintains some levers of influence in Armenia. Yerevan is economically dependent on Russian trade and natural gas supplies, and the Kremlin also maintains a military base in Gyumri that hosts a Russian brigade. However, Armenia recognizes that this is an opportune moment to explore other opportunities, as it doubts Russia’s willingness to support them in the event of a conflict with Azerbaijan or Turkey. Consequently, Armenia is increasingly turning towards the United States, even as it retains ties with Russia. Interestingly, just before Eagle Partner commenced, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Yerevan would withdraw from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. This suggests that the United States is winning Armenia’s heart as Russia becomes increasingly unattractive.

  • Will the Turkic States Group Become a Major International Player?

    Will the Turkic States Group Become a Major International Player?

    Turkic and Turkey might sound confusing, like Turkey the bird and Turkey the country, but there’s a distinction. Turkey is a Turkic state, but not all Turkic states are Turkey. Let’s not drag this into more confusion: Turkic states are a group that includes Turkey. They share a common ethnic background, similar language, cuisine, and almost identical culture, extending from Kazakhstan to Turkey. This includes most Central Asian countries except Tajikistan, the Caucasian state Azerbaijan, and Turkey (Türkiye). Some even include Hungary due to historical and linguistic ties.

    Currently, these countries are part of an evolving group that can influence Asian politics, global politics, and the global economy. They support and care for each other, with kebabs being a beloved symbol of their shared culture. Historically, the political evolution of this group was limited due to Russian influence. Now, they are free and more united.

    The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is the union of Turkic states that we are discussing. It includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey as full members, with Turkmenistan, Hungary, and Northern Cyprus as observers. The OTS was founded in 2009 to strengthen the bond between these countries. During the 8th summit in 2021, the organization was restructured to enhance cooperation, with refreshed objectives ranging from trade to extradition agreements. While many believe the OTS’ main aim is cooperation and growth, others think the organization’s main objective is the cultural revival of Muslim Turkic culture and protection from external influences, such as Russia’s historical cultural integration with Central Asian countries. As OTS eagerly pursues expanded trade relations with the West, the leaders of Turkic states in Eurasia are cautious about importing Western values. 

    The latest summit of the OTS was held in Azerbaijan, showcasing the dichotomy of interests among the Turkic heads of state. Hosted by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in the Nagorno-Karabakh town of Shusha, a region recently recaptured from Armenia, Aliyev highlighted in his opening remarks his vision for the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) to become an influential global entity capable of protecting regional interests from outside influence. He emphasized that the OTS should become one of the prominent international forces, stressing the commitment of their peoples to traditional values and shared ethnic roots that closely bind their countries. According to him, the 21st century must be a century of progress for the Turkic world.

    After praising traditional values and shared heritage, Aliyev stressed the significance of enhancing trade, declaring, “Expanding the East-West transport corridor is among our foremost priorities”. His sentiments were echoed by other participants, including Kazakhstan’s president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who stressed the need to utilize the full potential of the Trans-Caspian international transport route. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who attended the Shusha summit, referred to the OTS as a “Very important organization for cooperation between the West and East”.

    Aliyev urged his fellow heads of state to show greater commitment to the OTS through increased budget allocations, noting Azerbaijan’s recent $2 million contribution to enhance the OTS secretariat. They recognize the economic potential of the bloc, as member countries are rich in minerals and generate significant revenue from their resources. With Russia’s influence weakening, superpowers such as China, India, Korea, and the United States are keen to explore opportunities in the region. It is believed that uniting these countries will increase their scope and opportunities.

    Political scientists believe that the OTS represents a solution for Turkic leaders to navigate their complex political relationships. Aliyev’s efforts to bolster the OTS come at a time when Baku’s relations with the West have deteriorated. Over the past year, Aliyev and other top Azerbaijani officials have openly expressed grievances against the U.S., France, and major European bodies. In his inaugural address in February, Aliyev signaled further divergence from the West, speaking enthusiastically about pan-Turkic cooperation. Although Aliyev appreciates ties with Russia, they maintain a certain distance. Azerbaijan frequently boasts of its friendship with Pakistan, considers Turkey a brother, and is open to cooperation with India and Iran for trade. While trade is welcome, maintaining Turkic identity is their top priority. This sentiment is shared by other Turkic states, which rely on trade with various superpowers  but prioritize their cultural unity and Turkic identity.

    It’s certain that the OTS has great potential. With its strategically important location, population, economy, minerals, and everything necessary to grow into a superpower, they can impact world dynamics akin to the impact of the EU on global dynamics. United, they will gain more bargaining power and can effectively utilize their resources, particularly minerals currently in high global demand. The geographical area, intersecting important trade routes across all directions, west to east and north to south, will promote their growth. So, if they remain united, as Aliyev said, it’s a century for the Turkic world.